



## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
686 CUSHING RD  
NEWPORT RHODE ISLAND 02841-1207

5720

Ser N002/0142

April 4, 2019

Mr. Travis Sharp  
1305 Webster Street, Unit C203  
Alameda, CA 94501

Subject: FOIA REQUEST DON-NAVY 2017-007408

Dear Mr. Sharp:

This letter is in response to your request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated June 11, 2017, for information pertaining to documents concerning Admiral Richard Colbert located in the archives of the U.S. Naval War College's Naval Historical Collection. Your request has been denied in part. The enclosed documents are being released to you with the exception of the instances under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), which authorizes the redaction of information of other individuals that if released would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy.

I am the official responsible for handling your request. You have the right to an appeal. It must be received within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Please attach a copy of your initial request and amended request, a copy of this letter, and mark the appeal letter and envelope "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." You are encouraged (though not required) to provide an explanation why you believe the redactions were inappropriate or our search was inadequate. To ensure that your request is received by the deadline, I recommend that you make your appeal by using FOIAonline.

Alternatively, you may mail your appeal to:

The Judge Advocate General (Code 14)  
1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000,  
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066

Please also mail a copy to us at:

FOIA Coordinator  
U.S. Naval War College  
686 Cushing Road,

5720  
Ser N002/0142  
April 4, 2019

Newport, RI 02840

If you have any questions, please contact me via e-mail at: dennis.westman@usnwc.edu or via phone at: (401)841-6403. You may also contact the DON FOIA Public Liaison, Christopher Julka, via e-mail at: christopher.a.julka@navy.mil, or by phone at: (703)697-0031.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. E. Westman' with a stylized flourish at the end.

D. E. WESTMAN  
LCDR, JAGC, USN  
By direction





Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 6/30/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 303 Ltr to Mr Rowan"

Author: Colbert

Date of Presentation: 25 Aug 69

Classification: ☒ Secret ☐ Confidential Number of Pages: 3

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☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

SECRET

PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

25 August 1969  
SER:0073-69

Dear Harry,

You will remember the considerable discussions in Washington and NATO during the 1962-1964 period of the NATO Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), the basic concept of which was the arming of merchant ship hulls with Polaris missiles in a pre-loaded module. President Kennedy supported the concept, then later active U.S. support was withdrawn. As I remember, we published a good deal of technical information on the concept in open literature in addition to providing other NATO countries with further details on a classified basis.

I have had persistent qualms over the last few years that the Soviets might unilaterally adopt this concept of missile armed merchant ships as a cheap deterrent force as well as a cheap way of bridging the gap between our present large FBM submarine capability and their own just emerging YANKEE-class submarine program. Certainly, what was within the state of the art for us in 1964 is well within the Soviet capability now.

When one considers that the Soviet merchant marine is designed, financed, built and operationally controlled by the Soviet government in the same way as their Navy, their potential to create a surface ballistic missile force along the physical lines of the MLF is recognizably unique.

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I understand that the RAND Corporation, a few years ago, did a study on how the Multi-Lateral Force Polaris missiles-on-merchant-ships concept might be adopted and used by the Soviets for the purpose stated above. If, indeed, such a study was done by RAND, would it be possible for the War College to have a couple of copies? I can assure you that they would be put to good use in student research and that both the Navy and RAND might benefit considerably from having the idea worked over by our students.

We have had a number of new developments here at the Naval War College in recent months and I will be writing in the next week to bring you up to date. Do let me know when you might be coming East. Hopefully we can get you up here for a short visit.

As always, my warm regards.

Sincerely,



R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

*1-Per off*

Mr. Henry Rowan  
President, The RAND Corporation  
1700 Main Street  
Santa Monica, California

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37287

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Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

SER 0060

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

15 AUG 1969

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED  
less enclosure(s)

SECRET (Unclassified when enclosure is removed)

Dear Dr. Frosch,

I appreciate the opportunity of having a look at the draft for Part II of the study response to NSSM-50. Recognizing the time pressure under which the report is being produced, I found it, in general, to be sound as well as an excellent base for future studies.

The attached comments were hurriedly developed over the past three days by the staff and faculty here at the Naval War College. I hope they may be of some help and I assure you they are offered in an objective vein.

On the subject of studies, you might be interested to know that I have more than doubled our effort on group research projects here in response to Secretary Laird's expressed interest in having the thoughts and ideas of the faculty and student officers at the military colleges. I have every expectation that the outstanding officers now reporting to the Naval War College for our resident courses will produce some meaningful studies in the coming academic year.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Robert A. Frosch  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Research and Development)  
Room 4E736  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

encl

*Reg# 37248*

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The Draft for Comment on Part II of the Navy response to NSSM-50 is basically well conceived and written. Organization of material is effective and opens many areas for continuing research and consideration. General observations drawn from the staff and faculty of the Naval War College are given below:

1. The proposal (Page I-4) that the Naval War College establish a continuing study based upon the NSSM-50 study report is considered sound, and will be followed-up commencing with the 1969-70 student year. The annual results of this continuing study would be available as an input to future CNO studies but is not viewed as an entity to replace such study groups as produced the subject Draft for comment.

2. With respect to discussion of U.S. withdrawal from forward bases two points appear to be underdeveloped by the report.

a. The time factor is not adequately discussed. For example, the outcome of the Korean War may have been predetermined by the U.S. ability to apply force quickly from nearby bases in Japan. Without such bases we might well have faced an assault situation against a totally hostile peninsula rather than holding the Pusan perimeter until additional force could be brought to bear.

b. The Soviet and Chinese Communist options that are made available by our withdrawal from overseas bases do not seem to be fully developed. Conceivably, the Soviets could fill our shoes in a Soviet dominated Okinawa -- what then? Additionally, the political status of third world nations is affected by our presence or lack of presence. Thailand might be forced to modify its present political position in the absence of U.S. presence near the Chinese Communist East Asia area.

3. While it is recognized that the reply to NSSM-50 is an excellent vehicle to air all facets of our story, it is believed the report contains undue emphasis on selling Naval air as being cheaper than land based air. This emphasis should be reduced, although the issue should still be addressed.

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4. Throughout the study there is a tendency to treat the Soviet and Chinese Communist threat as one entity. It is believed that the Soviet and Chinese Communist strategies are in fact different and that the threat represented by their individual strategies should be separately addressed. At the minimum, recognition should be made that these two threats exist.

5. Referring to Page III-1 there is reason to believe that, while the Cuban crisis undoubtedly reinforced the Soviet new emphasis on maritime strategy, they were embarked on their building expansion program for some time prior to the Cuban incident. Construction dates for many modern ship types predate the Cuban Crisis. It is more likely that the Suez and Lebanon episodes wherein our seapower played a prominent part, encouraged the move toward a maritime strategy.

6. With respect to last paragraph of Page V-22, the regional multi-national organization capability of smaller nations is not addressed. It is considered that the possible formation of regional naval organizations similar to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic should be considered a factor in world maritime balance.

Below is a listing of specific points, in some cases amplifying those above, noted for consideration as appropriate:

#### PAGE II-2

Although present alliance structures, including those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, may undergo changes during the 1970's, there is no evidence to conclude generally that they will "experience continuing and accelerating erosion." In addition, this conclusion conflicts with the statement that alliances will continue to act "as both constraints and opportunities and to be one of the keystones of U.S. foreign policy."

#### PAGE III-1

Do not believe that the 1962 Cuban crisis "had much to do with changing their attitude toward naval forces." Or that "From that time, Soviet construction of surface ships has taken a different direction." Study overstates the case. The E-I SSGN with a cruise missile system and the KYNDA CLGM, KASHIN DLG and KRUPNYY DDGS were either

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operational at the time of the Cuban crisis or became operational so soon thereafter that planning and construction pre-dated Cuba. (Lead ships: E-1, 1960; KYNDA, 1962; KASHIN, 1963; KRUPNYY, 1959) Soviet naval writing also supports the view that the shift in naval thinking pre-dated Cuba. The study would make a much better case if it pointed out that the Cuban situation reinforced the new direction of Soviet naval strategy.

PAGE III-2

The first paragraph assumes that the Soviets could not provide escorts at that time. It may well have been that they chose not to do so, hoping to maintain the secrecy of the entire operation until they could present the U.S. with a fait accompli.

PAGE III-5

Mention should probably be made of the fact that the Mediterranean squadron contains and is closely supported by deployed submarines, including nuclear powered attack boats as well as, on various occasions, both conventional and nuclear powered cruise missile submarines. (J and E-II).

PAGE III-9

The first paragraph does not clearly state that the Soviet merchant fleet can be used to support the Navy, as, indeed, it has been used in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Caribbean deployments.

Another approach of the Soviets to their base problem may be the port development projects which they have undertaken or assisted in various of the less developed countries. For example, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Aden, etc. The Soviets might be more able to demand a "quid-pro-quo" from the host country where they had been instrumental in developing facilities.

PAGE III-10

Believe the following sentence might well be added after -- "qualitative improvement of the submarine force." "This decided qualitative improvement will apparently be accomplished without sacrificing (significant) numbers of their total submarine order-of-battle."

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PAGE IV-1

The study has concluded the freedom of the seas is vital to the U.S. but not to the Soviet Union (see II-10). This conclusion is considered too limited in that there is equal reason to believe that the Soviets fully recognize the full significance of exploiting the seas to reach other lands and peoples, and in all possibility see maritime capability as an essential element to their own survival in the modern world of competition for the uncommitted peoples and markets. There is no reason to believe the Soviets do not fully understand the broadest implications of seapower in the sense of Mahan's teachings.

PAGE IV-27

It is assumed that the threat to the U.S. from Soviet ballistic missile submarines is contained in the T/S NSSM-16 and/or in the T/S Appendix 1 to NSSM-50. The present study neither deals with the threat nor the requisite U.S. Naval forces to counter it.

PAGE V-12

Believe the Soviets and the Chinese Communists should not be grouped together in their strategies of fostering trouble. Believe their strategies are very different and should be handled separately. In fact, NSSM-50, in our view, does not have adequate discussion of how Chinese or other Communist countries could affect U.S. naval strategy.

We believe the Soviets would project military force ashore if they felt it to be vital to their interests and believed such projection would not lead to a "too dangerous" confrontation with the U.S.

PAGE IX-5, 7-8

Generally concur with the statement: "In view of all these possibilities, it is clear that the destruction of a surface task force is not a simple matter." There are other considerations however:

(a) The possibility that the Soviet SSGN can solve his missile fire control problem using passive sonar against a 20-knot transiting task force or other techniques such as television feed back from a first missile.



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(b) There are a number of world areas where restrictive geography may well cause the balance of power to shift from the carrier/surface force to Soviet attackers. Some of these areas include the Iceland-Faeroes-UK gap, Gibraltar, some parts of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, perhaps the Cape of Good Hope, the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, all straits into the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Japan itself and the open sea areas east of Japan and the Kuriles.

PAGE IX-9

Several of the areas mentioned above are exactly where "extreme circumstances of saturation" would be likely to occur. We contend that whenever the Soviet Navy is called upon to attack directly our major surface-carrier forces, high attrition rates would be acceptable to them. In fact, we imagine they would consider such forces entirely expendable.



Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

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FROM: R. ADMIRAL L. E. S. H. LE BAILLY, C.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMMANDER  
BRITISH NAVY STAFF, WASHINGTON  
POST OFFICE BOX 165  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20044

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01 COPY SENT  
5 COPY SENT

BNS 7/69

30th April 1969

Dear Dick,

It was extremely good of you to let me talk to you on the telephone yesterday and I would very much like to visit you on the afternoon of the 3rd June when I understand Captain Jungius is also visiting the College. This would save you giving a "double audience" and because I am leaving in September it would be extremely valuable from the continuity aspect if he could sit in when we talk.

I have just returned from a Chief of Defence Staff Conference which was attended by 80 of the most senior officers of the three Services and the permanent civil servants.

There were several unsatisfactory and several more satisfactory features to this Conference. Amongst the latter was the First Sea Lord's categorical statement that the "heart of the West's maritime capability was in the Washington/Norfolk complex" and generally the acceptance of this idea. He also set out the Soviet maritime threat in quite unequivocal terms and this was accepted, or so it seemed to me, by the Chiefs of the Defence Staff and by all the Royal Air Force officers present; although of course the Army is still hypnotised by the Central Front in Europe as are the Royal Air Force Commanders of the tactical Air Forces.

As you well know, we are utterly constrained by the financial situation. I was entranced to hear Mr. Healey discussing the proposition that Britain's proper role was a maritime one and that the Armies of the Continental countries should provide the main basis for the European land forces. Unfortunately he went on to say, and one cannot but agree, that if we were to withdraw and run down our Army completely in order to give ourselves the resources to produce a really big maritime capability there would be no stomach left amongst the European countries to produce the relatively larger land and air forces which would be needed. He saw no answer but to stagger on, "dividing the cake" between the three Services and doing the best we can.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Generally /

Vice Admiral R.G. Colbert, US Navy,  
President, Naval War College,  
Newport, Rhode Island. 02841



CONFIDENTIAL

Generally there was rather an air of hopelessness about any effective means to meet the Soviet maritime threat worldwide and so I took the liberty of saying that I believed this was now being studied at the Naval War College under your distinguished leadership. I said that I had discussed the problem with you and that I thought as you did that the first thing was to establish some sort of coherence amongst the many Western maritime powers not only in NATO, where at least there was a semblance of unanimity, but also with the Organization of American States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. I said I thought you were setting up a powerful working party to look at the possibility of some sort of regional maritime confederations in the same shape as SACLANT. I suggested for instance that if the South American navies and the rapidly emerging South African Navy could be brought to co-ordinate surveillance, could occasionally train together and perhaps eventually could have some form of common operational headquarters we would have a powerful answer in the South Atlantic.

Something also I felt might be done on these lines between the Royal Navy and the US Navy in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal with the help of Australia and New Zealand; whilst it was obvious to me that very soon the Japanese Navy would start to emerge and this together with your Navy could produce another powerful conventional deterrent in the Pacific.

The Chief of Defence Staff expressed himself extremely interested in this and told the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy) to send me a copy of a paper recently written by the Chiefs of the Defence Staff about maritime operations and instructed me to keep in touch with you and to let him and the Chief of Naval Staff know anything you cared to divulge on your plans and ideas. I know that the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Le Fanu, talked to Admiral Moorer that evening (Admiral Moorer was visiting London) but I have not seen or heard any record of their conversation.

I am under instructions from CNS to try and produce a lecture to give in London when I return, sufficiently vapid to get by the politicians but sufficiently pungent to make an impact on the subject of the Soviet maritime threat and the need for our Navy and yours to take a lead in trying to set up some sort of world naval confederation to meet it. Whether I shall get time to do much before I go back I do not yet know, but I am going to have about a week in Rhode Island before I leave, between the 27 August and the 2nd September. By then my ideas will have taken much more shape and if by any chance you are

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in residence at the Naval War College I would greatly  
value one last talk with you before I depart for the  
U.K.

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Wm.  
Wm.

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Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

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Author: Colbert

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SECRET

(Unclas when  
enclosures are  
removed)

11 March 1970

SECRET

Dear Admiral,

Attached is an exchange of correspondence with Eddy Van Rees which you may find of interest. It pertains to an extract from a letter from Admiral Maas to the Netherlands MILREP to NATO Military Committee.

We have given it a lot of thought here and I have tried to be objective in putting forth my views. I feel that the proposals are certainly consistent with the new "Nixon Doctrine." One area that may not be adequately recognized is the political inhibitions that would have to be overcome within NATO to deploying the SNF beyond NATO territory and even to move in coordinated national naval activities as Admiral Maas suggests. And yet I so well remember the "impossible political obstacles" that we were supposed to have in selling the SNF, back three years ago.

As indicated in my letter to Eddy, I have emphasized that the thoughts expressed are personal and in no way represent U. S. Navy policy.

We are so looking forward to your visit with Nan on 17 April. Do hope all goes well.

Prue joins in warm regards to both of you.

Sincerely,

SECRET

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy SECRET

Admiral E. P. Holmes, U. S. Navy  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
U. S. Naval Base  
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

IO:

SUBJECT:

EF:

2 February 1970

*Dear Dick,*

The other day I received a copy of a letter of my CNO to our MILREP on the NAMILCOM in Brussels, with the instruction to send it to SACLANT.

On reading it, it occurred to me that the contents might be of interest to you, so I obtained Admiral Maas' permission to send you on a personal basis an extract of this letter, which is classified SECRET.

The relevant paragraphs are enclosed herewith; they concern the subject of co-ordination of naval activities outside the NATO area and are intended to brief our MILREP on the official Netherlands naval point of view.

I would like to obtain your personal opinion as an U.S. Naval officer.

*With best regards to you and  
Pau  
Yours  
Edly*

E.H. van Rees  
Rear Admiral RNLN  
Netherlands Liaison  
Representative to SACLANT

Vice Admiral R.G. Colbert  
President U.S. Naval War College  
Newport  
Rhode Island 02840

*P.S. We are away on leave from  
February thru 17 March, touring  
the Southern States of this magnificent  
continent.*

# SECRET

1. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) came into being, the Alliance was confronted with a threat on land and in the air on the European continent, while in case of war the fleets of the Allied nations had to safeguard the supply of Europe from the United States across the Atlantic.

The strategic implications of nuclear weapons in their present configuration were then not yet fully apprehended.

Also it was not envisaged that the Soviet Union was undertaking the construction of an ocean navy, which could co-operate already in peacetime with a state owned and operated merchant navy, fishing fleet and hydrographic/oceanographic fleet, in pursuance of politico/military objectives.

As a result the NATO organisation also imposed limits to its treaty area at sea.

However, at present it has become increasingly clear, that the Soviet Union has embarked upon a worldwide maritime strategy, in which it exploits the present military status quo in Europe and legitimately uses the freedom of the seas in order to contain the West from outside the NATO sea area, in which most of the allied nations also have their established interests.

2. The significance of this maritime deployment of the Soviets should not be underestimated and the coordinated worldwide presence of the Soviet maritime potential clearly requires a distinct Western counterbalance.

This counterbalance should preferably be provided by NATO, through concerted action also outside the NATO area, thus demonstrating Western unanimity and solidarity.

In this connection it should be investigated, to what extent the Standing Naval Force Atlantic could show the "NATO flag" on an incidental basis outside the NATO area, although it is realised that such action will have its consequences and therefore ample time will be required to allow for the necessary arrangements.

Nevertheless the recent display of Soviet activities is of such significance, that a perhaps more pragmatic and speedy approach should be sought, for instance through coordination of intended national naval activities which lend themselves thereto.

National cruise and exercise schedules outside the NATO-area could be made to coincide partially or completely, thus also displaying increased solidarity, be it in a less ambitious manner.

-The maritime-

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The maritime NATO partners could in furtherance of this submit their cruise/exercise proposals to a co-ordinating authority, who could suggest alterations in order to achieve combined cruises or maybe exercises and port visits.

Such a coordinator should preferably be a national naval commander, holding also a NATO naval command function.

It would appear that CINCLANTFLT/SACLANT is the first choice for the role of such a coordinator, or maybe also CINC Western Fleet/CINCEASTLANT, who has at Northwood, the facilities required for such co-ordinating action.

It could be argued that these co-ordinated activities outside the NATO-area might be detrimental to the number of forces available to NATO at short notice, however, on the contrary it is felt that the very fact of having a co-ordinating authority, who has an overall view of the situation, would sooner lead to a reduction of the number of situations, in which the Alliance would find itself with less naval forces than would appear desirable under the prevailing circumstances.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

SECRET

*Dear Edlyn*

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in obtaining the extract of Admiral Maas' letter and sending it along to me. The proposals in it are of real interest to me, and I appreciate the chance to give you my views for your personal use.

As you well know, I personally am in complete agreement with the view that current Soviet maritime activity requires a meaningful Western naval counterbalance. I believe that the comments of Admiral Skjong and Commodore Gundersen during the Seapower Symposium are most illustrative of the urgency of this issue. You may recall their observation that the Soviet naval presence in the Norwegian Sea had become highly visible to Norwegian seamen and fishermen working in or transiting the area -- so much so that concern had been expressed openly in Norway concerning the absence of U.S. naval forces from the area. Their recommendation that more frequent U.S. naval visits to the area be scheduled has merit, but it seems to me how much better it would be if visits from NATO naval forces (with U.S. flags among others) were also included. Surely any apprehension by the Norwegian public that the Soviet Navy dominates the Norwegian Sea must be promptly laid to rest. Similar considerations apply elsewhere in the world as a result of the growing Soviet activity.

At the College, we have been giving the question searching analysis for some time now, and the basic suggestions outlined seem to parallel and complement our own line of thought. Of course, our analysis here has been conducted under the privileges of academic freedom, and our speculations are representative only of our own personal ideas. In no sense should they be considered as the U.S. Navy or U.S. government views of the issue.

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However, I believe that you know Admiral Moorer and Admiral Holmes as SACLANT have both been individual supporters of an enlarged role for the NATO Standing Naval Force for some time, and that the suggestions outlined are not totally inconsistent with their previously expressed views. They both have been strong advocates of eliminating the barrier of the Tropic of Cancer as NATO's southern boundary in the Atlantic.

It seems to me that enlarging the area of operations of the STANAVFORLANT might well be the first logical step toward the establishment of a visible counter to Soviet activity on a world-wide basis. From the standpoint of a U.S. naval officer, there are several considerations which tend to make such use of this force quite appealing.

First, President Nixon's recently formalized foreign policy posture dictates a decreasing "profile" of U.S. military involvement outside the country, while reaffirming at the same time the intent of the U.S. to continue to support our world-wide commitments. These dual objectives might best be supported by a selected broadening of the U.S. naval presence in foreign waters. At the same time, however, we are in a period of rapidly declining funding, which forces a reduction in the numbers of ships we can operate and support.

I believe that neither the announced cuts in forces nor the implicit constraints of the President's policy will substantially affect existing U.S. naval deployment patterns. However, the Navy will be hard-pressed to undertake any enlarged deployment commitments involving more than a modest numerical presence. This condition exists as a result of simple arithmetic. Thus, in addition to possible political and psychological advantages inherent in more visible and extensive operations by the STANAVFORLANT, there is a concrete numerical advantage as well. The U.S. Navy should have little difficulty in continuing to dedicate one or more

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destroyers to this force while fully supporting our existing Sixth and Seventh Fleet deployment pattern. Such use of the force represents an opportunity to the U.S. Navy to multiply the effect of our limited assets while enlarging the scope of options available to our leadership.

On the political and/or psychological side, there are some distinctly interesting possibilities from the U.S. point of view. For example, I recall an incident which occurred in 1966 which best serves to illustrate the point.

In the fall of that year, while I was calling on Admiral Roboredo, he expressed deep concern regarding the operations of the Royal Navy off Mozambique arising from events in Rhodesia. He commented that permission for any requested Royal Navy visits to Lisbon would be emphatically denied on this basis. At the same time, the IBERLANT inaugural was impending, and in connection with the arrangements I was requesting clearance for a concurrent visit of the then NATO Matchmaker Squadron to Lisbon to participate in the ceremonies. The group included a British ship, and the squadron was under the command of a Royal Navy Commodore. Admiral Roboredo promptly agreed! When I expressed my surprise, he made it plain that the two cases were regarded as being quite different from each other. Under the then-existing circumstances, a Royal Navy visit on a unilateral basis had to be denied, but as part of a NATO multinational visit, the Royal Navy would be welcomed. As you know, there are a number of ports in the Med which the U.S. Sixth Fleet does not visit, such as Algiers -- I find it interesting to speculate on Algerian reaction to a request from NATO for a port visit by a NATO squadron which included an American ship. It seems quite possible that a visit request couched in these terms might well be received favorably, while a unilateral request might be denied.

There are some specific ideas which occur to me regarding the implementation of the two suggestions included in the paper.

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With regard to the broadened use of the STANAVFORLANT outside the geographic NATO area, we should remember that no precedent will be set. The STANAVFORLANT has previously operated south of the Tropic of Cancer by participating in the annual Springboard training exercises off Puerto Rico. An extension of this idea is that future enlarged operations of the force could be related to the NATO Sunny Seas Program. For example, the squadron might cruise south past the Cape Verde Islands and simply continue down the West African coast, conducting training exercises enroute and calling at appropriate ports from time to time. A call in Liberia or at some of the NATO oriented ports might be most suitable for the initial effort, particularly if a Brazilian squadron could be encouraged to join the force at sea for exercises and joint entry into port. On the return trip, it might be feasible to schedule a brief entry into the Mediterranean or a visit to Casablanca. Morocco's recently increasing ties with the Common Market may make such a visit more acceptable than it might have been in the past. In this regard, the Standing Naval Force seems ideally suited as a vehicle for the West to reinforce and exploit such economic and political initiatives. The Soviets are clearly integrating their maritime efforts in support of their political and economic goals, and responses in kind by NATO are quite appropriate, it seems to me.

The second point raised by the paper is that of establishing means of coordinating national naval exercise and cruise schedules to provide a counter presence to Soviet activity where appropriate. Again, I personally support the broad concept, and concur that such coordination may be the most speedy way of establishing a responsive and flexible counterbalance to minimize the possible impact of Soviet naval activity. This would be particularly responsive to the Norwegian problem mentioned above.

There are a number of considerations which occur to me regarding the location of such a coordinating center. I am sure you recognize that the headquarters complex at Norfolk

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is uniquely capable of supporting such a coordinating effort. For example, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet training and operating schedule is generated and approved through the CINCLANTFLT side of the staff, while the U.S. joint command, CINCLANT, is authorized to conduct direct liaison with other U.S. joint commands for coordination of operations outside the Atlantic area. Specifically, this coordination responsibility affects such matters as the scheduling of the UNITAS cruises, and uncomplicated lines of coordination with all the South American navies exist for this purpose. With both these commands embodied in one U.S. naval officer, proposals for coordination can be considered and approved without undue delay. At the same time, the SACLANT organization has authority to encourage, through liaison with CINCEASTLANT, similar coordination of NATO naval training and operational cruises as well as that of the Standing Naval Force. In addition, the established communications infrastructure associated with these command organizations permits ready response to the increased demands likely to be made of an international coordinating center as it matures as an instrument of combined naval policy.

A possible disadvantage of locating the center at Norfolk is the increased risk of undesired publicity resulting from possible press misinterpretation of the purposes of this increased activity. However, this seems easily minimized, on inquiry, by representing the coordinating activity as no more than a simple extension of previous similar coordination efforts, now made more necessary by the reduction of U.S. fleet numbers and the desires of friendly navies to increase their own capabilities through coordinated training with U.S. and NATO naval forces. Such a representation would seem to me to be both accurate and in keeping with announced U.S. and NATO policies.

In principle, at least, establishment of a coordinating center at Norfolk would seem to be most desirable, although other locations may recommend themselves as the concept matures.

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In summary, our analysis here at the War College is substantially in agreement with that outlined in the paper:

a. Given the visible Soviet naval activity of recent years, a definite need exists for a continuing outward manifestation of Western naval strength and unity.

b. Such a display will operate to limit possible psychological or political gains hoped for by the Soviets through the use of their naval forces.

c. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic can be of real value in such a role both in and out of the established NATO command area. There are, however, limitations on the use of this force which may affect its responsiveness to the stated need.

d. It appears that a most effective and speedy method of providing a multi-national Western counter-presence may be through the establishment of a coordinating activity able to monitor both Soviet and Western naval movements.

e. This center must have an established communications and command liaison structure appropriate to promote combined Western and NATO naval cruise and exercise schedules without undue delay.

f. The SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Headquarters Complex at Norfolk appears most adequate to the task contemplated, and location of the center there would seem to be a logical and effective extension of the basic groundwork laid over the last twenty years.

I must emphasize once more that these ideas have been developed under the unique atmosphere of academic freedom which we encourage here at the War College. I am pleased to be able to pass them to you with the hope that they will

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foster the further development of the ideas expressed by Admiral Maas' paper. I am sure you understand that these views cannot be interpreted as those of the U.S. Navy or as U.S. government policy.

Welcome back from your vacation.

*Primus*  
*John*

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Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/1/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 304" Notes on trip to Europe

Author: Colbert

Date of Presentation: 16 SEP-30 OCT 70

Classification: ☒ Secret ☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 13

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16<sup>A</sup> Dated 08 APR 1996  
~~15 APR 1991~~

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
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PERSONAL/SECRET

Dear Champ,

Attached is a resume of meetings I had during my recent trip to Europe. It might be of interest to you and others there in Op06. I am sending a copy to Fritz Harlfinger.

As you know the purpose of my trip was to take soundings to determine whether we would get top level representation at a second Seapower Symposium in the Fall of 1971 and to elicit background information that might be useful in our worldwide ASW study that the CNO has directed.

It was good seeing you the other day.

As always, warm regards,

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral F. J. Blouin, U.S. Navy  
Deputy CNO (Plans and Policy)  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

Copy to: RADM Harlfinger

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RESUME OF MEETINGS BETWEEN VICE ADMIRAL R. G. COLBERT, USN, PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND NAVAL LEADERS IN LONDON, ROME, MADRID, BRUSSELS AND STOCKHOLM DURING THE PERIOD 16 SEPTEMBER - 30 OCTOBER 1970.

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LONDON

VADM Edward Ashmore, RN, Vice Chief of Naval Staff:

He was very enthusiastic about the U.S. Naval War College Seapower Symposium and supports a second symposium in November of 1971. He agrees that a regional symposium for the Eastern Atlantic is unnecessary in light of the SACLANT Symposium scheduled for November of this year. This latter symposium will include all of the countries bordering the North Atlantic, except Spain, which might otherwise have been provided for in a separate symposium.

He expressed concern at the shift of the balance of power at sea, and yet, is less inclined than others I met with to view the overall Soviet threat at sea as ominous. Believes that the Soviets are very unlikely to force a confrontation which could end up in Hot War.

While recognizing the desirability of having certain allies, who are capable, increase their ASW forces, he is adamantly opposed to the West German Navy getting out into Blue Water. He does like the idea of FRAM DD's, while "warm," going to smaller allies; but only if the U.S. provides support in the form of spare parts.

He privately indicated that he had strongly favored John Bush over John Frewen as First Sea Lord.

It would appear that the Attack Carrier problem in the Royal Navy revolves around personnel. The hope is to keep two of the carriers, but with the likelihood that only one will remain active.

ADM Sir Michael Pollock, First Sea Lord Designate:

As the former Comptroller he is still thinking about financing problems of the Royal Navy.

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He was very interested in the Naval War College Symposium and supports a second one in 1971. He cannot commit himself as to his presence at the next Symposium at this early date.

He believes, as do most of the RN, that NATO should have a Supremo at sea rather than split commands in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as of now.

He confirmed that the British still support the concept of a Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean.

He is enthusiastic about "thrudeck" cruisers as the answer to the CVA in the long term, i.e., with helo's for ASW and Harrier's for attack.

Because of current budget restrictions he could hold out little hope of expansion of ASW capabilities by the RN at this time. He deplored the reluctance of all the NATO allies to pick up their proper share of the security load.

VADM LeBailly, DNI:

He advised that his people were starting a study focussed on the Southeastern coast of the Med, looking at the buildup by the Soviets of naval base facilities from Libya east. He is deeply concerned about a new base which presumably is being developed 100 miles west of Alexandria, at Mersa Matruh.

He strongly supports the seapower symposium in November 1971. He also indicated this after his new appointment as the Chief of Defense Intelligence he will be in a better position to support top level participation at the Symposium in 71.

On our worldwide ASW study, he echoed similar views to those of Ashmore-Pollock. He asked, "How did Ed react?" to the idea of Germany being asked to expand her naval forces in the ASW area. He clearly knew that VADM Ashmore was bitterly, anti-German in this regard.

He is deeply concerned at recent Soviet activities on the island of Socotra. According to him, Soviet forces were recently on the beach there building a communications station as part of some sort of naval base facilities.

He advised that VADM Terry Lewen is to relieve Ed Ashmore sometime late in the year. He also advised that while many people thought Lewen would become First Sea Lord, the chances

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were that he was considered "too strong" a character in the light of Peter Hill-Norton, another strong character, going on up to Chief of Defense Staff.

Peter Kirk, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defense, RN (formerly known as First Lord of the Admiralty):

Mr. Kirk had learned of my visit to London and asked me to call.

He is deeply concerned with the situation in the Indian Ocean and was proceeding to that area in the next couple of weeks for an on-the-spot visit. He is particularly worried at what the Russians have done in Mauritius, including the development of Port Louis and the adjacent area as a possible naval base (naval air base) and the potential of Mauritius to support submarines and surface ships which could interrupt the LOC around the Cape of Good Hope. He was surprised that the U.S. would have major concern for its sea traffic in this area. He did not realize that we have many flags of convenience tankers that use this route and that we have a vital stake in keeping this LOC open.

He agreed that the threat at sea was growing sharply vis-a-vis the threat on land and that navies of NATO needed a larger share of available resources to combat this threat. He was pessimistic that the current Tory Government would necessarily recognize this philosophy. He mentioned that many Top Tories had served in the British Army and their allegiance was in that direction.

He is deeply concerned that the Soviet strategy of economic aid, military assistance, political support backed up by a naval presence at critical times was working so well in the Indian Ocean. He was also concerned at the Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean area and the Chinese presence in various countries of East Africa.

#### ROME

VADM Pighini, IN, Deputy Chief of Staff, Defence. (U.S. Naval War College NCC class of 1958):

He is most enthusiastic about the prospect of a second Seapower Symposium in 1971 at the U.S. Naval War College. He indicated that he had been trying to initiate a regional seapower symposium for the Mediterranean, but his problem had been

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that there was either only a caretaker government or a short life for Italian governments when installed. With respect to the Jordan crisis, he was delighted at the U.S. prompt use of the Sixth Fleet, i.e., the naval strategy of interposition (which was discussed at some length). As on previous visits to Rome it is quite clear that tremendous dependence is placed on the U.S. Sixth Fleet; in some ways too much. I stressed the point that the Italian Navy, I believed, could play a more significant role in the area.

VADM Pighini; RADM Di Giorgi, Deputy Chief of Staff Navy (NCC class of 1961 at U.S. Naval War College); RADM Cassardi, DNI and RADM Torrisi, Deputy Chief of Staff Navy Ops; (Admiral Spigai, the Chief of Naval Staff was ill and did not participate in this meeting at the Navy Ministry).

The subject of a Standing Naval Force Mediterranean was thoroughly discussed. The point was made by RADM Di Giorgi, and the others, that while the Italian Navy favored such a force, the political obstacles within his government were overpowering. The Italian Navy considered that it had won a "great victory" in obtaining agreement to the on-call force concept. This is now working well. They pointed out that space/time factors in the Med, as compared to the Atlantic, make an on-call force quite practicable for relatively quick reaction. In connection with their ASW efforts in the Med they are quite proud of their land based helo ASW operations in the Sicilian channel and want to expand the concept as feasible. Inquiry was made by RADM Di Giorgi as to the possibility of an LSD being made available to them. No commitment, of course, was made. While delighted with the DDs they are obtaining from us, they questioned whether they could man any more--in an effort to increase their ASW contributions. They mentioned that the Italian Air Force apparently finally recognizes the increased submarine threat in the Med and has good intentions which might produce useful results in time. They all expressed deep concern at a possible Soviet move into Malta and its use as a Russian naval base--giving them "control of the Eastern Med." VADM Pighini quoted a price of 30 million dollars as that "necessary" to keep Malta in the western camp. He did not elaborate.

#### MADRID

ADM Enrique Barbudo Duarte, Chief of the Navy General Staff:

Admiral Barbudo seemed most receptive to the idea of another Seapower Symposium here at Newport in November of 1971.

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He obviously had been well briefed on the 69 Symposium by Admiral Polanco and Vice Admiral Martel. While he did not commit himself as to attendance, in the event we hold the Symposium, he gave indications that he would want to come if he could.

Admiral Barbudo is clearly concerned, deeply concerned, at the buildup of Russian seapower in the Mediterranean area. As he says, you can "see the Russian flag everywhere" in the Mediterranean today. He also referred to various incidents where Russian ships come very close to the Spanish coast.

Of course, one of his major concerns are the Soviet subs and their expanding operations--both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic areas.

He stressed the need for a buildup of the Spanish Navy and the navy's hopes for some of the ships that are due to be transferred from the U.S. Navy, as a result of the recently negotiated base rights agreement. He was quite frank in describing his disappointment at the condition of the ammunition ship WRANGELL, which has been proposed for transfer to the Spanish and on which they would have to spend large amounts of money to try to make the ship operational. He is deeply concerned at the condition of the five FRAM Destroyers that are due to be transferred here in the near future, and asked for the assistance of our naval attache, on the occasion of this meeting, to ensure that the Spanish Navy receives ships that will not involve large expenditures to refurbish.

The subject of Spain and NATO came up during the meeting, and it was quite clear that the Spanish Navy would like to have their country join NATO. However, Admiral Barbudo was most frank in saying that Spain would not "ask" to join NATO. The "pride and dignity" factor clearly enters in here in a most significant way. He seemed to be most appreciative of the U.S. attempts to try to ease the way for Spain's entry into NATO.

The Admiral was clearly deeply interested in the study we're doing on the worldwide ASW problem. He also seemed interested in the remarks I made about the Nato Standing Naval Force, Atlantic in its three years of successful operations. He was a most attentive listener to some of the ideas expressed on the multinational approach to the ASW problem, but made no commitments.

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VADM Ignacio Martel, President of the Spanish NWC:

Admiral Martel, on first meeting with little encouragement, launched into a dissertation on his concern as to the worldwide ASW problem and in Free World navies keeping pace with the challenge posed by the Russian submarine buildup. He is particularly worried about the sea lines of communications in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean Area and here he was quite frank and candid in saying that he felt that Spain might well have a special role. He emphasized the value of the Canary Islands as a base for ASW operations along the West Coast of Africa which, along with Spanish Sahara, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese Guinea and Angola could provide valuable operational bases for ASW operations in this area.

Of particular interest was his suggestion that Spain might be the "front man" for working with South Africa in furtherance of combined naval operations in the area. He well recognizes the political problems with the United States making any such overtures to that country. He pointed out that there is no such inhibition on the part of Spain. What he appeared to be suggesting was a multinational naval ASW approach for the area down the West Coast of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope. This might include Spain, Portugal and South Africa. It was not clear as to whether he expected U.S. participation but he emphasized that it would be absolutely essential for the U.S. to take a strong leadership role (even, if behind the scenes), if such a plan was to succeed.

I mentioned the possibility of the British and the French in such a concept and it wasn't clear as to his attitude re these two countries. However it would seem logical and desirable for them to participate. Despite the political differences between England and Spain over Gibraltar, I feel that if any place combined naval operations "at sea" might well be feasible.

Admiral Martel emphasized the importance of the South American countries, bordering the South Atlantic, playing their part in an overall ASW posture for the area. He raised the issue of UNITAS, which he had heard of from some of his South American friends. I described one concept that has been proposed for UNITAS in the past and which I believe certain South American navies may be interested in, i.e., to recast it as a permanent force similar to the Standing

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Naval Force Atlantic. There was a consensus that ASW operations on the Atlantic coast of South America should be coordinated with any that might be set up for the West Coast of Africa. He mentioned that Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela had been in touch with Spain, and he believed also South Africa, in connection with possible coordinated naval operations. This needs to be looked into from an intelligence viewpoint.

While Admiral Martel insisted that all of his thinking was representative of his personal views, and not official thinking, I cannot help but believe that he must have nominal support in his thinking from Admiral Barbudo, the Chief of Naval Staff. His thoughts on the ASW problem in this area are most interesting, particularly the indicated willingness for Spain to take an important share of the responsibility. I feel that this meeting and the information obtained could be very useful for our worldwide ASW study.

Admiral Martel is clearly discouraged on his plans for a regional Seapower Symposium. The whole problem centers around national "pride and dignity" and fears that some countries will not accept when invited. On balance I did not force the issue because I don't feel it is essential at this time to go ahead with this regional symposium. He is most enthusiastic about another "world" symposium at the U.S. Naval War College in the Fall of 1971 and hopes to attend.

Commodore Lurquin, CNS Belgian Navy:

In company with Captain Poskin, Deputy CNS (NCC class of 1960, U.S. Naval War College) and Commander McCoy (NavAtt Belgium), I had a very useful meeting with Commodore Lurquin, who returned in the middle of annual leave to see me. The major goal of the Belgian Navy today is to obtain four small frigates of about 1500 tons. This has been a long term personal goal of Commodore Lurquin and he is nearer to it now than ever before. In actual fact, the ships will be closer to 1800 tons than 1500 tons, but for "political reasons" they are described as only 1500 tons. Commodore Lurquin agreed to send to Captain Schlim, RBN, a student at the U.S. Naval War College, all the specifications and details on this frigate, which has been fully designed, so that this information can be used in the NCC continuing study of the "ideal international frigate."

Commodore Lurquin had just returned from Spain. He is a great admirer of that country but feels that trouble is



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brewing, in that the many tourists, particularly American tourists, are making the Spanish lower classes, who are essentially servants to the tourists, unhappy with their lot. He believes that trouble may erupt particularly in the period after General Franco might withdraw. He was non-committal about Spain entering NATO. He felt that the Scandinavian countries would be always a problem, even after General Franco might disappear and a semi-democratic government might be formed in Spain.

Commodore Lurquin confirmed that the French Navy is very pro-NATO and in his opinion, could be depended on in time of war.

In addition to the immediate goal of the 4 frigates, the Commodore is determined to change the image of the Belgian Navy from the "minesweep navy" as it is known in Belgium, to one with a broad mission which would be to protect the sea lines of communication for Belgium. Here is a navy with the knowhow, desire, and enthusiasm to pick up a share of the ASW load. We might well support an expansion of its capability. In this regard, I passed on a copy of a paper on "Naval Defense Policy for Small Nations," reflecting my views on this subject. This paper was to be delivered to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Segers, when he returned to Belgium on Wednesday of 30 September, and was to be introduced that same day at the "contact" session of the Congress I was attending there with various foreign War Colleges represented. The goal of this paper is to help the Belgian Navy (and other small navies) in every way possible to expand its (their) ASW capabilities, in line with the terms of reference of our worldwide ASW study.

While Commodore Lurquin is hopeful that he will receive the funding for his frigates, he is discouraged at the attitude of the political leadership vis-a-vis increased defense expenditures. He emphasized that he felt that the political leaders of not only Belgium, but other NATO countries of Western Europe, were "wishful thinking" in connection with the Soviet threat. As he pointed out, political leaders of these democracies cannot expect to gain votes by supporting increased defense expenditures. Expenditures on social welfare reform are the real "carrots" for votes in Western Europe today. This of course presents us with a real problem in connection with our study.

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LGEN The Baron de Cumont:

In a brief luncheon meeting with the General, the former Chairman of the Military Committee and an old friend, I discussed ways that we might approach NATO countries and encourage them to increase their investments in their navies and particularly in their ASW capabilities. He strongly recommended that in connection with NATO, we follow the same pattern that I did some three years ago, when I presented the Soviet Worldwide Maritime Threat brief of SACLANT to the Military Committee. This was then followed by a request by the DPC to hear the same briefing, and subsequently by the PermReps requesting that the briefing be taken to their national capitals for presentation to their top level authorities. This would appear to be a very desirable way to do it--the only question is whether it should be done as a SecDef U.S. project, or SACLANT brief for NATO. On balance, I am inclined to the U.S. approach.

The Congress: (celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the Belgian National War College):

The general sense of the Congress was that the United States should not reduce its commitments to NATO because if it did, NATO might well collapse. Professor Van der Bengel of the Netherlands made this point in strong fashion, emphasizing that the United States should recognize the "political realities" which would prohibit any increased defense expenditures by the political leadership of the Western Europe democracies. On the other hand, Professor Richard Starr, of the Hoover Institute, made a strong case for the fact that Europe would have to fill the gap--because it was a "political reality" that the United States was going to have to reduce its commitments, particularly land based forces in Western Europe in the years ahead.

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STOCKHOLM: (Official Guests of the Swedish Government)

Upon arrival on 30 September, the afternoon and evening were devoted to personal/informal meetings with COMO Kierkegaard (NCC Class of 1958 at the Naval War College) and his family and friends. The official schedule started the following morning, on 1 October, when COMO Kierkegaard became RADM Kierkegaard and took over command of the Coastal Fleet. That morning we proceeded to the naval base outside of Stockholm where we witnessed Admiral Kierkegaard taking his 13 gun salute and assuming command of the Coastal Fleet. We were the only guests other than family for this relatively simple but impressive ceremony. Immediately thereafter, in company with the Naval Attache Stockholm a visit was made to the destroyer HMS SMALAND, the flagship of COMO Per Rudberg.

Commodore Per Rudberg:

The visit to his ship was most interesting. Clearly the Royal Swedish Navy were aware of my personal interest in the RB08 surface-to-surface missile and while we visited other areas on the ship, the main focus of briefings for me was the surface-to-surface missile battery and fire control system. We witnessed a demonstration of the movement of the missiles from the magazine to the launcher (which actually was a rather modest arrangement constructed over the triple mounted torpedo mount aft). As it was explained, in adapting the torpedo mount to become also a launcher for the RB08, it only required the elimination of one of four torpedo tubes. The arming procedure for the launcher gave every impression of being rugged and reliable but slower than the similar systems that we have for our surface-to-air missiles. In this regard, the question was asked about reloading speed during our meeting with COMO Rudberg, and he estimated that it was about four to five minutes to reload two missiles.

After witnessing the arming procedure, we then went on to the fire control/CIC spaces where we were briefed on the fire control system. While no technological details were discussed, the impression gained was one of great enthusiasm for the reliability and versatility of the fire control system and also for the Dutch surface/air search radar system which was also described as rugged and reliable and requiring minimum space on board and minimum maintenance.

PERSONAL/SECRET

In discussions with COMO Rudberg about the RB08, questions were asked as to the cost of the initial installation, the cost of the individual missiles and the problems of support maintenance. He estimated that the cost of the installation in his ship was less than a million dollars, the cost of the individual missile "about" \$150,000 which could be decreased drastically if they went into mass production and the problems of maintenance support relatively modest. The questioning included the range and accuracy of the missile. In these cases, he stated that 130 miles was the maximum range and that the accuracy was practically 1.0 without jamming.

The overall impression that I gained on this ship and in observing the enlisted men at various other naval activities that I visited indicated a relaxed discipline, particularly in the appearance of the men (shoulder length and sloppy haircuts and sloppy uniforms which could well reflect on their professional performance. I observed a note of apology in the officers in this regard.)

Vice Admiral Lundvall:

We had a very pleasant meeting on Friday the 2nd of October, the day after he had taken over as Chief of Naval Staff of the Royal Swedish Navy. We had met once before in Charleston, S.C., some 5 years ago, and he is clearly enthusiastic about the U.S. Navy and the relations of Sweden with the United States. In our meeting, he tried to emphasize the importance and the special circumstances of the Baltic area. This was inherent in my conversations with many of the other Flag and General officers that I met with during this visit. The naval officers made it clear that they felt that the navy was getting less than its share of the resources and that the Army and Air Force had priority in this regard.

Admiral Lundvall is very concerned about the ASW problem in the Baltic. In our various discussions, not only the initial meeting, but the dinner party for us, we got onto the subject of what could be done on a regional basis. I cited the experience in NATO where we would operate together with the French at sea, even after the French had withdrawn from NATO. The idea of the Swedish, German, Danish, and Norwegian navies operating together in combined exercises, ASW exercises in the Baltic, was discussed back and forth. I believe a seed may have been planted in this regard.

PERSONAL/SECRET

Admiral Lundvall is clearly interested in visiting the United States. However, it was made clear to me that, by protocol, the United States CNO is due to make the next visit to Sweden. I plan to recommend to Admiral Zumwalt that he make this visit and invite Admiral Lundvall back for a return visit as soon as possible. From both the political and military viewpoint, I think this has advantages for the United States.

Vice Admiral Lundvall is clearly in support of the next Seapower Symposium, in November of 1971. He has indicated that he would attend, if at all possible.



# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

## Declassification Review Form

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SECRET (Unclass when  
enclosures are removed)

13 April 1970

Dear Bill,

I'm attaching a copy of the letter I recently sent to Dave Richardson which I mentioned to you on the phone. I would like your private thoughts on this proposed Group Research Project concerning the Sixth Fleet.

As I told you, I don't want to upset anybody by spreading the word that we are attempting to downgrade the Sixth Fleet, even though only in an academic research sense. I am one of its most vociferous supporters! However, at this point in time, I think we have to look at all the options that are open to us -- particularly those new options that appear to be consistent with implementing the Nixon Doctrine. As I see it, the implications of the Doctrine go far deeper than the mere policy statements that we are going to move toward a lowered profile in our military presence abroad and move toward partnership arrangements without allies. In fact, simply in light of our sharp reduction in naval forces, which is inevitable, we are going to be forced in this direction.

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I will be looking forward to your thoughts and whether there possibly has been any thinking in the Pentagon along these lines. I recognize as we discussed, that, to many, the mere ideas expressed in the attached would be "heresy".

I am also attaching a copy of a recent speech by Secretary Packard and copies of recent letters to Champ Blouin and Tom Davies, pertaining to material help for our smaller allies ~~in~~ line with the Nixon Doctrine. I do hope we are moving on this.

As always, my warm regards,

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral W. W. Behrens, Jr., U. S. Navy  
Director, Politico-Military Policy  
Division, OpNav  
Navy Department  
Washington, D.C. 20350

PERSONAL/  
SECRET





# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED] Date: 7/1/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 304" Ltr to Capt Lewis

Author: Colbert

Date of Presentation: 14 Aug 76

Classification: ☐ Secret ☒ Confidential Number of Pages: 2

### Disposition:

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☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

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☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

14 Aug '70

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Dear Captain Lewis,

As you know, we held an International Seapower Symposium here at the Naval War College last November. We had some 38 countries participating, with 22 nations represented by their Chiefs or Vice Chiefs of Naval Staff. The other countries in most instances were represented by their senior Fleet Commanders or top level staff officers. Spain was represented by Admiral Enrique Polanco and Vice Admiral Ignacio Martel.

The Symposium was considered to be quite successful from the viewpoint of participants as well as from the perspective of the U.S. Navy. Admiral Zumwalt is most interested in repeating the Symposium at the earliest possible time. He feels, as I do, that the regional naval cooperation and area security arrangements that could develop from such meetings would be in direct support of the partnership keystone of the Nixon Doctrine. We have tentatively set as our goal, a second International Seapower Symposium to be held here in November of 1971.

Ideally in the interim, between the first and second Seapower Symposiums here, we would hope to have Regional Symposia carried out in various geographic areas of the world. The results of these Regional Symposia could then be considered at the so-called World Symposium here next year. In this connection I have been in private communication with officers who represented Italy, Spain and Japan at our Symposium here last November. They, along with some British officers, are all working toward the goal of their countries hosting regional symposia.

Last December, I had a long letter from Vice Admiral Martel expressing his interest in hosting a regional Symposium at the Spanish Naval War College. I am attaching copies of our correspondence which I believe you will find of interest.

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Since I have not heard from Admiral Martel recently, I would presume he may have had difficulty in persuading his authorities of the desirability of his project. While we do not want to exert any pressure in regard to Spain taking this initiative, I believe it appropriate for me to visit Admiral Martel to acquaint him with our thinking on the next Symposium at Newport, elicit his support for this, and tactfully inquire as to any progress he has made in regard to a Symposium there in Madrid. Hopefully, I might have the opportunity to see Admiral Polanco as well. I understand he is now retired.

We will be in touch by message asking the Defense Attache to make detailed arrangements for our visit which now would appear to have us arriving Madrid on Thursday evening or Friday morning, 24 or 25 September, and leaving Sunday 27 September. This letter is simply to provide you background information. Please feel free to show it to the Defense Attache. When you think it appropriate, you might want to alert Vice Admiral Martel as to my planned visit and inquire if it will be convenient for him.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Captain Daniel A. Lewis, U. S. Navy  
U. S. Naval Attache  
U. S. Embassy  
Serrano 75  
Madrid, SPAIN

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Declassification Review Form

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Author: USDAD [REDACTED]

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00  
Talked with Jack Bergen  
221600 local. He will  
verify Tom's statement  
and then invite  
Sir Peter.

GOA399

RTTCZYUW RUFR SBE4843 265 1520-CCCC--RULDSAA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 221455Z SEP 70

FM USDAO ROME

TO NAVWARCOLLEGE NEWPORT

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 1609 SEP 70

PERSONAL FOR RADM BENNETT FROM VADM COLBERT (U)

1. (C) PRIOR DEPARTURE RADM BERGEN SOLICITED MY ADVICE AS TO NAVY LEAGUE INVITING CHIEFS NAVAL STAFF CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE NAVY DAY BANQUET WALDORF ASTORIA HOTEL 27 OCTOBER WITH VICE PRES AGNEW AS SPEAKER AND ADMIRALS MOORER AND POSSIBLY ZUMWALT AS GUESTS.

2. (C) BY COINCIDENCE DISCOVERED DURING VISIT HERE ADM SIR PETER HILLNORTON CURRENTLY FIRST SEA LORD AND DESIGNATE CHIEF DEFENSE STAFF WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON 26 OCT AT END OF OFFICIAL VISIT U.S.A. AS GUEST OF CNO. CURRENT ETD AFTERNOON 26 OCT.

3. (C) HAVE INFORMALLY SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY ADM HILL-NORTON REMAINING OVER FOR NAVY DAY DINNER TO CAPT CADELL HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT (HE FORMERLY OF MY PLANS/OPS STAFF AT SACLANT AND CLOSE FRIEND). SOUNDINGS WOULD INDICATE POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE BUT ONLY IF ADM MOORER OR ZUMWALT TO ATTEND. IF NEITHER

PAGE 2 RUFRSBE4843 C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO BE PRESENT, ACCEPTANCE FIRST SEA LORD NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE FROM PROTOCOL VIEWPOINT. EVEN UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS, ACCEPTANCE NOT ASSURED BECAUSE OF BUSY SCHEDULE AWAITING HIM IN LONDON.

4. (C) SUGGEST, DISCUSS WITH OP-92 AND OTHERS AS NECESSARY, THEN ADVISE RADM BERGEN ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4

BT

#4843

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Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/1/98

Title of Article: Series 309 "Ltr to CNO"

Author: Colbert

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PERSONAL/SECRET

16 October 1970

Dear Bud,

You asked me to pass on to you a summary of my meeting in Madrid with Vice Admiral Martel, President of the Spanish Naval War College, including his thinking on the ASW problem in the South Atlantic. It is attached.

When Tom Moorer was here to speak earlier this week, this subject came up. He had attended a NATO Military Committee meeting while on his last trip with you and the Presidential party, and the ASW problem down the West Coast of Africa had evidently been raised by Portugal. I mentioned my discussions with Admiral Martel and Tom asked that I request that you pass on a copy of the attached summary to him.

A letter is in preparation on projects we might possibly implement with Latin American Naval War Colleges, and which could be helpful in connection with our U.S.-South American relations.

As always, warm regards,

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

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EXCERPT FROM TRIP REPORT OF VICE ADMIRAL R. G. COLBERT, PRESIDENT NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, SUMMARIZING MEETING WITH VICE ADMIRAL IGNACIO MARTEL, PRESIDENT OF THE SPANISH NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, IN MADRID ON FRIDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER 1970.

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Admiral Martel, with little encouragement, launched into a dissertation on his concern as to the worldwide ASW problem and in Free World navies keeping pace with the challenge posed by the Russian submarine buildup. He is particularly worried about the sea lines of communications in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean Area and here he was quite frank and candid in saying that he felt that Spain might well have a special role. He emphasized the value of the Canary Islands as a base for ASW operations along the West Coast of Africa which, along with Spanish Sahara, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese Guinea and Angola could provide valuable operational bases for ASW operations in this area.

Of particular interest was his suggestion that Spain might be the "front man" for working with South Africa in furtherance of combined naval operations in the area. He well recognizes the political problems with the United States making any such overtures to that country. He pointed out that there is no such inhibition on the part of Spain. What he appeared to be suggesting was a multinational naval ASW approach for the area down the West Coast of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope. This might include Spain, Portugal and South Africa. It was not clear as to whether he expected U.S. participation but he emphasized that it would be absolutely essential for the U.S. to take a strong leadership role (even if behind the scenes), if such a plan was to succeed.

I mentioned the possibility of the British and the French in such a concept and it wasn't clear as to his attitude re these two countries. However it would seem logical and desirable for them to participate, despite the political differences between England and Spain, over Gibraltar, I feel that combined naval operations "at sea" might well be feasible.

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Admiral Martel emphasized the importance of the South American countries, bordering the South Atlantic, playing their part in an overall ASW posture for the area. He raised the issue of UNITAS, which he had heard of from some of his South American friends. I pointed out one concept that has been proposed for UNITAS in the past and which I believe certain South American navies may be interested in, i.e., to recast it as a permanent force similar to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. There was a general consensus that ASW operations on the Atlantic coast of South America should be coordinated with those that might be set up for the West Coast of Africa. He mentioned that Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela had been in touch with Spain, and he believed also South Africa, in connection with possible coordinated naval operations. This needs to be looked into from an intelligence viewpoint.

While Admiral Martel insisted that all of his thinking was representative of his personal views, and not official thinking, I cannot help but believe that he has nominal support in his thinking from Admiral Barbudo, the Chief of Naval Staff. His thoughts on the ASW problem in this area are most interesting, particularly the indicated willingness for Spain to take a major share of the responsibility. I feel that this meeting and the information obtained should be very useful for our worldwide ASW study.

Admiral Martel is clearly discouraged on his plans for a regional seapower symposium. The whole problem centers around national "pride and dignity" and fears that some countries will not accept when invited. On balance I did not force the issue because I don't feel it is essential at this time to go ahead with this regional symposium. He is most enthusiastic about another "world" symposium at the U. S. Naval War College in the Fall of 1971 and hopes to attend.



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Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

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17 February 1971

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Dear Bud,

As you requested by telephone on 6 February I am responding to SECDEF message 020029Z of February. While the message covers a wide spectrum of military assistance programs, I am restricting my comments to only one aspect: the protection of the free world sea lines of communication. Some samples of programs for which I consider we should seek allied participation are given in attachment one. Many of these items have either been discussed by foreign naval leaders at the last International Seapower Symposium in 1969 or here in our Naval Command Course for senior foreign officers over the last few years. Some of the proposals were also discussed during my European tour last fall and during the recent Conference of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas.

Concerning the concept of the SECDEF message, the Newport Study (A Plan to Persuade Allies to Expand and Improve their ASW Capabilities) strongly advocates similar principles. The partnership principle is a keystone of the Nixon Doctrine, but it will only be meaningful if we make it possible -- with hardware and training -- for our smaller allies to take up a proper share of the burden.

The SECDEF message is certainly a step in the right direction. To make more rapid progress we must realize greater foreign participation and U.S. cooperation, not only in Military Aid Programs and Foreign Military Sales, but also in cooperative research, development, and production programs for appropriate weapons and families of weapons. Training and education under this new program will also be important and must not be overlooked.

The past role of the United States as the "Prime Supplier" of materials, both off-the-shelf and newly developed, must give way to more cooperative, participatory programs. While the majority of our military assistance material must necessarily be made in America, research, development, and production of outstanding weapons and weapons systems and other military material

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by our allies must be recognized; at least some of the weapons we use for MAP as well as for ourselves must be procured from foreign sources. Where we accept foreign or jointly developed weapons systems for U.S. use, we can in some cases seek franchise arrangements for their production in the United States. In other cases, we will be forced to purchase weapons manufactured abroad for reasons of production economies, e.g., the Harrier.

Paragraph two of the SECDEF message requested comments and questions. Taking the message by its paragraph breakdown my comments are:

Paragraph 1(A). The definition of the "best interests" of the United States and country concerned is crucial to the entire concept. "Best interests" should not be narrowly defined as whatever brings the most profit to the United States in monetary terms. Further, any definition of "best interests" must make provision for exceptions to accommodate those cases where political and long-range gains in other areas can be achieved by a project which on the surface may not appear in our "best interests".

We must change long-standing U.S. policies as to the type of weapons we will make available to allies. For instance, our old policy was essentially:

"The United States will protect your sea lines of communications (SLOCs); don't ask for any weapons for this purpose."

The new policy should be: "We will help you protect your sea LOCs. Tell us what weapons you need and we will do what we can to help."

For the various sea LOCs our policy on assistance might well be on a sliding scale:

- (1) Vital sea LOCs for the United States - we will maintain the capability and will control and protect them.
- (2) Vital sea LOCs of our major allies, i.e., NATO and Japan -- we will work in conjunction with those allies to control and protect them.
- (3) Vital sea LOCs of other free world nations - we will furnish hardware, weapons, technical assistance, and training to help protect them.

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Paragraph 1(C). Arrangements for foreign government purchases through the U.S. services, and for follow-on support by purchase direct from supplier, appear to be sound. The cost basis for the procurement, however, is important to the success of the program. To gain maximum advantage for the program and to make purchase of weapons in the United States more attractive to foreigners, the following would help:

- (1) Offer foreign countries a favorable rate of interest on loans or carrying costs on Foreign Military Sales. (This has often not been done in the past.)
- (2) Do not prorate research and development costs of U.S. weapons over the foreign sales. (This was only occasionally done in the past.)
- (3) Use a marginal cost basis in determining costs of material offered for sale and in crediting aid. (Any foreign sales made are a bonus to U.S. production lines and should not be used to reduce the cost of our own military equipment.)

Paragraph 2.

The concept in the SECDEF message will improve the existing situation. To achieve further gains, however, we must examine the feasibility of two more steps. One, as mentioned before, is utilization of existing foreign developed weapons systems, where these are clearly acceptable, if not superior. Such utilization will reduce the R&D time cycle and permit us to produce hardware in time to meet the critical mid-1970 threat period. The other step is a coordinated approach to the development, and production of free world weapons, combined doctrine, and multinational training such as described in attachment one. Such coordination will reduce proliferation of types of equipment, enhance logistical support and provide for operational efficiency of the allied effort.

In closing I would like to point out where we might gain additional help. We should keep in mind the military assistance that major allies such as Germany and Japan could offer to the smaller allies. We should not take steps which would prevent or limit such aid. Granted the political restraints on her own naval expansion, both domestic and international, Japan still has many reasons to help build up ASW/sea control forces of friendly countries along her sea LOCs to the south through the Malacca

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Straits and through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. She should be encouraged to offer such aid. I have discussed this with Ambassador Ushiba on a recent visit. He seemed receptive.

Germany, likewise, through her manufacturing and design capability, could give weaker allies aid to build up their sea control forces even though political considerations restrict the size of her "blue water" navy. Here again I have talked informally to Ambassador Pauls on what Germany might do to help.

The greatest risk the United States would be taking in any expanded cooperative weapons design and production program is the loss of some of our present independence in weapons production. The alternative of getting U.S. franchises to build any foreign weapon we choose avoids this difficulty, is probably more politically acceptable, but is more costly.

I hope these thoughts are helpful.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

P.S. I am enclosing a copy of an article from the December War College Review by the current holder of our "Chair of Military Management". You might want someone on your staff to review the basic study which is abstracted in the enclosed article.

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POINT PAPERINCREASED FOREIGN COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN MAP/FMS

DISCUSSION: - In keeping with President Nixon's more recent foreign policy approaches, new programs will necessarily be devised to implement his expressed partnership theme in order to protect our sea lines of communication. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds will have to be directed to those countries considered capable of providing a real military contribution to a cooperative allied effort. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) will have to consist of up-to-date equipment that will enable allies to provide meaningful assistance. Further, the United States will have to view a possible policy shift wherein military equipment researched and developed in foreign countries might well be purchased for U.S. distribution to allies, as well as possible U.S. use. The future will possibly be a two-way street if the best interests of the United States are to be served. Increased MAP funding and FMS of current equipment may well promote the concept of greater multinational ASW cooperation as projected in the Newport Study.

SPECIFICPOINTS -FREE WORLD

FRIGATE (FWF): - Members of the Naval Command Course at the War College are currently developing this project. Initial efforts have been directed toward a concept design for a small 1500-2000 ton ASW escort for multinational purchase and employment. Research into existing off-the-shelf equipment suitable for an ASW-oriented ship has been extensive and also complicated by security classifications. Although goals of weapon effectiveness, sophistication versus technological manning skills required, and high cost of equipments are being balanced, first indications point to a high cost per ship. Preliminary weapon choices have been made by multinational selection of the "best available on the market" systems compatible for small ship installation.

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It has initially been proposed that the hulls be fabricated on a regional basis (Europe, Americas, Asia) and that standardized equipment such as gas turbine engines, and variable pitch props, be sent to hull location. National identification with a FWF via individual national equipment representation is expected to aid international acceptance of FWF concept and ultimate purchase of ship. Of course acceptance of a standardized hull design, such as the British MK 21, would greatly reduce the time and cost required to design and build a ship from the keel up. Additional information on the Free World Frigate and a surface escort transfer program for allies is contained in the Newport Study.

FREE WORLD

ASW AIRCRAFT: - The Newport Study recommends an expanded ASW aircraft program, similar to the U.S. Air Force "International Fighter" concept under the Nixon Doctrine. The P3C could be modified into an export version which would become a "Free World ASW aircraft." The aircraft envisioned would have a capability between the P3B and P3C. The P3C is currently in production and a less sophisticated version of the P3C could be purchased for \$5 to \$6 million, whereas the P3C and NIMROD are priced at about \$8.5 million per aircraft. Continued production of a modified P3C, at a lower cost, would also keep U.S. assembly lines open. In conjunction with sales of a modified P3C to those allies considered technologically capable of operating them, an aircraft transfer program similar to the surface escort program could be initiated. The aircraft transfer program is also contained in the Newport Study.

STANDARD  
WEAPONS/  
WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS:

- A survey of ASW Weapons available to U.S. forces indicates that our ability to conduct unrestrained anti-submarine warfare is limited. Admiral Hyland, when CINCPACFLT, made the statement, "with our limited assets . . . and with no new or more effective employable weapons on the horizon, even our own forces will be hard pressed to function effectively for an extended period of time against the communist submarine threat."

U.S. torpedo assets would do well to provide an initial fill plus a limited second patrol capability for U.S. submarines. Current lead times for research, development, production and procurement for new weapons and weapons systems are excessive and also costly. A "buy American" policy wherein the United States purchases only those weapons produced in the United States, while proven systems have been developed and purchased by other allies, may not be in the best interests of the United States. The Italian 76MM gun, the French EXOCET SSM (23 Miles), the Swedish RB08 SSM (125 Miles) are examples of weapons with attendant systems that might be used in U.S. ships. In all, there are some 35-40 weapons/weapons systems that have been developed outside the United States, that have been considered superior and purchased by other countries. It is time that the United States took advantage of other countries' R & D. Additionally, the increased threat of the mid-1970's does not permit us the luxury of time required for lengthy U.S. R & D.

STANDARDSONAR:

- This area may pose problems involved in security and disclosure policy. Nevertheless, it should be investigated. The British have asked to purchase the United States BQR-15 sonar system. In return for such U.S. equipment the British 177 (surface ship) and 2001 (submarine) sonars may well be useful in U.S. ships or other allies' ships. The high-powered sector scan search sonar used in DREADNOUGHT may well be the key to submarine escort of surface ships. The problems involved with security of our sonar capability are recognized; however, investigation should be pursued in areas where tradeoffs can be made.

STANDARDTACTICSDOCTRINEANDTRAINING:

- It is noted that this comment is outside the materiel/hardware heading; however, it can not be ignored since it is directly involved in the materiel and hardware side of the problem. In the Newport Study reference is made to the lack of a standard doctrine, outside of NATO, that would enable ships of different Free World

nations to operate together. Different languages, skills, and technical abilities all unite to compound the problem. If we are to develop a free world frigate, standardize weapons, communications equipment and sonars, then we must consider a new approach to developing standard tactical doctrine. We must provide for common training to ensure reliable equipment repair and operation, and for men who are trained to operate these ships in conjunction with other ships of free world multinational forces. Possible methods/ways of accomplishing the above are:

- : Establishment of a Naval Staff course for mid-career foreign officers modeled on the current Naval Command course at the Naval War College; expansion of the present Vietnamese program at the Officer Candidate School into a multinational program that can be offered to various smaller navies which are to be expanded under the Nixon Doctrine.
- : Arrange for builders of internationally purchased equipment (Weapons, Sonar, Radio) to provide international schools to instruct in methods of repair and operation.
- : Use NATO as an example from which standard doctrine, tactics and publications may be developed. Outside of NATO there are no standard free world tactical publications, communications systems, or common doctrine. This poses serious obstacles to any effective concept of multinational ASW coordination. It may well be possible to obtain NATO permission to use many of the NATO publications on a worldwide basis. It might well be possible to foster a Mediterranean ASW training center at La Spezia, which could be operated by NATO or by the Italians, with U.S. and UK assistance. In the Pacific, a Maritime College of the Pacific could possibly be located on Okinawa to assist Western Pacific navies in the development of common ASW doctrine, tactics, and plans. Each of the above proposals is contained in the Newport



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Study. Additionally, a joint naval training school in Puerto Rico would be a valuable adjunct to the Springboard Training Program. Such a school would necessarily be operationally oriented. It could be started as a part of Exercise Springboard. At a time when U.S. Latin American relations are strained, this initiative might well have timely politico-military advantages for the United States.

STANDARD  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EQUIPMENT:

- Standardized, or at least compatible communications equipment should be developed for free world naval allies. This should be a matter of high priority in order to permit early multinational ASW operations with the existing ships and aircraft. Current equipment is so varied and obsolescent that ships of free world nations have difficulties communicating with each other. Communication techniques (Crypto) have evolved from a rather simple to a complicated process. What is needed is equipment that is compatible to men of varied nationalities. Equipment these men can be trained to repair and operate will be necessary in a multinational ASW force. Equipment that operates on the same frequency with comparable power outputs will greatly simplify the existing problem.

It is also recognized that language presents a problem equal to the equipment problem and is also an area that will have to be overcome. Acceptance of ENGLISH as the common radio language for free world navies would be a timely proposal and a major step forward.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

ROUTINE  
R 020029Z FEB 71  
FM SECDEF

TO CINCPAC  
CINCSRIKE  
USCINCEUR  
USCINCSO  
CSA  
CNO  
CMC  
CSAF

CONFIDENTIAL 2952

FROM ASD/ISA

SUBJ: INCREASED FOREIGN COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN MAP/FMS.

1. (C) AS FURTHER STEP IN IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC INTENT OF NIXON DOCTRINE, WE ARE EXAMINING A PROPOSAL AIMED TOWARD IMPROVING MAP/FMS, END ITEM SELECTION AND INCREASING PARTICIPATION BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN DETERMINATION OF CONTENT OF GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FMS CREDIT PROGRAMS. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL ARE:

(A) WITHIN DOLLAR LEVELS AND GENERAL FORCE LEVELS ESTABLISHED FOR EACH COUNTRY PROGRAM, FOREIGN COUNTRY WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITEMS MOST SUITED TO ITS UNIQUE PROBLEMS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER PARTICULAR ITEM IS USED BY US ARMED FORCES AND CARRIED IN DOD INVENTORIES. SELECTIVELY, OSD/SERVICES WOULD DEVELOP AND/OR TEST AND EVALUATE A BROADER SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE APPLICABLE MATERIEL INCLUDING FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS. NORMALLY, EQUIPMENT WOULD BE MANUFACTURED IN US, EXCEPT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE OSP IS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED AS BEING IN BEST INTERESTS OF US AND OF COUNTRY INVOLVED.

(B) PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOMMODATE PRICE CHANGES, ITEM DELETIONS/ADDITIONS, ETC., WITHIN COUNTRY DOLLAR LEVEL CEILINGS WOULD BE JOINT COUNTRY/MAAG RESPONSIBILITY.

(C) PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS NOT IN DOD INVENTORIES, INCLUDING FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR END-ITEMS, WOULD BE ARRANGED THROUGH SERVICES FOR DIRECT SUPPLY FROM CONTRACTOR TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT (PECULIAR ITEMS WOULD NOT BE REQUISITIONED FROM DOD INVENTORY MANAGERS). TO MAXIMUM EXTENT FEASIBLE FOREIGN COUNTRY WOULD

63(7) ...ACT

SN(5) 00(2) 09(1) 03(1) 04(2) 40(8) 06(1) 60(3) 61(3) 092(10)  
FP(1) BFR(1) IP(5)\*

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CONTROL NO. CREW#4/MH/	PAGE 1.	OF 2	PAGE 2	TIME OF RECEIPT 02/0047Z	DATE TIME GROUP 020029Z FEB 71
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NAVAL MESSAGE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT BY PURCHASE DIRECT FROM SUPPLIER, EITHER CASH OR FMS CREDIT.

(D) TO FACILITATE CONSIDERATION OF EQUIPMENT NOT USED BY US FORCES, A SPECIAL PROGRAM WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS ON A SELECTIVE BASIS AND FOR NECESSARY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND ENGINEERING TO QUALIFY AND, IF NECESSARY, TO DEVELOP ITEMS TO MEET THEM. UNDER THIS PROGRAM:

(1) UNIFIED COMMANDS AND MAAGS (OR EQUIVALENT DOD REP IN COUNTRY) WOULD ADVISE ASD/ISA OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH ITEMS, CITING DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE.

(2) UNDER OSD DIRECTION (ISA, DDR&E, I&L AND JCS), MILITARY DEPARTMENTS WOULD PROVIDE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND MAAGS WITH TECHNICAL DATA ON MATERIEL POSSIBLY MERTING COUNTRY. UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS.

(3) ALL DOD ELEMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE, WOULD ASSIST COUNTRY IN EVALUATING AND SELECTING EQUIPMENT. DOD ROLE WOULD BE TO INSURE TO GREATEST POSSIBLE EXTENT THAT SELECTION OF MATERIEL IS IN BEST INTEREST OF BOTH US AND FOREIGN COUNTRY OVERALL OBJECTIVES, BUT DECISION WOULD REST ESSENTIALLY WITH FOREIGN COUNTRY WITH US RETAINING VETO POWER.

2. (C) ASSUMING APPROVAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCEPT OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD BE INITIATED DURING FY 72. YOUR COMMENTS, QUESTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO ADEQUACIES/INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS AS REGARDS THE SELECTION, INTRODUCTION, AND STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS; PROPOSAL IMPACT ON WAR RESERVE MATERIEL AND WARTIME LOGISTIC SUPPORT; ADDED REQUIREMENT FOR AND USE OF R&D FUNDS; AND EXTENT AND IMPACT OF POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION OF TYPES OF EQUIPMENT IN FREE WORLD FORCES UNDER PROPOSED CONCEPT) ARE SOLICITED AT AN EARLY DATE. UNIFIED COMMANDS ARE REQUESTED TO INCLUDE VIEWS OF MAAGS AND IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEMS RELATING TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES/EQUIPMENTS. REQUEST COPY OF REPLIES BE PROVIDED JCS.

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*In recent years the rapidly rising cost and complexity of modern weapon systems have made their development and production prohibitively expensive for individual states of medium economic power. International cooperation in weapons development and production offers not only the advantage of economy, but also the general reduction of international economic and technological barriers. In this article Capt. Alexander H. Cornell summarizes an extensive investigation of the methods and effectiveness of international codevelopment and coproduction of weapons. This investigation included three case studies in coproduction: the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft, the Hawk antiaircraft missile, and the F104G Starfighter.*

## INTERNATIONAL CODEVELOPMENT AND COPRODUCTION OF WEAPONS

### Some Conclusions and Future Prospects

An article prepared

by

Captain Alexander H. Cornell, SC, U.S. Navy

The increasing sophistication of modern weapons has increased the cost of developing them to the point where it is economically impossible for any industrial state of less than continental dimensions to develop and produce for itself an entire arsenal of modern weapons. This trend of events at first seems to present smaller states with the unpleasant choice of remaining in a state of technological inferiority or of contracting major arms purchases with the superpowers. Today, however, multinational codevelopment and coproduction of weapons offer to smaller states a third option. Recent years have seen a large and little known number of successful projects of this type, including the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft, the F-104G Starfighter, and the

Hawk antiaircraft missile. While most of the codevelopment projects initially undertaken included the United States, the European states of NATO are now beginning to organize independently many projects which fulfill their own specific needs.

International production and development of weapons offer several advantages to the participants. The cost of development is shared by a number of states, thus avoiding duplication of effort and decreasing the cost for each state. The quality of the product usually benefits from the wider experience and knowledge that result from crossing national boundaries. Such projects also usually have the effect of increasing the technological capabilities of each state's industry. This was especially true in the

early projects, in which the United States was a prominent participant. Finally, such projects aid in lowering international trade barriers and in promoting international harmony and understanding.

As might be expected, such projects require sound management practices in order to coordinate the efforts of a multinational and multi-industrial organization. Two different types of management have emerged from these endeavors. One is the so-called institutional type where the project is organized and administered through the organizational framework of NATO. The second is the "permissive" type or a less formal organization which may include any number of states and which usually develops its own *ad hoc* administrative apparatus through an agreement by the participating governments. In this latter type the NATO structure serves more as a sounding board in which the members can air their military requirements and exchange ideas on the subject.

**An Overall Assessment.** The charge is heard today that technology has outgrown institutions. If so, it is high time to concentrate more effort on bringing the level of organization and institutional achievement up to the level of technology. Science and technology have long been recognized as being international by nature, therefore any progress that can be made in the field of international logistics institutions should be considered a contribution toward the solution of the problem of technology versus institutions.

A group of relatively successful attempts have been made to disperse the skyrocketing costs and complexity of modern weapons technology among a group of nations and industries. A series of collaborative programs in perhaps the most difficult and complex of all organizational areas—that of an international/interindustrial scope—now stand as suc-

cessful production accomplishments. It is rather ironical that the collaboration had to first take place in the production of weapons for warfare rather than "peaceful" hardware, but at least it has taken place and is continuing to take place. Peaceful hardware collaboration appears to be following on. In March 1969 the commercial supersonic aircraft *Concorde*, developed and produced jointly by France and the United Kingdom, flew successfully.

International military logistics, the larger field of which the subject of this paper is a part, has mushroomed in importance. International logistics has become a positive, ongoing program which has experienced an extraordinary growth in the form of multiple organizational bodies, both national and international. Because of the large number of institutions and the measures taken to manage the programs, most observers agree that it has not been a well-knit, cohesive operation. There have been a multiplicity of organs, programs, and overlapping assignments of responsibilities, particularly in the United States, that may or may not have contributed to the common objectives of the program. The situation is such in the United States that observers have felt there is no one point below the President, or perhaps the Secretary of Defense for most programs, which is capable of bringing about a clear direction of the joint weapons production program as a whole. As compared to American multiplicity of organs, programs, and procedures, the relative simplicity and fewer number of European and NATO organs stand out in sharp contrast.

In fairness to the problem, however, it must be borne in mind that international logistics affairs have been harder to manage because they are fast moving, worldwide, and extremely complicated. Many factors bear upon the problem to a degree not usually experienced by purely national or single industrial

problems. Despite these, it is safe to say that international logistics as a whole, and coproduction in particular, has produced some tangible, successful results since World War II. While expectations have fallen short in cooperative research, there is something to be learned from the codevelopment and coproduction efforts of the past 20 years. The record shows that industrial groups were created and operated of a size comparable to any national giants of industry. For both the governmental side and industrial side of the coproduction organizations, there were new coordinating groups created which managed the industrial combines as well as any unilateral enterprise. Unprecedented accomplishments using multinational and multi-industrial consortia took place with a speed, economy of resources, and production performance that equaled or surpassed many purely national or single industry programs.

Faced with the costly and almost impossible problem of procuring modern weapon systems by unilateral means, the NATO Allies developed a method and process of multilateral production. The method resulted in their being able to jointly participate in and contribute to common production and thereby obtain weapons for themselves they might not otherwise have been able to procure.

In practice the coproduction problems proved that many national, legal, customary, and self-interest barriers between and among participating nations can be eliminated or reduced. The consortia members furthered the cause of strengthening their economic and industrial capabilities and helped reduce the technological gap between them. They also helped reduce or eliminate trade, tariff, tax, and proprietary rights barriers which had been obstacles to production and procurement.

The weapons produced have been publicly acknowledged as being as good, if not superior, to any produced

unilaterally. The quality has been excellent and the quantity exactly that which was programmed. They kept remarkably within their original budgets. They produced well the standardized weapons suitable for international operation and provided common maintenance and logistics support by any of the user nations.

To direct successfully vast transnational coproduction programs required an unusual kind of flexible organization and managerial talent. These qualities were apparent not only on the part of top-level coordinators and management within NATO and the international/interindustrial agencies created, but also on the part of the governments themselves and the thousands of workers at the grass roots level.

Integrity and loyalty to the project as a whole were especially noteworthy. The policy of designating one man on policy boards and executive agencies for each nation and the high caliber and intellectual discipline of the designees were keystones of managerial effectiveness. As cohesive groups, they overcame or reduced the day-to-day problems and barriers of different national and business customs to make the programs work. They learned to schedule highly complicated production requirements and cross deliveries that had to be coordinated to meet the total program involving hundreds of industries, and they learned to depend upon each other for such coordinated deliveries.

They surmounted differences in language; differences in engineering standards and procedures; differences in distance and industrial locations; differences in the level of their technological and production capabilities; differences in business practices, measurement systems, and accounting and contracting procedures; differences in patent and proprietary rights laws; differences in financial and credit philosophies and practices; and differences in managerial techniques and



organizational habits, to recount but a few that were brought out in the case studies.

The entire management aggregate found that an organized approach, based on sound and imperative reasons for cooperating, coupled with a willingness to be flexible and to compromise, could make possible the benefits of mutually produced, expensive modern weapons, which they might not otherwise have gained.

Their managerial techniques and organizational elements, while differing in degree of authority, became more patterned and now can be generalized upon in several useful ways. The record of the programs alone shows a broadening but relatively standardized pattern as time and experimentation went on. In each case there was the familiar pattern of a top policymaking board of international members. Beneath it there was in each case a governmental executive agency and usually a parallel industrial executive agency. Similar functional divisions were created beneath these. In addition, other divisions were created as necessary to meet the peculiar demands of the particular production enterprise such as language, liaison, and technical documentation control centers. Even the manufacturing consortia, whether for aircraft or missile production, fall into subgroups organized along major component lines. The use of groups of experts was common practice in all three cases to make initial investigation and to recommend plans and organizational structures. It was generally a matter of degree of authority granted or taken by each of the above levels in which the programs differed.

Early joint production of weapons had as its publicly avowed purpose that of getting defense-related industries started in Europe. The purpose was to build up and broaden the technological base among European members in the belief that broader strength meant

greater security. Since then, however, the emphasis has changed to viewing joint production as a method of helping European industries survive in the face of overwhelming American competition. The large and increasing number of smaller programs underway since the first ones of the late 1950's and early 1960's are evidence of this trend. The literature is replete with statements by European nationals and industrialists confirming these new trends and emphases.

While the trend away from broader, multiple-member programs toward more specific bilateral and trilateral projects with more limited objectives is a matter of record, there is one significant exception. That is the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) organization in which all the NATO nations are members. It is submitted that the large, but relatively unknown, number of coproduction agreements taking place in the 1960's testify to the continuing acceptance, interest, and desire on the part of most Alliance members, and especially their developing industries, to participate in joint programs. "Transnational business" seems to have become interested in the practicability of the new way of joint manufacturing and most of the impetus for the new programs now comes from outside NATO as a formal organization.

Actually, as for the inception of most joint projects, nearly all important ones have been started by one or two members since the beginning. Thus, whether the programs have evolved into multilateral ones or have remained mostly bilateral as they are today, their beginnings were usually found in the requirements or interests of one or two members. One answer as to why the programs have gone down to smaller, lower levels has been due to the difficulties inherent in getting multimember agreement on the requirement and participation. However, there are undoubtedly other practical reasons such as



national pride in product, resurgent self-interests, both nationally and industrially speaking, and even selfishness, in view of the economic gain and sales advantages that can be gained by being a limited producer of a needed weapon.

The programs proved in actual practice that many national, political, legal, customary, and self-interest barriers between and among the participating nations and industries can be eliminated or greatly reduced. They furthered the cause of strengthening the industrial and economic capabilities of the partners and helped reduce the technological gap between them. They also helped reduce or eliminate trade, tariff, tax, and proprietary rights barriers. They were good examples of two significant elements necessary to any international or inter-industrial effort—the *will* to participate and the *goodwill* to see it through.

**The Role of NATO.** It is in the vital function of getting everyone interested and informed who may have a similar requirement that NATO has been of real assistance. The present NATO organization provides the place and opportunity for its members to hear each other's needs and to make the contacts which are necessary to reach an agreement. The very fact that each is made *aware* of the other's intentions and needs is a significant step toward co-operation. Above all, increased mutual respect and trust are fostered by the proof that they have been able to work together.

The present system of management which is in vogue, the permissive type, by no means shuts out the NATO bodies from active participation. All the sections of the International Staff and the military organs that influence production have important functions to perform. Not only do they provide a formal framework for negotiation, but they have facilitated many decisions as the result of informal, behind-the-scenes bargaining. Even Vandevanter, who did

not see the staff or NATO playing too important a role in production matters, admitted that the official network was "ideally constituted to act as a continuous channel of communications."<sup>1</sup> He visualized the correct role of the NATO organs as intermediaries rather than arbiters and concluded that the role of arbiter would only serve to curtail NATO efforts to establish criteria and select weapons.

By the late 1950's the Production and Logistics Division and its successors increasingly became the parliament for ideas within NATO rather than the vehicle of their execution. The military organs have not succeeded as well as might have been expected in having their carefully worked out requirements become realities. In fact, with the exception of Atlantic, not a single NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) drawn up by the Military Committee has ever been carried out. On the other hand, a large number of requirements that have come up from the members or their industries have been accomplished.

The NATO International Staffs, in responding to the need to provide some sort of structure in which to fit the growing number and kinds of cooperative programs, drew up general guidelines for them in their "NATO Production and Logistics Organizations" (NPLO's). These structural guidelines were necessary to bring the many current and prospective programs into as routine or standard grouping as possible to avoid political problems arising in the absence of such guidelines. There already had been sufficient patterns set in all three categories of programs to insure that the guidelines were reasonable and would be acceptable. They in no way straitjacketed any desirable deviations or impeded unique organization innovations. No instance was found wherein the International Staff/Secretariat overstepped its bounds as a clearing house or as a coordinating agency and catalyst. Not once did it

overstep its limited operational powers or impede progress by "forcing" any particular organizational arrangement. Its key position and value were recognized, for example, by the United States when it insisted that the staff be the focal point for negotiations between the European members and the United States or its industries for matters concerned with weapons production of U.S. origin.

The Ad Hoc Approach and Other Conclusions. An additional conclusion of this study is that when supranational authority does not exist, as in a coalition such as NATO, a tendency toward *ad hoc* arrangements for joint projects takes place. The necessary centralized authority and responsibility are provided by newly created international bodies or by the use of certain existing national bodies specifically endowed with supranational powers. Moreover, in the absence of real authority in its own right, there is a greater need to rely upon personalities.

The *ad hoc* approach to initial program organization and agreement is still the general method of arrangement between nations in the absence of any supranational authority. However, the nature of joint weapons production has changed from being primarily security mission-oriented and NATO-sanctioned programs, which reflected early U.S. domination of development and production, to programs which reflect broader national, economic, and technological interests.

The size, nature, and specific partners of today's combines have experienced changes. The earlier position of the United States, that of being generally the only one with a ready-to-produce weapon, is undergoing change. The current list of national combinations and weapons shows that all the members are substituting *their* components or *their* weapons more and more in place of components or weapons of

U.S. origin. Or, if a U.S.-developed weapon is selected, they are obtaining a larger share of production.

A trend that also may be observed is that the overall programs have moved from one of building up the industrial and technological potential of weaker member countries to one of international cooperation to meet specific needs. European countries have moved away from the initial security basis for cooperation to one based on greater technological improvement for national or economic reasons.

As a result of this change, the European members are demanding and arranging an increasing share of recent programs. As *quid pro quo* has become a keynote in the outright sale of weapons, it is becoming the practice in codevelopment and coproduction.

Still another conclusion regarding organization is that the present so-called "permissive" system of organization of combinations has fostered a greater number of joint programs than the early one of organizational and operational sanction under the so-called "institutional" method. The International Staff and its principal division responsible for coordinating cooperative weapons development and production can be credited with taking the initiative in seeking a better way, a more acceptable way, of facilitating international weapons planning and production efforts.

Regardless of the organizational "method" used to stimulate pooled productions by NATO, whether "institutional" or "permissive," they were designed to foster as much cooperation as possible. The "institutional" type structure was so short-lived that it certainly cannot be criticized for too much adverse influence on the programs. In fact, it only obtained completely for the Atlantic aircraft, one of the better structured and managed programs. The remainder of the programs have been organized by "permissive" type approaches of one degree or another. The

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system, or perhaps better called "process," produced sufficient successful structures to show that it is capable of adaptation to any degree of interest and competition between nations and their industries. However, it has not been either a detriment or a significant means of facilitating joint research and development efforts.

The "permissive" structure is really no prescribed structure at all, but a means of making every conceivable avenue and opportunity for joint efforts available to the members. Buyers and sellers are urged to negotiate in an unrestricted, logical market process. The product itself may be determined by the participants. The door is open even to latecomers who wish to join. When it comes to such crucial steps as the selection of a product, influence is left to exert itself in rough proportion to the amount of risk, production, and sales each member sees fit to pledge. It is not necessarily a one-vote situation. By such realistic apportionment, the system faces up to the facts of business life. The field is open to hard but open negotiation, until a group is found willing to take on the manufacturing task. A competitor whose product is not chosen cannot prevent the others from combining. There is no veto so long as at least two wish to proceed.

Existing international structures were used to assist in the organization of all cooperative projects. The NATO Standing Group, the Military Committee, the Armaments Committee, and particularly the International Staff were not specifically established for these functions but were given responsibilities to play an active part in the cooperative process. The staff was restructured no less than five times to fit the changing patterns of joint endeavor. The same observation is valid as applied to individual programs and organizations. National organs, both government and industrial, were used wherever feasible to operate or to assist in operation of

the programs. By using such existing bodies, duplication of organization was avoided, as were the creation of new jobs, the training of new units, and industrial reorganization.

Adherence to Principles and Objectives of International Logistics. The question of how well the case programs met or conformed with the principles of international military logistics can now be answered in summary. Certain basic principles are restated below followed by comment on each:

1. To promote the defensive strength of the allies by developing a coordinated production base in Europe for modern weapons systems.

This objective was enhanced by the three case programs to the extent that they, and many others, have been among the chief reasons for European countries being in the position they are today of initiating their own joint development and production programs.

2. To promote the concept and practice of standardization among the allies.

This principle also was adhered to. Weapons were produced that were identical in performance, support, maintenance, and use in all countries. It is obvious that an even greater amount of standardization among allies can be achieved by multilateral programs than can be by bilateral ones. However, in either case, progress is made toward a common family of weapon systems in use by the partners.

3. The principle that countries are still responsible for equipping their own forces but that cooperative means are indispensable for countries with limited resources.

The first part of this principle is still adhered to and is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. The second part has been the keynote of the case programs and has carried over into present-day cooperative projects.

4. To transfer the factors of production where needed in the alliance

and increase the technological and industrial base.

Proved by the programs.

5. To maximize the exchange and effectiveness of scientific and technical information and resources through elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort and facilities.

This, in fact, took place in the case programs and is continuing under present programs.

6. A NATO principle, that it is politically desirable that cooperative programs take place in NATO or under the NATO aegis.

This principle appears to have been drawn away from on the part of the members. None take place within NATO today, but most seek the NATO aegis. Again, the exception is NADGE.

7. A NATO principle that a system should be evolved whereby cooperation would be both efficient and attractive. Permissiveness, flexibility, an open door to members, and subsequent action taken by interested nations should be on a case-by-case basis in as free a manner as possible.

This principle appears to have taken hold and is the current basis for individual national and industrial cooperative programs. In fact, it has become a more common way of doing transnational business in weapons development and production with or without NATO sanction or initiative.

**Some Managerial Conclusions.** The touchstone of management problems in multilateral organizations is an understanding of coalitions. A coalition cannot enforce compliance by any sovereign member, simply because there is no supranational authority. Therefore, management is faced with an even greater challenge than is normally found in a typical organization.

One of the management successes was the practice of each government designating one man, and one man only, to represent it on the policymaking

organ. This resulted in a small, able group which did well at representing their governments, were very good at clearing problems at their own national levels, and, most of all, worked exceedingly well together. They were given general and flexible direction, real responsibilities, and, above all, trust—a combination that proved itself in the operational results.

The success of what might be described broadly as military/government/industrial endeavors in the joint application of development and production organization in order to produce modern weapons may well serve as an example to other international institutional effort. There are those who even view the successes as presaging a trend whereby the methods used to achieve weapons cooperation may be a useful way of conducting certain other international affairs. Whether one agrees with this or not, the avoidance of duplication of national effort that could be achieved by cooperative efforts in other fields than weapons is certainly an objective well worth considering.

**Future Prospects for Cooperative Development and Production of Weapons.** Although the problems of effective standardization and common production of weapons by the alliance members are complex and manifold, they are not insuperable. There are basic problem areas which challenge the success of all programs, areas which cut across every known attitude and national interest. There are problems of a more immediate but less fundamental nature, however, that might be resolved more readily if the proper study was attempted. For example, the problems of cost sharing and funding sources or methods are two whose resolution would greatly facilitate future programs. They too will be found by the student of organization to have their roots in the national sovereignty issue.

There is clearly need for some kind of central funding arrangements, particularly for feasibility and design studies and for research and development, if they are to be communal affairs. Central funding would be ideal for production, too, but perhaps more difficult to obtain agreement for in view of the larger sums of money involved. Unfortunately, it is not possible for NATO to commission even general "paper" studies at its own expense. The alliance is dependent upon individual firms or national governments to undertake even these at their own expense and risk. It would appear that if the recently reorganized NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and newly created NATO National Industrial Advisory Group Conference (NIAG's) are to perform any kind of real planning for weapons development, they must have some kind of funding resources. They should be able to commission innumerable studies to determine the economic feasibility or technical viability of projects they may propose in the future. NATO should continue to initiate projects which might interest any two or more members. It must continue to make its requirements known to members and encourage them to join together in projects where requirements of both the coalition and the individual nations parallel each other. Only in this way can the recent trend toward numerous bipartite and tripartite *ad hoc* arrangements be taken advantage of for the benefit of NATO as a whole.

The second more immediate problem, that of costing out each project to let each member know the total risk and his own share of the risk, is one that demands early study and resolution. Each project should be carefully costed out and sensibly phased, with agreed points fixed at which deliberate decisions must be taken on the future of the project. It will require common resources to carry out such a study for

each proposal, whether it be an *ab initio* one such as Atlantic or a purely production program of a weapon in being such as Hawk; whether it be an *ad hoc* project resulting from the usual unsystematic individual approach by one or two members or the hoped for result one day of controlled, advance planning and direction of a total collaborative effort.

The "unknown risk" must be made the "known fact" to the greatest extent possible to attract nations to join. "It is," as James concluded, "only fair to national parliaments, so that governments do not find themselves inextricably involved in projects that might grossly exceed the estimate."<sup>2</sup> In isolating the costing and phasing problems as being of significant importance, he was urging their resolution to satisfy, in turn, the political problem of nations which he too saw as being "in the last resort... a problem of political will, rather than the mechanics of organization."<sup>3</sup>

The problem of planning sensible R&D programs in a coalition is an enormously difficult one. Answers to such questions as the comparative usefulness of weapons available a decade or more from the present or how to gauge the probabilities of technical success or how to hedge against failure by a series of technological enterprises that by hindsight will look like "wasteful" duplication—these are tough enough for one group of political or military administrators in a single nation. The problem of agreement is compounded in a coalition many times over. However, if limited funds to integrate NATO R&D efforts could be made available, little would be lost and much may be gained. The added ingredient to a pooled, integrated R&D agreement could be the free exchange of scientific information, with even greater possibilities of gain.

Possible Weapons Fields for Future Cooperation. Returning to more factual

possibilities, many feel that the most promising approach would be to combine resources to develop and produce "families" of weapons or equipments. This approach would secure the advantages of cooperation without a great dispersal of effort. It would preclude the tendency of each nation to spread itself too thin into almost every conceivable type of weapon, as is generally the case today. By agreeing to engage in a whole field or family of weapons, each country could benefit and still remain comparatively self-sufficient, and certainly competitive, by being a participating producing member of a family of weapons required by all the others. Such a plan would go a lot further toward the common objectives of standardization and cost reduction than the present practice of securing cooperation on one weapon at a time.

Some say that there are only two basic choices facing Europeans in the problem of meeting the rising costs of modern weapons. One is the deliberate buildup of a European economic and technological system wherein each country attempts to find partners, especially in the United States, for specific projects in which it is interested. The second is the pursuit of a real "NATO Common Market" in arms, a major part of which would be a series of American/European industrial consortia, tied to families of weapons. In this respect the NADGE is pointed to already as an arrangement that goes beyond a single equipment, into a family of communications and warning devices. Such a proposal for the family approach is not without a great deal of interest. So much so, that Hunt, in summing up a forward-looking study of the requirements of military technology in the 1970's, concluded that there are clearly several areas where the member countries, particularly in Europe, could develop and produce their own weapon systems or families of weapons.<sup>4</sup> First, he drew up five categories of weapon

systems likely to be continued or to be newly required in the 1970's. Then he carefully estimated whether each weapon family and weapon were susceptible to either single effort or collaborative effort. Next, he forecast those weapons which would be susceptible to NATO collaborative programs and those which the members would be most likely to buy from the United States. There were some he foresaw as being almost certain to be left up to the United States alone to develop.

Many observers feel it is time to raise the sights in real cooperative efforts. If NATO fails in the field of arms coordination and standardization, one which now has proved its practicability, they see the possibility of that failure going far beyond the confines of NATO itself. Other observers feel it is time to abolish NATO and revert to bilateral or other multilateral agreements and treaties. What would be gained by such a change is hard to imagine, especially when there is in existence a good international structure and a history of cooperative effort to build on. An academician from Canada answered the abolitionists in a sensible manner when he wrote:

NATO is the first peace-time attempt at constructing sophisticated international apparatus for uninterrupted military planning and for the continuous exchange of political information analysis and consultation. Even if the present military *raison d'être* of NATO should disappear, the volume and complexity of contacts and transactions at the international level of a group of industrially advanced countries on the verge of forming a "security community" will require the continued operation of some international brokerage apparatus whose features would largely resemble the present NATO model. It would therefore seem prefer-

able to maintain the organization sufficiently flexible... than to follow the counsel of abolitionists, only to discover the immediate need for a laborious restoration of something very similar.<sup>5</sup>

There are some organizational and procedural bright lights pointing toward the future as this paper is written. For one thing, there is the complete rearrangement of the NATO armaments structure and the elevation of the revamped organization to a higher level within NATO. The phrase, "SHAPE requirement" has been discarded as evidence that there need not necessarily be a 100 percent militarily agreed upon endorsement to start a development program by two or more members. As a result of NATO's initiative, the former NATO Basic Material Requirement (NBMR) system has been abandoned. Where there was difficulty before in achieving a unanimity among the nations to start a program, today the flexible policy is that, "if any two countries see fit to enter in a cooperative R&D or production program, they are free to do so, as long as they are willing to pay the price." Moreover, the others are free to participate if they so desire and are willing to share the cost.

There is one improvement that many knowledgeable observers would like to see and that is that more emphasis and coordination power should be given to the most active and interested monitor-organ within NATO, the International Staff/Secretariat. That organization, and especially its Defence Support Division, has demonstrated a dedication that has risen above national interests, the intelligence to foresee the benefits of cooperative efforts from the very beginning, and the flexibility to include industry's assistance when it became a key element. They have earned the trust, confidence, and cooperation of industry. The Staff/Secretariat and its Defence

Support Division could be the keystones for achieving greater cooperation in the future.

One thing is clear. The scientific revolution has made the pursuit of special interests in weapons by the separate powers a dangerous, unrewarding, and costly game. This is especially true for the lesser powers, but apparently even for a nation as wealthy and powerful as the United States. Technological progress has placed common challenges before the nations and created common interests far more significant than their separate and often conflicting desires. It has given them the chance to pursue those common problems in international combinations for their own benefit and for the benefit of all other members.

The challenge is clear. The record stands as proof that cooperative institutions and programs can succeed in meeting it. The possibilities are almost limitless. The focus must be more and more on concrete, attainable inter-

#### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Capt. Alexander H. Cornell, SC, U.S. Navy, has had extensive experience in the field of business administration. His degrees include a B.A. from Union College, an M.A. in history from Connecticut University, an M.S. in administration from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. degree from American University, also in administration. As a supply officer he has served in a variety of administrative positions, including a tour of duty as Director of Warehouse Operations with the Naval Supply Systems Command in Washington, D.C. Captain Cornell served as Plans Officer for the School of Naval Warfare during the last academic year and is presently occupying the James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management at the Naval War College.



national efforts such as have been examined in this study if real progress is to be made toward a safe, prosperous,

and united community of the free world nations of Europe and America and the Far East.

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#### FOOTNOTES

1. E. Vandevanter, Jr., *Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: a Study of Alliance Processes* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1964), p. 94.
  2. Robert R. James, *Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in NATO* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 22.
  3. *Ibid.* (Underlining added.)
  4. Kenneth Hunt, *The Requirements of Military Technology in the 1970's* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 35-36.
  5. Harald von Riekhoff, "The Changing Function of NATO," *International Journal*, Spring 1966, p. 167.
- 

Decisions which determine the success or failure of the strategic direction of global war have to be determined by the meeting of a number of minds, each of which contributes its own specialized knowledge, while also serving as a balance and a check on the others.

James Forrestal: Testimony,  
Senate Naval Affairs Committee,  
1 May 1946



Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/1/98

Title of Article: Series 1

Coll 30  
Folder 310

"Memos for C.JCS: Latin American AS(12) Requirements"

Author: Nitzze

Date of Presentation: 9 Feb 71

Classification: ☒ Secret

☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 4

Disposition:

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☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

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☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.



9 February 1971

Dear Dick,

Here is the memo I just spoke to you about, signed by Paul Nitze in Dec 1968. I hope that it will be of use to you.

Our love to Prue.

Warmest regards,

John



**SECRET**  
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

11 DEC 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Latin American ASW Requirements (U)

I.

I appreciate the time and effort which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff have put into the studies which I requested on ASW requirements in Latin America. My comments on JCSMs 318-68\* and 564-68\*\* follow.

The ASW force levels projected for several of the South American Navies are relatively large and expensive, totaling a minimum of \$380 million in new construction over the next nine years and very possibly more. These force levels are projected against the admittedly unlikely threat of a protracted conventional war which could affect the US power base. The danger envisaged is that a moderate force of six-to-ten Soviet conventional submarines, supported by afloat logistics ships, would be able to inflict such heavy losses on shipping transiting South American waters that US war production would be impaired because stockpiles of essential materials could not be replenished. The remoteness of this possibility becomes apparent when one considers the substantial levels of essential materials that are stockpiled against possible wartime needs.

The studies do not describe how the projected ASW forces would be employed. Even under optimum conditions, however, they would have only a partial ability to reduce the damage that could be done by a moderate size conventional submarine force. Substantial shipping losses would still be incurred. The limited effectiveness of the projected forces would become even more limited if they were restricted to operations in their home waters or if the Soviets chose to deploy a larger conventional submarine force in the area. Moreover, as the studies acknowledge, their capability would be virtually nil against any nuclear submarines that the Soviets might choose to employ out of their growing nuclear fleet.

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See Ref. 2, p. 7-

\* Enclosure A to JCS 1976/570-1

\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 1976/570-3

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The remoteness of the threat and the marginal advantage to be gained do not, in my judgment, warrant encouraging the Latin Americans to spend their limited resources in trying to achieve the projected ASW force levels. Nor do I consider that circumstances warrant the expenditure of US resources for this purpose. The more appropriate policy continues to be that approved by the SIG when it acted last June in reaffirming the policy paper, US Regional Policy Toward Latin American Security Forces. That policy reads -

"Our strategy recognizes that the likelihood of general war with massive attacks on South American maritime lines of communications is relatively low in the threat spectrum. The United States does not discount this threat completely, but the main emphasis should be on orienting Latin American naval and air force capabilities toward internal security, and civic action.

"The United States recognizes that the larger South American countries currently have navies and air forces with capabilities going beyond these criteria. It is not prepared to share in the heavy investment and operational costs involved in maintaining such capabilities (e.g., ASW, convoy/escort roles) but will consider on an ad hoc basis, other measures (e.g., training, combined exercises, renewal of ship loans, credit assistance) which overall U. S. interests might justify, bearing in mind that Latin American naval and air forces having a multi-purpose capability could be made available for international action in furtherance of Free World objectives (e.g., Vietnam, Cuba quarantine)."

## II.

This review of Latin American ASW requirements points up the importance of examining most carefully any force levels or equipment goals that the Latin Americans might be encouraged to achieve. In at least some cases, the force levels seem to be based on those forces a country has or plans to have, rather than on how its legitimate security requirements might be met most reasonably.

Our examination of appropriate force levels must take into account not only the domestic and other resources available

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to the country concerned, but also the relative priorities of other needs competing for these resources. This is a difficult task at best and can only be done through the cooperation of other interested agencies such as the State Department and AID. Our force level discussions with Latin American representatives should reflect the results of such interdepartmental and agency review.

I am sure that the appropriate commanders are aware of these difficulties and will be guided by the results of our interdepartmental and agency review.

*Paul H. Witz*

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Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED] Date: 1/2/98  
Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 1 311" Memo for the President NWC  
Author: Capt Ruiz  
Date of Presentation: 20 May 71  
Classification: ☐ Secret ☒ Confidential Number of Pages: 3

Disposition:

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☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

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OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

20 May 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subj: ASW Support from Transport or Service Force Ships

1. LCDR Hall passed me a copy of CAPT Fulton's letter on helo operations from HMCS PROVIDER since the subject was related to our ASW study. This concept was not included in the Newport Study because we did not hear about it in time and did not think about it ourselves. VADM Aurand did mention it as a possibility for U.S. ships but I was not aware the joint effort had been made with the Canadians.
2. I think the idea has great possibilities for the U.S. Navy and would expect that it would have great merit on an international basis too. I would go so far as to say that this may be the breakthrough that would enable us to provide ASW protection to convoys without the use of dedicated escort ships.
3. The idea has much more appeal for me than the proposal for making small and simple hulls with sensors included in a helo detachment aboard. I would propose that instead we make our MSTS ships into escorts using helo detachments in the same manner. We could convert all our Navy Service Force and MSTS ships to give them the capability to support such detachments and require that merchant ships built for the U.S. have the capabilities designed into them for such use in wartime. Regular and reserve helo crews could both be trained and their equipment designed to fit into containers, (one for operations and one for maintenance, or maybe more than two would be required for some units). These could be lifted by heavy helos on to container ships which would be compatible. The container tops themselves could be made into landing platforms for the helos. On present ships that were not designed as container ships, a landing area for the containers themselves would then be the major space requirement on deck.

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4. Economically this is the only proposal I know of which would permit us to develop the ASW capability we need. The helo concept could be expanded beyond ASW capability if required, but ASW capability should probably come first. The merchant containerships would pay practically no penalty in loss of cargo carrying capacity in peacetime but would be capable of taking the reserve helo detachments immediately if an ASW capability was required. Use of the same concept on our Service Force and MSTs ships would permit us to perfect the operational techniques with regular Navy helo detachments and would be ideal for training the reserve helo detachments called to active duty for training.

5. Since ADM Zumwalt intends to achieve a helo capability on essentially all of the U.S. Navy combat ships the concept should be made compatible. Hopefully the same helos could be used on both combat and support type ships. This would give us a capability of shifting helo detachments from ships in yards or damaged ships and to maximize helo utilization. If the concept was accepted on an international basis the flexibility of course would be even greater.


6. The major drawback to the proposal as I see it, is the attitude of the officers in our Navy. I think the destroyer community would tend to fight the concept since it would essentially put them out of business except for a few high speed escorts for naval task forces. The aviation community would also tend to fight the concept for much the same reasons that they fought the original concept of placing helo detachments on destroyers. (i.e., the aviation community would lose control of a large part of its resources). As far as placing navy helo detachments on merchant ships, I think this would be about as unpopular as the navy gun crews on merchant ships in World War II, this means that the helicopter community would fight it too.

7. In summary, I think the concept is a major breakthrough, sound, economical and within the state of the art as it exists today. However, I don't believe that it has much of a chance to succeed in our Navy because of the opposition which

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will be inherent. Strong sponsorship from high places might be enough to get our Navy to accept it. Success abroad such as in Canada, the U.K. or NATO might also be enough to get our Navy to get behind it but then the NIH (Not Invented Here) problem would probably hinder its acceptance.

Very respectfully,



C. K. RUIZ  
CAPT USN



# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/2/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 1 311" Ltr to Mr DiBona"

Author: Colbert

Date of Presentation: 30 Apr 71

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☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 1

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☐ Other:

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~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED LESS ENCLOSURES (S)

SECRET/NOFORN (Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

Dear Charlie,

The "Newport Study" has now been completed and forwarded to CNO. Because of your interest in the rough draft of the study, I am forwarding a copy of the final version.

CNO has directed that the study be kept within the Navy until he authorizes release, and has not been briefed on or accepted the study as yet so it has not been approved for implementation. I hope you will find the study of interest and agree with our approach to the problem.

Glad I had the chance to at least see you at the CEP meeting but sorry that we had no opportunity to talk. I was very much interested in the brief you gave. Should you have reduced it to writing, could you forward me a copy?


Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Mr. C. J. DiBona  
President, Center for Naval Analyses  
Navy Department  
Washington, D.C. 59241

Encl: (1) The Newport Study # 38



~~SECRET~~ NOFORN  
UNCLASSIFIED LESS ENCLOSURES (S)  
SECRET/NOFORN



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Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date:

7/2/98

Title of Article:

Coll 30 Folder "Ltr to Adm. Rivero"  
Series 30

Author:

Colbert

Date of Presentation:

23 Apr 71

Classification:



Secret



Confidential

Number of Pages:

2

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Dated

05 APR 1996

~~15 APR 1991~~

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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23 April 1971

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Dear Admiral,

I appreciate your comments regarding "The Newport Study" and your kind words on the job my people have done. I believe the study provides a logical basic plan on which positive action on the part of the United States can be based, as well as providing a departure point for further studies in this vital area.

Unfortunately, your letter arrived the day after the final draft of the study went to the printers. All of the specific points made in your letter I am sorry to say were therefore not included in the final study. The revised study, however, does include the general tenor of most of your comments although these are not highlighted as they would have been if we had received them in time for inclusion in the final version. I am preparing a brief on the study for CNO, SECDEF and other interested parties and in it I will try to emphasize some of the points you made in your letter that did not get into the study.

I am enclosing a copy of the final "Newport Study". You will note our coverage of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean has changed from the draft study, however I would like to comment specifically on some of the points made in your letter.

The approach to the Indian Ocean changed considerably, although admittedly it is still somewhat optimistic, even from a step by step evolutionary standpoint. This region was by far the most difficult in which to develop an ASW improvement plan, because of the serious political and military obstacles you referenced. I consider that the evolutionary indigenous country approach recommended is the best long-term and sustaining one that can be made, if a capability other than one purely under the aegis of ANZUS is to be achieved.

You will also note that the study (Chapter VI) still contains some extracts from the U.S. input to AD-70. The point intended in citing these extracts is to highlight that the U.S. input to AD-70 is not the same as the thinking

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Pies off

Take To  
Munch

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of U.S. and NATO Naval leaders and does not represent a full appreciation of the scope or immediacy of the Soviet submarine threat to the extent that SACLANT's input to AD-70 or CNO's Project Sixty Report does. In short, the U.S. official national position does not reflect the submarine threat as we naval officers generally see it.

I strongly concur that in any ship and aircraft transfer program quality rather than quantity should be stressed. We must, however, make our deactivated ships and aircraft available if selected countries desire to use them and have the capability of doing so. The study proposes, for example, that a version of the P-3 appears to be ideally suited as a Free World maritime patrol aircraft. However until this can be worked out, and until certain countries have the capability to effectively employ such sophisticated aircraft we should make maximum use of our deactivated P-2 and S-2 aircraft.

With regard to the two major problems of ASW Command and Control and a viable URG capability, I concur that they could have been given greater emphasis in the study. These problems are of course significant in any effective ASW regional effort. It does appear, that based on the success COMNAVSOUTH has had in coordinating Eagle Eye surveillance operations, it would be the logical building block for a Southern Region ASW Command and Control system. This may be an oversimplification of the problem of effective ASW Command and Control, but it does appear attractive, especially since the Italian Navy would play a leading role.

Although URG capability is not emphasized to the extent it could have been in the study, the theme of doing the best with what we have, as well as making U.S. underway replenishment support available to allies is there.

Again, I want to thank you for your comments on the study and hope that you will find the final version an improvement. I assure you that in my briefings and discussions with CNO and other interested parties, the problems you raised will be emphasized. As I see it, our biggest problem will be in the digestion of the study and in maintaining an impetus that will result in significant Free World ASW improvements.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~  
Dick

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

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ADM RIVERO





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Author: [REDACTED]

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ZNY SSSSSS ZZH

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RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3137

RUENAAA/CNO

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR

RUDONBA/CTNCUSNAVEUR

RULESAA/USLOSACLANT

BUETRA/USNMR SHAPE

RUFSNO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1432

BUESPNO/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1610

BT

SECRET NOFORN USNATO 2563

SUBJECT: NATO MARITIME POSTURE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

REF: (A) USDAO THE HAGUE CITE 0275 APR 71/DTG 081140Z APR 71  
NOTAL

(B) USDAO BONN CITE 0236 APR 71/DTG 231517Z APR 71 NOTAL

(C) USDAO THE HAGUE CUTE 0345 APR 71/DTG 271410Z APR 71  
NOTAL

1. IN HIS 1971 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT, PRESIDENT NIXON STATED 'IN MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING OUR FORCES IN EUROPE -- AND IN THE SEAS ON EUROPE'S FLANKS -- WE ARE DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO TAKE UP A GREATER SHARE OF THE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY.'

2. IN THIS YEAR'S POSTURE STATEMENT, SECRETARY LAIRD SAID THAT IT IS ONE OF OUR GOALS FOR THE 1970S THAT OUR ALLIES PROVIDE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO PROTECTING THE CONVOYS THAT IN WAR WOULD BE CARRYING MATERIAL FOR THEIR SUSTENANCE.

3. IN MCM-31-71 (MEASURES TO COUNTER SOVIET MARITIME EXPANSION IN THE ATLANTIC), THE MILITARY COMMITTEE STATES THAT THE DOWNWARD TREND OF NATO FORCES IN THE AREA, AS COMPARED TO THE INCREASING SOVIET THREAT, WILL CREATE A MORE

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(PAGE 1 OF 3

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MO Jun YR 77

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

PRONOUNCED IMBALANCE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC, AN IMBALANCE WHICH COULD SEVERELY RESTRICT SACLANT'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE NORTHERN FLANK DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. ACCORDING TO THE MC DOCUMENT, SACLANT HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE ASW FORCES AVAILABLE TO HIM ARE INADEQUATE TO COMBAT THE SOVIET SUBMARINES WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED IN THE ATLANTIC.

4. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE DPC MINISTERIAL JUST CONCLUDED STATES 'MINISTERS ALSO NOTED THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER PLANNING FOR EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION ON THE NORTHERN FLANK.'

*p2 of 3 15/8/07*

5. DURING THAT SAME MEETING, MINISTERS WERE PUT ON NOTICE BY SECRETARY LAIRD THAT WHILE THE US INTENDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL CAPABILITIES, OUR INTENSIFIED NAVAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL RESULT IN OVERALL QUANTITATIVE SHIP REDUCTIONS IN THE NEAR TERM IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE QUALITATIVE GAINS FOR THE FUTURE.

6. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, THEN, IMPORTANT GOALS WOULD BE THE IDENTIFICATION OF CERTAIN NATO NATIONS (OR, INITIALLY, A NATION) WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER CONTRIBUTIONS TO ALLIANCE SECURITY IN THE ATLANTIC AREA AND TURNING THIS POTENTIAL INTO ACTUALITY.

7. RECOGNIZING THAT CERTAIN MAJOR POLITICAL DECISIONS WOULD BE INVOLVED, THE FIRST NATION WHICH COMES IMMEDIATELY TO MIND AS HAVING THE BEST POTENTIAL TO DO MORE IN THE AREA IS THE FRG. THE FRG POSSESSES A PREDOMINANTLY-MODERN FORCE OF DESTROYERS, FAST FRIGATES, AND ESCORTS AND IS CAPABLE OF OPEN-OCEAN OPERATIONS, YET IS, FOR THE MOST PART, CONFINED BY NATIONAL DECISION TO THE BALTIC.

8. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE WITH INTEREST REPORTS (REFTELS) OF FRG TREND TOWARDS AN INCREASED EMPHASIS ON NORTH SEA DEFENSE. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, CURRENT OFFICIAL FRG NAVAL EMPHASIS IS ON BALTIC. THIS EMPHASIS IS EXPLICIT IN FRG WHITE PAPER 1970 ON THE SECURITY OF THE FRG WHICH STATES THAT THE MISSION OF ITS NAVY 'IS TO ENGAGE ENEMY NAVAL FORCES -- CHIEFLY IN THE BALTIC -- IN FLEXIBLE OPERATIONS, TO PROTECT THE MARITIME FLANK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC BY NAVAL ACTION, AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENCE OF THE BALTIC APPROACHES. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET STRATEGY OF THE CONTROL OF HER PERIPHERAL

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SEAS, PARTS OF THE NORTH SEA MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE NAVY'S THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.'

9. THERE COULD BE, OF COURSE, VARYING GRADATIONS OF INCREASED FRG NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH SEA/ATLANTIC. AT THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE, FRG COULD SIMPLY INCREASE ITS OPERATIONS IN NORTH SEA WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO ITS TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER END OF THE SCALE, FRG COULD CARRY OUT EXTENDED DEPLOYMENTS, BASING OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF ALLIED OBJECTIVES, AS DOES THE US NAVY, IN OTHER COUNTRIES. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR SUCH A CONCEPT ARE NORWAY, PORTUGAL, AND THE EAST COAST PORTS OF THE US.

10. IN ADDITION TO SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN PARAS 1 THROUGH 4 (ABOVE), INCREASED FRG NAVY OPERATIONS OUT OF THE BALTIC AND INTO THE NORTH SEA/ATLANTIC COULD HAVE POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL EFFECTS:

A. SALVE NORWEGIAN ANXIETIES OVER THE LACK OF ALLIED NAVAL POWER TO COUNTER THE SOVIET POTENTIAL IN THE AREA;

B. CAUSE RECONSIDERATION OF FRG DECISION TO DISCONTINUE PROGRAM FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FOUR GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER ESCORTS TO REPLACE THE FIVE-FLETCHER CLASS DESTROYERS IN ITS NAVY;

*P30f3 1518107*

C. EASE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE USN REDUCTIONS;

D. DEPENDING UPON SPEED OF IMPLEMENTATION, COULD RESULT IN A TEMPORARY SHIFT OF ASSETS FROM SACEUR TO SACLANT;

11. ALL THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT MORE NATO NAVAL FORCES WILL BE NEEDED IN THE AREA AND WE RECOMMEND THAT THE USG EXPLORE IN DEPTH AND, AS APPROPRIATE, ENCOURAGE, BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF ENHANCED LAND AND AIR EFFORTS, THE EXPANSION OF FRG NAVAL OPERATIONS INTO THE NORTH SEA AND NORTH ATLANTIC. AS FIRST STEPS FOR EXAMPLE, WE MIGHT ENCOURAGE NORMAL GERMAN NAVY REPRESENTATION IN STANAVFORLANT AND MORE FREQUENT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING VISITS OF FRG NAVY UNITS THROUGHOUT THE NATO AREA.

12. COMMENTS FROM AMEMB BONN WELCOME.

BT



Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/2/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 313" USDOC SOUTH 140825Z

Author: ADM R. Jero

Date of Presentation: 14 JUN 71

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☐ Confidential

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☐ Other:

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**SECRET NOFORN  
SPECAT**

11 JUL 71

CCN 001

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FM USDOCOSOUTH

TO RUEAAAA/CNO

RUFLSEA/USDAC ANKARA TURKEY

INFO RUONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUFRSBE/USDAC ROME

RUPTMAA/COMSIXTHFLT

BT *pac*

SECRET NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

USDAC ANKARA NOT ALDIE PASS TO VADM COLBERT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM COLBERT, RADM SMALL INFO ADM RINGLE,

VADM KIDD, RADM SWANSON AND CAPT COGSWELL FROM ADM RIVERO

A. USDAC GREECE 122021Z JUL 71

1. APPRECIATE RECEIVING REF A.

2. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 1.A. OF REF, ADMIRAL ROSELLI HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO ME ON SUNDAY, HOWEVER, HE HAS DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT FURTHER WITH HIS SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER IN NAVSOUTH HEAD-QUARTERS AND HAS NOW TOLD ME THAT THE REPORTS REGARDING VADM ASHMORE'S ACTIONS WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

3. I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO GET SSN PARTICIPATION IN OUR NATO AND ASW

EXERCISES RUFRSAA6911 HAS DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF U.S. RELUCTANCE TO COMPROMISE SIGNATURES OF OUR LATEST SSN. I HOPE WE CAN DO SOMETHING TO IMPROVE THIS SITUATION.

4. WITH RESPECT TO MALTA, WE ARE DOING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR RELOCATION TO NAPLES, HOWEVER, THIS SHOULD BE HELD CLOSE. THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO MOVE FROM MALTA WILL BE MADE STRICTLY ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. MY PREFERENCE IS TO MOVE THE HEAD-QUARTERS TO NAPLES AND I HAVE SO STATED TO SACOR AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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# Naval War College

## Naval Historical Collection

### Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date:

7/2/98

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Coll 30 Folder "Series 1 313" Ltr to CNO

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Colbert

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<sup>A</sup>

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~~15 APR 1991~~

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☐ Other:

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OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 06 APR 1996.



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND  
02840

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

24 June 1971

PERSONAL - CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Dear Bud,

The purpose of this letter is twofold. First, I would hope that you would give the final major address at the Second International Seapower Symposium on Friday, 5 November, at 0900. Second, I want to let you know of the progress of our planning and give you my thoughts on the main thrust of the Symposium in order to provide continuity and uniformity in our discussions with naval leaders on our forthcoming trips to Europe. As you know I will be informally inviting the Chiefs, whom I meet, on your behalf.

I am inviting Ralph Cousins to give the keynote address "Reality and Opportunity" on Monday, 1 November; Arleigh Burke to speak on "Problems--Solved and Unsolved" on Tuesday; and Tom Moorer to speak about "Our Mutual Interdependence" on Thursday. I hope therefore you can give the major address on Friday, 5 November. To provide a logical summary we have entitled it "Our Future at Sea." We propose Thursday evening, 4 November, as the official dinner, which you will host; this will be the major social event of the week.

We have set aside Wednesday for solid committee discussions without a major address. Our thought is that with Wednesday as "Ropeyarn Sunday" you could return to Washington Tuesday night and then return Thursday morning if you wanted. Since you would not be involved in committee discussions, your absence could easily be rationalized.

We are now in the process of preparing invitations to the Chiefs of the forty-six navies. These invitations will be in the mail prior to my leaving for Southern Europe on 6 July. I appreciate the promptness of your staff in response to the request for country clearance.

From the enclosed schedule of events, you will see that I have developed the main thrust of the Symposium around the "Appreciation of a Common Challenge at Sea."

PERSONAL--CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

PERSONAL--CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

By using the classified threat briefing as a starter, we will have identified the problem. We can then use portions of the "Newport Study", as previously discussed in my letter of 4 February, to build the seminar discussions.

The "options" on regional ASW/Sea Control arrangements in the study should be excellent grounds for lively dialogue in the geographically oriented seminar groups. This will also permit us to observe the validity of the study as viewed by naval leaders from various areas of the world. At present we are working on a sanitized, shortened version of the study for general use at the Symposium and hope to elicit from the participants some new and original thoughts on alternative regional sea control arrangements. Hopefully we will arrive at meaningful approaches to finite regional arrangements to protect our mutual sea lines of communication.

In the invitational letter, I mention that our guests will have the opportunity to present "papers" at the Symposium. I consider this prudent and necessary in order to insure a meaningful dialogue at the conference and to make clear to our guests that we truly desire a frank exchange of ideas. We want to avoid any impression that the U.S. is "dominating".

I am also informing our prospective guests that accommodations will be provided during their stay in Newport, but not mentioning that the Naval War College would pay for transportation. However, in the letter of instruction to the Attaches, who will be delivering the invitations, I specifically address the fact that they, the Attaches, are authorized to offer financial assistance, for travel purposes, if it appears that cost is a primary factor restricting the attendance of a CNO or VCNO at the Symposium. We don't want to lose such important representation for the lack of a small amount of travel money.

The tremendous response to the Symposium of 1969, which was attended by many Chiefs and Vice Chiefs of Naval Staff from some thirty-eight countries, and the indicated enthusiasm at the highest level for a Second Symposium, indicates that we may well have a high percentage participation at the Chief level this time. Just last week I heard from Admiral Uchida of Japan who is "most anxious" to participate.

PERSONAL--CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

PERSONAL--CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

I know how busy your schedule is, but would hope you could plan to be present at least the four days, 1-2 and 4-5 November, to join with these top level leaders of so many navies of the world.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Navy Department  
Washington, D.C. 20350

Encl.

PERSONAL--CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN



Naval War College  
Naval Historical Collection

Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date:

7/2/98

Title of Article:

Coll 30 Folder "CNO Memo"  
Series 313

Author:

CNO

Date of Presentation:

21 Jun 71

Classification:



Secret



Confidential

Number of Pages:

1

Disposition:



Declassify LAW OPNAVINST 5513.16<sup>A</sup> Dated 15 APR 1991

00 APR 1996



Additional Review Required.



Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:



Article is greater than 30 years old.



Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.



Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 00 APR 1996.

SECRET - ORIGINAL INFORMATION DISCLOSED - NOT  
AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

21 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Via: Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Visits of Foreign CNO's (U)

Ref: (a) OP-00 Memo ser 585-67 of 19 Sept 1967  
(b) OP-00 Memo ser 546-67 of 13 Sept 1967 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Long-Range Plan for Visiting CNO's (U)

1. (C) In accordance with reference (a), the long-range plan for future visits of the commanders of foreign navies is forwarded for your approval.
2. (C-INT) This FY 1972 long-range plan has been coordinated throughout OPNAV. Concurrence of the appropriate State Department and OSD/ISA country desk officers also has been obtained.
3. (S-M) The plan, consisting of eight countries in order of priority, is forwarded as enclosure (1). It includes remarks on each of the following recommended visits:

PRIORITY

COUNTRY

- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| 1 | Australia |
| 2 | India     |
| 3 | Portugal  |
| 4 | Pakistan  |
| 5 | Indonesia |
| 6 | Brazil    |
| 7 | Turkey    |
| 8 | China     |

ALTERNATES

- |   |          |
|---|----------|
| 1 | Finland  |
| 2 | France   |
| 3 | Denmark  |
| 4 | Sweden   |
| 5 | Colombia |

Group 4  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
After 12 Years

SECRET



# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date:

7/6/98

Title of Article:

Coll 30 Folder "Series 1 320" Ltr to Zumwalt

Author:

Colbert

Date of Presentation:

14 Aug 71

Classification:

☒ Top Secret

☐ Confidential

Number of Pages:

2

Disposition:



Declassify LAW OPNAVINST 5513.16

<sup>A</sup>

Dated 08 APR 1996

~~15 APR 1991~~

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

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OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

14 August 1971

COSMIC TOP SECRET (Unclassified when quote is withdrawn)

Dear Bud,

I much appreciated the opportunity to debrief you last Tuesday on the main points gleaned from my recent trip to Europe. It was a most enlightening tour! I apologize for the laryngitis problem. Prue was struck also, so when I returned that evening we had a rather silent reunion. The few days in misty Ireland, I suspect, caused the trouble.

As requested, I will shortly forward a final trip report including recommendations. It is now complete, but I have sent it on to Rivets Rivero to clear some thoughts with him before sending it along to you.

On another but related subject, the classified quotation below is the McNamara statement to the NAC meeting of 25 July 1966 which you indicated you were interested in finding.

"Finally, a number of inefficiencies with respect to our naval force planning should be considered. It is not at all clear, for example, that we should be planning on substantial operations in the Baltic and Black Seas. Admittedly, both areas contain large Warsaw Pact naval forces, but these could be bottled up as long as we control the very narrow exits and this our naval forces have the capability to do. In the case of the Mediterranean, our ability to control the entrances is now substantial, and it will grow further in this five-year period. Warsaw Pact forces there would be quickly deprived of their home bases and thus would be faced with more or less suicidal missions.

Expenditures on naval forces in some instances would seem to be an undue sacrifice and an undue diversion from the more needed ground force strength that we would obtain with the same resources."

In light of the shifting balance, this is the kind of thinking against which we must wage a concerted education program.

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Copy 1 of 2 Copies  
Page 1 of 2 Pages

COSMIC TOP SECRET



COSMIC TOP SECRET

Turning to the Seapower Symposium, it is my understanding that you agree with the idea Secretary Warner discussed with me of his participation in a panel on "Laws of the Sea" at the Seapower Symposium. We are therefore proceeding with planning now. I checked, after your suggestion Tuesday, and Alexis Johnson, unfortunately cannot fit even a brief trip to Newport in his tight schedule. As Alex will be unable to address the Symposium I am passing the information to B.J. so that he might find a suitable substitute. I would suggest that we try to maintain the "blue suit" concept as much as possible and feel in such a case that we could invite Rivets, Chick, Charley or Bush to speak. On the other hand, I understand a tentative invitation to Armisted Seldon to speak has been extended by your staff. Since he spoke at the Sixth Inter-American Naval Conference in April 1971, the American participants, comprising approximately one-third of the Symposium delegation, will have already heard some of his views. However, I am sure he could mold his talk in a much broader context to this worldwide audience, if you desire him to speak.


So as not to overwhelm our guests with a U.S. presence I am extending invitations to a limited number of senior U.S. naval officers as the U.S. delegation. I have gone ahead with these invitations to Admirals Rivero, Clarey, Duncan, Bringle and Harty. If agreeable, I would like to attend as part of the delegation, or as an observer.

Also, as a result of our discussion on Tuesday, and your letter of 11 August, I have now scheduled you to give the keynote address on Monday, 1 November at 1030. This is in place of the wrap-up address you were previously scheduled to give on Friday, 5 November. The title of your address is "REALITY AND OPPORTUNITY" which could be changed if you desire. It will immediately follow the scheduled College Staff briefing on "CHALLENGES AT SEA".

I am turning over to B.J. Semmes on Tuesday, so subsequent correspondence will be with him. He is deeply interested in the Symposium and has the benefit of participating in the 1969 meeting which should be most helpful.

As always, Prue joins in sending our warmest best to you and Mouza.

Sincerely,



R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN  
Chief of Naval Operations

COSMIC TOP SECRET



# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/6/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 300" Ltr to Secy

Author: Colbert

Date of Presentation: 14 Aug 71

Classification: ☒ Secret

☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 45

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated <sup>05 APR 1996</sup> ~~15 APR 1991~~

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☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

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☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

SECRET

(Unclass when encl  
is removed)

PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

14 August 1971

Dear Sey,


Thank you for the draft of the Politico-Military Sub-Committee's paper. I have studied it carefully and think it is an excellent beginning. As you asked, I have added some thoughts which might make it more complete; they are provided as enclosures.

You are absolutely correct in coming straight to the heart of the matter by trying to ask those questions which must be asked and answered if the Navy's long range role is to be defined. In this connection, we have this last year at the War College conducted a study dealing with this very problem. In fact, the "Long Range Future of the Navy" project was briefed to Bud and he has directed that it be put on for the CNO Executive Panel. I have suggested to Kin that it be scheduled for the 9-10 September meeting when we will be addressing your paper. Like your draft, it tries to look ahead and give some hard thought to the probable international and domestic environments in the years before us. It goes through the year 2000 and provides three scenarios. I think portions of it might be worthy of incorporation into the Sub-Committee's final report.

I look forward to hearing your views on the brief.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

  
R. G. COLBERT

Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Mr. Seymour Weiss  
Member, Planning and  
Coordination Staff  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20521

Encl

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Enclosure to VADM Colbert's ltr to Mr. Sey Weiss of 14 Aug 71

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PAGE 8: add after first para:

Inherent in the Nixon Doctrine is the requirement for a lowered profile abroad and a reduction, if not a withdrawal, of our land based forces from various overseas areas. At the same time, there is a reaffirmation of our security commitments to some 42 nations around the world. If this reaffirmation is to be recognized as meaningful, it certainly will require our continuance of a forward strategy, a forward defense posture. Clearly, any such strategy, to be realistic, will have to depend heavily on seabased forces; in short, it would be founded on sea based mobility. This logically means an expanded mission, a heavier burden for the Navy in the years ahead.

But precisely how and in what ways this is to be realized remains to be articulated, much less initiated and implemented...

PAGE 8: add after first sentence of final para:

In his forward to the 1971-72 issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, Raymond Blackman comes down heavily in favor of the continued importance of this particular arm of our naval arsenal...

PAGE 13: add after second sentence, first para:

The Soviets have certainly demonstrated an uncanny ability to orchestrate a naval presence with diplomatic support, economic aid, and military assistance. This type of "troika plus one" strategy (pol/econ/mil means backed up by a timely naval presence, a sort of gun boat diplomacy) has prevailed especially in the Middle Eastern and Indian Ocean regions.

It is therefore suggested that the United States carefully consider ways in which it might be able to implement such a strategy. Specifically, it is suggested...

PAGE 19: add in middle of page as new para:

Certainly they have already begun to do so, in as yet limited fashion. When King Idris of Libya was overthrown in October 1969, Soviet Med fleet ships took station off the coast, as if to warn the U.S. Sixth Fleet

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against any Lebanon type landing. Likewise, during another coup that same month, that in Somalia, Soviet naval forces were on alert in nearby Socotra in the event "imperialist forces" prepared to intervene against the revolution. We can certainly expect other instances to occur in the near future.

There is, of course, one risk which such Soviet conventional "intervention" runs. That is the danger of miscalculating and ending up in a large and unwanted war with the U.S....

PAGE 21: add at end of last para:

So too is Mauritius. But tomorrow these fishing bases might well be bases for naval combatants. For this is obviously the Soviet plan; to initiate a presence by signing accords permitting the use of facilities for fishing vessels, and then gradually expanding those rights into access for merchantmen, and, ultimately, warships.

PAGE 34: add following first para:

In addition to the operational advantages to be gained for the western alliance from such coordinated naval exercises, there is one additional and equally important reason for increasing the nascent efforts in this regard. As Blackman points out in his Foreword to the 1971-72 issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, the Soviets are concerned about the knitting together of western navies "which have little power individually but immense power collectively." The synergistic effect of such cooperation could be enormous, but it remains to be fully exploited.

PAGE 40: add as d):

d) Finally, there is the all-important psychological factor. Espousing the virtues of allied naval cooperation is one thing; taking concrete steps is entirely another. To date, we still treat our allies as second rate friends; we hesitate sharing weapons systems and contingency plans with them for fear of security compromises. In the end, we are left carrying the load unilaterally, the Nixon Doctrine notwithstanding; worse, we alienate those on whom we are supposedly placing greater reliance. In fact, while we give recognition in some naval studies to the potential of allied forces we rarely include them in our contingency plans; except for NATO.

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DRAFT

Politico-Military Sub-Committee

1. Purpose.

The Politico-Military Sub-Committee was vested with the somewhat imprecise mandate of considering how, in the evolving international context, US naval power might be directed toward the accomplishment of diplomatic ends or, alternatively, might be confronted by politico-military issues requiring a reaction by our naval forces. The initial intent was to identify a series of problem areas which would subsequently be subjected to in-depth analyses before being submitted to the CNO. In its present form this paper is still designed primarily to raise questions in response to which the CEP may be able to help contribute answers. However, after Sub-Committee discussion of an earlier draft it was concluded that the paper contained sufficient substance to warrant its submission to the full Panel, and as modified by and subsequently if agreed to by the Panel, should be submitted to the CNO. This

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still leaves open the question of what further in-depth analysis is warranted (and incidentally to whom such analysis should be assigned.) If the paper serves its purpose the CNO may wish to indicate which areas touched on are of sufficient interest to him to warrant follow-up. Alternatively, before submitting the paper to the CNO we can perhaps modify it to identify the specific studies as corrective policies the Panel believes warranted. In any event what follows is a compilation and distillation, largely of contributions made by the Sub-Committee members, although with a major assist from other members of the Panel

## II. General Political Analysis.

a. The Environment of the 70's and 80's. Perhaps it is adequate to leave this consideration implicit in the analysis of the various political situations in which naval power may be applicable. The judgement advanced here is a contrary one: the Panel (and the Navy) had better have a generally agreed international frame of reference within which such analysis (and the naval policies and programs derived therefrom) should proceed.

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It seems a questionable expenditure of time for the Executive Panel to take on an exhaustive analysis of alternative "world futures" for the 70's and 80's -- every respectable (and some not so respectable) private, semi-private, governmental and semi-governmental research organization has conducted such projections. Nevertheless the Panel should, it would seem, have a reasonably clear appreciation of what sort of world environment the US will find itself operating within (and thus constricted by) over the next decade or so.

What interests and objectives is the nation likely to pursue? It has been suggested that we are in the process of a major shift in the characteristics of the international system which requires a new look at our foreign and defense policies. Unlike the immediate post-World War II decades characterized by bi-polarity and containment, the world is moving into a polycentric system somewhat akin to the "chandelier" balance of power of the 19th century. While some tenets of containment still apply, it appears that the real problem might be how to re-orient our defense policy from containment pure and simple to a new approach in which we will have to provide the necessary margin of security to the United States and our allies by playing the role of a balancer in a multi-power environment.



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This can be illustrated by a new governmental thinking which suggests that the perception of the security problem in Asia is changing. Briefly stated the argument is as follows; the threat from China has been over-rated. Not only is she limited in her capacities to directly wage war but even indirect support of aggression is limited (e.g., by local resistance to Chinese cultural domination). Were that not inhibition enough the Soviet threat to Chinese aspirations is. As for the Soviets, they are interested in precluding the extension of both US and Chinese power but have little hope of directly projecting a dominant Soviet influence into Asia, supplanting either

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its communist or capitalist adversaries. Japan, the argument goes on, is the <sup>U</sup>forth critical element in the equation. A growing power, allied to, but having potentially serious differences with, the US, it too is unlikely to embrace either China (culturally similar but otherwise a threat) or the USSR, by far the greatest danger to Japan. (Indeed, given her enormous power potential, as Tom Wolfe has suggested, Japan could occupy a "swing" role with all parties courting her.) From all of the foregoing a kind of quadrilateral balancing of power relationships is seen by some, resulting in a policy distinctly different in nature and effect from that of the China-containment policy of the last three decades.

Without suggesting that this micro-cosmic view of US-East Asian relations is a correct one, or that taken in isolation it would determine broader US national security policy, it does suggest that the view one holds of the external world is likely to have considerable impact upon how we assess the role of military force in general and of the navy in particular in dealing with anticipated politico-military problems.

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Perhaps of equal importance is an appreciation by, and agreement of, the Panel on the domestic environment within which the US Navy will have to operate. How will our perceptions of the external environment be influenced by our domestic attitudes? There is no gainsaying that the current concentration of national concern is with domestic needs. Poverty, race, and inflation, not external problems, are for the most part the key concerns. Somewhat less politically energizing, but of great concern to governmental officialdom, is the pernicious balance of payments deficit and the enormous budgetary deficits. Thus one wonders, how much at issue is the conclusion that the US has entered on what Frank L. Klingberg has called the "introverted mood cycle" of international involvement? In a retrospectively remarkable article, Klingberg wrote, almost twenty years ago (World Politics, Vol. IV, January 1952), that the US historically had experienced alternating periods of "introversion" and "extroversion" in foreign affairs. He predicted that if the average time of previous cycles was confirmed, the period of extroversion, at a very high point at the time he was writing, should end

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in a decade or so"....it seems logical to expect America to retreat, to some extent at least, from so much world involvement, and perhaps to do so sometime in the 1960's."

Moreover, Klingberg argues that political leadership can accentuate the prevailing mood of the nation but probably cannot effect a fundamental change. "Strong leaders can crystalize policies and sentiments, but apparently cannot 'turn the tide' except when the general mood is shifting." As a point incidental to his main thesis, but not to the CEP's, Klingberg notes that annual naval expenditures seem to bear a close statistical relationship "to America's alternating moods in international affairs." While, consistent with our nation's growth, rates of naval expenditure have gone up over our history, introvert phases are not good times for naval appropriations.

Whether Klingberg's cyclical laws are genuine or merely statistically coincidental, the Panel needs to establish reasonably clear parameters about the world environment, external and domestic, within which future Navy programs well perforce have to operate.

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To sum up, while we do not have to accept the inevitability of the conclusion that we are inextricably caught in an introvert cycle of US attitude toward foreign affairs from which there is no immediate escape (I am not myself a determinist) it appears to be true that we are, at least at this time, moving into a neo-isolationist /phase in our foreign policy. To the extent true this would warrant an assessment of what military responses in general, and naval responses in particular, are open to the US over the coming decade if domestic attitudes are likely to place a distinct limit on US external involvements. It would then seem desirable to weigh the conclusions of this analysis with the previously suggested analysis of the anticipated international environment. Conceivably this could result in a re-defined national security policy framework within US naval forces would play a role distinctly different from that of the post World War II decades.

Can the Panel agree on what the probable international and domestic environment is likely to be over the next decade or so, and can one draw operationally useful conclusions for guarding Navy programs during this period?

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b) Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Navy.

Clearly as a related issue, one can presumably take the Nixon Doctrine as reflective of the political context within which US military programs and objectives will be formulated for at least the immediate future (and perhaps until 1976). Despite the inherent ambiguities in that Doctrine, it is generally /accepted that naval forces lend themselves well, perhaps better than other forces, toward its implementation.

*add PP*  
But precisely how and in what ways this is true remains to be defined. Why are naval forces most suitable for this purpose? Which naval forces; all or are some more applicable than others? What guide can be derived for future navy budgets as to which forces are most needed to implement the Doctrine? How can these presumably uniquely suitable forces be reflected in force planning? How can this special role of the Navy, if it really exists, be made convincing to the American public so as to gain understanding and support?

One specialized aspect of this question relates to the role of the naval carrier. *add* Symbolically the most

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important political instrument of the Navy, how should it fill this role? Can it be better coordinated with other instruments of US diplomacy? Is a change in its war fighting role implied? For example, what is the role of the carrier against a USSR attack on Europe? Should it perform a nuclear or non-nuclear strike function against Warsaw Pact land targets or should it be primary directed at Soviet sea power in the Atlantic basin? Similarly, is its primary mission in the Med to protect our naval presence there or is its primary role to project air support to the land operations on the Southern flanks? (Adm. Rivero might opt for the latter; Adm. Kidd for the former.) Similarly, what is its role in the Pacific? Do we not lose a portion of the political (if not military) advantage of the carrier by tying it down to a semi-static role such as that which it currently performs in Indo-China? Why, in such an environment (i.e., where there exists large scale US ground involvement) should not land air carry the total burden? Conversely, why shouldn't the carrier be more specifically oriented toward the quick emergency situations, where land-based air is unavailable,

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thereby symbolizing a mobile, rapidly deployable force?  
(I gather this is now being introduced into Navy planning.  
Is it moving fast enough?) Is there validity to the concept  
that Navy forces provide a more flexible commitment because  
they can be pulled out as well as pushed forward? Could  
more smaller, less sophisticated ships and aircraft, better  
serve US foreign and security policy needs than a lesser  
number of larger, more costly and more sophisticated vessels?

There may also be a series of questions which should be  
posed regarding the future role of the Marine Corps as it  
relates to its mission under the Nixon Doctrine. Recognizing  
that the Marine Corps is not under the jurisdiction of the  
Chief of Naval Operations, the Corps is a part of the Navy  
Department, requires naval shipping and support, and it does  
therefore seem appropriate to consider its role in our strategy  
under the Nixon Doctrine.

Perhaps as currently constituted the Corps is ideally  
suited to the needs of that Doctrine but it is a matter  
which should be explicitly examined and not taken as a  
given. Is it, for example, to function as an intervention  
force, and if so where and under what circumstances? (Is

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intervention consistent with a period of introversion in international affairs?) There is perhaps a difference in this function if the need is limited to the Caribbean as contrasted to Asia. Is it to serve as a reinforcement force, if so, again under what assumed circumstances, Korea, SEA, Taiwan, Norway, Turkey? In short, without suggesting that the Corps is incorrectly constituted, a rethinking of its mission, in relation to the future politico-military environment, seems in order so long as it is expected to maintain its expensive capabilities.

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Finally having raised questions concerning the role and mission of some aspects of Naval force as well as of the Marine Corps, some speculation may be also relevant about basic US military strategy under the Nixon Doctrine. For example, would an island strategy in East Asia increase or reduce the pressures for US naval involvement? In what ways? With what effect upon requirements in other theaters of operation? (Such a strategy is one among several currently being reviewed in NSC studies.)

Such questions as these are obviously only indicative of ones which might be posed about the relationship of particular components of the Navy to the Nixon Doctrine. Doubtless there are other questions as well which could and ought to be analyzed in order to understand the relationship between the Nixon Doctrine and future naval requirements.

c. The Military-Diplomatic Use of Naval Presence.

A need for a sharper appreciation of what is covered in this requirement has been expressed by various members of the Panel. One correspondent sees this as a response to expansion of "Soviet Naval power which tends to: (a) neutralize ('stalemate') our power and influence at

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various points of the globe; (b) erode our alliances." The question is raised as to whether naval movements cannot be coordinated with diplomatic and economic (including foreign aid) actions to achieve specific foreign policy goals. ^ To this end it is suggested that (a) concepts be developed, (b) political trends be analyzed, (c) systematic planning be undertaken of naval movements to influence those trends and (d) an appropriate institutional arrangement be established by the Navy for this purpose.

While this seems a reasonable course of action two questions present themselves: (a) Can the CEP do more than identify this approach as one having potential utility?, (b) Can the Navy complete the task identified without extensive outside, i.e., other Executive Branch, cooperation?

These, and perhaps other questions, are worthy of CEP impact of naval force on foreign policy objectives, namely, discussion. However, there is one aspect of the subtle effect which naval presence (or the relative lack thereof) can have on political and psychological attitudes, which Tom Davies has suggested as warranting immediate consider-

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ation. This effect is one which a) is generated over a considerable period of time and b) may be related to a series of small but cumulatively significant events. This is in contrast to the more frequently considered individual act of considerable significance compressed into a relatively short time span e.g., the threatened use of naval forces in a given contingency.

While more difficult to define precisely, it can nevertheless be argued that this more subtle effect, which, for want of a better term, might be described as "the persistent effect of military presence" may be of considerable importance. Certainly the growing strength of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet has begun to create speculation concerning the relative power balance in the area even though an objective analysis might suggest that US forces now and for some time in the future will continue to be superior. In a similar vein the apparent ability of Soviet forces to trail US naval units tends to leave the impression that US naval forces are vulnerable to being disposed of at the will of the Soviets, even

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though such a conclusion may be far from the fact. Over time, however, such impressions can do much to erode the positive political effect of US naval forces unless means can be found to correct the impression.

Such means may be available and politically exploitable. For example, there is at least some evidence that the ability of the Soviets to locate and trail US naval forces is largely related to their ability to identify US electronic emissions. If the US force does not emit, the Soviets have great difficulty in locating the force. Conversely, through monitoring Soviet search emissions as well as through use of fixed wing and helicopter aircraft, Soviet forces can be kept under surveillance. It might well be feasible to demonstrate the effect of this capability (without incidentally disclosing the precise means by which it is accomplished), by having members of the press corps participate in naval exercises in which this capability to avoid detection while conversely maintaining surveillance of the enemy is demonstrated. The reporting of this capability might begin to counter the existing contrary impression.

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A second example of a way to underline US naval power and concurrent Soviet vulnerability might be to demonstrate the effectiveness of a fairly recent innovation under which US naval vessels are being equipped with missiles capable of homing in on electronic emissions. The missile in question was air delivered against SAM sites in North Vietnam. However, it apparently can be used from a sea platform against either shore installations or against enemy naval vessels which are electronically emitting. If a demonstration could be arranged (for example, by the 6th Fleet in conjunction with allied forces) during which an obsolescent naval vessel equipped with an electronic emitter is hit and/or destroyed at a considerable distance by such an electronic homing missile, the word about this rather impressive capability would quickly get around. It would be bound to impress allies and potential adversaries alike.

The preceding examples, are just that, examples. Doubtless others could be found. The point is that the Navy needs to think about how and in what ways its capabilities can be emphasized so as to add a significant

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positive politico-psychological dimension to its naval presence. There are, of course, pitfalls to be avoided. The problem of disclosing classified capabilities could be one such pitfall. This should not be an insurmountable problem however, for it is probably the details of the capability rather than its existence which need be classified. Moreover, if our naval forces are to serve in their primary role as an effective deterrent their capabilities in the preceding regard need to find some way to be emphasized. As Tom Davies notes, for the successful accomplishment of the "deterrent or 'presence mission', the forces must present the adversary with a clearly visible, credible capability to deal with and defeat his forces... For the successful accomplishment of the peace-time mission the conflicting objective of technical surprise in a war situation must frequently be subordinated."

Political Impact of Soviet Naval Forces.

a. Inter-relationship of Soviet Strategic and Conventional Power. Charles Herzfeld has quite correctly pointed out that if we are to justify a large US naval

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presence, we need to understand the latter's effect and motivation. This in turn will require an in-depth study of the political effects of naval presence for which the careful examination of some recent examples of the use by the Soviets of their force might be revealing. However, more than this is obviously required. Looking to the future one would presumably wish to consider how, with an altered strategic balance, and perhaps harkening back to the opening passages of this paper, a changed domestic and international environment, Soviet naval forces might be employed for political effect. The probability is that the two superpowers will essentially maintain a strategic nuclear standoff for the indefinite future. This is not to say that one or the other may not seek a politically exploitable strategic advantage. A continuing Soviet deployment of the large SS-9 type ICBM, not offset by countervailing US efforts, might be an example of such a politically exploitable advantage. But this sort of gamesmanship (serious gamesmanship to be sure, especially if the political exploitation occurs during a crisis) aside,

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is it not reasonable to assume that the Soviets will attempt to exploit conventional military power for political ends? Having effectively stymied the US strategic nuclear threat and assuming our perception of Soviet desire to advance its influence and interest is correct, why would they not seek to utilize their conventional military force, where suitable, to advance their diplomatic, economic and political purposes? <sup>add</sup> If they do attempt to do so, they run the risk, to be sure, of miscalculating their way into a large, unwanted war with the US. But the means are at hand to exercise considerable control over their chosen instruments (especially if these are naval forces). More importantly if their local power appears to provide a significant edge over US deployable power they may calculate, with some reason, that it is the US which does not dare engage or that if it does it bids fair to suffer a serious local defeat. Such calculations have long been at the heart of US willingness to employ a show of force, or if need be to engage that force, to deter effective communist intervention. Though the time may

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not yet have arrived, some analysis of Soviet ability to exploit naval power in this fashion in the future, and its implications for US interests, may warrant analysis. Such an analysis, along with the more conventional considerations of conventional war fighting capabilities, per se, ought to include other less direct but nonetheless important avenues of possible exploitation. For example, as one analyst has noted, "in a world of nuclear deterrence where soft and gradual military approaches may be far more successful than hard frontal assaults on the part of a large nuclear power, substantial merchant forces have many advantages: they earn hard currencies, they show the flag in parts of the world, they provide a manpower pool of trained seagoing reservists, they provide ships which can be converted to naval purposes in many instances, they can gather many kinds of intelligence, etc."

These various avenues of possible exploitation suggest another question: Does the CNO have a suitable body which could not only analyze, but follow through in actual policy implementation, the multi-leverage approach necessary to counter Soviet ability to exploit naval power?

b. Soviet Overseas Bases? The exploitation of overseas bases is a similar area warranting analysis not only for their obvious military utility but, if they command the narrow straits and key trade routes, their threat to the commercial life lines of dependent states can be a powerful political weapon. Largely as a

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consequence of some \$11 billion in military and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries since 1955, the USSR has acquired:

- The use of the ports of Algiers, Alexandria, Port Said, Latakia and Tartus
- Naval and commercial vessel rights to use Aden, Basra and Bombay
- A prospective submarine base (being built for India) at Visakhapatnam
- Prospective use of port facility at Hodieda (Yemen).
- Fishing fleet access to various countries
- Use of Cuban facilities
- Prospective use of Singapore

While the evidence is not conclusive that the Soviets are planning to build a series of overseas bases their presence overseas is undeniably expanding. In the past, nations aspiring to great power status have acquired a substantial overseas base complex. As a recent Rand Study (from which the foregoing was largely extracted) notes "Okinawa was once a haven for American whalers in the days of the sail; today Japan and America discuss its nuclear status. Today Aden is a haven for Soviet fishing vessels...." *add*

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A different aspect of the Soviet expansion also merits consideration: The extent to which this expansion makes the Soviets vulnerable to the interruption of sea lines of communications and might enhance their stake in international stability and the freedom of the seas. When viewed in this light, the problem of the Soviet expansion of overseas presence is a complex one which requires a complex response. Assuming a certain degree of inevitability in the Soviet overseas expansion, the question arises: Would it be possible, through a prudent and far-sighted U.S. policy, to influence the direction of the Soviet overseas expansion in such a way as to minimize its power value to the Soviet Union and maximize the Soviet stake in international stability?

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c. Soviet Arms Control Proposals. Another area in which we may well have had a recent demonstration of the political use of Soviet naval presence, and to a degree in anticipation of that presence, is the Brezhnev proposal for arms control agreements <sup>relating to</sup> / US and Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. In one fell swoop this offer accomplished the following:

- By emphasizing that any such agreement would of course have to be on the basis of equality (the USSR is prepared to discuss the problem of naval deployment but only "on an equal basis") it established itself as a naval power entitled to equal treatment with the US well before objectively gaining naval parity.
- The approach suggests a US-USSR arrangement even though it is clear that any such conference would have to deal with issues of vital interest to our allies, some of whom, incidentally, have large naval forces in the area operating with our own.
- The offer establishes the Soviets as taking a peaceful political initiative. If an agreement eventuates they get the lion's share of the credit; if one doesn't the US gets the blame.

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-- The approach highlights the "unreasonableness"  
i.e.,  
of the US position/criticizing Soviet naval  
activity while considering the US Navy's ubiqui-  
tous presence "normal and natural".

The analysis of the objectives of Soviet naval presence,  
as Herzfeld has suggested, while it might not have pre-  
dicted such a Soviet ploy, nevertheless might have and  
thus placed us in a better position to deal with it when  
it occurred. Even now the Navy must ask itself what  
sort of arms control proposal relating to naval forces  
in the areas identified by the Soviets (or others?)  
might be in the US interest and have some reasonable hope  
of being negotiated. With the Navy claiming that its position  
in the Mediterranean is fast deteriorating, and foreseeing  
little prospect of matching present and future Soviet deploy-  
ments to the Indian Ocean, it is incumbent upon it to think  
hard about whether an arms control arrangement might contribute  
/to a stabilization. Might it be possible, for example,  
to pose a "freeze" at current levels while publicly  
acknowledging the principle of Soviet equality? If not, (it  
is doubtful that the Soviets would buy this) how much more

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Soviet naval presence would we settle for -- and of what sort -- before accepting a freeze on both sides as being in our interest? Could a "free zone" in some part of the Eastern Mediterranean be established? Would we exchange this for Soviet abandonment of proxy bases at Alexandria, and/or elsewhere? The Navy must carefully consider not whether some ideal arrangement which can guarantee its previous superiority (can be negotiated, but rather what it sees as the alternative to an arms control agreement in terms of the evolving US-USSR naval balance in this area of the world. In sum, how can the Navy respond to this Soviet initiative without a serious worsening of the current politico-military situation and, if possible, with some improvement?

### III. Specific Politico-Military Problems Warranting Analysis

Several members of the Panel have suggested a range of specific problems, issues and contingencies which, presumably for want of a better home, may be worthy of analysis by the Politico-Military Sub-Committee. Some of these specifics bear a relationship to, if they do not actually overlap, the areas of general political analysis treated in II above. A partial listing of those areas which have been suggested follow:

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a. The Growth of Soviet Naval Power. Under what circumstances and with what effect might the Soviets be tempted to utilize through interposition, their growing naval power to deprive or defeat US objectives? Examples

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might include: interposition between American or O.A.S. forces and a revolution in the Caribbean, between the US Sixth Fleet and/or Greek forces seeking to intervene in a Cypriot civil war, or, perhaps between Portuguese naval forces and a revolution taking place in Mozambique or Angola.

An interesting use of naval power by the Soviets in the classical tradition was the deployment of two destroyers off the coast of Guinea late last year. The purpose of this show of force was to reassure the government which believed itself endangered by the threat of foreign military intervention. The Soviet destroyers called at Conakry, and Soviet diplomats in the capital stated that the warships' presence "will help to guarantee the integrity of Guinean territorial waters." However, this Soviet earnest of help to fend off a seaborne threat to the Guinean government did not apparently allay the government's continued fears of attack. Nevertheless, the incident is a noteworthy example of Soviet use of its

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newfound sea power to support a friendly government during a time of crisis. Even today Soviet destroyers still patrol off the coast.

b. Freedom of the Seas. Questions involving the freedom of the seas are central to the mission of every navy. Possible scenarios vary from problems involving a challenge to the principle of freedom of the sea to armed attempts to deny it to merchant or naval vessels. For example, in 1962 the United States was extremely successful in the "missile blockade" of Cuba. In what manner would the scenario be developed given the Soviet Union's naval power of today?

In a related vein, the USG is preparing for a major Law of the Seas Conference in 1973. Prospects are that coastal the non-maritime states will exert their combined influence

over territorial waters to distances up to 200 miles and by closing straits to right of free passage). Preparation for this conference is a matter in which the Department of Defense and the Navy are engaged. One wonders, however, just how much attention the matter is receiving in the Navy and at how

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senior a level? Are the implications of various potential restrictions on the ability of the Navy to operate, clearly understood by the State Department? Have all possible avenues been explored for countering the anticipated efforts at constricting freedom of the seas? For example, has thought been given to advance preparation and cooperative action by the maritime powers --/including the USSR?

c. The Role of allies. There are several facets to this problem. There is first of all (as both Bob Delaney and John Hoefer point out), a need for an up-to-date assessment on allied capabilities and how those capabilities might be utilized to achieve common US-allied objectives, granting the inherent uncertainty of whether, from a political point of view, those forces are likely to be available. Do we, for example, tend to discount certain allied potential because their military capacities do not measure up to our standards of performance? In some quarters there has been a belief, perhaps unjustified, that the US Navy talks a good game when it comes to the potential use of allied naval forces but in reality finds

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many reasons to discount this potential because of its materiel and training limitations. Second, is there a realistic appraisal of what circumstances allied navies could be relied upon? Acknowledging the "chanciness" of relying on a third party, still how extensive is our planning for allied use and have we done all we can to explore with allies contingencies in which they might join us? Third, what, if anything, can be done to increase the extent to which allies can be involved in joint undertakings? Is there more room for peace-time exercises -- e.g., how much do we do in the way of bilateral peace-time maneuvers? Do we have a careful analyses of the political, as well as the military effect of the UNITAS exercises (US-Latin American naval maneuvers) and or their possible applicability to other regions? One special problem area immediately comes to mind. Recent studies of US-Norwegian relations suggest that there is a clearly perceptible trend indicating a further shifting of power toward the Soviet Union in the Northern Flank of NATO. The essence of the problem grows out of increased Soviet capabilities in the Kola Peninsula which is contiguous to North Norway. As a base for air strikes against the US and Atlantic shipping the Soviet Union has built on Kola one of the world's greatest and

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increasing concentrations of military power, comprising numerous missile emplacements, thirteen air fields, and as many as six divisions. Kola contains most of the world's population north of the Arctic Circle and the Soviet's only year-round ice-free ocean port. Most of the Soviet fishing fleet is based there, as well as the Northern Fleet, the most powerful component of the Soviet Navy. A recent study points out that recent increases in Soviet capability in the area, including a demonstrated amphibious capability, have fanned Norwegian concerns about growing Soviet capability to isolate Norway from its allies, as well as invade by sea. Accordingly it has been suggested that Norway be provided with increased assurance of its defense and of the existence of an effective deterrence. Toward this end it proposes that since the principal root of Norwegian anxiety is the recent Soviet naval buildup, increased naval operations would enhance deterrent credibility, and contribute toward attaining a viable capability for holding in case of

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attack. It further suggests increased NATO naval exercises toward this end. It strongly urges the US to commit an aircraft carrier toward this end. Such an exercise might be a concrete example of increased alliance involvement which the Panel may wish to consider in greater depth. It might also be worth contemplating whether, if a significant US show of naval force in this area were to prove feasible, it might also have the effect of causing Soviet planners to think twice about the extension of Soviet naval forces to distant areas, such as the Mediterranean, in the face of a possible threat much closer to home. In any event would this specific exercise or other similar ones be of value and does the Navy have the capability for undertaking them?

d. Multinational Naval Cooperation. This is closely related to the preceding point. Dick Colbert points out that the existence of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, has demonstrated the possibility of creating a multinational naval force on a limited scale. Regional exercises need not involve large numbers of ships and could start with initial emphasis on communications and

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basic tactical training evaluations. Exercises should also include the cultural and psychological aspects of port visits.

Joint naval operation scenarios, as suggested, might involve the Mediterranean location, including NATO allies, and perhaps Israel. Joint exercises with Naval Forces of the Americas should also be considered. Especially interesting might be a multinational Indian Ocean Force. Scenarios should explore several facets of this problem:

(1) What political objections to such multinational exercises exists among the governments engaged in the exercise?

(2) What political and operational benefits can be derived from such exercises?

(3) What forms can multinational exercises take in order to avoid domestic political objections?

(4) What political or military objections are likely to be raised by third parties?

(5) How can multinational exercises be used as tools of foreign policy, such as a demonstration of solidarity in the face of foreign aggression?

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Tom Wolf<sup>2</sup>notes that in addition to joint exercises it might be possible to encourage the cooperative study of selected military-political problems with other navies. My own experience with multinational gaming and analysis suggests that more can and ought to be done in this area, although the situations to be analyzed and gamed, and the participants, would have to be carefully chosen.

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e. Middle East and Persian Gulf. Several variants of a Middle East confrontation growing out of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been proposed for analyses. A Yellow Sea crisis growing out of inadvertant confrontation between US and North Korean or PRC forces is another. A Persian Gulf crisis emerging out of an Iran-Iraq confrontation, is still another. Indeed several contingency situations suggest themselves out of the prospective British departure from the Persian Gulf. A recent NIE (30-1-71 of April 1, 1971) may be worthy of Panel consideration. The study points out that with the British departure the area will be open to "accelerating political

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change". Among other actions which may be expected is the seizure of certain islands in the Strait of Hormuz, unless acceptable political compromise (deemed unlikely) can be achieved. Moreover, "if a radical regime should come to power in one of the Sheikdoms -- and the chances are growing in Bahrain -- both Saudi Arabia and Iran would probably seek to unseat it by direct means." Both might attempt military intervention. At the same time the estimate notes that "once the British leave, the Soviets will seek diplomatic relations with the lower Gulf states and may offer military equipment to the rulers. Soviet naval presence in the Gulf will doubtless increase" although within certain constraints. This would suggest a range of possible problems in which US naval force might be involved either in an effort to deter hostilities or subsequently in an attempt to influence the outcome of hostilities, although as a practical matter it may well be that the USG would be loath to exert other than political influence in this area. Even so, might there not be a direct correlation between the effectiveness of political pressure and the presence of US naval forces?

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g. Strategic Deterrence. Most of the foregoing suggests analysis dealing largely with naval general purpose force missions. One may ask, however, whether some analysis of the political implications of strategic naval forces would not also be useful. For example, how if at all, can our ballistic missile submarine force and our strategic ASW forces be utilized toward meeting political objectives? Which objectives, if any, lend themselves to such use? If Soviet strategic programs, offensive and defensive, continue to grow, this may provide the Soviets with a useful political leverage. Can US naval strategic forces contribute to offsetting this leverage? If so, is it merely a matter of publicizing and emphasizing our own capabilities or can other actions be taken? The development of ULMS is likely to be sufficiently dramatic to provide counter leverage, in a political and psychological sense, to Soviet strategic forces. Are there particular ways the capability of this system can be exploited for political ends (and might this mean

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less of a shroud of secrecy)? Similarly are there ways that our ASW capabilities can be better advertised for political ends without serious security degradation?

There is a danger here worth noting. Partly out of a genuine conviction that US underseas strategic forces are and will remain the most invulnerable, partly out of a desire, for the foregoing and other reasons, to gain a larger share of the Defense budget, and perhaps partly to underline for political purposes the effectiveness of Polaris, Poseidon, and ULMS, the Navy may be drawing itself into an inter necine inter-Service fight. Should this occur the results, in political if not military terms, could be counter-productive. The weaknesses, real, imagined or potential, of the Navy's underseas strategic forces will be publicized. As Albert Wohlstetter has pointed out, the Navy is likely to find ready friends in the Congress who will only too readily agree that land based systems are undesirable -- only to argue against further naval forces once the Army and Air Force needs are beaten back. The ensuing carnage can only do damage

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to the political, if not the military impact of naval strategic forces. Instead, it might make more sense to concentrate attention on the need for improving certain characteristics of the SSBN force such as command and control and improved missile accuracies (stellar inertial guidance). This would, among other things, reduce some of the deficiencies currently embodied in the SSBN force, deficiencies which are especially significant if it is to be thought of as a replacement for our land-based strategic forces. In this connection I have raised with the Strategic Sub-Committee what seems to me to be an imprecise focussing on what sea-based strategic offensive forces are capable of doing and not doing and how one ought to think about their mission over the long run. Clearly they are a deterrent, but to what? Solely a massive counter value strike against the USSR and China? Are their missions other than simple "assumed destruction" to which these forces can be devoted? During a period of nuclear parity with the USSR, the deterrence against massive countervalue nuclear usage may be strong, but is it clear that such deterrence extends effectively to more limited nuclear usage? The political implications of developing the capability of the Navy's strategic offensive nuclear forces to contributing to limited nuclear applications (would improved Poseidon accuracies raise the first strike concern?) might warrant examination.

h. Technological Advances. As a somewhat related matter, one wonders whether at least some of the technological advances in prospect for the Navy cannot be used to effect foreign policy advantages. Naval plans for high speed hydrofoil, sea control ships, use of ocean surveillance capabilities, etc., might be politically exploitable if more thought were given to precisely how this might be accomplished. One problem which suggests itself, however, is that the Navy cannot readily advertise its deficiencies, especially drawing unfavorable

comparisons with the growing might of the Soviet Navy, while simultaneously trumpeting its technological superiority. The question warrants further analysis.

Similarly, thought ought to be given to a more extensive interchange<sup>and cooperative programs</sup> on advanced technology with our allies.

Granting the security problems involved there are three potential advantages to more extensive allied involvement:

a) It may improve their naval capabilities and, with limited budgets, maximizing the effectiveness of their forces is important;

b) We may profit from the interchange, depending on how it's done (it's worth recalling that radar, the cat's deck and other important advances were not "made in America"), and;

c) Such interchanges can have, and normally do have, a large political spin-off, which can be very useful to the Navy and the US in pursuing broader objectives.

<sup>add</sup> i. Navy International Affairs Expertise. In connection with all of the foregoing, it might be well for the Navy to

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assess its own in-house expertise in international relations. The Army in particular (the Air Force somewhat less so), has for several years had a very large program for post graduate academic work in international relations. As a result the Army is equipped with a large corps of personnel who are able to deal in highly sophisticated problems of a politico-military nature including of the sort suggested here for analysis. The Navy's training programs for its officers in international relations is perhaps worthy of further consideration.

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# Naval War College

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## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/6/98

Title of Article: Coll 30 Folder "Series 320 Ltr to Colbert"

Author: Leadly

Date of Presentation: 17 Aug 77

Classification: ☐ Secret

☒ Confidential

Number of Pages: 4

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 <sup>A</sup> Dated 08 APR 1996 ~~15 APR 1991~~

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.



CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDING OFFICER  
NAVAL UNDERWATER SYSTEMS CENTER  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02840

12 August 1971

A:RTL:jsd  
3900  
Ser. 01734

17 AUG 1971

CERTIFIED MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy  
President  
Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Colbert:

As requested by your letter of 2 July 1971, I reviewed the General Dynamics' brochure on the "NATO Submarine" and asked that our analysis staff critically examine the concept as well. The results of this cursory examination are attached.

In general, the concept of a small, conventional submarine is considered desirable. However, its tactical utility should not be compromised for the sake of simplicity. It might well be desirable to minimize its mission flexibility to obtain a more effective boat. The major objection of our analysis staff is the use of the large sail/gas turbine generators in the depicted manner.

Sincerely,

*BT*  
R. T. LUNDY  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Enclosure

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All paragraphs of this report are classified

## CRITIQUE

General Dynamic's

NATO Submarine

There is a market for coastal submarines of the size proposed by General Dynamics. France has sold a number of their Daphne class to Spain and Portugal, and General Dynamics has sold a few stretched Mackerel types to Peru. Italy has recently built a number of coastal subs, as have Sweden, Norway, Japan, Germany, and Denmark. All of the above are diesel-electric, all carry only torpedo tubes, and they range from 350 to 1000 tons standard displacement. The submarine proposed by General Dynamics would be superior to all of the above from some aspects but far from optimum in others. Specific comments on its merits and drawbacks follow.

### 1. Offensive Capabilities

a. Anti-shipping. The submarine is proposed to be quieter and faster than current NATO coastal (Med.) subs. Its BQS-2 sonar is adequate to detect merchant shipping; however, only 6 asurf torpedoes are provided to kill them, thereby limiting its capability. With an estimated 2 or 3 shots/kill, this will allow only 2 or 3 attacks before it is necessary to return to port.

b. Anti-escort. The proposed weapons for such a mission include both torpedoes and asurf missiles. Unless the large-diameter torpedoes are rather sophisticated in nature, such as the Torpedo Mk 48, their use against a high-speed, maneuverable surface target such as a destroyer would be of very limited value. Anti-destroyer operations with the asurf missile are also not very promising. Its small warhead implies that a destroyer would likely survive several hits. Other enemy destroyers would likely take up ASW action, making it difficult for the sub to close in for a torpedo kill.

Attack on a carrier would be possible by missile only, owing to the denseness of the ASW screening with helos expected to surround the MOSKVA-class ships. Since the MOSKVA exists in only small numbers, harassing attacks (non-kill) may be worthwhile in reducing its effectiveness. Inter-sub communication should be provided to make this capability greater.

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c. Anti-submarine. Anti-submarine engagements are most critically dependent on first detection. If the NATO Submarine is quieter, as proposed, it should have the advantage. Its low speed prevents its use in the trailing mission. This submarine, as proposed, would carry only small (12-3/4-inch diameter) ASW weapons. Because of present U.S. Navy policy, this would limit the submarine to the Torpedo Mk 44, essentially a 30-knot, 6000-yard weapon, or other NATO ordnances. If future arrangements are made to release the Torpedo Mk 46, the ASW effectiveness will be dramatically increased.

## 2. Defense Capabilities

a. Anti-air. By moving the charging engines above water, the designers have transformed its vulnerability to surface and submarine craft into a vulnerability to air attack. The sail will present a radar target and a visual target; but, worst of all, the engines and exhaust will provide an IR-equipped ASW aircraft with a beacon. A small IR detector such as that used in a Sidewinder missile should be able to detect the submarine at something like 5 nm; a larger aircraft sensor at something like 20 nm. If attacked by air, the AA missiles are too small, and probably too slow, to be of much use. A better defense would be an emergency dive capability, able to dive in under five seconds of detecting the oncoming aircraft, along with sufficient sensors to detect ASW radar emission at 20 nm. The AA missile may have a good anti-helo capability.

b. Destroyer/Submarine Attack. No anti-torpedo counter-measures are included in the proposals. If detected, the submarine would not have the speed to escape nor any way to hide.

## 3. Miscellaneous

Propulsion. As noted, the use of gas turbines above the air/water interface will definitely compromise the submarine's position when in a charging cycle by visual, radar, and infra-red means. The report notes the use of conventional lead-acid batteries for submerged energy. On the positive side, the gas turbine power plant would be smaller, lighter, and more dependable than a diesel. The use of snorkelling charging engines with a subsequent reduction in sail size is mandatory. The cost/performance dividends possible from the use of more energetic electrochemical couples should be determined; the use of silver-oxide/zinc secondary batteries is an example.

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UDT. The UDT capability would be useful for operations near enemy harbors and beaches. The submarine is rather large for that specific mission, but as a secondary capability it should be excellent.

Low Noise. The mounting of the turbines above water as described does not assure that a large fraction of the radiated noise (at low frequencies) will not proceed down the mountings and use the submarine hull as a resonant sound emitter. No special mountings are shown.

Patrol Craft. Small submarines are the ideal ships to oppose small craft. The patrol craft have negligible sonar capabilities and are large enough and noisy enough to be fine targets for asurf missiles. Yet they are small enough to be sunk, or at least badly damaged, by one hit. If the submarines can be made cheaply enough, this may be the answer to the OSA/KOMAR threat.



# Naval War College

Naval Historical Collection

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Date:

7/6/98

Title of Article:

Coll 30 Folder "Series 328" Ltr to CNO

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~~15 APR 1991~~



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OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELLED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

Prospective  
Chief of Staff  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
HEADQUARTERS  
OF  
THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, 23511, U.S.A.

REFER TO

3 September 1971

Dear Bud,

When I gave you a quick debrief of my trip through Europe, you asked for a written report as a "check off list of recommendations". Because I worked closely with Rivets Rivero as senior naval advisor to General Goodpaster, in connection with all of my meetings with NATO naval leaders in the seven countries visited, I wanted to clear my report with him before submitting it. I have received his thoughts and have tried to reflect his views. I have also, of course, shown the report to Admiral Duncan who generally concurs. The report is attached.

You will note that my conclusions and recommendations are all consistent with and support, and in some cases expand on the conclusions and recommendations of the Newport Study.

In short, it is clear to me, if we are to get our naval allies to do more in the ASW/Sea Control area, there are certain basic steps that are essential:

- a. Using the Seapower Symposium as an initial step - on a navy to navy basis - to elicit ways and means of expanding national naval capabilities and utilizing them on a multinational/regional basis to cope with the threat to our worldwide sea LOCs.
- b. Eliminating the McNamara/McNaughton policy of downgrading NATO navies and establishing a new U.S. policy at the top level of NATO which would support expanded national naval (ASW/Sea Control) capabilities for our allies; this might best be done by the U.S. Secretary of Defense at an early NATO Ministerial Meeting.
- c. Establishing within the JCS the fact that the shift in the balance of the threat has been to seaward, and that MAP allocations to strengthen allied naval forces need to reflect this.
- d. Convincing the Congress, by a major joint State-Defense effort, that a "new look" at military assistance is essential if the Nixon Doctrine to persuade our allies to carry a heavier burden at sea is to be viable.

My trip debriefings to State (Assistant Secretary Marty Hillebrandt and the various European and NATO desk officers) and Defense (Deputy Assistant Secretary John Morse and the ISA European area people) seemed to be extremely well received. I am more than ever convinced that the Newport Study (in its worldwide approach) should be presented to Defense and to State as soon as feasible. I believe it should best be done by your personal staff in your name, with appropriate help from the Naval War College.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

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Subj: Trip report of VADM R. G. Colbert - Europe,  
12-29 July 1971 (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium,  
W. Germany, UK and Portugal)

Ref: Joint State/Defense message 080209Z July State  
122263, Nixon Doctrine, AD-70, MC 14/3, MC 85-70,  
DOD Blue Ribbon Panel Supplementary Report on the  
Shifting Balance of Military Power

## I. Purpose

1. To call on the Chiefs of Naval Service of indicated countries as President of the Naval War College (NAVWARCOL) and as representative of the CNO, to extend a personal invitation to the Second International Seapower Symposium to be held at the NAVWARCOL in November 1971 and discuss the scope of that agenda. To be briefed as prospective Chief of Staff, SACLANT, and to explore the concept of navies of NATO countries taking a greater role in multinational naval arrangements (comparable to STANAVFORLANT) with a view to implementing the partnership principle of the Nixon Doctrine, enhancing the NATO alliance image, and effecting better surveillance and ASW operations vis-a-vis Warsaw Pact Navies.

## II. Summary

2. All navies of the seven NATO countries visited were deeply concerned about Soviet naval expansion and comprehended the importance of further developing their capabilities to counter the threat, particularly the submarine and surface to surface/air to surface missile threat posed by Warsaw Pact navies. However, they all made clear that they are committed to capacity and would need additional assets to take on substantially expanded roles. Navies visited were obviously in an inferior position (shared in most cases by their sister air forces) in relationship to the Armies of countries concerned. Therefore, any movement for expanding national naval capabilities and any development of a national awareness of the need to increase the naval share of the military budget in each country must be stimulated from outside (e.g., at the NATO Ministerial level and at the top U.S. level by a clear statement of U.S. policy and a substantial increase in U.S. military assistance for sea control forces.) The NAVWARCOL Seapower Symposium can play a major role not only in examining the possibilities of multinational regional naval arrangements on a navy to navy



level, but also in exploring the best approaches to the national leadership in each of the nations to gain support for an expanded naval and ASW air effort. Very importantly the McNamara/McNaughton policy to downgrade navies of NATO nations on the argument that they are unnecessary luxuries and that the U.S. Navy will control the seas needs correction at the highest NATO ministerial level. Of equal importance is the need to establish within the JCS arena the shift in the balance of the threat to seaward and need for increased Navy MAP allocations for our allies to increase their capabilities at sea. Finally, the Departments of State and Defense clearly must join together and make a herculean effort to persuade Congress to the important need for a "New Look" at military assistance, if the Nixon Doctrine of partnership in mutual security is to be viable.

### III. Highlights

#### A. Rome

1. The Italian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini, felt strongly that preparations should be made to shift COMNAVSOUTH HQ from Malta to Naples in order to bring psychological pressure to bear on DOM MINTOFF (CINCSOUTH concurs on the move to Naples for sound reasons of Command and Control, but doubted that it would have the desired effect on MINTOFF, as events have proven).

2. The Italians were concerned that the U.S. would not afford NATO consultation with respect to bilateral US/USSR talks on Rules of Engagement at Sea. Assurances were given that the U.S. would consult with NATO allies before making any commitment. (The American Ambassador to Rome, Graham Martin, later confirmed that the U.S. would consult with allies. The timing of consultation is a sensitive issue with Italians).

3. The Italian Chief of Defense Staff (General Marchesi) expressed deep concern over the potential for a communist power grab from within Italy and said the Italian military would not stand by and let it happen (this raises the clear possibility of far right reaction to communist/leftist domestic gains in Italy).

4. The STANAVFORMED concept (supported by CINCSOUTH) was viewed by the Italians as good conceptually, but they argued it would overstretch their present resources. However, with the suggestion of the possibility of an add-on of an SSN to the force for ASW training, the Italians expressed sudden interest. (Admiral Rivero is also anxious to get nuclear attack sub services for ASW

training). Italians (and later the Greeks and Turks) seemed to welcome the idea of a STANAVFORLANT demonstration visit to the Med.

5. The Italian Navy appreciated the need for increased surveillance ops against soviet subs, but begged lack of resources and little influence on national budget to increase resources. Here again, only external help from the top level of NATO and U.S. government could give them necessary support to fight for adequate funding in their national forum.

6. The Italian Navy wants an increased URG capability including a moderate size oiler. (CINCSOUTH strongly concurs in adequate URG capabilities - for all smaller NATO navies - to make them more self-sufficient logistically, able to conduct sustained operations and expand their deployments out of area; finally, to be able to provide emergency fuel supplies for SIXTHFLT).

7. The Italian Navy is "Sponsor" of the Algerian Navy for training of cadets. The Italians asked about Yugoslavian Navy, with which they are becoming more friendly, being invited to Seapower Symposium. They believe it important that they maintain contact "for the west" with such marginal countries.

8. Interest was shown in Italy, and elsewhere we visited, in the Free World Frigate concept.

#### B. Athens

1. Malta - the Greeks were not as sensitive as the Italians to this problem. Greeks doubted utility of Malta in general war where it could be quickly neutralized, but appreciated important impact of USSR gaining control of harbor facilities in cold war as major naval base, etc.

2. Suez Canal - Med countries in opinion of Vice Admiral Margaritis, Chief of Naval Staff, Hellenic Navy, have adjusted economically to the closing of Suez. Opening would be of great strategic advantage to USSR - particularly for access to the Indian Ocean. (CINCSOUTH concurs).

3. Greek Navy also is resource-limited and in inferior position vis-a-vis Army. Greeks strongly advocate NATO common funding -- particularly for fuel. (It was later found there is little support at SACEUR HQ for this position because the NATO budget committee rejects it).

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4. Greeks feel there is clear significance and need to increase their capability to conduct surveillance ops of major Russian fleet anchorages to east and west of Crete. Coast watchers and fishing vessels could be used for surveillance of Soviet naval ops in Aegean/Ionian area but need radio equipment, according to Greeks.

5. The Greek Navy "sponsors" the Libyan navy in the field of education/training of cadets -- similar to Italian sponsorship of Algerian Navy. Greeks believe it important politically that they nurture their Libyan relationship at this time.

6. Greek Navy has short legs - needs AO and URG capability. It also requires extensive modernization to enhance effectiveness of both ships and MPA.

7. CINCSOUTH is interested in breaking down "national area boundary" fixation of Med navies. Italians are most pliable; Greeks consider Aegean to be "their Sea"; Turks want eastern half of Aegean as their area. CINCSOUTH has made progress in getting Greek and Turk navies to work together harmoniously by alternating command of "TACEX'S" encompassing Aegean/Ionian seas. By avoiding "black and white" paper agreements - and working informally he has done a masterful politico-military job of bringing the Greeks and Turks together at sea.

8. Restrictions on U.S. military sales to Greece have forced them to seek military hardware from Germany and especially France, which is "out to sell" arms to anyone, according to Greek sources.

#### C. Ankara

1. The Turkish Navy is sharply focused on Black Sea operations and control of the straits. (CINCSOUTH pointed to Turkish reluctance to operate outside "boundaries" but cited progress that had been made as noted above in paragraph III.B.7.).

2. Admiral Eyiceoglu, Turkish Chief of Naval Staff, cited advantage of additional minelayers for controlled mines, although claimed could close Straits in 24 hours with current capabilities. (This was later questioned by the First Sea Lord in London). (As indicated in sub-paragraph H.10., CINCSOUTH feels that Turkish Navy must be strengthened to insure closure of straits.)

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3. The Turkish Navy is relatively optimistic about capability to increase naval forces (personnel strength). Cited DE building program in own yard as important symbol of increased naval potential. Turkish Navy still very inferior to Army in national military picture and this has been abetted by U.S. MAP priorities which allocate only 10-13% to Navy requirements. Turks, as Greeks, would like to see expanded NATO common funding.

4. The Turkish Chief of Naval Staff made various references to underwater detection gear (in one case alluding to ITASS need in Med).

5. American Embassy officials in Ankara do not appear to be seapower oriented. That is, they oppose major Sixth Fleet visits to Istanbul on the argument that "gunboat diplomacy" is obsolete, without appreciation of the fact that the USSR is dynamically expanding its influence in the Med by sea (using "gunboat diplomacy") on an accelerated and aggressive basis.

6. In subsequent discussions of the inferior position of the Turkish Navy and Air Force, CINCSOUTH agreed that there was need to re-examine JCS Navy and Air (ASW) MAP priorities for these countries and concurrently reverse the McNamara/McNaughton policy which argued that expenditures on small navies were an "undue diversion" from more needed ground force strength and assumed that the U.S. Navy would handle all problems at sea for NATO.

D. Casteau and Brussels

1. General Goodpaster expressed full appreciation of the threat of Warsaw Pact seapower and the need for NATO navies to redress the balance at sea, particularly in the defense of shipping area. He is particularly concerned about the views expressed by the USN and Allied Naval leaders that NATO navies will be unable to adequately protect the vital sea LOC's between North America and Europe. He is concerned as to what will happen to his theater stocks - how they will be kept up when the USSR might mount sub/missile attacks on this vital LOC. According to Captain Bill Read, USN, General Goodpaster's senior aide, the General discussed this matter with Admiral Zumwalt. The General is also concerned about the survivability/availability of forces at sea for naval support of the land battle on the flanks and in the center.

2. General Goodpaster discounts the view expressed by some members of the SACEUR staff that war with USSR will be a short one (less than a week). And if it were short he is not convinced that it would be to the allied advantage.

3. Secretary General Brosio and General Goodpaster conceive naval power as an essential factor in the military power equation, not to the exclusion of other forms of military power, but certainly due its proper assessment and weight in light of the Soviet's burgeoning power at sea.

4. Secretary General Brosio expressed concern about the election outcome in Iceland where he considers the situation more vital than Malta.

5. SACEUR Staff members were not optimistic about common funding which smaller navies (Italy, Greece, Turkey) seek being approved by NATO Military Budget Committee. The Budget Committee has repeatedly said that except in certain particular situations (e.g., Special unscheduled operations and transportation for the AMF) navies have to fund their own consumables (fuel, food, ammo) and personnel. The basic problem is that NATO infrastructure does not support mobile forces.

6. At staff level in SACEUR, request was made (Commander Wainwright, RN) for greater degree of Staff level coordination in development of plans between SACLANT and SACEUR. Evidently there has been some lack of coordination in development of Maritime Air Contingency plans. This general coordination theme was raised again by Major General Sleetuw, Dutch MilRep, Major General Von Butler, FRG MilRep, and by SACLANTREPEUR. The latter advocates designation of members of both SACEUR and SACLANT staff for interchange roles. Greater planning cooperation would be fostered and in time of emergency an immediate staff exchange could take place to provide operations coordination.

7. U.S. NATO major thrust is for German Navy to move to "blue water" in North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Atlantic. While making a strong case, there is significant political opposition, including AMEMB Bonn.

#### E. Ostend

1. The appearance of the USN ships at the Belgian Naval Review, USS TAUSSIG and USS HARTLEY, was smart. It was favorably commented upon by senior foreign officials present. (Naval Attache Brussels sent Admiral Zumwalt a message on this subject.)

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2. The Belgians expressed doubt that it would be politically acceptable to encourage German Navy operations in the North Sea/Atlantic. The Dutch and UK are apparently both still sensitive to this emotional issue; and current German strategic considerations to expand their operations reflect hesitation because of the residual antipathy of their allies.

- F. Bonn

1. According to Chief Navy Section MAAG (Captain Oliver Hallett), German Navy is not in as good a shape as some of us would like to think, due to lack of middle management resulting from the 11 year hiatus in naval training after WWII.

2. The German Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Jeschonnek, said that the German Minister of Defense was leaning more toward Navy and is considering a Naval strategy that encompasses North Sea as well as Baltic roles, putting missile boats/hydrofoils in Baltic and larger ships (3 DDG and 4 large DD's) in North Sea. U.S. Embassy observation on Minister of Defense is that he is politically ambitious "and views his present job as an 'albatross'".

3. Resentment in Germany against the military continues, (blamed for disastrous consequences of WWI and WWII.) Makes enlarging scope of Navy roles and capabilities (and those of other services) a very touchy political subject. U.S. domestic proposal and popular support for draft elimination impinges on German civilian thought too, and could question FRG national service.

4. Chief MAAG cited the security overclassification problem in selling naval weapons to German Navy. (He pointed out problem of Standard missile specifications and break-track component of ULQ-6 ECM gear.)

5. VADM Zimmerman (reputed to be next Chief of Defense Staff) questioned U.S. effort to sell Standard to FRG as S/S missile comparable to Exocet. Strongly supports latter for FRG because of extra range, no requirement for constant illumination, etc.

6. Vice Admiral Colbert's idea that an increase in MPA capability of German Navy would not ruffle sensitive political feathers of NATO allies, as would substantial increase in ships/subs deployed to blue waters, generated some support with U.S. officials.

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7. There is a clear need in German Navy for better URG capability for sustained operations. This is particularly pertinent if operations into the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Atlantic are to be carried out.

8. MAAG's evaluation of German Navy capability for aggressive at sea operations is not high.

G. London

1. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Michael Pollock, voiced strong antipathy to German naval expansion into the Atlantic. Highly emotional! He was also very concerned about the idea of German representation in SACLANT Staff.

2. The First Sea Lord was not encouraging with respect to his own participation in the Seapower Symposium. He has been long scheduled to be in the Med. Understand privately he may nominate Admiral Sir Horace Law, RN, Commander in Chief, Naval Home Command, Flag Officer Portsmouth and First and Principal Aide de Camp to the Queen and/or Admiral E. D. Ashmore, RN, CINCPACFLT, CINCEASTLANT and CINCHAN.

3. The First Sea Lord was pessimistic that democracies will stay the course and be willing to devote necessary resources to counter Soviet expansion at sea. However, he believes we must do all possible to get the threat message through to political leaders so they appreciate the risks being taken.

H. Naples

1. Admiral Rivero indicated support for various initiatives discussed with Italian, Greek, and Turkish naval authorities.

2. He supports STANAVFORMED and thinks NAVOCMED might well form the basis for transition to something like STANAVFORMED.

3. He wants more SSN's to operate with NATO navies in ASW.

4. He agrees that we should internationalize ITASS to widen its use and at the same time reduce load on USN.

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5. He thoroughly agrees that military assistance priorities and material priorities should be reviewed in light of the expanded Soviet submarine and missile threat. Concurred in two-pronged approach:

1). via JCS - for review of military assistance allocations.

2). via NATO - to generate external influence in support of efforts in national arenas to increase naval capabilities.

6. He advocates more oilers for small navies in Med (as noted previously in this paper).

7. He believes U.S. overclassifies security information to the detriment of the relationships with our allies.

8. Opening Suez - While not affecting Med situation substantially, he feels it would be most advantageous to Russians for their access to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

9. He supports move of NAVSOUTH HQ to Naples from Malta as being better from a command and control view, irrespective of current political problem.

10. He feels that with respect to closing the straits it is important to provide for defense against amphibious landings in the Black Sea by emphasizing Turkish Navy submarine roles to include attack on amphibious forces at sea and mining of Warsaw Pact ports from which amphibious ops could be mounted; further that FPB attacks on forces in the vicinity of objective areas and mining of such areas would be most important. He would give high priority to provision of 2 U.S. fast minelayers, offered by Admiral Zumwalt, plus necessary sub laid mines and training. In addition he recommends modern artillery for straits control, modern detection equipment for straits entrance and provision of at least one additional mine planter.

11. He concurs with VADM Colbert that there is urgent need for a major State/Defense selling program with Congress on a need for a "new look" at military assistance. Clearly the Nixon Doctrine not viable, cannot "sail" unless there is substantial help available to smaller allies we are asking to do more.

#### I. Lisbon

1. American Ambassador Knight brought out that \$150,000 is needed to rehabilitate an oceanographic ship as part of the "price" for Azores agreement. He indicated that arrangements were stalled in ISA/Navy/State. (RADM's Behrens and Small indicate that this is now "on track").



2. Portuguese preoccupation with African problem (large part of budget - 45%) detracts from the resources its Navy can allocate to NATO commitments.

3. The importance of IBERLANT sea area as main choke point for world oil sea LOC's is growing daily.

4. Of interest is fact revealed that Germans contribute substantial MAAG aid to Portuguese and have significant bilateral plans involving Portugal in war times (latter of higher classification).

5. Portuguese have great enthusiasm for STANAVFORLANT and may well participate on a continuing basis, making them eligible for Command on the present rotational basis.

6. Major restriction on Portuguese ability to expand is limited potential for technicians (reflects lack of education). Same applies to Turkey.

7. Portuguese could do more in MPA - attractive because numbers of highly trained personnel not as great as for ships.

#### IV. Conclusions

1. All the Chiefs of Navy visited indicated their intentions to attend the Seapower Symposium except the British and Portuguese who had irrevocable commitments for the time concerned. Indications are that latter will nominate senior officer at "Vice Chief level" to represent them.

2. NATO navies perceive the need to meet the Soviet sea threat, but they are in an inferior position nationally vis-a-vis armies, and would need strong external assistance from U.S. and NATO at high level to support any significant expansion of capabilities and participation in a STANAVFORMED. Their requirements include modernization, expansion in numbers of ships and aircraft and an extensive program of education and training.

3. Not only are NATO navies (and to some extent air forces) in an inferior position vis-a-vis armies but there is a pervasive reluctance on a political level in NATO countries to support increased military funding of any kind.

#### V. Recommendations (which support and supplement those of the Newport Study)

1. We should structure the NAVWARCOL Second Seapower Symposium (November 1971) so that it highlights the

shifting balance of power at sea, and becomes a forum for developing ideas on how to gain requisite national support in each nation to strengthen their own capabilities and achieve greater overall NATO sea control capabilities (including maritime air); this in order to redress the balance of power at sea in NATO and insure its vital sea lines of communications.

2. We should form a task force in OpNav to develop a coordinated program to progressively implement the steps necessary to strengthen allied navies. This program should include, but not be limited to:

a. Working closely with the Naval War College to develop plans for the Seapower Symposium, including drafting major addresses and the structuring of the discussion areas for the geographical committees, in support of the goals described in para V.1. above.

b. Prepare supporting documentation to enable SecDef to make the shifting balance of power at sea his major address at an early NATO ministerial meeting with the goal of clearing the air on the former McNamara/McNaughton policy on navies and getting top level NATO political support for expansion of national naval capabilities.

c. Mount a comprehensive review of security requirements with respect to hardware and publications needed by NATO allies with a view to increasing the release of information (based on realistic estimates of how much we hurt our own cause by withholding information from allies who are bound by agreements to assist the U.S. in its forward strategy against the Soviet Union.)

d. Develop, in concert with appropriate NATO Staffs, a Warsaw Pact naval threat analysis (submarine and missile) and based thereon review U.S. and Allied Naval and Maritime Air requirements to meet the Bloc challenge at sea. Prepare appropriate recommendations for the JCS. MAP support recommendations would be an outgrowth of this effort.

e. In light of French, British and other dynamic programs to sell military equipment, examine U.S. position on expanding military sales and document case for expansion, particularly in light of our serious balance of payment problem.

f. Develop a program to enlarge the foreign naval exchange and training programs. Concurrently, determine where allies can, with USN assistance, increase their liaison and training programs with the navies of "fringe" countries with whom U.S. cannot deal directly. (Such as cadet training programs of Italy and Greece with Algeria and Libya, respectively.)

g. Examine the possibility of release of ITASS to NATO navies in order to enhance allied ASW capabilities against Soviet subs in Mediterranean without expanding USN commitment.

h. Examine the possibility of making the maximum number of SSNs (early models) available for NATO exercise purposes in order to improve the capability of NATO navies in operating against nuclear subs, recognizing the importance of this as an inducement to wider ASW operations. Expedite the concept of "masking" to avoid compromise of acoustic signatures.

i. Examine requirements of NATO navies for URG ships in order to increase their logistic self-sufficiency and expand their operational capabilities. Consideration should be given to fact that maintenance of URGs by other NATO navies will provide USN ships with strategically located emergency replenishment resources at low cost.

j. Review all factors, politico-military and military, involving a shift of COMNAVSOUTH Headquarters from Malta to Naples to achieve better command and control.

k. Develop an operational concept for greatly increased surveillance operations against USSR fleet units in the Mediterranean using, inter-alia, such ancillary capabilities of NATO allies as the Greek fishing fleet and coastal watching stations (estimate of additional communication equipment requirement should also be made).

l. Examine all possibilities leading to NATO common funding for operational (fuel) costs for smaller navies employed in ASW surveillance requested by NATO commanders.

m. Analyze the capability of the Turkish Navy to close the Black Sea Straits, and develop a U.S. position in support of Admiral Rivero as outlined in sub-paragraph H.10.

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n. Determine the extent to which the maritime patrol air assets of NATO navies, in particular Germany and Portugal, could be increased to assist in meeting the Warsaw Pact submarine threat.

3. Support CINCSOUTH in his efforts to transition NAVOCMED into STANAVFORMED. Examine the possibility with SACLANT of deploying STANAVFORLANT as a visiting demonstration force in the Mediterranean to urge this concept on the political leadership of nations involved.

4. Consider the possibility of inviting Yugoslavia to the Seapower Symposium.

5. While the OpNav task force referred to in paragraph 2. above would initially be focused on the NATO area, it might well later widen its efforts to encompass the worldwide ASW/Sea Control problem in implementation of the Newport Study. This task force would work closely with ISA and State in further development and refinement of the Newport Study as it would apply to various regional ASW/Sea Control arrangements.

## PRINCIPALS VISITED

### 1. Rome.

General Enzo Marchesi - Chief of Staff, Defense  
Admiral Giuseppe Roselli-Lorenzini - Chief of Naval Staff  
Ambassador Graham A. Martin - U.S. Ambassador Italy  
Captain G.W. Cogswell, USN - Naval Attache

### 2. Athens.

Captain D. Stamoulis - Acting President Greek Naval War  
College  
Vice Admiral K. Margaritis - Chief of Naval Staff  
Mr. Robert M. Brandin - Deputy Chief of Mission, American  
Embassy Greece  
Captain Bono, USN - Naval Attache  
Captain J. Hitchcock, USN - Chief Navy Section, MAAG

### 3. Ankara.

Major General Edward C.D. Scherrer, USA - Chief JUSMMAT  
Rear Admiral Walter N. Dietzen, Jr., USN - Chief Navy  
Section, JUSMMAT  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff  
Admiral Eyiceoglu - Commander in Chief, Turkish Naval  
Forces Command  
Mr. Robert B. Hill - Acting Deputy Chief of Mission  
American Embassy Turkey  
Captain F.L. Boushee, USN - Naval Attache

### 4. Casteau (SHAPE).

Rear Admiral J. LeBourgeois, USN - Deputy Assistant Chief  
of Staff for Plans and Policy, SACEUR  
General Horace Wade, USA - Chief of Staff, SACEUR  
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA - SACEUR

### 5. Brussels (NATO).

Rear Admiral Edward H. Van Rees - SACLANTREPEUR  
Lieutenant General Theodore Milton, USAF - Deputy Chairman  
Military Committee and U.S. Representative  
Military Committee  
General Johannes Steinhoff - Chairman Military Committee  
Mr. George Vest - Acting Permanent Representative NAC  
Honorable Manlio Brosio - Secretary General NATO  
Major General Slecuw - Netherland Military Representative  
Lt. General von Butler - FRG Military Representative  
Mr. Ralph Earle - Defense Advisor U.S. Mission NATO --  
Ambassador John Eisenhower - U.S. Ambassador Belgium  
Rear Admiral J. Shanahan, USN - USN Representative NATO

6. Ostend, Belgium.

Commodore Leon Lurquin - Chief of Naval Staff  
Captain E. Poskins, Vice Chief of Naval Staff

7. Bonn.

Minister Frank E. Cash, Jr. - Deputy Chief of Mission  
American Embassy Germany

Vice Admiral Gert Jeschonnek - Chief of Staff, German  
Navy

Rear Admiral Heinz Kuhnle - (Chief of Staff designate)  
Deputy Chief of Staff, German  
Navy

Captain G.F. Gauthier, USN - Naval Attache, Bonn

Captain O. Hallett, USN - Chief Navy Section, MAAG

8. Naples.

Admiral H. Rivero, USN - CINCSOUTH

Captain Merle M. Hershey, USN - Deputy Chief of Staff  
Operations, CINCSOUTH

9. Portugal.

Ambassador R.B. Knight - U.S. Ambassador Portugal

Admiral Fernando Ornelas E Vasconcelos - Chief Portuguese  
Naval Staff

Vice Admiral Sequeira Araujo - Director Portuguese Naval  
War College

Rear Admiral E. B. Fluckey - COMIBERLANT



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
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<sup>A</sup>

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~~15 APR 1991~~

☐ Additional Review Required.

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Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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OPNAVINST 5513.16 DATED 05 APR 1991 WAS  
CANCELED BY OPNAVINST 5513.16A DATED 08 APR 1996.

C-02R H/S

17 September 1971

Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy  
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Fleet  
Norfolk, Virginia 23511


Dear Admiral Colbert:

My purpose in writing is to forward the enclosed article written by Professor Jun Tsunoda, a political advisor to the Liberal Democratic Party, who asked that it be sent to you. You may remember that Professor Tsunoda was the author of the series of articles on the Imperial Japanese Navy I sent to you last year and which were subsequently forwarded to Professor Tuleja. I believe Professor Tsunoda wants you to have his article due to his belief in your expertise in international politics and interest in Japan.

I regret I was unable to meet you last February after my return to the United States. Spencer and I visited Newport but you were on leave at the time. I subsequently got the opportunity to return to Japan to actually write my thesis there. I then got involved with Rear Admiral Julian Burke, Commander Naval Forces Japan who successfully got my orders as a student in the Command and Staff course changed (I was a little tired of school after three years). I am now assigned as political advisor at CNFJ which is fine as long as I cannot be at sea. If I can now get designated as a career specialist Japan and get an assignment for a sea tour on one of the destroyers to be homeported here following this job, everything will be fine. As for the thesis itself, Naval Institute Proceedings and ISS London are presently reviewing it; Naval War College Review has indicated they will publish a small excerpt in December.

I hope you enjoy the enclosed article and wish you well in your new most challenging assignment, Admiral.

Very respectfully,

  
James E. Auer

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

LCDR J. E. AUER, USN  
Commander Naval Forces Japan (N 36)  
FPO Seattle 98762



29 September 1971

Dear Jim,

Many thanks for your letter of 17 September and the article written by Professor Tsunoda. While I have not had a chance to read it in detail, I have glanced through it and believe I have his thrust. It brought back memories.

When I was on the Policy Planning Council at State, one day I was given the mission by Walt Rostow (passed on by Secretary Rusk) to come up with a concept for an MLF for Asia. Needless to say I was taken aback! After much agonizing appraisal, I came up with a concept which, believe it or not after you have read it, created quite a bit of interest. Walt, and a number of others on the Inter-Agency Planning Group at that time, thought it had real merit. If nothing else, it was considered ingenious.

The only reason the paper was classified Secret was that it was generated in the State Department. The paper was written without reference to classified material. Because of that, and considering the fact that it was written in 1963-1964, it should be declassified by now.

The last time I saw Walt he mentioned the paper as one that particularly intrigued him.

I would be interested in your thoughts.

Sincerely,

R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

P.S. Congratulations on the new job. While you missed C&S at this time, do plan to attend either it or Naval Warfare (or both) in the years ahead.

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THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE:  
QUEST FOR STRATEGIC COMPATIBILITY

BY

Dr. Jun Tsunoda

June 1, 1971

Throughout the 1960s the predominant fact of international politics was the co-existence of two superpowers, who vastly surpassed all other states in their material capacities, global commitments and conventional and nuclear military power. In a strategic sense these conditions still persist, with the United States and the Soviet Union developing the nuclear capabilities appropriate to maintaining the "balance of power" between themselves. Because any execution of a general nuclear war involving the second-strike capabilities would inevitably result in annihilation of both powers, a policy of mutual deterrence entailing strict self-control on the part of both superpowers has come to prevail as the critical key to "peaceful co-existence".

The superpowers remain as the only truly global powers, with their interests and capabilities extending to every region of the world and in this sense balance between them does constitute a global peace. However, because of recently demonstrated incapacities of the superpowers to control all conflicts arising in the world the nature and timing of their intervention have increasingly been becoming matters of uncertainty. Not all conflicts are critical to the global peace between the superpowers. Rather the changing priorities of the United States and the Soviet Union will define the parameters of the balance. Now, quite clearly, global peace is not identical with world peace. The multipolar world that has consequently come into being has raised the possibility for regional conflict which can occur without affecting so much the bipolar strategic balance and which may sometimes involve the active participation of one or other of the superpowers.

Vietnam provides the most clear-cut example, but similar logic applies also to the problem of West European strategy. A security "gap" does exist because of the different boundaries of global peace and world peace. These boundaries, which are determined in ad hoc fashion by the superpowers, has raised new strategic problems for all other states, especially for those

with growing regional interests. On the one hand, a passive and defensive superpower can tolerate in easy or uneasy conscience the break-down of peace in a region of the world so long as the balance with the other superpower remains much untouched. On the other hand, an active and offensive superpower can threaten or actively intervene in a region and endeavor to insulate this action from global balance. Ever since the Soviet Union has had substantial deployment of ICBM's the threat against the European region has been a central issue of the strategic calculus and one which de Gaulle pressed as a critical test of American nuclear guarantee. On the purely strategic level it proved very difficult to provide absolutely credible assurances that the United States was prepared to sacrifice, say, New York or Washington, in order to deter the Soviet Union from attacking, say, London and Paris. To be sure, the unique web of political, economic and cultural ties anchored in the NATO served to vitiate these concerns, but it was the emergence of the French force de frappe and her concrete military measures that evolved that have produced a remarkable strategic mix intended to bridge the gap between regional interests and the bipolar balance.

The critical dimension of those arrangements that were worked out from the NATO side within the context of the Western alliance under American leadership were: first, physical deployment of American and West European combat troop and necessary tactical air support has served not only as a strict deterrent to Soviet and East European forces, but has merged regional and global strategic interests; secondly, actual deployment of the American tactical nuclear arms for use by both American and West European troops has further worked to make identical American and European strategic interests by raising the threat that an outbreak of regional war will escalate into the full-scale strategic nuclear exchange between the two superpowers.

Despite these elements of the NATO strategic arrangements and the high priority the United States places on West Europe (the Nixon Doctrine notwithstanding), the possibility of Soviet moves to test that credibility of American guarantee can not entirely be ruled out and, so, remains a very real problem in the strategic situation of the present-day Europe. It is just



here into which the French force de frappe enters. What de Gaulle and his followers have been intending amounts to the establishment by force of arms an independent deterrence of France not on global basis but on a regional one. Indeed the French conception of "multilateral" deterrence is seen as not incompatible with the American deterrence but rather to be additional and complementary to it in that it presupposes the existence of protective wing of American global deterrence. Substantially speaking it intends nothing but to make American credibility doubly sure on the one hand and to make Soviet calculation doubly insecure on the other (1).

Anyway, the present nuclear force of France, together with that of Great Britain, stands essentially as a regional deterrent against the Soviet Union and both of them are ultimately coupled with the global deterrent capability of the American nuclear forces. If the scheduled expansion of the French nuclear force proceeds on time, by 1976 a significant "junior" deterrent consisting of six French and British submarines armed with Polaris-type missiles will further insure that any regional security will have a nuclear dimension---thereby tying still more tightly American and West European security interests and further deterring Soviet action. To be sure, the acrimonious history of French-American dialogue concerning the issue of the French nuclear armament still raises a fundamental political obstacle, but in the shifting strategic conditions of the post-Vietnam era basic principles of the past decade might well be reviewed and reappraised once again. Moreover, a new arrangement of this kind would be fully in keeping with the recent suggestions of the present American Secretary of Defense: "... in deterring theater nuclear war the United States also has primary responsibility but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities" (2).

To what extent can the logic of this European strategy of deterrence be applicable in the Far East? The strategic situations in Europe and Asia are similar in that both of them ultimately depend on the stability provided by the condition of mutual deterrence between the two superpowers. However, the differences are far more striking. First of all, the credibility of America's commitment is open to far more doubt regarding Asia so far as the Nixon Doctrine envisages a cut-back and ultimately the withdrawal of American troops from the Asian mainland. Furthermore, the American alliance system in that region is a patchwork affair, lacking the coherent and comprehensive commitment involved in the NATO. Secondly, the Chinese nuclear threat against equal or less powers in Asia is far more plausible than Soviet threats to Europe and there is no regional nuclear force of the sort which France and Great Britain could form in order to provide strategic incentive to American involvement. Thirdly, there are no serious plans for a multilateral force, conventional or nuclear, involving regional powers. Last but not least, Communist China remains the most dedicated revolutionary power in the world and its accompanying military capabilities, chiefly nuclear, are rapidly expanding.

According to the latest report of the present American Secretary of Defense there is possibility that the Communist China's limited deployment of MRBM might have already occurred; it is expected to have a small number of MRBMs deployed by the middle of this year; and by mid-1972 it is expected to have operational a modest number of missiles, with a mix of MRBMs and IRBMs. This will be sufficient to place all of the neighboring countries within its attacking radius (3). Countering this menace there is, of course, the American promise in the form of the Nixon Doctrine that it shall "provide a shield, if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us..." Yet, the specific content of United States policy behind that Doctrine is left very ambiguous, and the thrust of that Doctrine heavily tends to leave doubt about America's ultimate intentions.

The test of credibility of the American nuclear guarantee in Asia will flow from a scenario involving Real politik manoeuvres



of Communist China regarding its neighboring countries, especially conventional operations in Korea or Taiwan area. Just what the American response thereto would be is, to say the least, uncertain. As one distinguished American scholar has put it, "it remains unclear (under the Nixon Doctrine) where and under what circumstances United States would be prepared to counter conventional aggression by a nuclear power (i.e. Communist China)" (4). Should the United States threaten direct nuclear retaliation against Peking, it is most probable that Communist China would respond not against the American homeland, but rather by holding as nuclear "hostages" the neighboring states, who have, on the contrary, been supposed to benefit most from the Nixon Doctrine itself. While China will, within a few year, have the weapon systems required to carry out such a politico-military strategy, all of the countries neighboring it are of course non-nuclear and extremely vulnerable to any sort of nuclear attack, which relationship contributes greatly to reducing the technical competence required of the Chinese weaponry system. For example, to develop an effective regional nuclear force, Communist China will need only 10 or so pieces of MR/IRBM's of having 10 % of the degree of accuracy indispensable to both of superpowers, and a warhead in the 10 kg/ton class. Moreover, its only defensive concern would be the survivability of its own missiles from the expected American attack and it could be secured, at least throughout 1970s, by having them mounted on submarines. And, in such circumstances as these, coastal-going submarines of conventionally propelled type would be sufficient to retain its second-strike capability. In any event, even such a small nuclear force has the capacity to inflict catastrophic damage to the utterly vulnerable cities of neighboring countries. Any threat by the United States to retaliate thereto could be met by a counterthreat not against the United States---which it can not do anyway until it develops its own ICBM---but against its noncommunist neighbors. Then, such a counterthreat from the hand of Communist China could severely test the effectiveness and, indeed, credibility of the American treaty commitments and the implications of the Nixon Doctrine. (5) As to the Japanese Government, facing such a desperate eventuality of having to expect nuclear devastation of Chinese homeland only in return for the extinction of their own major cities, it would very

naturally fall into the most serious difficulties, even to the extent of letting the proposal of capitulation to China's nuclear blackmail have more or less substantial appeal.

Consequently, the logic of the "hostage" arguments now suggests that it might be American nuclear capability, however predominant, that will largely be neutralized by the very primitive and small Chinese nuclear force (6), the point which has already been suggested by Dr. Alice Hsieh: "The possession of tactical nuclear weapons could have important payoffs for the Chinese, particularly in so far as it complicated military decision-making within the United States Government... By means of a regional (nuclear) capability (of its MR/IRBMs), the Chinese may hope to create an uncertainty as to the United States intentions among United States allies in the area... (It) might calculate that fear on various scores would lead Asian nations to assert pressures on the United States to avoid any confrontation with China---conventional or nuclear" (7). This kind of argument has great relevance, for the latest report of the America Secretary of State to the Congress, too, confirms that "already Communist China probably has a small force of missiles capable of reaching targets in neighboring Asian countries". (8).

Now the international circumstances in the Far East region present a far more basic challenge to the American credibility "gap" than in the region of West Europe. At the same time, in accordance with the degree of the ambiguity inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, Chinese potential for making international mischief is enhanced just to that extent; and the appeal to Japan of developing nuclear arms as a more certain way of reinsuring America's credibility could enormously be enlarged. According to the apt statement by Dr. Hsieh: "It is my conclusion that the Chinese are more sensitive to (nuclear) weapon systems developed in the region... Any strengthening of Japan militarily, particularly as far as nuclear weapon are concerned...would be bound to make Chinese even more cautious into military policies... (Then) the present (nuclear) balance of power might be further complicated to China's disadvantage... A Japanese regional nuclear capacity...may well have the effect of limiting China's political/psychological use of its emerging nuclear capability." (9).



If Japan might prove to be able to develop nuclear arms while maintaining internal political stability and without disrupting the fundamental alliance with the United States at the same time, then the restraints on Communist China would surely be substantial. Peking, forced to live with a new nuclear regional competitor in the shape of Japan in addition to the two hostile superpowers, would, of all probability, be greatly inhibited in Real politik manoeuvres in East Asia. On the other hand, development of a Japanese regional nuclear force may, in those circumstances, well prove to be the less costly and, yet, most effective check on the Communist China's capability of making nuclear blackmail.

Seen from the perspective of international politics and the logic of deterrence strategy, the nuclear armament of Japan seems an almost inevitable and salutary development. However, there are undoubtedly two basic roadblocks: the nuclear policy of the United States and the legal, political and emotional conditions in present-day Japan.

There is no need to trace the whole history of the development of the American policy of nuclear-nonproliferation. Suffice to point out here two decisions taken during the course of its development which were destined to bring about far-reaching effect on the contemporary scene of the international politics: America's feud with France and the stillborn programs of multilateral force.

Successive French governments under both the Fourth Republic and President de Gaulle had continuously been searching for American support in their endeavor to create an independent nuclear force, rather naively convinced of the possibility of such assistance being given with manner that Great Britain was treated in this field. Especially, after 1957 the French sought technical assistance in building a nuclear propulsion reactor for her submarines. On the American side, the Eisenhower administration had during these years been placing high priority on nuclear arms collaboration with all NATO allies, including France at that time. However, it was rebuffed in the efforts to transfer custody of its nuclear stockpile to NATO (1957) and in sharing nuclear power with those allied states (1959 and 1960) largely through the opposition of Congress, particularly its powerful Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, and the Atomic Energy Commission. That administration was ultimately prevented also from extending nuclear privileges, already granted to Great Britain, to other allies in the NATO. Indeed, the year 1959 can be seen as a major turning point in the whole course of the American policy toward the extension of nuclear arms and it inevitably led to grave deterioration in French-American relations. Once it was made clear to the French government that American nuclear assistance would come only after the country had made "substantial progress in this area" (McMahon Act) a decision was definitely made to go nuclear unilaterally (10). It was, after all,



this insistence on the part of the United States on a nuclear monopoly (excluding only the kindred Great Britain) that brought into being the movement for an independent French nuclear force. The strategic aspect of "Ganllism" is, consequently, to be seen as the step-child of the American philosophy of nuclear monopolism.

The next administration of Kennedy was, from the very beginning, opposed to any sort of nuclear proliferation and forces were set into motion rather to the direction of establishing a nuclear force for West Europe as a whole. This concept of collective and multilateral force (MLF) was in part a reaction to the French "Gaullistic" challenge and it envisioned an American led military integration of Europe without France and, if necessary, against her (11). At the same time, American concern centering particularly on West Germany, the Bonn government was told by that administration that sublimation of her own national nuclear aspirations would eventually lead to a European nuclear force in which Germany would directly participate. At the same time, that Kennedy administration also moved to perpetuate the nuclear duopoly with the Soviet Union. And, because a duopoly condition requires an absolute ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons beyond those duopolistic powers, negotiations were inevitably initiated for the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) with the Russian government.

Now, there undeniably existed a basic incompatibility between the regional security arrangement of MLF, with its fundamental objective of giving West European countries a voice in deterring the Soviet threat, and the global security arrangement of the NPT conceived exclusively from the global interests of the two superpowers. In the words of Henry Kissinger, "the MLF can not at the same time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing and assuage concerns about nuclear proliferation... There is something absurd trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing non-nuclear countries of NATO into nuclear fields" (12). Eventually both the plans for an MLF and its accompanying program of holding the options open for collective European nuclear force were abandoned (1965 and 1967 respectively) and the United States came to adopt the position that possession of some strategic nuclear forces was essential for participation in strategic planning (13). In one sense, this marked a victory of the NPT over the MLF, of global strategic interests over the regional concerns and it was nothing

but this victory which paved the way smooth enough for the Soviet ratification of the NPT. Needless to say, it also spawned doubts in the Bonn government of American-Soviet collusion to solve the "German problem" and directly led to the Ostpolitik of balancing America against Russia (14).

A new concept of nuclear strategy seems, however, to have come now into being which emphasizes the integral place of the independent nuclear forces of West Europe in America's strategic deterrent. This could eventually lead to technical assistance to make the European force appear credible (15). Such moves toward cooperative deterrences mark a significant departure from the duopoly premises of the NPT and open up a new possibilities for an appropriate new strategy for the Far Eastern region.

In considering the thorny issue of a nuclear strategy appropriate to Japan, the starting point is, of course, the present so-called "peace" constitution originally drafted by the American Occupation headquarters at the height of its efforts to democratize and demilitarize Japan. In denying Japan "the right of belligerency of the state" and depriving her of the right to maintain "armed forces" an unprecedentedly abnormal situation in the context of national state was really brought about. To be sure, it was understood both by the Occupation authorities and the Japanese governmental circles at the time of its promulgation that Japan did not and could not lose the inherent and universal right of self-defense of the state, a right which had just been confirmed a year before in the newly established Charter of the United Nations. Yet by what effective measures, we have to ask very seriously, can Japan exercise her inherent right of self-defense without being given the measure to recourse to "armed forces" in its normal sense of the word?

In 1951, the Occupation was ended and the wording of both the Peace Treaty and its accompanying Security Treaty openly confirmed Japan of having the inherent right of "individual or collective" self-defense as a reinstated sovereign nation. Now the term "collective self-defense" was an entirely new legal conception devised in the process of drafting the Charter of the United Nations with the sole aim of incorporating already existent regional security arrangement led by the United States ( the Chapultepec Pact) into the framework of the Charter. "Collective" self-defense is, thus, legal expression of political fact of regional security arrangement and it is in this context that special reference to that term in both the original Security Treaty (1951) and its revised one (1961) should be seen. Yet, again, we have to ask very earnestly that by what effective measure can Japan execute its right of "collective" self-defense together with the United States without having any sort of "armed forces" in its normal sense of the word?

In a basic sense, there is much to support both in the official assertions of successive Japanese governments and Opposition



interpellations that the existing "self-defense forces" are not the "armed forces" which are categorically forbidden by Article 9 of the constitution. At the same time, there is also validity in Oppositions' repeated accusations that the right of "collective" self-defense can only be established on the political foundation of regional security system and that, therefore, both the Peace Treaty and the Security Pact (so far as their references to that right are concerned) are in open violation of the constitution, which contains in its preamble solemn and peculiar proclamations drafted by the Occupation: "We, the Japanese people...have determined to preserve our security and existence trusting in justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world." The simple fact is that the "peace" constitution and the concept of "collective" self-defense are essentially incompatible, and, under the weight of this solid fact, the Japanese government has from time to time had to concede that Japan as a state does have no right of "collective" defense (e.g. Prime Minister in February, 1960).

Two questions rooted in legal perplexities of this situation are certainly critical to Japan's security. First, can the nation preserve her "security and existence" by "trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world," as was commanded by the Occupation, without having any sort of armed forces but "self-defense forces"? Second, if not, can Japan preserve her security and existence by a mutual defense arrangement based on a regional security system without having the right of "collective" self-defense and, consequently, without having the right to undertake joint planning and manoeuvres in advance and to participate in joint operations in some emergencies? Bluntly speaking, throughout the past twenty years since her re-independence Japan has incessantly been falling between the two stools of "peace" constitution and of "collective" self-defense only to lose, not to gain, benefits from each.

This situation of legal perplexity becomes even more acute by virtue of the clause in the "peace" constitution depriving Japan of the "right of belligerency of the state". Soon after its promulgation it was pointed out by several Japanese professors of international law that the origin of this queer concept might be found in the draft convention on "Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression" produced by Harvard lawyers in 1934. Article 3

of this convention provides that, with the exception of humanitarian regulations, "an aggressor does not have any of rights which it would have if it were a belligerent" (16). I am not wholly confident that this assumption is true, but, if it is accepted, it is directly relevant to the policy of early Occupation in outlawing Japan on a permanent basis as an "aggressor" from the benefit or protection given to sovereign states by the traditional authority of international law. The only possible interpretation to that penalizing clause presented by the Japanese scholars of international law was that it would mean the renunciation in advance of the freedom to make war, which in turn might mean that Japan would be able to engage hostilities only after the opposite member should have declared war against her. In order to engage open hostilities for the security of her state, Japan, first and by all means, has to beg her opponent to declare war toward her, an utter nonsense from the view-point of international law. As to the Japanese government, it has simply been at a loss and the only escape interpretation it invented out of desperation had resulted in making the situation even more confusing. It has been officially replying to the Opposition interpellation in the Diet that "right of belligerency" means the rights of searching, seizing and catching possibly hostile vessels in the open sea in case of emergency or hostilities (Chief of Cabinet Legislative Bureau in March, 1954), while confidentially acknowledging that the renunciation of such rights might make activities and operations of maritime "self-defense" almost impossible and nonsensical, bringing thereby the inherent contradiction of its own stand into the open anew.

Unquestionably life-and-death aspect of nation's political life is that of its own preservation and security and, so, when the legal situation with respect to that overwhelmingly vital aspect of nation's political life is nonsensical and ridiculous to the extent that all the other states of the world are fundamentally exempted from such a grotesque legal prohibitions, it is not only unnatural but may also prove to be unbearable for a nation sooner or later. In order simply to relieve that situation of the worst legacy of the Occupation and develop in its stead adequate security force in a normal sense of the word,--- a process that may be characterized as absolving the abnormal and replacing it by the normal---the normalization process so to say---, basic

political change is inevitable in due time which may turn out to be smooth or potentially destabilizing according to the circumstances or the time. Anyway, the new momentum in this direction will be difficult to reverse, chiefly because of three significant factors affecting deeply and dynamically the present-day Japanese people: Chinese nuclear threat, its own economic recovery and its emergent nationalism.



To the strategic implications for East Asian states of Communist China's development of nuclear capacity previously mentioned it is necessary only to add several other considerations particularly weighty to present-day Japan. The first deals with the enlarged threat that will appear once the delivery system of China is improved. Two years ago (May 22, 1969) in testifying before Congress the present American Secretary of Defense stated that "once Communist China acquires a force of MR bombers and/or BM all of her neighbors would be open to nuclear blackmail" (17). Time has made this warning even more imperative. Moreover, perception of the nuclear threat China poses is growing in Japan. For instance, the two annual public opinion polls conducted by the nation-wide paper the Mainichi in 1969 and 1970 on this subject produced almost the same results (18).

Table One

That the nuclear armament of the Communist China is:

		April, 1969	March, 1970		
			Total, Male, Female,		
Very dreadful	43%	46%	43%	48%	
A little dreadful	35	32	31	32	
Not too much dreadful	15	14	20	10	
Not dreadful at all	3	3	4	3	
		Graduates of			
		Middle School	High School	Universities and Colleges	
Very dreadful		47%	45%	44%	
A little dreadful		30	34	33	
Not too much dreadful		12	15	21	
Not dreadful at all		3	4	2	

There is much reason for such a widely prevalent fear of Japanese general public in face of the growing Chinese capability to make nuclear blackmail and, so, it is more than natural that

they should come to wish to have some sort of effective measure capable of neutralizing that capability of her neighbor. Logically speaking, nuclear capability of one party can only be neutralized by that of the other party and not by otherwise. It is still doubtful that the general public comes to be aware of this harsh logic of deterrence, but the anxiety expressed in these polls could give the government enough latitude to move in necessitated direction. This aspect is further corroborated by a poll conducted for the other nation-wide paper the Asahi (which is famous for taking a leftist and non-nuclear posture) which showed that 60% of the respondents believed that the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles of the present Sato government would break down (19). It is indeed possible and even probable that, in accordance with the steady development toward operational deployment of the Chinese MRBM, the Japanese general public will become more and more reconciled and resigned themselves to the inevitability of going nuclear.

The remarkable economic growth of Japan has especially important bearing on her security considerations in three ways. First, Japan is trading nation, heavily dependent on both imports of food-stuffs and raw materials including oil and exports of fabricated goods. And with the expansion of scale of her national economy her trade relations with other countries, especially those of East Asian region, have been turning into pattern of mutual dependence to an unprecedented degree. Today we may be able to say that the situation of the closest economic interdependence between us and the East Asian countries has really been created, making Japan and those countries virtually inseparable from one another economically. Expansion of Japan's material stake in the region unavoidably carries with it political and security implications. It will prove more and more difficult to separate Japan's security interest from that of the region as a whole.

Second, while the annual expenditure allotted to the "self-defense forces" has continuously been kept at about 0.8% of Japan's GNP and may well be held at this level in the near future, the growth of GNP itself, with estimated figure of 200 billion dollar for 1971 and that of between 350 and 400 billion dollar for 1975, would inevitably lead to budget greater in absolute terms year by year. Moreover, the size of the economy will be such that the costs attendant with nuclear development will not greatly impede economic growth.

Thirty, economic prosperity is surely helping Japanese nationalism to re-emerge. Success in the field of economic development naturally restored self-confidence to the political leaders and the general public alike after the long years of submission, humiliation and poverty that accompanied defeat and occupation. If nationalism, in its first phase, can be defined as the longing of people with some homogeneity to have a state of its own, and so to form a nation-state, then its second phase may be for any nation to attain a status of equality in the community of nations. This may well be the point at which Japan now stands, and the abnormal and ridiculous legal situation regarding the nation's security needs will increasingly come under serious security, which the growing material capability owing to her success in the economic field will make possible other options. Around these double foci of moral self-confidence and economic growth Japanese nationalism may now be in a period of rapid growth.



Ever since the last years of the Occupation when John Foster Dulles strongly and openly pressed the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, Yoshida Shigeru, to begin to rearm seriously, each of successive Japanese governments has been under constant pressure from the American side to expend more and more on behalf of defense. Indeed, official American security policy in the Far East has been very clear-cut: the right of "collective" self-defense of the Japanese state---mutual security system centering around Japan---and the creation of Japanese forces. The Japanese governments, on the other hand, has sought to fend off those American pressures, partly because they have been predominately occupied in pursuing the policy of economic recovery and growth and unprepared to make any serious defense efforts which were economically unproductive, but mainly because they throughout have been more or less aware of the lack of a national consensus on which a major problem of rearmament can only somehow be built.

Now, the emergent wave of nationalism has been creating the possibility of such a consensus being formed, but to turn the possible into reality Japan has first of all to get rid of the present legal mesh originating from the demilitarization policy of the early Occupation. Only after it will have been achieved in one way or other will Japan have the real capacity to fulfill her treaty obligation under "collective" self-defense together with the United States, without which the mutual security system between the two countries can never be brought into actuality. Against this possible realization on the part of Japan of official American pressure and encouragement throughout the past twenty years, the accusation that such a development signifies rebirth of Japanese "militarism" is ironically inappropriate. Some of the influential American scholars most prominent in giving their counsel and warning against the revival of Japanese "militarism" clearly retain an affection for the Occupation demilitarization policy in utter disregard of the changed international circumstances and also the changed American policies since then. Unwilling to perceive the middle road between the policy of demilitarization on the one hand fear of "militarism" on the other, they rather seem still committed

heavily to fastening Japan permanently to the legal mesh of "peace" constitution. Or, are they really the convinced disciples of the gospel of "peace" constitution far above the dimension of policy and sentiment? If so, why do those American scholars, the Japanese are tempted to ask, not recommend that gospel, first of all, to their own government with the aim of demanding the basic revision of the present American constitution instead of preaching it only abroad---and to Japan exclusively? Or, are they, in the last analysis, conducting political experiment about the national feasibility of living without arms not at their own cost but at that of Japan? On the contrary, the Japanese are much grateful to President Nixon for his radio address to the American general public in which he stated that "we intend to give our friends time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world" (20).

There is yet another international impact of the emergent Japanese nationalism to which careful analysis is seriously invited from the American side. To be sure in a certain stage of its development nationalism tends to show inclination of being anti-foreign especially when it is over-sensitive around the issue of its independence and sovereignty. Even so, it is anti-foreign in general and needs not to be taken inevitably and exclusively as being anti-American. We know too that there has been notable enthusiasm in America for federalism and conversely that "the reverse side of that enthusiasm is their abhorrence of nationalism" (21). Nevertheless, one of the basic realities of the modern international politics has been and still is the persistence of nationalism and nations, in spite of various American schemes and endeavors to dilute and destroy this fundamental trend through some sort of supra-national or international organizations, perhaps with the only exception of the United States itself (22). The emergent Japanese nationalism, too, is essentially neither militaristic nor anti-American by itself and surely needs not to be treated as such, simply because there is room wide enough in the present international politics to allow two nations---Japan and America---to live side by side and more or less compatibly.

When Japan will again take a normal position in international politics and will be ready and able to have "armed forces" in



its normal sense, the logic of deterrence demands that they should include not only conventional but also nuclear ones. Then, the issue of nuclear armament of Japan must necessarily be considered in the global setting of nuclear proliferation, which brings us back again to the recent American philosophies of nuclear monopolism and duopolism. Now with the dramatic shooting of Vostok and Sputnik by the Soviet Union the era of American monopoly disappeared once for all, making that philosophy unquestionably out of date. American philosophy of duopoly, on the other hand, apparently still holds valid, as has been shown in the victory of the NPT over the MLF, but it is the development of the Chinese nuclear capability which is expected to shake this philosophy to its very foundations. In the words of the present American Secretary of Defense, "The President of the United States, no matter who he may be at the time, could find himself in an extremely difficult position in a serious confrontation with a Communist China armed with a force of even 25 primitive ICBMs. Our cities would be hostage to the Chinese ICBM force, and the President would have no other alternative but to back down or risk the destruction of several major United States cities and the death of millions of Americans" (23). In such an eventuality American philosophy of duopolism would most probably lose its validity and the adamant rejection of all "junior" nuclear deterrents as irrelevant, harmful and even inimical in the style of the Kennedy administration (24) would be singularly inappropriate. To consider a move to the direction of "junior" deterrent by a nation such as Japan simply and out of hand as "anti-American" would be nothing but an American version of the nuclear allergy. Hopefully, there has already appeared thoughtful counsel for a two dimension approach in stead of one dimension approach of either monopoly or duopoly. It asks squarely "to confront the problem of meshing the two spheres of politics" (25) --- the global sphere of duopoly politics with the Soviet Union and the regional sphere of multipolarity politics which the former "does not absorb or dominate" (26). Surely this two dimension approach is composed at the same time of both the global one and the regional one and the latter embraces the creation of regional nuclear forces by "junior" democratic countries.

Thinking in terms of national interest of the Japanese state, it should be her posture never to go nuclear unilaterally but absolutely bilaterally with the United States, or multilaterally if possible, in the event of her response to that hopefully new approach on the part of the United States. More concretely speaking, Japan should be ready to admit that any bilateral framework of regional nuclear force embracing her own will inevitably involve restraints and controls on her, probably under the formula of the so-called double veto or two-key system. By virtue of a framework of this sort countries affected by Japan's international role, the United States, the non-communist countries of East Asia, the Soviet Union and even Communist China, would be relieved of the apprehension of having Japan going nuclear in an unilateral, unrestricted and unrestrained fashion. In this regard it is instructive to look at a poll conducted by the Yomiuri paper in September and October of last year among university students in several East Asian countries (27).

Table Two

Do you think that Japan should go nuclear when the American nuclear arms will have been withdrawn from Okinawa?

	Hongkong	Indonesia	Korea	Malaysia	Phillipines
Yes	31.5%	56.3	36.9	58.0	55.3
No	67.3	41.3	40.4	40.4	43.3
No Answers	1.2	2.5	1.6	1.6	1.4

	Singapore	South Vietnam
Yes	53.5%	45.0
No	44.8	53.0
No Answers	1.7	2.0

As to the Soviet Union, its opposition to such a possible Japanese move should not be strong as their stand against a nuclear Germany, especially when Japan is put under American restraints and controls (28) and if the United States and the Soviet Union are made to accept the advantages of that two



dimension approach. It ought to be stressed here that the United States has already succeeded in making the latter see the value of the American-Japanese Security Treaty, the latter indeed giving tacit recognition to that Treaty in the Joint Soviet-Japanese Peace Declaration (1956) in which high contracting powers confirmed that each of them had the right of individual and "collective" self-defense. It seems possible that the framework of American-Japanese bilateral restraints and controls with regard to the regional Japanese nuclear forces might finally be accepted by the Soviet Union, at least, as tolerable.

If, on the contrary, the United States should still persist in pressing for ratification of the NPT, then a frontal collusion with the emergent Japanese nationalism and with the imperative of strategy of deterrence as seen from Tokyo may well occur. It would become, I am deeply afraid, the most sure way of driving that nationalism to the stand of both out-and-out anti-Americanism and unilateral nuclear armament. Indeed the logic of deterrence in face of the developing capability of the Chinese nuclear arms leaves only two choices: bilateral nuclear co-operation with the United States or nuclear armament on anti-American basis. Seen from across the Pacific it looks as though there lies at the root of the American Far Eastern policy a fundamental ambivalence regarding Japan's future, a desire that Japan be both strong and weak at the same time. Such half-measure as asking Japan to become strong conventionally without going nuclear can only make sense and effectively prevail so long as Japan obediently remains American defense satellite. Indeed all might go well with that ambivalence if Japan can be persuaded to remain so for a long time to come. That, however, is a definitely impossible requirement in the situation of new national climate of present-day Japan.

During the first half of 1970s one may well live the period in which wisdom as to the strategic policy is most needed from both sides of the Pacific. Although the changing political mood within the United States may inhibit the development of a new, imaginative and flexible security policy for East Asia, I personally wish to pay my full respect to the wise counsel offered by Professor Osgood on this issue and hope that his advice will be heard:



In no case, however, can the United States afford to subordinate all other political considerations to nonproliferation. A rigid stand on nonproliferation is apt to be as inept for dissuading states that find compelling reasons to acquire nuclear weapons as for punishing states that have already undertaken nuclear programs... In the specific cases of India and Japan the United States may eventually have to decide whether American interests in Asian security and order are not better served by one or two friendly nuclear counterpoises being added to a pattern of countervailing power..." (29)

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- (21) Calleo. op. cit. p. 112.
- (22) ditto. op. cit. p. 113.
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

20 October 1971

SECRET

C-02 *RA7*

Dear Dick,

Thanks for your letter of 3 September. As you note, the discussions which you had on your trip support the underlying tenets of the Newport Study. Hal Shear, with assistance from your old team at the Naval War College, has been putting together a presentation to go to the Secretary of the Navy on the study. As of now, the 20th of October is tentatively scheduled. The presentation will not ask the Secretary's approval of the study, but rather his support for my using it in discussions at the Seapower Symposium.

I know that you desire to move rapidly into OSD and State channels on the study. I, too, am impatient, but we need to know fairly precisely how and when we should proceed in advance of definitive action on our part.

In regard to the basic steps which you have indicated in your letter, the first will certainly be highlighted at Newport - barring Secretary Chafee's veto, which I do not expect.

As to the McNamara/McNaughton policy issue, this is no longer germane in U. S. channels. The Secretary of Defense strategy guidance of 28 January 1970 states "Since the McNaughton force goals for Greece and Turkey are not being implemented, they should be abandoned in favor of JSOP force goals. We should then support them as NATO force goals". Our MAAG's and Military Groups are proceeding on this basis. Unfortunately there has been no international pronouncement of this change in policy. Frank Vannoy has suggested to Jack Morse that this would be an appropriate matter to include in the Secretary's

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statement at the November Ministerials. Jack thinks it is a fine idea which he will try to implement. In this connection, we have been doing quite well in supporting Turkish - and to a lesser extent Greek - Navy requirements as a result of ship availabilities resulting from our own force reductions.

Your third point is an absolute non-starter. Our friends in the JCS refuse to accept that the increase in the Soviet naval threat has any significance vis-a-vis the Soviet air/ground threat. *We will try to prevail in other ways*

The fourth point is one which weighs heavily on the administration. There is complete recognition that your point is valid; there is some optimism that Congress will see it that way. Happily, there is a complete turn-around in Defense on military sales support and they have always supported a reasonably high level of Military Assistance. How much we can convince Congress to do, remains to be seen.

Warm regards,

  
E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN  
Chief of Staff  
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic  
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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21 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Via: (1) Director, Naval Command Course *WLS 10-2-70*  
(2) Chief of Staff *By Prefer Draft 1. It has going.*

Subj: Draft of CNO Address to SACLANT Symposium

Encl: (1) Two First Drafts  
(2) Copies of CNO Materials related to Symposium (C)

1. On 23 and 25 September while in Washington on the Naval Command Course Field Study Trip, I visited the office of CDR John Davey, USN, Public Affairs Officer for Admiral Zumwalt, in order to obtain materials and guidance for subject draft. CDR Davey was most cooperative, and I reviewed several tapes of recent speeches by CNO in order to develop a feel for his method of expression. In addition, I asked CDR Davey to review two first drafts which I had completed prior to departure for the Naval Command Course Washington Field Study Trip.

2. I was orally informed that Admiral Zumwalt had approved your proposal to provide two drafts on or before 20 October, along the lines suggested in your letter.

*same as 2*  
*WLS.* 3. CDR Davey reacted most favorably to both drafts. He expressed the view that Draft No. 1 was preferred. He further felt that the discussion of the Tocqueville Oscillation in Draft No. 2, although interesting and pertinent, was not in keeping with Admiral Zumwalt's general style.

4. In the course of extensive discussion, CDR Davey made further suggestions to modify the initial drafts to reflect his understanding of Admiral Zumwalt's views. I intend to incorporate all such suggestions in a third draft effort to be completed within a few days. I would propose that Draft No. 1 (attached) and Draft No. 3 (in progress) are the best candidates for submission. CDR Davey also suggested that a brief rationale be attached to each draft, giving reasons why you consider certain remarks within the draft most appropriate, if you have strong preferences.

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
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5. In addition to visiting CDR Davey, I dropped in to the office of OP-601. LCOL Fuller of that office is conducting liaison with SACLANT on the details of the Symposium. I obtained copies of previous correspondence and message traffic relating to the Symposium in order to develop an understanding of how Admiral Zumwalt's remarks would fit into the overall sequence and tone of the meeting. I found that RADM House will be making a presentation on 5 November dealing with Modernization Programs of the U.S. Navy, and obtained a tentative draft from Captain Barker, USN, in order to minimize possibilities of substantive conflicts between CNO's remarks and those of RADM House.

6. Admiral Zumwalt is tentatively scheduled to speak on 3 November for 30-45 minutes immediately after the opening remarks of Admiral Duncan. Since at that time the SACLANT Change of Command had not yet taken place, all existing plans are subject to Admiral Duncan's preferences, and have been regarded as tentative.

7. Materials regarding CNO/SACLANT planning for symposium are also attached for information.

Very respectfully,



J. F. McNULTY  
CDR., USN

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PRIMARY DRAFT OF REMARKS PROPOSED FOR DELIVERY ON 3 NOVEMBER 1970  
BY ADMIRAL E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
TO ACLANT FLAG OFFICER SYMPOSIUM

PREPARED BY VADM R. G. COLBERT, USN  
PRESIDENT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

I. SALUTATION TO RANKING GUESTS.

II. INTRODUCTION

Gentlemen:

I am privileged to be here today to address this distinguished audience. I have been looking forward to this occasion as an opportunity uniquely in harmony with the major thrust of my activities during these initial four months of my tenure as Chief of Naval Operations. During this period I have come to an increased understanding of the existing and predicted problems of the United States Navy. Of necessity, I also have been very much concerned about the international environment in which that Navy must operate now and for the future. Above all, I have sought to grasp the implications of the changing political guidance which ultimately defines the goals and objectives to be served by the U.S. Navy and its allies. In that light, then, these last few months have convinced me more than ever that the current and future decisions we must make in the U.S. Navy will be greatly influenced by the views and actions of the navies represented here today -- conversely, I know that our decisions will figure heavily in

your calculations as our naval partners. Therefore, my remarks today are intended to give you some understanding of the general concepts which will govern my approaches to the problems we all share. I hope that the continuing exchange of views during this Symposium will provide us all some common guidelines for the future.

In order to make clear my views, and to set the stage for some recommendations I wish to suggest for your later consideration, I propose first to review some significant aspects of my initial four months as Chief of Naval Operations, then to discuss the basic concepts of the Nixon Doctrine which I hold to be most relevant to the purposes of this meeting, and finally, to outline certain conclusions and recommendations which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.

### III. TEXT

When I returned to Washington from Viet-Nam, I assumed office at a time when critical U.S. national budget decisions were being made at all levels of government. I am sure that you are familiar with the several pressures influencing these decisions, and so I will not detail them all here. In general, it is enough for us to understand that it is the growing concern

over environmental conditions and the legitimate social needs of our cities and minority groups which forms the basis of these pressures. As a result, the U.S. Navy and its sister services have programmed substantial force reductions for this and future fiscal years. We in the Navy have been describing our own experience as an exchange of quantity for quality. This is of course quite true, since we have been able to remove from active service the oldest and least capable units while continuing a modest, but essential, construction and modernization program. However, I consider that such a simplistic description of what is happening tends to give an inaccurate picture. It may be more constructive to consider that, on my arrival I found that the U.S. Navy projected strength, in gross overall numbers, had been reduced from a high of \_\_\_\_ ships on 1 July 1969 to a projected level of \_\_\_\_ ships on 1 July 1972. Even these figures are subject to further downward revision if predicted budget cuts now being discussed are imposed.

Within these lowered budgets, however, we are able to exercise discretion as to the types of forces to be cut, and so I have sought to categorize our naval forces in terms which can best assist me in deciding where our diminishing resources



should be placed. Using our stated Navy mission as the foundation, I have broken our forces down into four categories which I can feel most comfortable in describing:

First, strong Second Strike Capable Forces --

Polaris and Poseidon;

Second, Sea Control Forces -- that is, those

forces dedicated to maintaining control of

the seas, such as our Attack Submarines,

some of our Strike Carriers, all of our

ASW Carriers, our Escort Destroyers, and

our Maritime Patrol Aircraft;

Third, Projection Forces, in which I include our

Merchant Marine as well as our Amphibious

Forces and the remainder of our Strike Carrier

Forces -- all Forces that is, which can project

power and influence into the Eurasian rimland;

Fourth, and finally, Overseas Presence Forces,

capable of providing a military-political show

of force.

My analysis, on this basis, seemed to indicate that some adjustments to previous plans were in order. The realities of our Viet-Nam experience had driven these plans to err on the

side of providing more Projection Capability at the sacrifice of Sea Control Capability. In Viet-Nam, as in Korea, our naval forces never experienced a real challenge to their control of the sea -- the adversary simply allowed our forces to operate as in a sanctuary. On the other hand, our ability to meet our in-country commitments demanded substantial allocation of resources to our projection forces -- so our sea control forces have had to "live off their own surplus." -- That reserve capacity is now exhausted. At the same time I am convinced that the threat to our ability to control the sea in support of our mutual interests has never been greater.

This increased threat level exists because of the unprecedented growth of Soviet maritime power over the last decade. Although that expansion has manifested itself on a world-wide basis, nowhere does it have more serious implications than here in the Atlantic area. Only a few short years ago no serious challenge to the U.S. and Allied ability to control the seas in support of our objectives could have been mounted -- today, the rise of Soviet seapower concurrent with the diminishment of U.S. and other Western naval forces has made the possibility of successful challenge a much more credible, and therefore a much more probable option for the Soviets.



In a conventional "war at sea" situation, the Soviet Navy can bring numerous conventional weapons systems to bear against our Sea Control and Projection Forces. It is estimated that in 1972 this threat can include over \_\_\_ submarines equipped with Surface-to-Surface missiles, up to \_\_\_ SSM-equipped major combatant warships, more than \_\_\_ missile equipped small gunboats, and in excess of \_\_\_ medium bombers capable of launching Air-to-Surface stand-off weapons. Even today, the combined air, surface and sub-surface assets of the Northern Fleet alone can launch over \_\_\_ cruise missiles against NATO surface forces.

In my view, the most hazardous imbalance exists between our ASW Forces, including our surface escorts, and the Soviet submarine forces. It has accurately been said that no Admiral has ever had enough destroyers, but my concern is not generated merely by a desire to have a comfortable margin of superiority in this area -- it is the visible insufficiency of such forces with respect to the threat level and deployment posture which gives me pause. At the moment, the Soviets have nearly \_\_\_\_\_ submarines, almost one-fourth of them nuclear types, capable of entry to the Atlantic/Mediterranean areas. They can construct new nuclear submarines in their covered yard at

Severodvinsk at the rate of \_\_\_per year -- while the U.S.  
building capacity is only\_\_\_per year. In fact, the Soviets  
2 have introduced more new types of submarines since mid-1968  
than the U.S. has built submarines!

Additionally, we have witnessed a steady broadening  
of the Soviet deployment pattern in the same period. You are  
all familiar with the Soviet world-wide exercise 'OKEAN' which  
took place with great publicity earlier this year. It may be  
true that such an ambitious undertaking at this time promised  
benefits to the Soviets more political-psychological than  
military in nature, but I view the venture as a harbinger of  
a continuous world-wide politico-military presence by Soviet  
naval forces within a very few years. Everything I have  
observed points to this conclusion, including the published  
statements of the Soviet leadership, which repeatedly insist  
that this is indeed their goal. Certainly, we would be remiss  
if we failed to regard these changing patterns of deployment  
with concern. The Soviet Navy is both young in spirit and  
advanced in technology. They are vigorously working both  
to enlarge their professional competence and to become  
familiar with all the oceans and seas of the world -- waters  
which include our allied sea-based lifelines.

These deployments and the development of effective afloat support capabilities pose particularly difficult problems for NATO. This enlarging pattern in the Atlantic is clearly aimed at minimizing the geographic disadvantages facing the Soviets. If they are able to develop the capability to maintain for extended periods significant portions of their forces beyond the narrow seas and straits off their bases, we can neither count on surge deployments to warn us of an impending attack nor be certain of engaging their forces with success from the outset of a confrontation. This is particularly true of their submarine forces, which are most capable of contesting us for control of the sea lanes which bind our Alliance and make our mutual defense possible.

Admittedly, these facts are sobering. However, after careful assessment, I am confident that the balance still remains in our favor. At the moment, I consider that the U.S. Navy alone has a substantially better-than-even chance of handling a Soviet challenge at sea. With your assistance, those odds improve greatly. However, I am not so optimistic about the future, in the face of their accelerating growth and our continuing reductions.

In my view, these diverging trends indicate that the later years of this decade can be decisive, and so I have

been willing to accept cuts in present force levels in order to be able to continue the procurement of our new Navy. Thus, although we speak of quality versus quantity, what we are really doing is to emphasize the future at the cost of the present. I believe that to do otherwise will inevitably force us into a stern chase after 1975 -- and, as you well know, any stern chase is a long one in which an adversary could gain crucial distance toward his objectives.

For the same basic reason, we are taking a parallel approach to our personnel situation. You are undoubtedly familiar with some of the many recent actions we have taken to help retain our finest young people and to encourage them to stay with us during these days of trial and adversity. We intend to continue and enlarge these efforts, even at the cost of immediate forces, since the sacrifices we are making to obtain a new and more capable Navy will be in vain unless sufficient numbers of competent and motivated officers and men are available to operate it. The urgency of this situation is best illustrated by the fact that our carriers currently are experiencing an overall retention rate of about 3%. It is clear to me that we must turn this situation around quickly, and that we must expect to pay for it.

In my concurrent role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have found that my fellow Service Chiefs are making equally agonizing decisions with respect to their own forces, since our entire U.S. Defense establishment is undergoing the same retrenchment process. Thus, these substantial budget cuts are also forcing a re-appraisal of our national military strategy in order to bring our level of force commitment into balance with our available and predicted means.

5        At the highest levels of our Department of Defense, the so-called "swing strategy" is most often discussed. Under this approach, U.S. military forces would be configured to a "1-½ war capability," able to fight a major conventional war in one theater and a simultaneous limited holding action elsewhere. This strategy is based on the belief that U.S. forces, largely based in the U.S., could be "swung" into action by rapid redeployment to meet the most imminent threat.

It is my thought that this philosophy may be valid for air and land forces, in view of the expanded airlift and airmobile forces now in existence or coming on line. However, I am convinced that such a strategy is questionable with regard to sea-mobile forces. In a conventional NATO war

situation, the U.S. Navy cannot ignore the Pacific in favor of the Atlantic. The Russian Navy is capable not only of mounting a world-wide threat to our ability to control the sea in support of our own or allied forces but also of threatening our very territorial unity since two of our fifty states are tied to their continental sisters by Pacific Ocean sea L.O.C.'s.

Further, it is clear that even with the advent of C-5A and other large aircraft, any sustained military action in Europe or elsewhere must be supported directly by sealift of  
6 over 90% of the tonnage required. Under any such localized conflict situation, it also would be essential that we not be isolated from our allies elsewhere in the world who might remain un-engaged, for this might encourage the Soviets to undertake a concurrent "divide and conquer" strategy -- that is, a strategy aimed at separating us through the use of diplomatic and economic initiatives and pressures. Therefore, I consider it essential to advocate that the broadest flexibility be incorporated in our full spectrum of maritime capabilities -- not only in the design and construction of our newer forces, but as well in their relation to our national or international command structures and in the concepts



governing their employment. Where U.S. forces themselves seem inadequate to the demands of some areas of our interest, either in number or capability, I would hope to augment their influence or effect by other means, possibly by encouraging their regular commitment in support of, and in partnership with, allies having similar regionally oriented interests. What I have categorized as "Overseas Presence Forces" might be most responsive to such assignment.

This brings me to what I believe to be a most promising option for us in the immediate future, and that is the increasingly real prospect and need for international naval cooperation and partnership.

Our President has made his views in this area most clear. Under the Nixon Doctrine, formalized in his February message to the U.S. Congress entitled "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," he announced his belief that the "postwar era in international relations has ended" and that new approaches were in order.

Most notable among the ideas he expressed was that of seeking "Peace through Partnership." I believe that the new concept of partnership he outlined is the keystone to the success of the entire new policy. I also believe that we

in this room are in the best position to provide early and concrete proof that the partnership approach will work.

The essence of the Nixon Doctrine is its acknowledgment that the United States cannot be, and should not be, a unilateral policeman of the world. Too often in the years since World War II, the United States has assumed a position of "dominance" rather than real partnership in its international commitments. Perhaps in the early days, with our allies ravaged by war and in deep economic distress, this dominant leadership was warranted. Now, however, the weak have become strong, while the United States is no longer in a position of commanding relative strength. Our allies today are able, and in many cases eager, to bear a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense.

Some observers have claimed that the Nixon Doctrine is merely a recognition of, and an accommodation to, the reality of internal pressures on the United States Government. I strongly disagree. The Doctrine does recognize reality -- but it is the reality that "domination" leads to dependence, while true "partnership" encourages the independence, pride, and dignity of our sovereign allies. Nowhere has this basic principle of human intercourse been more effectively illustrated



than by the experiences of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic. This force, now in its third year of existence, provides all participating nations an opportunity to contribute on an equal basis, not only in the hardware area, but also in the sharing of that most demanding responsibility of all -- command! The first U.S. naval commander has only recently been assigned. In my view, such sharing on a co-equal basis of both material assets and command responsibility is particularly representative of the partnership thesis which is the warp and woof of the Nixon Doctrine. It is fitting that this first successful demonstration of the theory has arisen from the fraternity of seamen represented in this room today. I believe that more can be done along this line. I also believe that our common professional understanding arising from parallel careers in which we have shared both the rewards and the hazards of life at sea best fits us to undertake the effort. That such an effort is indicated seems evident to me after consideration of other implications of the Doctrine.

In his message and subsequent statements, the President clearly and strongly has reaffirmed our commitment in support of the defense of forty-three nations around the world. For that reaffirmation to be valid and credible, a forward strategy is required, with the American flag continuing to be visible world-wide. But, at the same time, he has specified a lowered

profile for U.S. forces overseas, suggested the prospect of selected reductions if not complete withdrawal of such forces from certain areas, and indicated a cutback in U.S. bases on foreign soil.

These seemingly inconsistent requirements can only be reconciled by an understanding that the strategic emphasis is concurrently shifting to seaward. A strategy based on seapower is the only logical one which can flow from these conditions.

You have heard this trend referred to as the "Blue Water Strategy," under which greater emphasis is to be placed on sea-mobile strategic and conventional forces. It may be that the depth of U.S. land commitment overseas will have to be reduced gradually, but I believe such reductions will be accompanied by offsetting increases in our collective and individual sea-based capabilities. Increases of U.S. naval forces to this end are being programmed, but they cannot be brought into being until the later years of this decade. Therefore, I foresee a pressing need to develop interim measures to fill the gaps which may exist in some areas during the immediate future.

Above all, I must emphasize that although the Nixon Doctrine has announced a shift in the philosophical approach

of the U.S. toward its alliance commitments, the essential elements of our commitment have not changed.

In particular, I can assure this audience that the U.S. commitment to NATO continues to be regarded as the heart of our entire alliance structure, just as it has been so regarded for the last twenty-two years. In a very pragmatic sense, the security of the United States is inextricably bound up with that of Europe. President Nixon himself personally emphasized this point during his recent trip to Europe. It is clear that our commitment there will continue to command the highest priority in our national thinking and planning. However, in the shift from a position of U.S. "dominance" toward a more realistic position of U.S. "partnership," NATO has been provided with an opportunity to modify its own stance in order to be more responsive to the changed conditions of the 1970's. I believe that only the failure of NATO planners to take up the gauntlet and move imaginatively to accommodate these changed circumstances can pose any hazard to our mutual security. In this regard, it appears to me that several new approaches should be considered, particularly as to NATO's maritime aspects.

Above all, as I earlier mentioned, the Soviet threat to our ability to control the sea must take urgent claim on our

attentions. The U.S. Navy will continue to maintain forward deployments of what I have referred to as Overseas Presence Forces capable of exerting a military-political show of force. However, it should be remembered that such forces, to be credible, must be subject to swift and effective reinforcement from our closer-to-home supporting units. If ever an adversary became convinced that he could successfully interdict this reinforcement, that is, challenge us for control of the sea, we will have set the stage for a possible war at sea. Therefore, it is essential that we in NATO's naval component be able to display a constant and unquestioned ability to control the sea to this end. Thus, as U.S. forces dwindle in number, those of other nations in the alliance must, as a minimum, clearly and visibly indicate a willingness to offset possible resulting shifts in relative strength.

At the moment, the Soviet leaders may feel that challenges may be made at sea without real risk of hazard to the Soviet homeland. It is true that at one time the West had the sole option of choosing a sea-based confrontation with Communist power -- now that option belongs equally to the Soviets.

In addition, they may be coming to the belief that a strategy of sea-borne interposition holds the promise of

significant advantage for them. Under this view, the simple, prompt placement of forces between an adversary and his objectives in a peacetime or sub-limited war situation shifts the onus of possible escalation to the adversary with minimum risk to the vital interests of the interposer. Consider, for example, the effect of the presence of Soviet naval forces in the harbor at Alexandria during the 1967 "five-day war." If the Israeli government had chosen to attack these port facilities, they would have risked the escalatory effect of possible damage to Russian ships or crews. By the same token, the presence of Russian merchant ships in the harbor at Haiphong certainly constrained the target opportunity of U.S. forces during the bombing campaign in the North. This is the essential element of an interposition strategy -- careful placement of one's own forces can deter or restrict adversary actions unless he is willing to accept the responsibility for escalation. Even if such risk were deemed acceptable, the course of action may only be chosen after deliberate high-level consideration of other alternatives. Thus, the decision may only be interpreted as a conscious governmental act which reflects national resolve and risk assessment -- vital information for the interposer. Of course,

the most recent example of this concept was our own prompt movement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to a position south of Crete during the September Jordanian crisis.

I believe that a possible Soviet election of a maritime strategy of interposition can be defeated by NATO forces, acting in concert. Certainly, the arrival of a mixed NATO naval force on a scene of tension would give the Soviet leadership a set of considerations to weigh differing from those which would be generated by the arrival of a unilateral naval force. For example, in the recurring crises of the Eastern Mediterranean, it is conceivable that a U.S. Sixth Fleet force intended to evacuate U.S. nationals might at least temporarily be hindered by the interposition of Soviet naval forces on a pretext of "protecting their Arab brothers from U.S. intervention." How different the situation might be if a mixed NATO evacuation force arrived to remove all NATO nationals, under the cover of Sixth Fleet forces distant to the West!

Certainly, the options of Western leadership would be substantially broadened if our naval forces possessed a credible and visible capability to shift the responsibility for possible escalation back to the other side. Possible ways of developing



such a capability to the sophisticated level indicated requires our earnest consideration.

One method to foster a closer integration of NATO naval forces is by the conduct of combined exercises on a more frequent schedule than in the past. Another possibility might be to commit more of the regularly deployed U.S. naval forces to NATO objectives on a semi-permanent basis -- that is, to enlarge the NATO Standing Naval Force concept to permit integration of major U.S. Fleet units into the Force in support of specific and announced aims. Either course of action would have the significant advantage of expanding the real military capability in our numerically limited forces through their increasing familiarity with the unique demands of multi-national operations. Another possible advantage would be to accelerate our efforts to attain standardization of some basic equipments within all NATO navies. It is discouraging to realize that at  
10 this moment, we have not yet been able to agree even on standardized replenishment-at-sea rigs -- surely a step essential to the success of combined naval operations in wartime.

Since the nature of combined wartime operations would be oriented very heavily toward the ASW problem as we attempt to maintain the flow of support and supplies across the Atlantic,

I believe that we also should take an early look at the possibility of maximizing our combined capabilities in that area. Some of the navies represented here have specialized in the ASW business over the years, and can bring to the problem some highly expert people as well as advanced weapon systems. Furthermore, some of you now have new ASW ships in production or in development. As I have said, numbers of such units are going to be essential if we are to maintain a credible capability to control the sea against the expected threat from the Soviets.

Recognizing that we are all constrained by our national budget programs, I want to point out that other alternatives for the possible procurement of ASW units may exist. One corollary to the Nixon Doctrine and its emphasis on partnership is the proposed new approach to U.S. military aid programs. On 15 September 1970, the President outlined this freshly conceived plan to our Congress. Entitled, the "International Security Assistance Program," it is intended to "help other countries assume the responsibility of their own defense, and thus help us reduce our presence abroad." When the fully developed plan is submitted to the new Congress in January, 1971 it may well permit those countries which have the will



but clearly cannot afford the unilateral costs of enlarging their ASW forces to expect U.S. aid for this purpose. It would appear to me that countries with a production program in progress would be in a good position to take advantage of this aid simply by enlarging their existing order. Others might order ships of similar or related characteristics, thus obtaining significant economies over the cost of developing purely national designs.

We should, at least, look very carefully at what might be done along this line, for my appraisal of the threat convinces me that the contest may soon become a numbers game. No effort to improve our numbers or capability in this area can be regarded as wasted. In the event of hostilities in Europe, the anti-submarine battle in the Atlantic will once more be critical to the outcome, and we would be derelict if we overlook any reasonable prospect of improving our ability to win it.

12        Another aspect about which I am sure you have all been concerned is that which requires NATO naval operations to be confined to sea areas North of the Tropic of Cancer. In my view, now is the time for NATO to look outward, beyond this arbitrarily assigned limit. Surely, we are all able to plot

the striking range of Russian sea-based missiles, and it is clear that a Soviet "Yankee" class missile submarine may threaten both Portugal and the U.S. simultaneously from a position south of that imaginary dividing line. Additionally, Europe is heavily dependent on energy sources which lie far from the Continental coasts -- consider the oil tonnage from the Middle East which must pass each day through the waters off South Africa. Does it make sense to say that these vital tankers may be threatened before they cross  $23\frac{1}{2}$  degrees of North latitude without arousing the determined interest of NATO?? Of course not. As accurately as I can determine, the Tropic of Cancer as the southern sea boundary of NATO naval interest was established purely out of an early desire to avoid the risk of disagreement within the membership -- no one ever really checked to see if some other dimension to the alliance would be acceptable or even if a boundary on the limitless sea were necessary. In fact, I can see no valid reason for adhering to this arbitrary limit in this coming decade. On the other hand, I can visualize many very compelling reasons why to do so would invite great difficulty, if not disaster. Is it not the height of folly to let the fledgling sea commanders of Russian forces believe that we are not really

interested in what they might do, so long as it is south of that imaginary line? Consider the prospect of "hot pursuit" of an unidentified submarine which may have threatened a NATO interest but then headed South to what the submarine commander may regard as sanctuary, since we have never declared otherwise. Should we not question whether the continued adherence to this sea limit adds to or detracts from the security of the members of NATO -- is there reason to believe that gradual enlargement of NATO sea operations to the South Atlantic would be other than advantageous to our interests? At least let us now consider these questions, understanding in advance that certain political sensitivities may be aroused, but ready to face them and bow only to those which are, in fact, valid and controlling. We must equally be ready to pursue imaginative new horizons where our sensitivities are proven to have been misplaced.

Also with regard to geographic limits to NATO interest, consider the situation in the Mediterranean at the moment. Twenty years ago, the southern Flank of this Alliance was considered as existing somewhere in the reaches of the international waters of that sea. Is that consideration valid today, or has the determined activity of the Soviets

13 in the countries of the North African littoral changed the basis for locating that vital flank? Should NATO Mediterranean sea forces continue systematically to ignore those southern shores of the Mediterranean as beyond their interest? Would it not be to our mutual advantage to affirm our interest in some of the states of North Africa, possibly by a planned series of port visits of NATO-characterized forces with NATO requesting the visits? Might not such a visible display at least give the leaders of countries not yet totally alienated from our beliefs some alternative to the embrace of the Russian Bear?

In considering all these approaches we are again confronted by concern for NATO internal political sensitivity to changes which may influence national political positions. However, should we not also consider the ultimate implications of the Nixon Doctrine in this area before making judgment? -- "United States partnership" in place of "United States dominance" can be a powerful tool to national leadership in justifying reasonable shifts of balance within our proven alliance structure. Further, what better proof of our strength need we send to the Soviets than to show them that we are, at this advanced state of our mutual understanding, able to

subordinate previous disagreements to a firm resolution in the face of the clear and accelerating threat which we perceive?

As President Nixon said, "the postwar era in international relations has ended," and it is time for us all to seek new approaches to our mutual security problems.

As naval officers, each understanding the real responsibilities of command, we find ourselves beset today by circumstances and threats not of our own choosing -- we cannot change them, for both sets of pressures have arisen from the realities of life in a complex and interdependent world. The options available to us are, as always, limited. Just as we of the U.S. Navy are seeking to communicate our needs to our civilian masters, so must you all. --And in explaining to them our perceptions and requirements we must provide them with options based on imaginative new solutions or programs. At least, it is essential that we discuss our problems, not ignore them. Merely by seeking new alternatives, we will grow stronger together.

Finally, I believe that, within the spirit of partnership announced by the Nixon Doctrine, we will find the seeds of a revitalized Alliance. Already, the early successes of the

Standing Naval Force Atlantic and our Mediterranean Surveillance Force, together with the promise shown by our Maritime Contingency Forces Atlantic, prove that we have only begun to explore the realistically attainable dimensions of true partnership.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Gentlemen, I have tried today to give you a view of my personal approach to some of the urgent problems which bear on our common interests as we face the new decade ahead. There are many such problems, and I have cited only those few which seem representative of the difficulties ahead of us individually and collectively. I recognize that none are amenable to swift and efficient solution, but I do believe they can be solved or minimized if we try. Just as a decade ago a young American President said of the problems facing America and the World in the 1960's:

"All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days... Nor even perhaps in our life-time on this planet. But let us begin."

I am ready to begin. Thank you.



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Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: 7-1-98

Title of Article: MEMO FOR PRESIDENT NWC

Author: Cdr McNULTY

Date of Presentation: 2 OCT 70

Classification: ☐ Secret ☒ Confidential Number of Pages: 2 (x 3 copies)

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 08 APR 1996

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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CDR R.J. KURTH, USN  
Op-616C, X76788  
18 June 1971

SUBJECT (C)

How could we proceed to encourage our Allies to make a greater contribution to control of the seas?

HIGHLIGHTS (U)

The growing Soviet maritime presence has become a challenge to vital sea lines of communication. At the same time, most Allied navies are faced with rising costs, decreasing funds and comparatively low national priority. If the trend continues, the Soviets will be able to use naval forces coercively but without need for a clear confrontation. Political and economic advantages (an increase in power) will accrue them.

DISCUSSIONS (C)

Among the free maritime nations of the world, we can:

1. Encourage national actions which:
  - increase the exchange of ideas.
  - foster national organizations to generate public support of navies.
  - reduce sophistication and standardize naval weapons systems.
2. Encourage regional actions which:
  - Strengthen the political and economic links of maritime nations in order to:
    - a. Resolve regional differences.
    - b. Recognize maritime interdependence.
    - c. Build common maritime strategies.
    - d. Increase existing naval strength as forces in being through multinational forces and joint operations.
  - Acquaint political leaders with the benefits to be achieved by navies operating together.
  - Examine multinational consortiums to develop and produce ships and weapons systems.

We may improve allied contributions through US actions which:

- Relate MAP aid to actual security needs of recipients.
- Offset the tendency of the US technological pace to outstrip allies:
  - a. US construction is increasingly divergent from the requirements and means of Allies.
  - b. Tactics and doctrine may cease to be compatible.
  - c. The problem is becoming critical in communications area.

GROUP 4

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intervals; declassified  
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CALL NO: \_\_\_\_\_ Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

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7-2-98

Title of Article: NATO/SEATO EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Author: CDR R.T. KUENTH

Date of Presentation: 21 JUN 71

Classification: ☐ Secret

☒ Confidential

Number of Pages: \_\_\_\_\_

Disposition:

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CDR R. J. KURTH, USN  
Op-616C X76788  
21 June 1971

SUBJECT (U)

NATO/SEATO Exchange Program

HIGHLIGHTS (C)

- NATO/SEATO Exchange Program planning begun at CNO initiative in summer, 1970.
- Concept is to put USN personnel in desirable allied-Navy shore billets with Allied counterparts serving aboard US Navy ships.
- Initial planning completed and policy authorization obtained by January 1971. CNO personal letters sent to 7 Allied Navy Chiefs on 12 February: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, FRG, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Initial contacts with UK and Netherlands made personally by CNO. Total: 9-countries.
- All countries have responded:
  1. UK, Italy and New Zealand: planning negotiations underway.
  2. Netherlands and Greece.  
Interest shown. Further contact promised by both but not yet made.
  3. Canada, Australia, FRG, and Turkey.  
Initial response holds open possibilities.  
Further contact promised after more staffing.
- Oceanographer Exchange Program jointed to NATO/SEATO Exchange Program. Action underway on one USN Captain billet each for Canada and Australia.
- Policy approval requested from ISA/STATE to expand Exchange Program to include Belgium, Mexico, and Brazil.

DISCUSSION (C)

Several problems have become evident as plans for the Exchange Program progress:

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21 June 1971

a. Security and the disclosure of information to foreign nationals. On what ships in which billets may foreign nationals be assigned? Op-942 is preparing recommendations.

b. Other navies have the same personnel imbalances as US. Several willing to accept US men without sending theirs. U. S. Navy does not have billet "spares" and needs foreign personnel to fill vacated slots.

c. Agreement on rank/rate and specialties to be exchanged.

d. Scarcity within other navies of funds for transportation and support of their personnel.

e. Relationship of NATO/SEATO Exchange Program and standing Interchange Program.

Work on ironing out these problems is continuing.

RECOMMENDATION (C)

Casual remarks in support of the Exchange Program by CNO to Allied Navy Chiefs during the forthcoming European trip would probably help expedite action in favor of the NATO/SEATO Exchange Program.

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## Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer:                     Date: 7-2-98Title of Article: EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY WARSHIPSAuthor: CDR R.J. KURTZDate of Presentation: 22 JUN 71Classification: ☒ Secret☐ ConfidentialNumber of Pages: 2

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 05 APR 1996☐ Additional Review Required.☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

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CDR R. J. KURTH, USN  
Op-616C X76788  
22 June 1971

SUBJECT (U)

EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY WARSHIPS

HIGHLIGHTS (S)

- Navy has been seeking incremental increase in visits to Soviet ports by non-combat USN/USCG vessels. Reasons: reciprocity, open Soviet ports, pave way for possible exchange of warship visits.
- Two successful visits recently. USCGC SOUTHWIND to Murmansk in September, 1970; USNS KELLAR to Nakhodka in April 1971.
- Navy has asked USCG to visit Nakhodka in October. Plans underway.
- Navy wants exchange of warship visits with USSR.
  - Nothing to lose, much to gain.
  - Time is right to move now.
  - Soviet Fleet status is fact based on order of battle and ability to operate, not US attitude.
  - NATO Allies (Denmark, Norway and Netherlands) are planning exchanges.
  - Exchange may increase US knowledge of Soviet fleet: operational capability and infrastructure.
  - May exert subtle influence on USSR, whether exchange offer accepted or rejected.
  - May provide US populace with vivid image of Soviet Navy useful to USN objectives.
- Proposal will require careful preparation with our Allies. Italians may be most sensitive to implications.
- First visit should be US warship to Soviet port.

DISCUSSION (S)

The Navy proposal is the subject of a CNOM tabled with JCS requesting support and forwarding memo of support to SECDEF. Navy seeks authority to propose exchange of visits on a service-to-service basis after careful political coordination at home and abroad.

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CDR R. J. KURTH, USN

Op-616C X76788

22 June 1971

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RECOMMENDATIONS (S)

- That CNO not mention specifics of plan to Allies at this time.
- That CNO seek Allied reactions through elliptical remarks concerning extension Norwegian, Danish, Dutch visit plans to a USN proposal to USSR.

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CALL NO: \_\_\_\_\_ Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 7-2-98

Title of Article: STATEMENT OF ADM ELMO R ZUMWALT BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

Author: ADM ZUMWALT

Date of Presentation: UNKNOWN

Classification: ☒ Secret

☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 61

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SLIDE #5 REGARDING SUB. ACOUSTIC  
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STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR., U.S. NAVY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
CONCERNING FY 1973 MILITARY POSTURE AND BUDGET OF THE  
UNITED STATES NAVY

DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS  
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## BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF ADMIRAL ELMO RUSSELL ZUMWALT, JR., USN

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was born in San Francisco, California, on November 29, 1920. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy and was graduated with distinction and commissioned Ensign on June 19, 1942. He attended the Naval War College (1952-1953) and the National War College (1961-1962). He advanced to the rank of Admiral on July 1, 1970.

Admiral Zumwalt assumed command as the nineteenth Chief of Naval Operations on July 1, 1970. Prior to his present assignment, he served as the Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam and Chief of the Naval Advisory Group, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Other significant positions of responsibility have included Director of the Systems Analysis Group in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Secretary of the Navy, and Director of Arms Control and Contingency Planning for Cuba in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

He has commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla SEVEN, the guided missile ship USS DEWEY, the destroyer USS ARNOLD J. ISBELL, and the destroyer escort USS TILLS.

During World War II, he served on the destroyer USS ROBINSON and saw action against enemy Japanese battleships during the Battle for Leyte Gulf on October 25, 1944. After the cessation of hostilities in August 1945, and until December 8 of that year, he commanded, as prize crew officer, the HIMJS ATAKA, a 1200-ton Japanese river gunboat. In that capacity, he took the first ship flying the United States flag up the Yangtze River since the outbreak of World War II.

Admiral Zumwalt's decorations include: The Distinguished Service Medal with a Gold Star in lieu of Second Award, the Legion of Merit with Gold Star, and the Bronze Star Medal and the Navy Commendation Ribbon, each with the Combat "V". In addition, he holds twelve campaign, service and theater medals, and awards or decorations from the Republic of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Korea.

Admiral Zumwalt is married to the former Mouza Coutelais-du-Roche of Harbin, Manchuria. They have two sons, Elmo R. Zumwalt, III, and First Lieutenant James Gregory Zumwalt, U.S. Marine Corps, and two daughters, Ann F. Zumwalt and Mouza C. Zumwalt.

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CNO PROGRAM AND BUDGET STATEMENT

FY 1973

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you in support of the Navy's budget request for Fiscal Year 1973.

Again this year, Admiral Moorer, in his statement presents a thorough exposition of our national nuclear deterrent forces. I shall therefore discuss the naval component of these forces only in connection with our ULMS program, for which we request a substantial increase in funding in Fiscal Year 1973.

The Unique Role of Naval Power

In his statement, the Secretary of Defense elaborates on the total force concept and particularly on how our defense planning fits within the Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence. As he makes clear, with the advent of nuclear parity, general purpose forces, those of our allies as well as our own, are increasingly meaningful for deterrence in the types of situations which we as a nation and as a partner in several alliances may face in the next decade. Mobile, flexible forces are the key elements of such forces. In some situations, naval forces, including

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amphibious forces with embarked Marines, are the only forces that can be brought to bear quickly and effectively without dependence upon forward bases, overflight or landing rights or other support requiring the consent of territorial sovereigns. They thus provide a "signal" coupled with power, yet permit the exercise of restraint.

The 1970 Jordan crisis provides a unique example of the utility of such Navy/Marine Corps forces. If CINCEUR had wished to transport ground or air forces from Germany, they probably would have had to follow the circuitous route shown on this slide:

(SLIDE #1)

Naval power, including an amphibious force with embarked Marines was close at hand - available - and capable of rapid reinforcement.

Likewise, in the event of hostilities, we must recognize the inescapable reality that assured control of the seas is the indispensable element of a strategy which envisages military support of allied forces or the employment of military forces overseas. Here again, conventional naval forces - in the sea control role - are the key element in making our strategy a success.

I have been discussing the more traditional roles of the Navy, but I believe a new one is emerging.

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Effects of Increasing Dependence on the Oceans

In the next decades, as technology improves, the sea is certain to become a major source of the world's resources. It is already becoming a valuable asset and hence a disputed one, not only for what can be pumped or mined from below the sea bed, but for what can be done with the sea itself.

No one can deny the trend; the question is entirely one of time. One peacetime use of the sea that will be vital to our economy is certain to be upon us soon.

(SLIDE #2)

During the past year, it has become increasingly clear that, by 1985 or so, we will have to import perhaps a half of the petroleum we need. The quantities imported by sea will be vast -- on the order of 12 million barrels a day. This will require from several hundred to over 1000 tankers, each of 70,000 tons, fully committed to deliveries of oil to the U.S. The potential for coercion of the U.S., with or without allies, inherent in this situation is ominous when one considers the measures the Soviets are taking to improve their Navy.

Because of the utility of conventional naval forces in so many roles, I wish to devote the major portion of my posture statement to a status report on how we stand vis-a-vis our most likely adversary and on our progress on the programs we have initiated to improve our relative situation.

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### The Present Situation

Last year I outlined for you the current capabilities of the Navy with respect to four naval capabilities:

(SLIDE #3)

- Assured second strike
- Control of sea lines and areas
- Projection of power ashore
- Overseas presence

The last three of these categories constitute the Navy's contributions to this nation's conventional deterrent and war fighting capability. Last year I pointed out the rapid growth of Soviet maritime power in these categories in relation to our own strength. A few of the key indicators from last year are shown on the next two slides.

(SLIDES #4 and 5)

The trends indicated here have continued. For example, during 1971, the Soviets added 7 missile ships (including the first of a new class of guided-missile cruisers) to their naval inventory. They accelerated production of Yankee class ballistic missile submarines. Last year, they produced a total of 13 nuclear submarines of all types.

These additions indicate a continuing effort to upgrade the Soviet Fleet. Here are some other recent indicators of this trend:

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(SLIDE #6)

- Five new generations of anti-ship missiles have been identified.
- New SAM's have been mounted on several sizes of combatants.
- A 3000-mile sea-launched ballistic missile was tested in December.
- A new 25,000 ton fast underway replenishment ship (AOR) has been deployed.
- ASW-configured Bear aircraft have been deployed.
- BACKFIRE, a variable-geometry wing jet bomber, with 3,000 mile radius, is undergoing high-priority tests.
- Soviet shipyards are being upgraded substantially.

We also have ample reason to believe that construction has begun on the largest ship ever built in a Soviet shipyard. Moreover, in recent conversations, Soviet naval officers have told us in confidence that the Soviet attitude toward aircraft carriers is flexible, if not already changed. Thus, on two independent bases there is a strong possibility that this new ship may have an air related mission. I personally believe we are seeing the Soviets develop some new type of carrier that will provide them with tactical aircraft on the high seas, in order to meet their expanding naval requirements.

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Soviet naval growth is not reflected only in new and improved hardware, however.

(SLIDE #7)

As I said last year, the rising strength of the Soviet Navy can also be seen in its large number of worldwide deployments, as, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. During the Indian-Pakistani War, the number of Soviet naval surface ships in the Indian Ocean reached a high of 26. Another sign is the increasing sophistication of its fleet exercises, as demonstrated in Exercise OKEAN in 1970 and this past year in a series of summer exercises conducted by the various fleets. I am sure you recall seeing pictures of Soviet warships operating within a few miles of Hawaii.

(SLIDE #8)

The year 1971 also saw major increases in the frequency of visits by Soviet naval ships to foreign ports and the continued use of naval forces as extensions of statecraft in the furtherance of foreign policy.

(SLIDE #9)

The Soviet Navy suffers from one basic weakness -- a lack of sea-based tactical air. It is therefore more dependent on land-based air support than we are. This deficiency is only partly compensated for by anti-ship missiles. Thus, the sea-based air power of the United States Navy, which is

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vital to both sea control and projection missions, marks a key difference between our Navy and the Soviets'. They must compensate in the near term by access to ports and airfields around the world. They are doing this at an impressive rate as indicated in this slide.

(SLIDE #10)

Their ability to shape domestic public opinion or disregard it entirely makes it easier for them to plan such access. By contrast, since the mid-1950's the U.S. has reduced its facilities and personnel overseas, excluding Southeast Asia, by at least a third.

As I noted last year, we trace the beginning of the Soviet Navy's current spurt of growth to the Cuban missile crisis of 10 years ago. It is only within the past few years, however, that we have perceived the scope of that expansion. All along, we have underestimated it. The following slide illustrates the extent of those underestimates.

(SLIDE #11)

As you can see, except for conventionally-powered submarines, we have consistently had to revise our estimates of the Soviet naval forces upward as the true scope of their build-up became apparent.



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Despite the growing evidence of increasing Soviet naval power, the U.S. has reduced its naval forces steadily. This slide

(SLIDE #12)

shows the plans for U.S. naval strength for 1975, drawn up in 1967 and every year since. In every category except nuclear attack submarines, our current plan shows a reduction of 40% to 59% compared to 1967.

In actual strength,

(SLIDE #13)

too, the budget you are considering provides for forces that are reduced below the levels of 1965, that is, before the Vietnam buildup:

Ships	- down 37%
Aircraft	- down 18%
Military personnel	- down 10%

Only in the numbers of civilian employees, reflecting the situation in our swollen supporting structures, do we show no significant reductions. It is in this area that we shall have to make cuts this year and the next, and we ask your understanding as we find it necessary to reduce civilian personnel levels, close bases, or both.

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I recognize that comparing two Navies principally on the basis of numbers of ships, weapons, and aircraft may not constitute an accurate assessment of their relative strengths. Many intangibles must be considered - maritime tradition, battle experience, esprit-de-corps, battle readiness, logistic support and many other factors all play a part. In many of these areas the Soviet Navy is largely untested while the U.S. Navy has proven itself in World War II and the almost constant, high tempo operations, including combat, that we have conducted in the post-War years. By coming along behind us in construction, the Soviet Navy has been able to optimize against us, as, for example, with large submarine forces and surface-to-surface missile forces. The USSR has also acquired access to many land bases for her naval arm to add a third dimension to the naval power she can bring to bear against the U.S. Navy. As we modernize our forces, we now have the opportunity - and the challenge - to counter-optimize against them. The programs we have initiated - many of which are reflected in the FY 1973 budget, are in many cases, directed to that goal and, if supported by the Congress, will go a long way toward reversing the trend which I have been discussing.

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Progress on New Initiatives

Last year I spoke to you of several new initiatives that we were taking to offset the adverse effects of force reductions. I can now report significant progress in some areas, but I am dissatisfied by our slow progress in others. For your convenience, I have grouped these new initiatives in the same general categories as last year.

Initiatives Involving Multi-Purpose Forces

(SLIDE #14)

Multi-Mission Carrier-CV Concept. I am happy to report that our pilot program, using SARATOGA's recent deployment to the Mediterranean with a mixed air group -- ASW and attack -- proved the feasibility of this concept. As a result, we plan to configure all FORRESTAL and later classes of carriers as CV's by 1977.

Marine Corps Aircraft Squadrons on Board Carriers.

Two Marine Corps aircraft squadrons have deployed on board attack carriers in the Atlantic and Pacific. They thus support our peacetime deployments; in certain combat situations, however, they would have to fly ashore to support their divisions. The carriers would then, of course, be short of aircraft.

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Submarines in Escort Role. During the past year, we have tested this concept in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific, with encouraging results. However, we must still find ways to improve communications if this concept is to realize its potential.

Initiatives Involving Close Substitutes

(SLIDE #15)

Wartime Use of Merchant Marine. Last year I reported a joint project with the Maritime Administration to study the use of merchant ships in underway replenishment and rapid deployment so that we will not have to devote so large a proportion of Navy shipbuilding funds to this category of ships. In the past year, we have progressed from the study stage to the test stage. Beginning 10 February, we shall hold a 2-month series of tests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, using an unmodified, unaugmented commercial tanker to refuel Navy ships.

Allied Naval Forces. In the past year, I have met with the CNO's of 29 allied navies and have proposed to many of them additional cooperative measures to improve our common posture for sea control. I am following up these initial contacts, with the hope of establishing detailed cooperative arrangements. The navies of many of these allies are

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excellent, containing modern, capable ships, albeit in most cases in small numbers. In time of conflict they will provide valuable support for common objectives. In some cases, their area of concern will be limited mainly to local waters - for example, the Italian Navy to the central Mediterranean, the German Navy to the Baltic, and the Netherlands Navy to the North Sea. Maintenance of sea control in the broad reaches of the ocean will fall largely to the United States as our Allies focus the major share of their expenditures on land based forces. Nevertheless, the contributions of allied navies are significant, and we are seeking closer cooperation in many ways.

#### Management Initiatives

(SLIDE #16)

Reducing Support Costs. I have already indicated that our cuts in the shore establishment have not matched our cuts in forces. Although, in this respect, we have not made the progress I had hoped for, we have attained some economies by horizontal personnel cuts and staff consolidations and are still working hard on this. However, vertical cuts plus elimination of shore bases and consolidations of functions offer the only hope for significant additional savings.

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Retention Efforts. Last year, I said that every man we re-enlist helps to reduce our extremely high training costs. In this area, I am happy to report substantial progress. You are aware of our continuing efforts to "humanize" the Navy. Although it is always difficult to tie together cause and effect, I can report that, during the period these measures have been in effect, we have seen our overall first-term re-enlistment rates rise from less than 10% for FY 1970 to an average of 17% for FY 1971. For the first four months of FY 72, the figures are even more encouraging, averaging 21%. I must qualify these figures by pointing out that re-enlistment in some critical rates is still dangerously low (less than 10%), far short of our 31% goal. In the junior officer category, retention of aviation and submarine officers has improved. However, our badly overworked and overdeployed surface officers are being driven out of the Navy at increasingly high rates.

Overseas Homeporting. This is a new item. Our studies have shown that homeporting additional fleet units overseas can, at reasonable cost, improve our overseas presence with limited forces and make possible an improved surge capability in time of crisis. Such a policy should also increase the time in home port for

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both CONUS-based and forward deployed units, increasing time with families, and thus will, based on previous experience, improve retention. We have already homeported a destroyer squadron in Japan and a carrier division staff in the Philippines, and we are working with OSD and the State Department to homeport a carrier group in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Northern Europe. I would like to emphasize that such forward-homeporting is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. The support facilities will be very austere. The families involved will live largely "on the economy;" it is not our intention to establish new bases. The ships will continue to come and go as they always have.

Initiatives to Meet Soviet Capabilities - Measures to Expedite Modernization

(SLIDE #17)

I have broken down this category of initiatives in a slightly different way this year, to make this portion of my statement more easily understood.

Weapons and Sensors

CAPTOR. We are continuing development of this deep-water moored mine, which will fire a MK-46 torpedo against a submarine but ignore surface ships. Initial operational capability (IOC) remains 1976.

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HARPOON. Development of this air- or ship-launched anti-ship cruise missile is proceeding well. The IOC is 1975. We are concurrently developing an encapsulated version, to be fired from submarines.

Interim Surface-to-Surface Missile (ISSM). This is a temporary stand-in for HARPOON until the latter is available. IOC's are: Semi-active version now, an anti-radiation version in 1972, and an active version in 1973. We will place Standard SAM's, modified as ISSM's, on 6 destroyer escorts and 2 patrol boats this year. We have also added our DDG's and DEG's to the list of ships to get the active and anti-radiation versions of the Standard Missile. This dovetails with our plans for HARPOON, since the missile ships will be the last to receive that weapon.

CONDOR. This program to produce an air-launched, electro-optically guided stand-off missile for use against heavily defended targets is moving on schedule. IOC: 1975.

LAMPS. This helicopter system, which became operational late last year, will extend the radii of destroyer anti-submarine and anti-air warfare capabilities.

#### Defenseive Systems

Sidelobe Cancelers. These devices reduce vulnerability to jamming and are operational now in all attack carriers in the Atlantic. Fleet tactical aircraft have been provided with radar warning and homing devices.

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Acoustic Countermeasures. We are continuing to develop advanced submarine and towed target decoys for torpedo diversion. The IOC's are 1975 and 1972 respectively.

Anti-Ship Missile Defense. In this vital area of development, I can report measurable progress. The IOC of the VULCAN-PHALANX gun system has been advanced by 4 months, to 1973. We have 72 Basic Point Missile Defense systems ready or in production. Installations will be made in 30 ships in FY 1972. Infra-red decoys, with demonstrated capability against actual missiles, are tested and ready for use. Follow-on development is in progress.

#### New Ship Concepts

As the slide indicates, we have also moved ahead with new ship concepts. I shall describe them later in the presentation.

Thus, I can report qualitative gains in several important areas. There has also been some improvement in Fleet readiness. But these gains have not been sufficient to offset the effects of reduced force levels nor to reverse the increasing relative strength of the Soviet Navy. Approval of the programs recommended in the FY 1973 budget is required to counteract the unfavorable trend.

#### Cost Growth

(SLIDE #18)

As you know, we are experiencing cost increases in some major procurement programs. We are deeply concerned

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about them, just as Congress is. We acknowledge that there is room for improvement in our procurement procedures, and we are working hard to manage our programs more efficiently. At the same time, some factors are beyond our control. Rapid increases in costs, especially in labor costs, and a decrease in the Government's overall procurement level, which increases the average overhead loading, have led to higher cost levels on new contracts and cost increases on contracts already in effect. As a consequence, the Navy is limited still further in its ability to procure the new ships and aircraft essential to its missions. Much of the Navy's management talent has been concerned with the problem of how to fit the required acquisitions into a limited funding schedule, while maintaining a healthy aerospace and shipbuilding industry and keeping costs down. We hope that productivity will increase and that the industries concerned can adjust to new, lower levels of Government procurement, that procurement can be coordinated better among the Services, NASA, and other federal departments so that the industries can thus be stabilized. These measures may ease the cost pressure. In the meantime, however, we face a severe problem despite our efforts; we may be forced either to pay prices higher than anticipated by the Navy or to forgo acquisition of vitally needed ships and aircraft. For the future, we fully support the new procurement methods of the Secretary of Defense.

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The Fiscal Year 1973 Program and Budget - The Hard Choices

I shall now comment on our Fiscal Year 1973 budget and authorization request. Last year I showed you this chart, depicting the hard choices we had to make in arriving at an annual budget for the Navy.

(SLIDE #19)

This year is no different. We have to make many choices. These include trade-offs between the present and the future - that is, between spending heavily to provide a greater capability today by keeping more older ships in service, or using more funds to procure new ships and aircraft thereby increasing future capability. We must also analyze the trade-offs between greater sophistication of individual ships and aircraft (and consequently higher unit costs) and procuring greater numbers of less sophisticated, less expensive weapons.

The budget we are requesting for the Navy totals more than \$23 billion. Within that total we have continued to emphasize the future. For the second straight year we are putting an increased proportion of our resources into future capabilities.

(SLIDE #20)

We are doing more R&D and are buying more new ships and combat aircraft. Unfortunately, this means fewer ships

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and aircraft in the fleet in the next few years. Even so the average age of our aircraft is increasing and of our ships is staying unhealthily constant.

We also strive for a balanced program that includes a mix of less sophisticated platforms - such as the Patrol Frigate, Sea Control Ship, and Guided Missile Hydrofoils, whose lower costs enable us to buy a greater number of ships -- and the more sophisticated platforms and systems -- such as the CVN-70, DD-963 class destroyers, 688-class submarines, and F-14 airplanes -- whose unit capability is desperately needed, but whose high cost limits the numbers we can buy. These in combination with the larger numbers of less effective units provide the balance that will optimize our capability of being able to cope with the existing and predicted threat.

Turning now to some of the major items in our request, I will comment briefly. Program sponsors, who will appear later, will deal with all the items in detail. Of course, if you have questions about these or any of our other programs, I shall be pleased to answer.

CVN-70

(SLIDE #21)

We are requesting \$299 million for long lead time items for CVN-70, the third nuclear powered aircraft carrier of the NIMITZ class.

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The aircraft carrier has at least three very critical missions. First, it is an important part of our national tactical air capability. As we reduce our overseas land bases outside Europe in consonance with the Nixon Doctrine, the aircraft carrier has become increasingly central to that mission. It has and will continue to be, in many cases, as in Vietnam in the beginning, the only way we can bring air support to allies in need.

Second, the aircraft carrier is a necessary part of our sea control forces. As the Soviets have increased their ability to launch air attacks over wide ocean areas and bring surface combatant strength to bear, the aircraft carriers' role in controlling the sea has grown. If we are to be able to provide the vital energy and other resources from overseas needed to keep our economy going in the face of Soviet blockade, or if any U.S. forces are to be delivered to support our overseas allies in the face of opposition at sea, that is if we are to have any credible alliances, we will need carriers and modern ones.

Third, the carrier provides peacetime presence. As the number of our land-based forces deployed overseas declines, we will need to keep some evidence of U.S. power in sight. This will at the same time sustain our allies' confidence

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in us and demonstrate by our presence both our capability and our determination to protect our commerce and our sources of strategic materials from any interruption. Carrier peacetime deployments are unlikely to drop significantly.

In 1980, when CVN-70 is ready to join the Fleet, our force level of modern, broadly capable carriers will include only the eight FORRESTALS and four nuclear-powered carriers, plus, at most, 3 older carriers which will then be 33 to 35 years old. The four nuclear carriers, two each based in Atlantic and Pacific coastal ports, will provide for rapid reinforcement and contingency response. The nuclear carrier enjoys a high degree of logistic independence and can rush to areas of potential crisis at high speed. It arrives fully ready, with enough self-contained ordnance and aircraft fuel for full air operations. More than any other single new general purpose weapon system, CVN-70 will demonstrate our capability and resolve to meet the challenge of the Soviets; it will serve as a visible and credible naval deterrent.

I consider CVN-70 the item of highest priority in the budget. Without it, we forgo any prospect of assuring our naval superiority in the late 70's and 80's.

There are two significant bases for this conclusion:

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First, under the Nixon Doctrine we are committed both to reducing our overseas presence and to honoring our mutual defense agreements with our allies.

Second, at the same time, we see the Soviet Union conducting foreign policy aimed, in part, at acquiring forward bases suitable for pressuring our sea lines of communication to our allies and trading partners.

Therefore, as we look at the next decade, there is an almost certain prospect that without new carriers we would simply lack the ability to control and use the seas in support of our stated interests.

Underseas Long Range Missile Systems (ULMS)

(SLIDE #22)

Our present POLARIS/POSEIDON system is excellent now and is highly capable for the near future against threats that we anticipate the USSR is likely to develop. That is true today largely because we did not rest with the strategic offensive technology available at the beginning of the 1960's even though it was perfectly adequate then and appeared to be adequate for the near future. The early series A-1 POLARIS missile and the GEORGE WASHINGTON class submarine looked very good at that time against what could then be called the "near-future" threat. But, we continued to improve the system. Today's result is the POSEIDON missile which provides improved warhead characteristics and extended

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SSBN operating areas. Concurrent submarine improvements have included reduction of detectable noise levels, better passive and active sonars, and improved navigational equipment.

This orderly, upgrading process has paid off and the logic for it remains valid today. If we were still operating the original missile in the earliest submarine, the near-future threats would now be formidable. It would be unwise to assume that the offensive technology of the late '60's and early '70's will unequivocally remain adequate against the potential 1980's threats.

The Soviets are building strategic missile submarines at a rapid pace. We are building none. They now have operational and under construction more sea-based strategic missiles and submarines than we do.

We can stay ahead of enemy developments for countering SSBNs, but only if we continue to improve our technology as we have in the past. For the past year the Navy has been developing a program to do just that -- the Underseas Long Range Missile System (ULMS).

The program for development of this strategic missile system is time-phased: a near-term ULMS missile, capable of deployment in the present FBM submarines, as well as the ULMS submarine in the late '70's, and a follow-on higher performance missile, for deployment in a new ULMS



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submarine in the early 80's. The near-term missile, which will be developed as a hedge against the emergence of a near-term threat to the current SSBN's, will have greater range and improved penetration capability. The larger, follow-on ULMS will exploit the advantages in performance and flexibility afforded by the significantly larger launch tubes envisioned for the ULMS submarines.

Development of the ULMS submarine will stress pre-launch survivability and system reliability through improved quieting, propulsion plant design, and defensive support systems. Combining a long-range missile system with installation of modular submarine equipment offers significant improvements in system availability by eliminating the need for transiting to alert patrol areas and reducing refit and overhaul requirements.

Development of the near-term ULMS 1 missile is proceeding on an urgent basis to protect an option to deploy it in POSEIDON submarines as early as 1977. The ULMS submarine development program is being restructured to design and build the ULMS submarine with lead ship delivery in December 1977 and deployment with the ULMS 1 missile in the fall of 1978.

The Secretary of Defense's decision to accelerate ULMS development to permit first deployment in 1978, a

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3-year speed-up, reflects the technological facts discussed above as well as the politico-diplomatic environment of arms limitation and the reluctance to date of the Soviets to include sea-based strategic forces in an interim SALT agreement. I firmly believe that we need ULMS in order to assure, with a high degree of confidence, a continuing survivable strategic force, regardless of an enemy first strike. We are moving forward now at an accelerated pace in the absence of a SALT agreement to achieve that goal, but in any case, and even in the event of successful arms limitation negotiations, we must continue orderly development of the ULMS to cope with future Soviet capabilities and provide eventual replacement for our POSEIDON submarines.

Patrol Frigate (PF)

(SLIDE #23)

The Patrol Frigate program is a continuation of our effort to augment our inadequate escort forces and to replace WWII vintage destroyers which no longer have the weapons, sensors or growth potential for further modernization. PFs will fulfill an important mission in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Among other assignments, their most vital one will be to help keep open the sea lanes for transport of critical resources into the U.S. Our request for \$191.5 million provides funds for ship system design

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and procurement of the lead ship. Contract award for the lead ship is expected early in FY 1973. We envisage a 50-ship program allocated among at least 3 contractors. We have exercised rigid configuration control to optimize the ship for its mission while keeping the costs low enough to permit acquisition in the numbers required. We have consciously eliminated shore bombardment and ASW escort for fast carrier strike forces from its mission in order to keep the price down.

Sea Control Ship (SCS)

(SLIDE #24)

The SCS will be a relatively small, austere ship whose principal mission will be to protect: (1) merchant ships bringing critical resources to the U.S., (2) underway replenishment groups (3) amphibious assault forces, and (4) task groups that have no aircraft carriers in company. Its tasks will include antisubmarine and anti-air warfare, defense against anti-ship missiles, early warning, and surface attack. The program is now in concept formulation; preliminary design has begun. As we now see it, the SCS will displace about 15,000 tons and carry about 17 aircraft, including helicopters and vertical or short take-off and landing type aircraft. We plan for a "buy" of 8 SCS ships

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in the first generation of this new type. Follow-on ships are expected to cost less than a hundred million dollars each.

SCN funding of \$10 million in the FY 1973 budget is for contract design, with full funding of the first ships planned for FY 1974. An initial operational capability of FY 1978 is planned.

F-14/PHOENIX

(SLIDE #25)

The F-14 weapons system continues to have one of the highest priorities in the Navy. Continued development and introduction into the fleet are vital to the Navy's ability to maintain control of the seas in the years to come. Armed with the PHOENIX missile, the F-14 is the only fighter flying, or on the drawing board, capable of dealing with the Soviet FOXBAT at maximum altitude. It will provide the margin of victory against high-performance air and missile raids against our carrier task forces.

Critics predicted that the F-14 performance would not be achieved; however, all testing to date indicates otherwise. The cause of the unfortunate loss of the first F-14 in December 1970 was identified and corrected. Flight tests were resumed in May. Documented data have confirmed that the aircraft is meeting and exceeding specifications.

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Six pilots from the Naval Air Test Center completed the first Navy Preliminary Evaluation (NPE) in December. Although the final results are not yet published, initial reports indicate that the NPE team's impressions concerning overall airframe performance and availability were unanimously favorable. In 13 flying days, the NPE team, flying two aircraft, made 39 flights for a total of 73.9 hours, with only minor maintenance required. The aircraft showed outstanding handling qualities, and its flight characteristics in the carrier approach-speed regime make us optimistic that it will repeat the outstanding qualities of the A6 in this important performance requirement.

Today, a total of nine F-14A aircraft are involved in an extremely successful test program. Aircraft #1X, replacing F-14 #1 as the high speed test vehicle, has swept wings through the full range and has flown faster than Mach 2.0 at 42,500 feet. Aircraft #2, the slow test airplane, has flown as slow as 95 knots at 23,000 feet. The first aircraft whose weapons are fully controlled by a radar system (#4) flew in December, and three more (#5, #6, and #9) will be flying in the next few months.

The next PHOENIX missile firings will be conducted this month from the TA-3B test bed, which has installed

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developmental version of the F-14's AWG-9 radar weapons control system. Initial F-14 PHOENIX firings are planned for some time within the next few months. PHOENIX firings to date have achieved a 71% success against realistic targets.

To date, 12 research and development aircraft, plus the first 74 production aircraft for Readiness Squadron and initial fleet squadron outfitting, have been funded. The present budget request is for an additional 48 F-14A aircraft, to continue an orderly program of modernization. Some adjustment in the delivery schedule may be necessary as a result of the cumulative schedule impact that has accrued from the crash of the first aircraft a year ago. This adjustment in the delivery schedule will also give us more time to review the development and phase-in of the "B" engine. That engine now appears to be progressing quite well after experiencing development problems last year.

We are just completing a review of the program and will advise the Congress of our plans as soon as they have been completed.

Surface Effect Ship (SES)

(SLIDE #26)

A technological breakthrough that offers the potential for revolutionizing naval warfare is the surface effect ship.

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The SES, riding on a cushion of air at more than 80 knots, promises to improve our capabilities for surface ship missions. The advent of these very high-speed ships will change warfare at sea in ways we cannot yet fully foresee.

Two 100-ton test craft will begin underway evaluation this spring. Our next goal is to produce two prototype ships, of 2200 tons each, the smallest ships of their type likely to have military value in the deep ocean. We need the prototypes as fast as technical progress and funding constraints will permit. The FY 1973 funds we request will enable us to award a detailed design and construction contract for large prototypes later in the fiscal year. We now expect, with your support, to have the two 2200-ton prototype ships ready for evaluation by the end of Fiscal Year 1977.

Guided Missile Hydrofoil Patrol Craft (PHM)

(SLIDE #27)

The PHM, which is a cooperative NATO program, will provide a high mobility capability for delivering anti-ship cruise missiles in narrow waters at relative low cost. Our development has progressed to the point where we can request two of these craft in this year's program. An IOC of 1975 is planned.

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CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the strategy enunciated by the Secretary of Defense makes it clear that strong and capable naval forces are an essential element of the conventional forces which will be necessary for managing the likely contingencies of the next decade. In some contingencies, because of geographical, political or other constraints, they may be the only forces which have utility.

The Soviet naval building program which I have discussed gives unmistakable evidence that the USSR recognizes the value of naval forces and that they intend to attain predominance at sea. Our own initiatives - particularly those in the area of sea control - are directed toward denying them this capability and to this end we are making the best use of the dollars allotted to us. But, as I have pointed out, neither change nor improvement comes fast. Despite the decision to try to modernize, it takes a substantial part of our budget to maintain some of our capability today. Long lead times in construction also delay the arrival of improvements.

Our force reductions have thus far not been compensated fully by our efforts at improvement through new initiatives.



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The Secretary of Defense has stated that last year he presented a "bare bones" budget, in effect one providing for base line forces from which we should build. Congressional action further reduced that base level by \$3 billion. The Navy budget which we recommend this year, is a first step in building from that reduced base line.

As I stated earlier,

(Repeat SLIDE #20)

our FY 1973 budget puts an increased proportion of our resources into the future. Our FBM forces are fully supported and their modernization assured. But in other areas of current capabilities - sea control, projection and overseas presence - we accept substantial increased risks. I have grave concern as to the outcome of a confrontation or any conflict that may result therefrom now or in the next several years. This is necessary, however, if we are to build toward the naval capabilities that will be required in the late 70's and early 80's.

We are in a period in our history in which we face grave risks from circumstances over which we may have little control. Our Navy can be a decisive factor in such circumstances. As an island nation, we cannot rationally engage in commerce, honor treaties or deploy forces overseas without the protection of a strong Navy.

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
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Without adequate naval capability we cannot deter conventional war, let alone win it.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I recommend approval of the full amount of the FY 1973 Navy budget as a matter of grave national urgency. Approval by the Congress will allow us to move forward toward the attainment of the types and amounts of naval power that will enable us to fulfill the role required of our Navy under the strategic doctrine laid down by our President and Secretary of Defense.

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# Landbased Air Traffic Contingency Routes JORDAN 1970



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# **U. S. Dependence On Oil Imports-1985**



**ONE-HALF  
DOMESTIC NEEDS**

**ONE-HALF OF NEEDS** EQUALS ABOUT 12 MILLION BBL PER DAY  
EQUALS SEVERAL HUNDRED TO OVER 1,000 70,000 TON TANKERS

# **NAVAL CAPABILITIES**

- **ASSURED SECOND STRIKE**
- **CONTROL OF SEA LINES AND AREAS**
- **PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE**
- **OVERSEAS PRESENCE IN PEACETIME**

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
U.S. vs USSR GENERAL PURPOSE  
NAVAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION 1966-1970

	U.S.	USSR	USSR/U.S.
MAJOR COMBATANTS	9	20	222%
MINOR COMBATANTS	28	138	490%
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS	24	10	42%
ATTACK SUBMARINES	27	41	152%
TOTAL	88	209	237%


GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCH  
PLATFORMS

	1960	1970
MAJOR MISSILE WARSHIPS	6	20
MISSILE PATROL BOATS	6	160
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES	0	65
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION (SHA) BADGER AIRCRAFT	145	282
TOTAL	157	527
LONG RANGE AVIATION (LRA) BEAR AIRCRAFT		75

U.S. AND USSR MERCHANT FLEETS



AGE/TYPE OF ACTIVE MERCHANT  
SHIPS U.S. vs USSR




DATA FOR U.S. REFLECT ONLY PRIVATELY OWNED VESSELS

SECRET


SECRET

# SUBMARINE FORCE COMPARISON

ATTACK/ANTI-SHIP MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCES  
(Excludes Ballistic Missile Submarines)



SUBMARINE-RADIATED NOISE-COMPARISON  
(1.5 KHz - 15 KNOTS)



SECRET

**SECRET**

## **OTHER INDICATIONS OF CONTINUING SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP**


- FIVE NEW TYPES OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
- NEW SAM'S ON SEVERAL SIZES OF COMBATANTS
- TESTING OF A 3000-MILE SEA - LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE  
(DEC, 1971)
- OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW 25,000-TON FAST UNDERWAY  
REPLENISHMENT SHIP (AOR)
- DEPLOYMENT OF ASW-CONFIGURED BEAR AIRCRAFT
- PRIORITY TESTING OF "BACKFIRE", A VARIABLE GEOMETRY WING, 3000-  
MILE - RADIUS, JET BOMBER
- MAJOR UPGRADING OF SOVIET SHIPYARDS

**SECRET**





# U.S. AND SOVIET SHIP OPERATING DAYS MEDITERRANEAN AND INDIAN OCEAN

## MEDITERRANEAN



## INDIAN OCEAN





SECRET

# SOVIET NAVAL UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

---

1969

- ATTEMPTED COERCION OF GHANA -- TO FREE IMPOUNDED TRAWLERS.

1970-72

## ● "WEST AFRICA PATROL"


- DETERRENCE OF/PROTECTION AGAINST ANTICIPATED RENEWAL OF GUINEA INVASION

1969-72

- INCREASING FREQUENCY OF TASK FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO THE CARIBBEAN TO BOLSTER CASTRO'S IMAGE AND TO PROMOTE SOVIET INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

# SOVIET ACCESS TO WORLD NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES



SECRET

# U.S. ESTIMATES OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES FOR 1975

	A		B	C	D
	MISSILE-EQUIPPED MAJOR SURFACE SHIPS	MAJOR SURFACE FORCE COMBATANTS	NUCLEAR SUBS (INCL. SSBN's)	CONVENTIONAL SUBS	
YEAR ESTIMATE MADE					
1967	58	178	117	232	
1968	77	191	130	218	
1969	83	209	139	218	
1970	95	215	141	159	
1971	81	217	152	116	
	140%	121%	129%	50%	

SECRET

SECRET

# U.S. PLANS FOR 1975 U.S. NAVAL FORCES (Active Fleet)

	A	B	C	D	E
YEAR PLAN MADE	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	AMPHIB ASSAULT SHIPS	ESCORT SHIPS	ATTACK SUBMARINES NUC CONV	TOTAL SHIPS
1967	20	137	243	69 36	826
1968	21	99	238	68 37	793
1969	20	77	240	69 38	713
1970	15	67	205	68 19	578
1971	12	67	176	68 19	554
	(60%)	(41%)	(69%)	(101%)(47%)	(64%)

SECRET

## NAVY STRENGTHS: 1965 TO 1973

	1965	1968	1971	1972	1973
1. SHIPS	936	976 (+4%)	702 (-25%)	657 (-30%)	594 (-37%)
2. VF/VA/VS/HS/VP AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS	138	135 (-2%)	111 (-20%)	110 (-20%)	114 (-18%)
3. MILITARY PERSONNEL (THOUSANDS)	672	765 (+14%)	623 (-7%)	602 (-10%)	602 (-10%)
4. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (THOUSANDS)	315	395 (+25%)	331 (+5%)	317 (+1%)	311 (-1%)

## **MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES**

- **REDUCING SUPPORT COSTS**
- **RETENTION EFFORTS**
- **OVERSEAS HOMEPORING (NEW)**



# INITIATIVES TO MEET SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND EXPEDITE MODERNIZATION

## WEAPONS AND SENSORS

- CAPTOR
- HARPOON
- INTERIM SURFACE- TO-  
SURFACE MISSILE
- CONDOR
- LAMPS

## DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

- SIDE LOBE CANCELERS
- ACOUSTIC COUNTERMEASURES
- ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE


## NEW SHIP CONCEPTS

- SURFACE EFFECTS SHIP
- SEA CONTROL SHIP
- PATROL FRIGATE
- HYDROFOIL CRAFT

# EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXPENDITURE CHOICE

- A BALANCE PRESENT VS. FUTURE
- B SACRIFICE PRESENT TO FUTURE
- C SACRIFICE FUTURE TO PRESENT

PROBABILITY  
OF  
SUCCESS



1970 1972

TIME


# ALLOCATION OF NAVY BUDGET

	FY 71		FY 72		FY 73	
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%
PERSONNEL & OPERATIONS	11.5	58.3	12.2	55.4	12.3	52.4
INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT	8.2	41.7	9.8	44.6	11.1	47.6
TOTAL	19.7	100	22.0	100	23.4	100





# PATROL FRIGATE (PF)



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ALL NO: \_\_\_\_\_

# Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 7-2-98

Title of Article: SHAPEX PRESENTATION: IMPACT ON SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY ON NATO IN 70s

Author: CDR MARRIOTT

Date of Presentation: UNKNOWN

Classification: NATO ☒ Secret ☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 48

Disposition:

☐ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 08 APR 1996

☒ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

NATO SECRET CLASSIFICATION



SHAPEX PRESENTATION*Retyped  
page*IMPACT ON SOVIET MARITIME  
STRATEGY ON NATO IN 70'S

-----

LAST NOVEMBER, GENERAL GOODPASTER ATTENDED A SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM AT MY HEADQUARTERS IN NORFOLK. HE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THAT CONFERENCE. HIS BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF SEA, LAND AND AIR POWER IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL STRENGTHS OF NATO.

IT IS AT GATHERINGS SUCH AS THAT AND SHAPEX THAT WE CAN BEST ILLUMINATE ... OUR MUTUAL PROBLEMS. WHILE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC IS

NATO-SECRET

CONTROL OF THE SEA, I AM ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPORT TO THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE; SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF CARRIER-BASED AIR STRIKES AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS, AND FOR THE SAFE DELIVERY OF SACEUR'S STRATEGIC RESERVE.

*Retyped page*

SLIDE - SACLANT INSIGNIA

IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO SPEAK TO SUCH A DISTINGUISHED COMPANY ON MARITIME MATTERS BECAUSE IT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR BUSINESS.

SLIDE - GORSHKOV QUOTE

IN 1968, ADMIRAL GORSHKOV SAID,

(( THE SOVIET NAVY WILL NO LONGER  
BE CONFINED TO ITS HOME WATERS  
BUT WILL EXPLOIT THE FREEDOM  
OF THE SEAS, AND THROUGH ITS  
GLOBAL PRESENCE IN PEACETIME  
WILL SPREAD COMMUNIST INFLUENCE  
OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF THE USSR. ))

SEA POWER IS BEING USED TODAY TO  
SUPPORT THEIR POLICIES WORLD-WIDE.  
SOVIET MARITIME EXPANSION CONSTITUTES  
A MILITARY DANGER TO NATO FORCES, BUT  
IT ALSO HAS A VERY REAL POLITICAL IM-  
PACT AROUND THE WORLD.

SLIDE TITLE SLIDE

THERE ARE TWO BASIC POINTS I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IN DISCUSSING THE IMPACT OF SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY ON NATO IN THE 1970'S.

SLIDE BASIC POINTS

**FIRST**-SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY EXTENDS NOT JUST NATO-WIDE, BUT WORLD-WIDE, AND IS STRICTLY IN KEEPING WITH THEIR AVOWED OBJECTIVES OF WORLD DOMINATION.

**SECOND**-THE EFFECTS OF THIS STRATEGY ARE MANIFESTING THEMSELVES IN TERMS THAT SHOULD BE OF REAL CONCERN TO NATO IN ALL AREAS INCLUDING THOSE THAT GEOGRAPHICALLY FALL WELL OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

**SLIDE      SOVIET MARITIME THREAT**

TO THIS AUDIENCE, THE SOVIET MARITIME THREAT IS WELL KNOWN AND APPRECIATED. WE ARE ALL VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES, SURFACE COMBATANTS AND LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT IN AND OVER THE WATERS IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING EUROPE. THEY HAVE HELD VERY LARGE SCALE EXERCISES IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA; THEY HAVE MAINTAINED AND CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND THEY HAVE SHOWN THE ABILITY AND READINESS TO SHIFT FORCES FROM AREA TO AREA.

**SLIDE      ACCELERATING GROWTH**

IF THERE IS A KEY OR "OPERATIVE"  
PHRASE TO DESCRIBE SOVIET MARITIME  
CAPABILITY, IT IS "ACCELERATING GROWTH."

ANALYSIS OF LAST YEAR'S EXERCISE  
"OKEAN" REMOVED ANY DOUBTS CONCERNING  
THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIETS TO DEPLOY  
AND CONTROL NAVAL FORCES ON A WORLD  
WIDE SCALE. IMPORTANT FACTS CONCERNING  
THEIR NAVAL FORCES HAVE BECOME INCREAS-  
INGLY APPARENT IN THE LAST YEAR.

SLIDE SUBMARINE

FIRST, THEIR SUBMARINES, WHICH FORM  
THE PRIMARY ELEMENT OF SOVIET NAVAL  
STRENGTH. THIS FORCE OF ABOUT 340  
INCLUDES NUCLEAR POWERED AND DIESEL

NATO-SECRET

POWERED BOATS -- WITH GREAT EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON THE FORMER. WHILE TOTAL NUMBERS HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE OVER THE PAST YEAR, NEW NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES ARE REPLACING THE OLDER DIESEL BOATS AT A RATE OF 3-4 TIMES THAT OF THE WESTERN WORLD WITH A RESULTANT SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN CAPABILITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR INCREASED OPERATING RADIUS AND INCREASED UNDERWATER SPEEDS.

SLIDE

SUB GRAPH

AT CURRENT BUILDING RATES, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE MORE NUCLEAR-SUBMARINES THAN NATO WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. WITH THEIR PRESENTLY DEPLOYED 1300 N.M.

NATO-SECRET

MISSILES, THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SHOOT BOTH EAST AND WEST FROM POSITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC. THEY WILL HAVE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILES IN THIS DECADE CAPABLE OF 3,000 MILE RANGES.

FIVE NEW CLASSES OF NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE SOVIET INVENTORY, A PRODIGIOUS ACHIEVEMENT.

SLIDE

IMPROVING SOVIET MARITIME  
CAPABILITY

IN THE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE SPHERE, SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED IN NEW AND BETTER SENSORS AND ANTI-SUBMARINES WEAPON SYSTEMS. THIS WILL LEAD



NATO-SECRET

TO INCREASED CAPABILITIES IN THEIR OPEN OCEAN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SLIDE

MOSKVA

TWO MOSKVA CLASS HELICOPTER SHIPS ARE NOW OPERATIONAL. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ILLUSTRATES THEIR GROWING INTEREST IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE. THIS INTEREST AND GROWING COMPETENCE IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IS A MATTER FOR CONCERN.

SLIDE

SURFACE SHIP

(KRIVAK)

THEIR SURFACE SHIPS ALL CARRY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, OR SURFACE-TO-AIR

SECRET

MISSILES SYSTEMS. SOME CARRY BOTH.

(THIS IS THEIR LATEST SHIP, THE KRIVAK.)

SLIDE - NANUCHKA. (PAUSE)

A NEW, FAST, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE-FIRING CORVETTE CALLED THE NANUCHKA HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MOST FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY IN COASTAL WATERS, AND IN THE BALTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN SEAS.

SLIDE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

THEIR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES HAVE NOW BEEN DEVELOPED TO ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO EXERCISE A WIDE RANGE OF INITIATIVES FROM A SHOW OF FORCE, TO DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE FLANKS.

SLIDE MAY A/C

IN THE AIR THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NEW AIRCRAFT, THE MAY, WITH AN IMPROVED ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITY. IT REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS SOVIET ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.

SLIDE BADGER

THE BADGER MEDIUM RANGE BOMBER CAN BE ARMED WITH A 120 NAUTICAL MILE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE. IT IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ANY SHIP THAT LACKS THE ABILITY ADEQUATELY TO DEFEND ITSELF. IMPROVED ANTI-SHIP AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES ARE TO BE EXPECTED.

SLIDE WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS

NATO-SECRET

THE SIZE AND MODERNITY OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES PROVIDES THEM WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF OPTIONS RANGING FROM A SHOW OF FORCE THROUGH MINOR HARASSMENT, TO FULL SCALE WARFARE AT SEA. IN ANY PLANNED MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH NATO, IT SHOULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PRE-DEPLOY THEIR SURFACE AND SUBMARINE FORCES TO BEST ADVANTAGE BEFORE HOSTILITIES ~~BEGIN~~. COMMENCE.

SLIDE SHOWING ATLANTIC WITH BALTIC AND BLACK SEAS

DEPLOYMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA COULD BE REINFORCED FROM THE BALTIC AND, IF NECESSARY, BE FURTHER REINFORCED

NATO-SECRET

FROM THE BLACK SEA FLEET AND FROM THE PACIFIC FLEET. THE LEVEL OF THEIR PEACETIME DEPLOYMENTS HAS BECOME SO GREAT THAT A DEPLOYMENT WITH HOSTILE INTENT COULD EASILY BE CONCEALED.

SLIDE WORLD MAP

THE IMPROVED CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET NAVY HAVE ENABLED THE SOVIETS TO EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE AND EXERT PRESSURE WORLD WIDE. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY NOTICEABLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE INDIAN OCEAN AND IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN. BY OUTFLANKING AND LEAP-FROGGING NATO, THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO EXPAND THEIR

NATO-SECRET

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE WITHOUT DIRECTLY  
CONFRONTING THE WEST. THIS EXPANSION  
IS ERODING NATO'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL  
CAPABILITY TO CONTAIN THE THREAT, AS  
THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO  
TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTSIDE THE  
LIMITS OF THE TREATY BOUNDARIES.

ACTIONS TAKEN NATIONALLY TO COUNTERACT  
FORCES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA  
MIGHT BE OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE  
ALLIANCE, BUT MIGHT ALSO REQUIRE  
NATIONAL RETENTION OF FORCES WHICH WOULD  
OTHERWISE BE EARMARKED TO NATO.

NATO'S MARITIME FORCES TODAY WOULD  
BE HARD PUT TO COUNTER THE FULL FORCE  
OF SOVIET NAVAL POWER EVEN WITHIN THE

NATO-SECRET

NATO AREA IN A PROTRACTED CONVENTIONAL WAR AT SEA. WE NEED MORE SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND SUBMARINES AND WE NEED THE BEST AND MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT.

SLIDE MEASLES SLIDE #1

STARTING IN A RELATIVELY SMALL WAY WITH EXERCISES IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA, SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITIES HAVE RAPIDLY EXPANDED INTO EXTENDED CRUISES AND FREQUENT VISITS BY ALL TYPES OF SHIPS TO PORTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THIS SLIDE INDICATES SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN 1962-63.

SLIDE MEASLES #2

NATO-SECRET

IN COMPARISON THIS SLIDE SHOWS  
THEIR PRESENT ACTIVITY.

AS YOU CAN CLEARLY SEE, THEIR  
ACTIVITY IS BY NO MEANS CONFINED TO THE  
NATO AREA OF OPERATIONS.

IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE SOVIET  
NAVY HAS MAINTAINED A PERMANENT PRES-  
ENCE SINCE 1968. AN AVERAGE OF 7-8  
NAVAL VESSELS ARE MAINTAINED IN THE  
AREA. SHOULD THE SUEZ CANAL BE REOPENED,  
IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY FACILITATE SOVIET  
SUPPORT OF THESE FORCES.

SLIDE

INDIAN OCEAN SHOW SOCOTRA,  
SEYCHELLES, CHAGOS

THEIR MAIN AREAS OF OPERATIONS IN



SECRET

THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE THE GULF OF ADEN INCLUDING THE AREA AROUND THE ISLAND OF SOCOTRA AND THE GULF OF OMAN. OCEANOGRAPHIC AND HYDROGRAPHIC RESEARCH HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT IN THE SEYCHELLES AND CHAGOS AREAS, INCLUDING THE LAYING OF BUOYS.

SLIDE RUSSIAN SHIP IN PORT

*WE NOTE*

~~IT IS MOST DISTURBING TO US WHEN WE~~  
HEAR OF THE WELCOME THE SOVIETS RECEIVE  
IN THE PORTS OF THE MORE ANTI-WESTERN  
STATES OF THE AREA, SUCH AS TANZANIA,  
THE SOMALI REPUBLIC, THE SUDAN, THE  
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, YEMEN, AND IRAQ,  
BUT THEY DO NOT CONFINE THEIR VISITS TO

NATO-SECRET

THESE LEFTWARD-LEANING STATES. IN  
FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR A SOVIET REAR  
ADMIRAL AND HIS FLAGSHIP WERE ONCE  
AGAIN PRESENT IN THE PORT OF MASSAWA  
FOR THE ANNUAL CELEBRATION OF ETHIOPIAN  
NAVY DAY. ~~NATO WAS ALSO WELL REPRESENTED ON THIS OCCASION, WITH UNITS FROM THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND UNITED STATES NAVIES IN ATTENDANCE. BUT A FEW YEARS AGO NO ONE WOULD HAVE DREAMED THAT~~  
SOVIET SHIPS WOULD BE ON HAND FOR A  
CELEBRATION IN ETHIOPIA.

SLIDE REPEAT INDIAN OCEAN MAP

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS ARE  
CONTINUALLY BEING SOUGHT BY THE SOVIETS

NATO-SECRET

FOR BASE FACILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IN AUGUST 1969 AN AGREEMENT TO AID THE SOVIET FISHING INDUSTRY WAS SIGNED WITH THE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT ISLAND OF MAURITIUS INCLUDING AIRCRAFT LANDING RIGHTS FOR REPLENISHMENTS. AS A RESULT, SOVIET WARSHIP AND MERCHANT SHIP CALLS AT PORT LOUIS INCREASED BY 45 PERCENT COMPARED TO THOSE OF 1968.

SLIDE

CARIBBEAN--LATIN AMERICA

TURNING NOW TO THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA, WE FIND THAT REGULAR VISITS BY SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANT SHIPS TO CUBA, INCLUDING OCCASIONAL FLIGHTS BY NAVAL AIRCRAFT HAVE BECOME A REGULAR

NATO-SECRET

FEATURE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA.

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PERMANENT SUPPORT FACILITIES IN CUBA MAY BE ESTABLISHED FOR SOVIET USE.

SOVIET NAVAL UNITS MADE FOUR VISITS TO CUBA DURING 1970. THERE IS NOW A CONTINUAL NAVAL PRESENCE IN THESE WATERS. VISITS BY SOVIET SHIPS HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE TO JAMAICA, MARTINIQUE, BRAZIL, AND URUGUAY.

THE RUSSIANS, NO DOUBT, EXPECT THAT THE PRESENCE OF THEIR SHIPS IN THESE WATERS WILL HAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS ON THESE AND OTHER NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH AMERICA.

20

SLIDE MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE  
 USE OF THEIR NAVY SHOW UP MOST CLEARLY IN  
 THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. SINCE  
 1967, SOVIET VESSELS HAVE <sup>ESSENTIALLY USED</sup> ~~OFTEN VISITED~~  
 THE EGYPTIAN PORTS OF ALEXANDRIA AND  
<sup>AS NAVAL OPERATING BASES.</sup> PORT SAID, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING  
 BASE SUPPORT TO THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN  
<sup>FLEET.</sup> ~~SQUADRON,~~ <sup>THIS PRESENCE HAS</sup> ~~THESE VISITS~~ HAVE DETERRED  
 POSSIBLE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS, AND <sup>HAS</sup> ~~HAVE~~  
 SERVED TO WARN ISRAEL AND ITS FRIENDS  
 NOT TO PUSH TOO HARD AGAINST THE UNITED  
 ARAB REPUBLIC. UNITS OF THE SOVIET FLEET  
 HAVE ALSO VISITED OTHER PORTS AND  
 ANCHORAGES ALONG THE NORTH AFRICAN COAST  
 IN LIBYA, TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND MOROCCO

NATO-SECRET

THE SOVIET FLEET ALONE MIGHT NOT MAKE TOO MUCH IMPACT, BUT IT SUPPORTS AGGRESSIVE SOVIET DIPLOMACY WHICH SEEKS AND FREQUENTLY GAINS A FOOTHOLD BY OFFERS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

SLIDE

SOVIET MARITIME COMPONENTS

ANY DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT MENTION OF THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF SOVIET MARITIME POWER: THE FISHING, MERCHANT AND OCEANOGRAPHIC FLEETS. WAR AT SEA WITH THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE FULLY ASSESSED WITHOUT INCLUDING THESE COMPONENTS IN THE TOTAL

NATO-SECRET

STRATEGIC PICTURE, ALL DIRECTED FROM A  
CENTRAL POINT -- MOSCOW.

SLIDE      MAP SHOWING OCEANS OF THE WORLD

ALMOST THREE QUARTERS OF THE EARTH'S  
SURFACE IS FREE TO BE USED BY ANY NATION.  
AS KNOWN NATURAL RESOURCES ON LAND DIMIN-  
ISH, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TURN OUR  
ATTENTION TO THE OCEANS.

SLIDE      UNDERWATER MINING SCENE

(?) BUT WHO OWNS THE RICHES CONTAINED IN  
THE OCEAN DEPTHS? THERE HAVE BEEN  
NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES OVER  
FISHING RIGHTS. THAT NATION WHICH CON-  
TROLS THE SEAS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY

NATO-SECRET

HAVE THE STRONGEST VOICE IN SETTling  
DISPUTES AS THE WORLD TURNS TO THE  
SEA FOR RESOURCES. WE WOULD DO WELL  
TO REMEMBER THIS AS THE SOVIETS  
RESEARCH THE OCEANS OF THE WORLD WITH  
OVER 80 HYDROGRAPHIC AND OCEANOGRAPHIC  
RESEARCH SHIPS.

SLIDE

SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY

WE BELIEVE THAT THE TWO FOREMOST  
AIMS OF SOVIET STRATEGY ARE TO GAIN THE  
ABILITY TO HIT THEIR OPPONENTS SO HARD  
THAT THEY CANNOT RETALIATE, AND AT THE  
SAME TIME TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AND  
THEIR HOMELAND.



SLIDE YANKEE SUB

THE SOVIETS HAVE SOME 17 YANKEE CLASS STRATEGIC MISSILE FIRING SUBMARINES OPERATIONAL TODAY. THIS NUMBER INCREASES AT THE RATE OF ABOUT 8 PER YEAR. THIS FORCE WILL SOON MATCH THE STRATEGIC STRIKE CAPABILITY OF NATO SUBMARINES. THESE SUBMARINES ARE PART OF THE OVERALL SOVIET NUCLEAR DETERRENT. THEY ARE INTENDED TO BALANCE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO AND ARE A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS.

SLIDE STRIKE FLEET

IN PURSUIT OF THEIR SECOND AIM, THAT OF PROTECTION OF THE HOMELAND, THE SOVIETS

NATO-SECRET

WILL NO DOUBT TASK SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT TO OPPOSE NATO STRIKE FORCES. BUT THE STRIKE FLEETS ARE NOT EASY TARGETS. THEY HAVE A GREAT ABILITY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AND TO DELIVER THEIR STRIKES ON TARGET.

SLIDE CARRIER STRIKING FORCE

THE NATO STRIKING FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING TREMENDOUSLY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS AT GREAT RANGES. THEY ARE COMPLETELY SELF CONTAINED UNITS WITH THEIR OWN. . .

SLIDE F4 PHANTOM OVER UK CARRIER

...PROTECTIVE AIR COVER OF HIGH

NATO-SECRET

PERFORMANCE "PHANTOM" JET FIGHTERS.

SLIDE A-7'S

A-7 ATTACK AIRCRAFT, . . .

SLIDE A-6'S

. . . AND A-6 ALL-WEATHER BOMBERS. IT  
WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR AN ENEMY  
TO UNDERESTIMATE THE CAPABILITY OF THESE  
FORCES AND THEIR ABILITY TO SURVIVE EVEN  
IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. I AM CONFIDENT  
THAT THE STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC CAN  
PERFORM ITS MISSION OF SUPPORTING THE  
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE AS REQUESTED BY  
SACEUR, BE IT ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OR  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

SLIDE

NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBS

ALONG WITH THESE POWERFUL AIR AND SURFACE FORCES, NATO HAS A FORCE OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED AND EFFECTIVE ATTACK SUBMARINES. WE NEED MANY MORE NUMERICALLY, BUT WE ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES OF OUR BEST UNITS.

SLIDE

SINKING SHIP

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING A NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND PROTECTING THE HOMELAND, SOVIET SUBMARINE AND SURFACE FORCES ARE A THREAT TO NATO MERCHANT SHIPS AND MILITARY CONVOYS. INDEED, THIS

NATO-SECRET

THREAT IS OF IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE TO MOST OF YOU HERE TODAY. THE ALLIANCE DEPENDS TO A VERY LARGE DEGREE ON SHIPPING, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. DISRUPTION OF THESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD PUT THE SOVIETS IN A STRONG POSITION TO FORCE SOME CONCESSION OR COMPROMISE FROM NATO. CLOSE SCRUTINY OF THEIR FORCES SHOWS THAT THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS -- A WAR OF ATTRITION -- OVER A LONG PERIOD. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THIS IS A PRIMARY MISSION OF THEIR SUBMARINE FORCE.

SLIDE LONG WAR; SHORT WAR

THERE HAS BEEN TALK IN SOME QUARTERS OF A SHORT BUT INTENSE CONVENTIONAL WAR LEADING QUICKLY TO A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. WHILE I WOULD NOT ARGUE AGAINST THIS POSSIBILITY IN A LAND AND AIR WAR IN EUROPE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT A CONVENTIONAL WAR AT SEA NEED NECESSARILY BE SHORT OR THAT IT NEED NECESSARILY LEAD QUICKLY TO A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL BELIEVE THAT THE RISKS OF ESCALATION AT SEA ARE LESS THAN ON LAND AND MAY BE TEMPTED UNDER FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES TO TRY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON NATO AT SEA. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO DISREGARD THE POSSIBILITY OF A "WAR AT SEA," LIMITED IN THE

NATO-SECRET

SENSE THAT ACTION AT SEA ONLY MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN. AS THEY WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO HOLD THE INITIATIVE, WE MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN A WAR, ON WHATEVER TERMS THE SOVIETS WISH TO CHOOSE. IN A NAVAL CONFRONTATION IT IS THE FORCES READILY AVAILABLE THAT COUNT AND THEY MUST HAVE STAYING POWER.

FROM A MARITIME POINT OF VIEW, A LONG CONVENTIONAL WAR AT SEA IS THE WORST SITUATION WHICH NATO MARITIME FORCES MAY HAVE TO FACE. UNTIL I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS CANNOT HAPPEN, I BELIEVE THAT NATO MARITIME PLANS MUST PROVIDE FOR THIS CONTINGENCY.

CURRENT NATO PLANS PROVIDE FOR

NATO-SECRET

REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE FROM THE U.S.  
AND CANADA WITH BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL.  
SOME OF THIS WILL BE DONE BY AIR, BUT  
MOST MUST BE DONE BY SEA. THE SOVIET  
SUBMARINE FORCE HAS BEEN BUILT TO PRE-  
VENT THIS REINFORCEMENT.

*SINCE PROTECTION OF THE SEA LINES OF*  
I SHOULD LIKE NOW TO GO INTO A LITTLE  
*DETAIL IS ONE OF MY PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES,*  
MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE WORLD-WIDE PATTERN  
OF SHIPPING.

SLIDE BAR GRAPH

A RECENT STUDY AT THE SACLANT  
CENTER AT LA SPEZIA ANALYSED THE PAT-  
TERN OF WORLD SHIPPING TODAY. I WOULD  
LIKE TO EXAMINE TWO COMMODITIES. FIRST  
OIL. NEARLY ONE HALF OF THE WORLD



NATO-SECRET

MERCHANT SHIPPING TONNAGE TODAY IS CONCERNED WITH OIL AND 3 QUARTERS OF THIS TRADE TODAY IS WITH NATO COUNTRIES; AND, THE DEMAND FOR OIL WILL INCREASE.

SECOND, RAW MATERIALS. ONE THIRD OF WORLD SHIPPING IS CONCERNED WITH RAW MATERIALS AND 42 PERCENT OF THIS IS WITH NATO COUNTRIES. NO WAR COULD POSSIBLY BE FOUGHT TODAY WITHOUT THESE VITAL COMMODITIES.

SLIDE OIL ROUTE ROUND SOUTH AFRICA

ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF EUROPE'S OIL TODAY COMES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF ON THE SEA ROUTE AROUND SOUTH AFRICA. THE PERSIAN GULF IS NO LONGER CONTROLLED BY

NATO-SECRET

THE WEST AND MUCH OF THE LONG SEA ROUTE BETWEEN THE GULF AND EUROPE IS OUTSIDE THE PRESENT BOUNDARY OF NATO.

IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A FORMIDABLE INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF BOTH TANKERS AND BULK CARRIERS AND THIS HAS BEEN ACCELERATED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AS SHIP OWNERS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FIND MORE ECONOMICAL MEANS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE VERY LONG SEA ROUTES INVOLVED.

SLIDE      GIANT TANKER #1

GIANT TANKERS ARE COMMON TODAY AND THESE VESSELS WITH THEIR COUNTERPART BULK CARRIERS ARE TOO LARGE FOR THE

CANAL. EVEN IF THE SUEZ CANAL WERE TO BE REOPENED TOMORROW, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPE ROUTE TO NATO WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

SLIDE

SUEZ CANAL

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OPENING OF THE CANAL WOULD BE OF GREAT STRATEGIC BENEFIT TO THE SOVIETS AS IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THEIR DEPLOYMENTS BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND INDIAN OCEANS.

SLIDE

GIANT TANKER #2

ONE JUMBO TANKER TODAY IS A VERY ATTRACTIVE AND VALUABLE TARGET. A CONVOY

NATO-SECRET

IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT MIGHT CONSIST OF AS FEW AS TEN OF THESE SHIPS. A 477,000 TON TANKER NOW BEING BUILT, WILL EQUAL A WORLD WAR II CONVOY OF 40 SHIPS. FURTHERMORE, THEIR ROUTING IS MORE RESTRICTED DUE TO THEIR VERY DEEP DRAFT, AND TERMINAL POINTS ARE FEWER THUS ENABLING THE ENEMY TO CONCENTRATE ON FOCAL POINTS.

SLIDE

CAPETOWN OPERATIONS ROOM

31,000 SHIPS PASS CAPE POINT EACH YEAR OR ABOUT 90 PER DAY, 14,000 USE SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS. TAKING THE EXTREME CASE: IF ALL OIL TO EUROPE WERE CUT OFF, EUROPEAN STOCKPILES WOULD

NATO-SECRET

PROBABLY NOT LAST FOR MORE THAN 1-2 MONTHS. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN TIMES OF TENSION OR WAR WOULD ONLY MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. THE ALLIANCE IS VULNERABLE ON THE CAPE ROUTE.

(?) WHAT ARE WE IN NATO GOING TO DO TO DEFEND THESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION?

IT IS NO GOOD WAITING UNTIL THE SHIPS REACH THE TROPIC OF CANCER BEFORE ESCORTING THEM TO EUROPEAN PORTS, AS THE SOVIETS WOULD SINK THESE SHIPS WHEREVER THAT WAS MOST FEASIBLE.

SLIDE

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

I HAVE, I REALIZE, POSED MANY PROBLEMS AND IT IS NOT EASY TO FIND

SECRET

SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS. ESPECIALLY IN  
A WORLD WHERE PRICES ARE ESCALATING,  
NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST  
HAS BEEN REACHED AND DETENTE IS THE  
WATCHWORD.

SLIDE RECOMMENDATION 1

I HAVE, I HOPE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT  
NATO SHIPPING WILL BE SPREAD WORLD-WIDE  
AND THAT ESCORTS WILL BE SCARCE WITHIN  
THE ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC AREA AND  
NON-EXISTANT OUTSIDE <sup>THE NATO</sup> ~~THAT~~ AREA UNLESS  
EMPLOYED NATIONALLY. A STUDY IS CUR-  
RENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY MY STAFF ON  
*IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER AREAS, ON*  
THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FLOW OF SHIPPING  
FROM ALL POINTS OF ORIGIN WHICH SHOULD

GIVE US A BETTER IDEA OF THE MAGNITUDE  
OF THIS PROBLEM. *WE MUST HAVE THE ABILITY*  
*WE MUST FACE UP TO IT.*

*TO PROTECT NATO SHIPPING AGAINST INCREASED*  
*SOVIET SUBMARINE*  
*CAPABILITY*

SLIDE

RECOMMENDATION 2

I HAVE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD  
UNDOUBTEDLY PRE-PLAN AND PREPARE FOR A  
MAJOR CONFLICT. THEY WOULD SCHEDULE  
THEIR MAINTENANCE SO THAT AT THE OUTSET  
THEY WOULD HAVE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE  
MARITIME FORCE DEPLOYED AT SEA.

WE MUST THEREFORE IMPROVE OUR SUR-  
VEILLANCE CAPABILITY SO THAT WE CAN  
DETECT ANY SUCH REDEPLOYMENT BEFORE THE  
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. FURTHERMORE,  
WE MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THIS  
SURVEILLANCE SO THAT WE CAN EVADE THE

NATO-SECRET

VERY SERIOUS SUBMARINE, SURFACE AND  
AIR THREATS AND TO EXPLOIT THE FACT  
THAT, IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME, THEIR  
SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WILL HAVE  
TO RETURN TO THEIR BASES.

SLIDE

RECOMMENDATION 3

*strike enemy support  
facilities*

IF WE FAIL TO DETER THE OUTBREAK OF  
HOSTILITIES, EVEN LIMITED IN SCOPE, WE  
MUST ENSURE THAT WE HAVE VIABLE PLANS TO  
STRIKE AT ENEMY SUPPORT FACILITIES,  
WHETHER AFLOAT OR IN RUSSIA. THE NORTH,  
BALTIC AND BLACK SEAS ARE FOCAL POINTS,  
AND WE MUST ENSURE THAT THESE AREAS  
WOULD RECEIVE THE FULL WEIGHT OF OUR  
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY SHOULD A CONFLICT  
OCCUR.



SLIDE

RECOMMENDATION 4

*Develop ties with  
like-minded nations*

INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP  
TIES WITH LIKE-MINDED NATIONS IN THE  
SOUTH ATLANTIC AND INDIAN OCEANS IN ORDER  
TO PROVIDE FOR WARTIME AVAILABILITY OF  
ADDITIONAL FORCES AND THEIR SUPPORT.

WE MUST ENCOURAGE NAVAL EXERCISES,  
BOTH MULTI-NATIONAL AND BI-NATIONAL,  
BETWEEN THE NAVIES OF LIKE-MINDED NATIONS.  
IN THIS MANNER THE FLEETS OF THE ALLIANCE  
CAN PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN COUNTERING  
SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITY IN PEACETIME.

I CAN ADD SOME ENCOURAGING WORDS FROM MY  
POSITION AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S.

ATLANTIC FLEET. AS UNITED STATES CON-  
MITMENTS TO VIETNAM ARE REDUCED, ATLANTIC

NATO-SECRET

FLEET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT EFFORT ARE BEING RELEASED TO RETURN TO DUTY WITH THE ATLANTIC FLEET. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISE TIME WITH U.S. FORCES SHOULD INCREASE <sup>SOME</sup> IN THE FUTURE, EVEN THOUGH OVERALL U.S. NAVAL FORCES HAVE BEEN REDUCED.

SLIDE

RECOMMENDATION 5

SNFL

THE MULTI-NATIONAL STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC HAS BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THIS FORCE IN TERMS OF MORE NATIONS AND MORE SHIPS IS DESIREABLE. ASSIGNING LARGER AND MORE CAPABLE SHIPS IS ALSO DESIREABLE. THE NEXT STEP, I FEEL, IS THAT A

SUBMARINE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO IT.

SLIDE

RECOMMENDATION 6

*PAUSE*

~~THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE HAS PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAINING. A COMPLEMENT TO THIS TRAINING, AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT, IS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR THE NATO NATIONS TO COOPERATE IN THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENTS TO ENSURE STANDARDIZATION, COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY WHEREVER POSSIBLE. EACH NATION BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EFFECTING QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENTS PROVIDED TO ITS OWN FORCES. HOWEVER, FAILURE TO~~

NATO-SECRET

REALIZE THE FULL BENEFITS OF COOPERATION  
AMONG NATIONS IN THE RESEARCH, DEVELOP-  
MENT, AND PRODUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIP-  
MENT COULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE THE  
~~effectiveness of this equipment and will be~~  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS EQUIPMENT. <sup>^</sup> WE  
MUST COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY THROUGHOUT  
NATO, IN THIS REGARD.

SLIDE

BLANK

I HAVE DISCUSSED THE MILITARY AND  
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET  
MARITIME STRATEGY AND HOW I BELIEVE THIS  
STRATEGY WILL AFFECT NATO DURING THE  
1970'S. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SOVIET  
MARITIME THREAT AS IT EXISTS TODAY AND  
HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS INCREASING WORLD-  
WIDE. I HAVE ALSO SHOWN HOW THE SOVIETS

ARE ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL AIMS IN MANY AREAS THROUGH THE USE OF SEA POWER.

THEY ARE "LEAPFROGGING" NATO TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF THE ALLIANCE AND THEY NOW HAVE THE ABILITY TO THREATEN THE FOCAL POINTS OF WORLD SHIPPING, ESPECIALLY THE VITAL OIL ROUTES.

WE MUST REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MARITIME FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET THREAT. WE MUST DO ALL IN OUR POWER POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY TO DENY FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSION IN UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES.

NATO-SECRET

THIS CAN BEST BE DONE BY LIKE MINDED  
NATIONS OF THE WORLD WORKING MORE  
CLOSELY TOGETHER.

WE SHOULD INCREASE THE SIZE AND  
SCOPE OF THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE.

THERE IS A GREAT DEAL THAT CAN BE  
DONE AND WE MUST START NOW.

THESE PRESENTATIONS OF THE SOVIET  
THREAT, STRATEGY, AND IMPACT MAY SEEM  
TO BE CRTES OF GLOOM AND DOOM. IT IS  
NECESSARY TO BE REALISTIC, WE HAVE  
REASON TO BE GLOOMY ABOUT THE OPPOSITE  
TRENDING CURVES OF SOVIET/NATO MARITIME  
CAPABILITY *VIA A VIS NATO'S MARITIME CAPABILITY* BUT WE HAVE EVERY REASON  
TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO

PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE, AS FAR  
AS NATO S RESOURCES, INVENTIVENESS,  
POPULATION, AND POTENTIAL ARE CONCERNED:

SLIDE

OCEAN SCENE

BELISARIOUS SAID IN THE SIXTH  
CENTURY:

"THE MOST COMPLETE AND HAPPY  
VICTORY IS THIS - TO COMPELL  
ONE S ENEMY TO GIVE UP HIS  
PURPOSE WHILE SUFFERING NO  
HARM TO ONESELF."

*THE SOVIET UNION*  
WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT ~~THIS DOES~~  
*DOES NOT ENJOY THIS VICTORY.*  
~~NOT HAPPEN TO NATO.~~

HAVING NOW BEEN ONLY A RELATIVELY  
SHORT TIME IN THIS NATO TOUR, IT IS MY

NATO-SECRET

OPINION THAT IT IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL NATO NATIONS TO MAINTAIN RESOLUTION, DETERMINATION, THE WILL TO RESIST, AND COHESIVENESS.

THAT IS THE WAY TO MEET THE IMPACT OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE 70 S.

- END -





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# Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 7-2-98

Title of Article: SPECIAL EXCAVATION DEVICES (SEDS)

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NATO

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☐ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 08 APR 1996

☒ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☒ Other:

NATO CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION

**NATO CONFIDENTIAL**

SPECIAL EXCAVATION DEVICES (SEDs)

A Concept

**NATO CONFIDENTIAL**

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

This paper outlines a concept for the use of Special Excavation Devices (SEDs) for creation of obstacles in the mountainous border areas of Greece, Italy and possibly Turkey to impede the advance of aggressor forces in the event of an attack on NATO's Southern Region.

Current application of the NATO defense philosophy leans heavily toward the concept that NATO forces should fight at the conventional level as long as possible. Specific guidelines for NATO response to full-scale conventional aggression or lesser attack permit use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, but only after political consultation. Controls over nuclear weapon release are stringent and tightly held at the highest political levels within the Alliance. This is as it should be. However, the system for control needs greater flexibility, and a capability for instant reaction to take advantage of situations where the immediate use of nuclear devices, in limited and tightly controlled applications offers the only feasible possibility for containing aggression, short of using tactical nuclear weapons against enemy forces on the battlefield. Such an application - immediate use of nuclear explosives in a limited role as Special Excavation Devices - will be required in defense of NATO's Southern Region.

Most avenues of approach into the region pass through rugged, mountainous terrain. Successful defense of the area demands the prevention of enemy penetration through these borders.

Intelligence estimates leave no doubt that force ratios are heavily in favor of Warsaw Pact forces in the Southern Region. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact forces will enjoy greater mobility, tactical air superiority, and massive superiority in armor. Under these circumstances, if the Warsaw Pact forces should penetrate the border areas, their capability to exploit the situation and quickly overrun vital land areas of the region strongly suggests that only extensive use of tactical nuclear weapons would stop them.

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

With superiority of numbers and the initiative in their favor, it is reasonable to expect that hostile ground forces could penetrate conventional defensive systems in a few days. To stop a determined, all-out enemy attack through the border areas, it would be necessary to block - physically - passes, tunnels, roads, and railroads that constitute the avenues of approach. The topography of the approaches is ideal for creation of the necessary obstacles. By employing explosives to produce massive land slides and craters in the narrow passes, which would then be covered by fire from forward defensive elements, we could effectively stop advancing enemy units, or delay them for sufficient time to mobilize and deploy forces in main defensive positions, and to move in and deploy external reinforcements.

It is clear, however, that conventional explosives would not be adequate in most situations to move the quantities of earth required in the time available. Nuclear devices would also be required. Moreover, since the areas of concern are very near hostile or potentially hostile borders, timing would be crucial to success. Early authority to release these nuclear devices would be absolutely essential. Otherwise, the areas where they could be effective in delaying or stopping enemy penetration will already have been overrun. Not only would defensible NATO territory have been lost, there appears to be little choice but to resort to use of tactical nuclear weapons against enemy forces on a large scale basis.

Current procedures for obtaining authority for release of tactical nuclear weapons, including the necessary political consultation, will not permit employment early enough to prevent enemy penetration through the border. Thus, paradoxically, the tight military and political controls governing use of nuclear weapons could actually contribute to the unnecessary escalation which they are specifically designed to avoid.

The key to resolution of this problem is recognition that nuclear devices, employed in a limited role as Special Excavation Devices (SEDs) are

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

not nuclear weapons. SEDs are, in fact, engineering tools. Their sole function is to create obstacles to impede the advance of aggressor forces. SEDs would be employed in NATO territory at the specific request of the host country. Employment of SEDs would not be intended to produce enemy casualties, destroy his equipment, nor damage enemy territory.

The physical result of a SED detonation is phenomenologically equivalent to nuclear detonations being planned for peaceful applications in the U.S. Plowshare Program, and the nuclear detonations being used for economic purposes with increasing regularity by the USSR in their program for Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy (PNE). By taking advantage of the technology developed in the Plowshare Program, and by pre-chambering to insure detonation at optimum depth of burial, maximum efficiency of SEDs as earth movers can be assured, and the unwanted collateral effect of radioactive fallout reduced to insignificance.

Preliminary studies show that substantial delays, measurable in weeks, could be achieved by SEDs employment in conjunction with conventional barrier systems in most of the major avenues of approach through the mountainous border areas of the Southern Region. The military and political advantages of such delays in the early stages of an armed conflict would be invaluable and would be completely consistent with the NATO strategy of flexible response, MC 14/3. More detailed studies, and improvements in barrier planning are expected to lead to significant increases in these delay factors.

Release procedures to permit employment of SEDs in time to be effective should be developed as a matter of highest priority. Since SEDs are not weapons, release procedures for these devices should be decoupled from nuclear weapon release procedures. Basic elements of the program required to achieve the necessary release procedures are: (1) involvement of the political decision makers during peacetime in the process of developing and approving concepts for employment of SEDs; (2) a system for prepositioning detailed information on plans for use of SEDs,

N A T O   C O N F I D E N T I A L

justification for employment, and elements of the situations that will require immediate release authority, at all decision making levels; (3) the communications system (equipment and procedures) that will permit the necessary exchange of information between military and political decision makers for immediate employment of SEDs.

Achievement of the foregoing will not be an easy matter. But the stakes are high. Successful implementation of the SEDs Concept could mean the difference between stopping an aggressor at the level of conventional combat, or having to take the dreaded step of escalation to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against enemy forces on the battlefield. There is, then, no rational alternative to successful implementation of the concept.

## ALLIES IN U.S. STRATEGY AND PLANNING

### FINDINGS

1. These findings are based on the briefings given to the Politico-Military Sub-Panel and limited staff research on the subject matter. They can be conveniently focused on two aspects of allied support: (a) the extent to which the various aspects of our planning for reliance on allied support is realistic, including the degree to which allied capabilities for support have been realistically appraised, and (b) whether the techniques we employ to assure allied support are effective, consistent, and coordinated.

### Realism of Our Planning

2. The principal impetus to obtain greater support from the allies was given by the Nixon Doctrine. More directly, allies are being introduced into U.S. planning more extensively than before under the total force concept which stems from the Nixon Doctrine. This concept has so far found its strongest expression in the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for FY74-78 issued on 23 October 1971. The thrust of the present effort is focused on increasing the capability of our allies. Its principal instruments are military grant aid, sales on credit, and cash sales.

The general tendency is to phase out military grant aid (it amounts now to about \$500 million and, it is hoped, will perhaps be about \$100-150 million by FY 1978) and, eventually, sales on credit, thus converting the entire military assistance to cash sales of arms.

3. The present effort with regard to the allies, however, has certain unresolved fundamentals which potentially undermine its ultimate success. In particular, there is no firm consensus between the United States and its allies on the nature and the magnitude of the threat. With regard to the USSR alone, one can distinguish at least four different perceptions of the threat: (a) the perception of our military establishment; (b) that of our civilian leaders (somewhat lower); (c) that of the military leadership of our allies (in some cases equal to that of our military leadership, in other cases lower); and (d) that of the political leadership of our allies (in most cases lower than any of the above). Moreover, in a number of instances our allies are more concerned with the potential threat from their immediate neighbors rather than from communist countries. Thus, our estimate of what the allied capability should be - against the threat as we see it - may not necessarily be acceptable to a particular ally.

4. Even if in a given case the United States and an ally agree what the ally's capability should be and, with our



assistance, a desirable level of capability is reached, there is no guarantee that the ally in question would respond to the threat as the United States would like to see it respond. U.S. effort aimed primarily at strengthening our allies may well fall short of strengthening U.S. security.

5. Apart from differences in the perception of the threat and the capabilities required, different perceptions of national interests introduce a further complication which places reliance on allies in doubt, ~~E~~.g., the United States believes that the Europeans should be concerned about the Middle Eastern oil and the Soviet involvement in the Middle East. The Europeans, however, view U.S. support for Israel as at least in part a causal factor of the crisis. They would place greater pressure on Israel to meet Arab demands thereby assuring free flow of oil. The United States disagrees with this position; moreover, the United States has a domestic constituency which makes such an approach impractical.

6. As a result of these unresolved fundamentals, there is a certain unrealism in our planning. This is not to say that our planning is faulty in each and every instance and that no improvement is being made. In some cases, the U.S. and the ally's perception of the threat coincide and a reasonable assurance exists that the given ally would respond to the threat as expected. In still other cases, this is not so. Some illustrations can be provided.

7. South Korea presents a fairly straightforward case. There is an agreement on the enemy: North Korea. We have every reason to believe that the South Koreans will fight when attacked. We provide military assistance to South Korea and attempt to minimize the involvement of our own forces. In this instances, as in the cases of Vietnam and Cambodia, there are distinct tradeoffs between military assistance and the size of U.S. forces.

8. Japan presents a somewhat different case. Book VII of Vol II of JSOP views the function of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force as a defensive naval force designed not to operate as an independent navy but in conjunction with U.S. naval forces. The basic missions are: (1) protection of ocean supply lines through ASW and anti-mine operations; and (2) protection of essential ports, bases, and coastal areas of Japan." To that end, Book VII recommends a considerable strengthening of Japan's naval forces for FY74-81 (p. 3-E-10). Part I of Book VII, dealing with military assistance, recommends specific equipment and weapons systems for sales to Japan. There is no guarantee, however, that the Japanese will use this equipment as envisioned by military planning. There appears to be a growing belief in our policy circles that, in the event of a major conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, Japan is more likely to assume a posture of neutrality or "semi-neutrality" rather than be actively engaged in warfare on the U.S. side. This

posture seems to be dictated by a high degree of vulnerability of Japan.

9. The case of Pakistan illustrates the divergence in the perception of the source of the threat between the U.S. and an ally. Book VII, Vol II of JSOP, dated 1 December 1971 states that JCS objectives for Pakistan's military forces are: (a) Encourage the acceptance of U.S. influence to counteract the growing Communist presence; (b) strengthen Pakistan's will and ability to resist and deter expansion of Communist influence on the subcontinent, etc. The same Book VII (pp 2-c-8-10) recommends qualitative improvements in Pakistan's armed forces, stating that "the recommended objective forces are designed to provide for the combat and combat support forces required to provide for internal defense, promote political stability, enhance the maintenance of national unity, and perform civic action functions." Part I of Book VII, dated 2 December 1971, dealing with military assistance, recommends a modest \$270,000 for Pakistan, for training only (p. 2-144). The recent events on the Indian subcontinent indicate the unreality of our objectives for Pakistan's military forces.

10. Our planning documents reflect elements of unreality in other respects as well. JSOP's force goals for many of our allies are not usually formulated in close consultation with our allies; they reflect what we would like to

see and what is "reasonably attainable," provided a sufficiently compelling reason exists. As a result, in a number of cases the recommended force objectives are not usually attainable when viewed in the light of political or economic realities of a given ally. For example, Book VII of Vol II of JSOP, dated 2 December 1971, recommends for Australia, as its mid-range objectives (FY74-81), two ASW carriers (CVS) and one helicopter carrier (LPH). Part I of Vol II of JSOP recommends sale to Australia of one CVS and one LPH. A discussion with the Australian naval attaché (in which no reference to JSOP was made) revealed that the acquisition of a second CVS for Australia is unrealistic; an LPH is conceivable, but not very likely. Realistic objectives in Australia's future amphibious capability (as viewed by the Australian naval attaché) also fell considerably below JSOP's recommended objectives. (It may be noted parenthetically that a number of people in the Australian government are concerned about our efforts to strengthen Japan's military power; also, Australia appears to view Indonesia as a likely potential threat, although not necessarily under the present government.)

11. Shortcomings of our planning with regard to the allies are illustrated by differences in our procedures with regard to the three principal forms of military assistance: grant aid, sales on credit, and cash sales.

12. As noted previously, we do not have a realistic appraisal of a desirable capability of all of our allies and specific

effort to bring about that capability. However, it should be emphasized that to the extent that a realistic appraisal of allied capabilities is attempted, this is being done with regard to countries which receive grant aid. Here MAGs, in cooperation with the country team and the CINC, produce initial estimates of military requirements of a given ally. These estimates are not free of shortcomings (e.g., a desirable capability as we see it, not necessarily the ally; allies are not always consulted in producing these estimates) and, depending on further deliberations in OSD/ISA and State and on Congressional actions, an adequate amount of equipment may or may not be provided. But here at least there is a bone fide effort to strive towards a certain capability of our ally and to relate it to our capabilities in the area.

13. It should be stressed, however, that while such an effort exists with regard to grant aid, grant aid occupies only a relatively small part of the total arms shipments to foreign countries (about \$500 million, as compared with a total of about \$3.2 billion). Moreover, grant aid goes to countries which are the least capable of strengthening the security of the Free World (e.g., Cambodia, Indonesia, the Phillippines, Republic of China, South Korea

Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Ethiopia), and, as noted previously, is destined to be eventually phased out. Our principal allies do not need any grant aid; at ~~xxxxx~~ most, they could use some of our arms if sold to them.

14. There is an effort to appraise requirements <sup>of</sup> ~~xx~~ those of our allies which receive credit for arms purchases, but it is less satisfactory than that in the case of grant aid. Credit sales, however, do not constitute a very important ~~xx~~ item if viewed in <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ totality of <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ relationship with our allies for a number of reasons; (a) the total amount is not very large - \$734 <sup>million</sup> ~~million~~ (FY-71); (b) of this total, the lion's share goes to a single country - Israel - which is a sui generis case; (c) the remainder goes mostly to the countries which receive grant aid and, therefore, are subject to our capability assessment in that ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ connection.

15. The single largest amount of outflow of arms from the United States to foreign countries is <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ form of cash sales (\$1.9 billion in FY-71). There is no effort on our part to control this flow of arms as a part of a comprehensive planning process aimed at a certain agreed-upon projection of the military capability of an ally (as noted previously, force objectives and recommended sales stated in JSOP are not closely related to reality). In fact, here the ally itself makes the decision what it wants and asks us to sell the requested equipment. We merely respond to these compartmentalized requests for sales by approval or disapproval, and not by a comprehensive appraisal of how the ~~xx~~ sale of a particular equipment meets the total military capability of

of the ally and the interest of allied support in a comprehensive sense.

Efforts to Assure Allied Support: The Navy-to-Navy Approach

16. It has been noted that, under the total force concept, we attempt to strengthen the capabilities of our allies. This approach does not necessarily assure the allies' support of the United States; perhaps the principal exception to this are the NATO countries where integrated standing forces exist and where one might assume, rightly or wrongly, that the support will be forthcoming as a part of the integrated package of defense. The Navy, however, undertook an effort of its own which predates, and ~~which~~ differs from, that conducted under the total force concept (although, in actual practice, the two frequently overlap). The Navy effort assumes several forms, but its single most important expression lies in a number of personal initiatives by Admiral Zumwalt.

17. The Navy effort goes beyond the mere strengthening of allied capabilities. It attempts, on a navy-to-navy basis, to establish close relations with the allies, present them with a frank appraisal of the threat, point out certain aspects of the threat, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ which might provide inducement to cooperate (e.g., the interruption of <sup>oil</sup> ~~oil~~ supplies), and to engage them on various levels, such as: (a) joint exercises eventually aimed at multilateral operations and standing integrated peacetime forces (e.g., for regional and world-wide ASW); (b) the encouragement of cooperative programs in R&D in the hope that commonality of effort will develop; (c) the encouragement of procurement of mutual components in those areas where such procurement would be

applicable to the internal maritime effort of individual nations;  
(d) various other activities which improve relations with other navies such as the Seapower Symposium, the establishment of the International OCS and the International Destroyer School, the Personnel Exchange Program, and civic action with foreign naval personnel. The thrust of the Navy action is to establish strong military ties which would by-pass initial political obstacles and, hopefully, would sway the political leadership of our allies when the time for the "right" kind of decisions comes.

18. Considerable progress has been made in the navy-to-navy approach. Admiral Zumwalt in particular launched an era of cordial relations with allied and other Free World navies through his personal initiatives. However, the navy-to-navy approach has its problems, too.

19. So far, there is little evidence that one of the principal goals of the Navy-to-Navy approach - a peacetime multilateral standing force - is attainable. Foreign navies appear to prefer bilateral cooperation with the U.S. Navy. High costs of ships and of advanced technologies and the political motivations behind buy-at-home programs provide stumbling blocks in realizing the efforts aimed at procurement of mutual components. The discussion of the "Free World Frigate" at the Seapower Symposium revealed the conflict of national perspectives in an attempt at a common effort. Depending on their national interests, some nations emphasized an FWF as a sophisticated ASW ship, while others, concerned about potential amphibious attack at their shores, wanted effective anti-air and anti-ship capabilities.

20. On the other hand, there is no conclusive evidence that the fundamental assumptions of our navy-to-navy approach are faulty



and that this approach is inevitably destined to failure. It appears that, in some respects, this approach ~~zh~~ has not been tried out in its full potential. For example, the Newport Study provides a comprehensive design to integrate allies into a broad ASW effort. However, a number of measures proposed by the Newport Study had been initiated earlier by OP-095 and were in varied stages of implementation at the time the study appeared. OP-095, therefore, tends to view the Newport Study as an occasionally useful reference book, and not a comprehensive <sup>e</sup> guide for action. OP-095 has made substantial progress in strengthening bilateral cooperation with the allies and, in some, instances, stimulated multilateral exercises, but there is no complete understanding of the rationale behind Admiral Zumwalt's navy-to-navy approach in OP-095 and in OPNAV as a whole. In particular, only a few officers are aware of political goals behind this approach. There is little appreciation in OPNAV that, in the light of the rationale of the navy-to-navy approach, a peacetime multilateral standing force (in ASW or elsewhere) is a principal goal to strive for. As a result, whatever is done or attempted on the CNO level, loses its momentum and thrust as it filters its way down to the working level. The entire effort is diffused and greatly compartmentalized; in order to find out what is going on in this area one has to collect bits and ~~pieces~~ pieces of information from officers responsible for various aspects of the problem. It is conceivable - although not guaranteed - that a more comprehensive and better guidance on lower levels could achieve more effective results.

### Some Other Approaches to the Issue of Allies

21. Our present efforts attempt to strengthen the allies' capabilities and engage them in areas central to our security. One briefer (Mr. Brown, PM/State) suggested that - especially in the Far East - it might be more realistic to concentrate on obtaining allied cooperation in selected secondary areas. These areas were identified as:

- a. Support (ship repair, etc)
- b. Intelligence
- c. Surface surveillance
- d. Fleet air defense
- e. ASW

22. With regard to the above, it was pointed out that:

a. We can count on support activities of our allies because the enemy would not want to spread belligerency to other nations, thus, in effect, creating sanctuaries.

b. Intelligence, surface surveillance and fleet air defense are all interrelated, inasmuch as all focus on information. In the case of fleet air defense, we can count on allies to give us early warning, but not actually defend us.

c. Potential allied support in ASW in Asia was viewed by the briefer as limited. Japan is the only nation which has ASW capability, and in a U.S. - USSR war it is difficult to count on Japanese assistance in ASW.

23. It was also pointed out (with particular reference to

Europe) that we cannot expect significant total increases in the contribution of the allies. It is more a matter of relative priority which a particular nation assigns to its naval forces; meaningful increases can be achieved if, in the over-all allocation of resources and differentiation of functions among the allies, naval forces in a particular country receive higher priority. In most countries, however, the navy has the lowest priority. Also, in balancing various priorities, the United States may prefer that a particular nation in NATO strengthen its air capability rather than naval power. The U.S. Navy's expectations of contributions from allies have to be viewed in the light of these considerations.

#### Winds of Change in the DOD Approach to the Allies

24. There is some awareness on the DOD level of the unsatisfactory nature of our approach to the allies, especially as it pertains to military assistance. As a result, the part of OASD/ISA dealing with military assistance has been reorganized this Fall and some new approaches are being planned.

25. In particular, an Office of the Director, Plans, Policy, and Program Formulation has been established in OASD/ISA. At the same time, a separate Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) was established. It largely consists of the personnel split off from the OASD/ISA and it deals with

implementation of military assistance, as distinguished from policy formulation and planning.

26. The new approaches to military assistance by the OASD/ISA have not fully crystalized as yet, but the following is in the process of planning:

a. Planning is not to be limited to grant aid, but to extend to sales under credit; eventually some control of cash sales is expected.

b. MAGs will be converted from operators into planners. They will be assigned to the Ministry of Defense level and will assist the country to do resource planning in a comprehensive way. In this way, the present compartmentalization between grant aid, sales on credit, and cash sales is expected to be bridged.

c. In the case of countries receiving grant aid, the traditional approach was to view this aid as the principal foundation on which the ally's military capability was built. The new approach is to place the emphasis on internal resource planning first, with grant aid filling the gap.

#### DISCUSSION

##### The Allies Under the Total Force Concept

1. As presently designed, the new approach of OASD/ISA is intended to introduce a more realistic planning in strengthening the allies' capability; it does little, if anything, to ensure that the allies' support will be available to us when needed.

2. Even given this limited objective of the new OASD/ISA approach, there are some serious questions whether it can provide a real improvement. As discussed at length in the previous section, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, the formulation of an "objective" capability of an ally satisfying both the ally and the United States is hampered by at least three factors: (a) differences in the perception of the threat from the Communist world; (b) differences in the perception of the sources of the threat (i.e., an ally may be more concerned about the threat from a neighboring state than from the Communist world), and (c) differences in national interests of the parties involved which may not be related to (a) and (b), but which would provide a handicap in an effort to arrive at an "objective" capability of an ally. The new OASD/ISA approach does nothing to resolve these fundamental problems.

3. It is therefore questionable that our allies will allow our personnel to <sup>become</sup> bona fide participants in their total resource planning. Some countries which heavily depend on our grant aid and where the various differences mentioned previously exist only to a small degree, if at all, may allow our personnel to participate in resource planning, but there will be few of such cases.

4. In the last analysis and from the U.S. point of view, the question of a desirable level of capability of our allies is inseparable from its use, i.e., allied support. Allied

support is never completely assured, although there are various means to increase the degree of assurance. So far, two principal means have been identified: (a) concentration on secondary areas where allied support is more likely and, (b) the navy-to-navy approach. The emphasis on engaging our personnel in resources planning in foreign countries does not provide a solution <sup>(although it might facilitate it,</sup> to the question of allied support, A more practical effort <sup>--</sup> aimed not necessarily at supplanting, but at complementing the concept of resource planning in foreign countries - might be our own unilateral assessment of each allied country on its own merits.

5. Such a country-by-country assessment would be aimed at both the strengthening of the ally's capabilities and allied support. Mr. Leslie Brown's thesis of closer cooperation with allies in secondary areas might be examined in a specific country-by-country context. Where secondary areas promising from the point of view of allied support are identified, appropriate emphasis should be placed on strengthening these areas. Accordingly, with some allies we may cooperate only in selected areas, and not across the board. It should be noted, however, that, in some instances, it may not be possible, for political reasons, to strengthen an ally disproportionately in secondary areas, while the principal ones are obviously neglected as the ally in question is unable of sustaining its capability in central areas through its own resources. In such instances, a degree of balance will have to be maintained.

6. Our present institutional machinery is not geared to the requirements stated in the above paragraph and appropriate adjustments would be necessary. In particular, JSOP's estimates of the allies' desired capabilities (and, hence, proposed grant aid and sales) are determined by us as we see the requirements. The allies themselves are seldom consulted. The existing institutional machinery needs to be modified to ensure close cooperation and consultation with the allies in this matter. Whether or not the conversion of the MAGs into resource planners would provide an adequate channel for consultation with the allies is not clear at this point.

7. The foregoing discussion suggests that, in its fundamentals, the issue of the allies' support is not truly a Navy issue; it is a DOD issue. The Navy is facing a problem in this area because of certain weaknesses in the DOD approach and the Navy cannot fully correct these weaknesses unless appropriate steps are taken at the DOD level. This does not mean, however, that the entire issue should be delegated to the DOD level; certain corrective improvements will have to be made within the Navy. For example, naval forces are sufficiently separate and have certain unique missions so that the analysis of what the allies' requirements are can be conducted on a navy-to-navy basis, in close consultation with the allies and with the CINCs (through the Navy component commander). The results of

such an analysis, after further consultation with JCS and OSD/ISA, would be introduced into JSOP. This, probably, would be an improvement over the present procedure, whereby the allies' requirements are initially determined by the JCS on the basis of CINC inputs, but are then modified by the interaction between the CINCs and OSD/ISA, leaving both the Navy and the JCS largely outside of this chain.

#### The Navy Approach

8. The Navy approach to the problem of allies is an imaginative one. Its ultimate success is not guaranteed, but it brings meaningful benefits even if it falls short of complete success. The problem with this approach is that:

- a. some of its aspects have not been fully thought through, and
- b. it has not been subjected to a full test because of shortfalls on the lower rungs of the hierarchy.

9. One example of point (a) of the preceding paragraph is the relationship between the strengthening of bilateral ties with an ally and the outlook for an eventual multinational peacetime standing force. Does the strengthening of bilateral ties provide a stepping stone to an eventual multinational force or a hinderance to such a force? Is a multinational peacetime standing force (e.g., in ASW) a viable concept in a period of detente? If not, then perhaps a web of strengthened bilateral relationships can provide an adequate,



if not ideal, solution. Also, the relationship between our military ties with the allies and our political objectives (greater commitment of the allies) needs further elucidation on our part. The specific leverages of influence may be different in different countries; these need to be brought to light and fully exploited.

10. With regard to point (b) of paragraph 8: Admiral Zumwalt's navy-to-navy approach suffers in the implementation phase because it is not sufficiently and uniformly understood in OPNAV and, largely for this reason, is not carried out in a concerted and well-coordinated fashion. Thus, what is needed is a clarification of its philosophy and goals to the individuals involved on the working level and a concerted and well-coordinated effort on several fronts, an effort which would be stimulated by improved familiarity <sup>with</sup> ~~of~~ the objectives sought. It is noteworthy that the issue of the allies has never been discussed in its totality at a meeting of the CNO Executive Board.

11. The philosophy and certain aspects of the Navy approach to the issue of the allies are certainly relevant to the DOD effort in this area. If the Navy's approach is correct and bears fruit, then perhaps it should be adopted by the OSD and JCS. However, before a move in this direction is made, it would be advisable to improve <sup>our</sup> ~~our~~ (the Navy's) pursuit of this approach and to have a comprehensive (albeit interim) assessment of results.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the CNO <sup>write</sup> ~~with~~ a CNOM to the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff. This CNOM should:

a. Point out the shortfalls of our present approach to the problem of the allies, in particular, our tendency to strengthen the capability of the allies for the purposes as we see them, ~~and~~ with limited regard to the threat as seen by the allies.

b. Note the present effort on the part of the OASD/ISA to modify the DOD approach to military assistance; while a potential improvement, this approach is not likely to provide a complete solution for the reasons pointed out in paragraph 2 and 3 of the preceding section ("Discussion").

c. Point out that, in order to achieve realism in planning with regard to our allies, the strengthening of allied capabilities cannot be separated from the issue of allied support. Support may come only in some areas, but not others, and the strengthening of the "right" kind of capabilities may be important to ensure support.

d. Recommend an ad hoc country-by-country assessment of the ways and means of obtaining better support from the allies by the JCS. This assessment should consider the possibility of focusing on the secondary areas of allied support, if such areas are the more realistic ones in a particular case. The results of this assessment should be used to review our policy with regard to allied support

and, if necessary, improve our institutional arrangements and procedures for this purpose.

e. Recommend that the Navy, in close consultation with each ally and the CINCs, would formulate recommendations for military grant aid and sales on an on-going basis. After further consultations with JCS and OSD/ISA, these recommendations will be introduced into JSOP.

2. If the response to the CNOM is favorable, it is recommended that the CNO establish a branch in OP-60 which, in close cooperation with OP-63 and in consultation with the CINCs, OSD/ISA and requisite allies, would formulate recommendations to the JCS for military grant aid and sales. This branch would use the country-by-country assessments proposed in paragraph (1), above, as its general guidance. If the response to the CNOM is different from that recommended by the CNO, this step should be deferred or, possibly, modified in the light of the CJCS action.

3. It is recommended that the question of how the allies be best introduced into our planning and strategy be placed on the agenda of the CNO Executive Board (CEB). At least two meetings should be devoted to this subject. During the first meeting, the CNO will amplify on his philosophy of the navy-to-navy approach, provide a brief outline of the overall progress made, point out selected areas which require further clarification (see e.g., paragraph 9 in "Discussion," above), and request OP-60 and OP-96 to prepare brief studies

for the CNO on this subject. He could further request each member of the CEB to appoint an officer within his office to provide coordination of and overview all navy-to-navy activities under the jurisdiction of the member in question in accordance with the over-all philosophy of the navy-to-navy approach. The CNO will further request each member of the CEB to be prepared to discuss the future directions and thrust of the navy-to-navy approach at the next meeting of the CEB devoted to this subject.

4. The second meeting of the CEB on the subject of the allies should be held no sooner than one month from the first meeting. At this meeting, the CNO will report on the recommendations of OP-06 and OP-96 with regard to the areas of the navy-to-navy approach which these Offices had been requested to clarify. The CNO will lead the discussion on future directions and the thrust of the navy-to-navy approach. At the end of the meeting, the CNO will ask each member of the CEB to submit to him reports each 60 days on the progress of the navy-to-navy approach as carried out in accordance with its over-all design and philosophy.

5. It is recommended that, in about six months, the CNO request the VCNO to provide an overall assessment of the navy-to-navy approach with particular reference to the extent to which conceptual objectives of this approach were achieved. Depending on the outcome of this assessment, the CNO will decide whether or not to recommend this approach to the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for its adaptation to the DOD as a whole.



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PRIORITY MSG DTG 051554Z SEP 70

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR VADM COLBERT INFO ADMS HYLAND, HOLMES, AND WENDT  
FROM ZUMWALT

PLAN TO DEVELOP IMPROVED ALLIED ASW CAPABILITIES (C)

1. (S) MY CURRENT ANALYSIS OF OUR CAPABILITY TO DETER OR DEFEAT THE SOVIETS AT SEA SUGGESTS STRONGLY THAT WE MUST DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION TO PERSUADE SELECTED ALLIES TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR ASW CAPABILITIES. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TAKE ON THIS TASK AND ASK THAT THE FLEET COMMANDERS PROVIDE YOU APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED. YOUR PLAN WOULD OF COURSE BE SUBMITTED TO THEM FOR EVALUATION.

2. (S) MY VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD RESTRICT OUR PROPOSALS TO THOSE NATIONS WHOSE INTERESTS, MARITIME SKILLS, AND RESOURCES OFFER THE BEST POSSIBILITY OF A FAVORABLE RESPONSE AND PRODUCTIVE RESULTS. WE SHOULD BE CLEAR ON OUR ALLIED FORCE OBJECTIVES, THE PLANNED EMPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED ALLIED SEA CONTROL FORCES, AND THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OF THOSE FORCES WHICH WE ANTICIPATE UNDER VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT THIS PLAN TO SECNAV/SECDEF WITH A DETAILED PROPOSAL ON HOW IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

SECRET

3. (C) I APPRECIATE THAT YOU ARE FULLY ENGAGED WITH YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT FEEL YOU ARE UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PRODUCE THE PLAN THAT I HAVE IN MIND. MY STAFF OF COURSE IS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY. AS A TARGET, I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE PLAN WILL BE READY BY LATE OCTOBER.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT





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## REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

NORTH ATLANTIC

MEDITERRANEAN

SOUTH ATLANTIC

PACIFIC

INDIAN OCEAN

(SLIDE 45)

THE APPROACH TO THE FIVE AREAS WE HAVE EXAMINED ARE SIMILAR IN PURPOSE AND DIRECTION, BUT THEY ARE NOT INTERDEPENDENT. THERE IS NO REASON WHY ACTION IN ANY REGION MUST WAIT ON ACTION IN ANY OTHER REGION. ALSO, OUR REGIONALLY ORIENTED RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON A "KEY COUNTRY" CONCEPT. IN EACH AREA A KEY COUNTRY OR KEY ORGANIZATION IS IDENTIFIED WHICH SHOULD BE WORKED WITH TO EXPAND THE ASW CAPABILITY IN THAT REGION. THESE KEY COUNTRIES ARE THOSE WHICH ARE EITHER AN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ASW POWER, OR ARE CONSIDERED A KEY TO UNLOCKING THE ASW CAPABILITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THEIR AREA. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT LIMITED TO KEY COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE WORKED WITH TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHERE NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE. BY ILLUSTRATION, LET US TURN TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA.

## THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

(SLIDE 46)

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA MUST BE TREATED IN TWO HALVES WHEN DETERMINING KEY COUNTRIES. IN THE WESTERN HALF, BRAZIL IS REGARDED AS THE KEY COUNTRY. IN THE EASTERN HALF, SPAIN, FRANCE, PORTUGAL, U.K. AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE ALL CONSIDERED KEY COUNTRIES IN THAT THERE IS NO DOMINANT NAVAL POWER IN THIS AREA.

FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, OUR TWO PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC  
NCS AREA OVERLAY

(SLIDE 47)

FIRST: CAPITALIZE ON EXISTING BILATERAL AND MULTINATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC TO IMPROVE REGIONAL NCS, SURVEILLANCE AND CONVOY ESCORT CAPABILITIES.

INITIAL ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS ARE:

A. IN THE AFRICAN AREA, ENCOURAGE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CURRENT BILATERAL FRENCH, PORTUGUESE AND U.K. LIMITED NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS (SHOWN HERE) INTO WIDER AREA SURVEILLANCE, ASW, AND SEA CONTROL PLANS IN A COOPERATIVE INTER-LOCKING MATRIX. WITH THE U.K. AND PORTUGAL AS THE INITIAL

CATALYTIC AGENTS, SPAIN, FRANCE, AND SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO JOIN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REALISTIC NCS, CONVOY ESCORT AND AIR ASW SURVEILLANCE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE AREA FROM MADAGASCAR TO THE MADEIRA ISLANDS. THE PLANS DEVELOPED SHOULD BE TESTED ANNUALLY IN EXERCISES. IN THE CONVOY ESCORT AND SURVEILLANCE EXERCISES, PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATION OF ALLIED MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT FROM BASE FACILITIES IN THE AREA.

B. ON THIS SIDE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE U.S. SHOULD SPONSOR A COMBINED REMOTE PLAY WAR GAME WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO TEST CURRENT NCS ARRANGEMENTS LIKE "COORDINATOR SOUTH ATLANTIC MARITIME AREA" OR (CAMAS). THIS WOULD HIGHLIGHT THE NEED FOR GREATER COOPERATION, COMMON DOCTRINE AND CRYPTO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.

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C. ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COOPERATIVE SURVEILLANCE ARRANGEMENT ALONG THE EAST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA LIKE RENOVATE OR EAGLE EYE TO COVER THE PRIMARY SHIPPING LANES FROM ARGENTINA INTO THE CARIBBEAN. THIS EFFORT

SECRET/NOFORN

COULD BE COORDINATED BY CONSOLANT, OR PREFERABLY CAMAS. THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS ARRANGEMENT, BUT ONLY AFTER THE EAST COAST ARRANGEMENT IS WELL DEVELOPED AND THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE PACIFIC ALLIES WILL SUPPORT IT.

D. ULTIMATE ACTION: WILL BE TO INCREASE OVERALL REGIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH COORDINATION OF THE IMPROVED ASW CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR ASW OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN AFRICA AND SOUTH AMERICAN AREAS. MEASURES SHOULD INCLUDE COMBINED CPXs AND WAR GAMES, COOPERATIVE INTERLOCKING EXERCISES AND INCREASED INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES.

SOUTH ATLANTIC RECOMMENDATIONS

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CAPITALIZE ON EXISTING NATO PLANNING  
EVOLUTION OF "UNITAS" INTO OPERATIONAL  
INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL FORCE

(SLIDE 48).

SECOND: FOSTER THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXISTING UNITAS EXERCISE PROGRAM INTO AN OPERATIONAL INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL FORCE THROUGH A STEP BY STEP PROCESS.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO THIS PURPOSE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CONCENTRATE UNITAS PARTICIPATION INTO FEWER BUT LARGER MULTINATIONAL SEA EXERCISES ON A SUBREGIONAL OR OVERALL LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL BASIS THROUGH COMBINED PLANNING.

B. EXPAND MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SPRINGBOARD WITH PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON COMBINED ASW TRAINING.

C. ESTABLISH A COMBINED OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOL IN PUERTO RICO AS AN ADJUNCT TO THE SPRINGBOARD TRAINING PROGRAM.

D. WORK TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING OF AN INTER-AMERICAN ON-CALL MARITIME ASW CONTINGENCY FORCE UNDER A COMBINED STAFF.

E. ESTABLISH THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AN AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WORKING GROUP OF PARTICIPATING NATIONS MODELED ON THE SEA SPRAY ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE POLITICAL CONTROL OF THIS ON-CALL MARITIME FORCE.

AND F. DEVELOP AND OPERATE A STANDING INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL FORCE UNDER THE COMBINED NAVAL STAFF.

## THE NORTH ATLANTIC

(SLIDE 49)

IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA THE KEY IS CLEARLY NATO. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH THE GREATEST ASW POTENTIAL IN NATO ARE THE U.K. AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THE U.K. BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF HER NAVY AND ITS TECHNOLOGICAL AND ASW EXPERTISE. GERMANY BECAUSE SHE IS CAPABLE OF THE GREATEST EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT IN HER ASW EFFORT.

IN THE ATLANTIC AREA WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

## RECOMMENDATIONS--NORTH ATLANTIC

(SLIDE 50)

FIRST: FOSTER THE EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF GERMAN ASW CAPABILITIES.

ACTIONS:

A. SINCE GERMANY HAS MADE PROPOSALS FOR "SHARED BURDENS" WITHIN NATO AND HAS THE RECOGNIZED FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEM, THE U.S. SHOULD PROPOSE THAT GERMANY EARMARK AT LEAST PART OF THESE RESOURCES FOR IMPROVING HER OWN ASW CAPABILITIES, AND THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THOSE OF HER LESS AFFLUENT ALLIES.

B. THE INITIAL GROWTH OF GERMAN ASW FORCES SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED FIRST ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER AIR ASW CAPABILITIES, AND THEN ON ESCORT AND SUBMARINE FORCE EXPANSION. TO THIS END, THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE PURCHASE OF ADVANCED ASW AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE P3.

C. GERMAN NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MULTINATIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED AS A MEANS OF MAKING HER NAVAL EXPANSION CONTROLLABLE AND PALATABLE TO OTHER NATO ALLIES.

(SLIDE 51)

SECOND: APPRISE NATO OF THE REVISED U.S. THREAT ASSESSMENT, THE ON-GOING CHANGE IN U.S. NAVAL FORCE LEVELS AND POLICY, AND A NEW U.S. POLICY OF WIDER ALLIED ASW COOPERATION.

ACTIONS: FORMULATE AND PROPOSE DELIVERY OF AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY SECDEF TO THE NATO COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSION. THIS ADDRESS SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. PRESENTATION OF A REVISED U.S. THREAT APPRAISAL WHICH FOCUSES ON THE EXPANDED CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET NAVY, PARTICULARLY THE ABILITY OF ITS SUBMARINE FORCE, TO INTERDICT SIMULTANEOUSLY NATO SEA LOCS, TO CONDUCT STRATEGIC SLBM OPERATIONS, AND TO MAINTAIN A VERY CREDIBLE DEFENSE IN DEPTH OF THE SOVIET HOMELAND.



B. OUTLINE THE EXTENT OF CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN U.S. NAVAL FORCE LEVELS DUE TO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS. EXPLAIN THE CONCOMITANT CHANGE IN EMPHASIS FROM POWER PROJECTION TO SEA CONTROL FORCES MADE NECESSARY BY OUR FLEET REDUCTIONS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT.

C. WHILE EMPHASIZING THE THREAT TO MUTUAL INTERESTS, CALL ON THE MEMBER NATIONS OF NATO TO JOIN THE U.S. IN A MORE ACTIVE EFFORT TO INCREASE ASW/SEA CONTROL COOPERATION, BOTH WITHIN AND BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF NATO, ON A MORE EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIP BASIS.

D. ADVISE THE NATO COUNCIL THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO MAKE A MORE DETAILED PRESENTATION ON THESE SUBJECTS TO THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE FOLLOWED BY BRIEFINGS IN NATIONAL CAPITALS AS REQUESTED.

HAVING ANNOUNCED NEW POLICIES BEFORE THE NATO COUNCIL, THE U.S. SHOULD THEN IMMEDIATELY EXECUTE A WIDE RANGING AND ACTIVE PROGRAM FOR INCREASED MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION ON A PARTNERSHIP BASIS. HERE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

A. PROVIDE A U.S. BRIEFING TEAM LED BY A SENIOR OFFICIAL (AMBASSADOR OR EQUIVALENT) TO PRESENT THE REVISED SOVIET NAVAL THREAT AND THE PROPOSED ALLIED ASW PLAN TO NATIONAL OFFICIALS AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL LEADERS IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPITALS.

B. UPDATE OFFICIAL U.S. DEFENSE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO NATO TO REFLECT NEW U.S. POSITIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT AND THE PROPOSED INCREASE IN ALLIED NAVAL COOPERATION.

C. INCREASE INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES BILATERALLY WITH OUR ALLIES IN ORDER TO BROADEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREAT, TO CORROBORATE NEW U.S. THREAT ESTIMATES WITHIN THEIR OWN NATIONAL COUNCILS, AND TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL RESOLVE TO COPE WITH IT.

D. ADVOCATE A MORE REALISTIC REEVALUATION AND EXPANSION OF NATO PLANNING TO INCLUDE ASW CONTINGENCY PLANS BEYOND THE PRESENT ALLIANCE BOUNDARIES, AND ELIMINATION OF THE TROPIC OF CANCER BOUNDARY IN ORDER TO OPEN THE NATO MARITIME AREA FROM POLE TO POLE IN THE ATLANTIC.

E. PROPOSE A LIMITED CHANGE IN NATO LOGISTICS POLICY TO ENCOURAGE WIDER CROSS SERVICING AND NATO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF U.S. AND OTHER ALLIED UNREP FORCES SUPPORTING NATO ASW/SEA CONTROL FORCES AT SEA.

(SLIDE 52)

THIRD: REORIENT STANAVFORLANT MORE TOWARD ASW AND AUGMENT IT, AS FEASIBLE.

ACTIONS:

A. ADVOCATE MAXIMUM SCHEDULING OF ASW EXERCISES USING LIVE SUBMARINE TARGET SERVICES AND SUPPORTING ASW AIRCRAFT.

B. ENSURE AVAILABILITY OF AN SSN TO STANAVFORLANT FOR APPRECIABLE EXERCISE PERIODS. THIS SHOULD BE A JOINT EFFORT OF THE U.S. AND THE U.K., AND SHOULD BE APPROACHED ON A PRO-RATA BASIS. AVAILABILITY OF AN SSN TARGET WOULD PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL "DRAWING-CARD" APPEAL TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FORCE.

C. INCLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SURFACE, SUBMARINE AND AIR ASW CONCEPTS AND TACTICS IN THE STANAVFORLANT PROGRAM.

D. RECOMMEND THAT ALL PARTICIPATING SURFACE UNITS RECEIVE IDENTICAL WORK-UP TRAINING IN ASW AT A COMMON TRAINING BASE, SUCH AS THE PROVEN COURSE AT PORTSMOUTH, ENGLAND, PRIOR TO JOINING THE FORCE.

E. STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF INCREASING THE SIZE OF STANAVFORLANT TO A FLOTILLA WITH UNITS IN BOTH THE EASTERN AND WESTERN ATLANTIC.

(SLIDE 53)

FOURTH: ACHIEVE WIDER YEAR-AROUND MULTINATIONAL ASW SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC.

ACTION: PUSH FOR THE MORE FREQUENT EMPLOYMENT OF MULTINATIONAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES WITH AN EMPHASIS ON ASW TO INCLUDE DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE OF RENOVATE AS A STANDING 365 DAY-A-YEAR OPERATION IN THE ATLANTIC, MUCH LIKE EAGLE EYE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(SLIDE 54)

FIFTH: ENCOURAGE NORWAY, AND THE NETHERLANDS, AS WELL AS DENMARK, BELGIUM, AND PORTUGAL TO EXPAND THEIR COMMITMENT OF ASW SHIPS AND ASW PATROL AIRCRAFT TO NATO MARITIME FORCES.

ACTION: DIRECTLY AND THROUGH NATO, SUPPORT THE EXPANSION, IMPROVEMENT, AND COMMITMENT OF THESE COUNTRIES' ASW-CAPABLE FORCES ON A CONTINUING DAY TO DAY BASIS.

## THE MEDITERRANEAN

(SLIDE 55)

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NATO IS AGAIN THE KEY. OF THE MEDITERRANEAN NATO COUNTRIES ITALY IS THE STRONGEST, IS CENTRALLY LOCATED AND HAS THE GREATEST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MARITIME AFFAIRS. ITALY CLEARLY IS IN A POSITION

TO TAKE THE LEAD IN IMPROVING NATO ASW CAPABILITY IN THIS REGION. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MEDITERRANEAN RECOMMENDATIONS

(SLIDE 56)

FIRST: EXPEDITE THE INSTALLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DARLINGTON SYSTEM.

ACTIONS:

A. URGE THAT EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT BE MADE TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE CURRENT SPANISH/U.S. NEGOTIATIONS FOR INSTALLATION OF DARLINGTON.

B. CONDUCT ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SPAIN AIMED AT PROVIDING HER WITH ASW-CONFIGURED HELICOPTERS FOR USE IN ACTIVE "ALERT PAD" PROSECUTION OF SUBMARINE CONTACTS DETECTED BY DARLINGTON.

(SLIDE 57)

SECOND: REORIENT THE NATO "EAGLE EYE" SURVEILLANCE OPERATION TO EMPHASIZE SUBMARINE SURVEILLANCE ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

ACTIONS:

A. EMPHASIZE USE OF ASW CAPABLE UNITS IN ASW SURVEILLANCE, AND LESS CAPABLE UNITS IN SURFACE SURVEILLANCE.

B. ENCOURAGE THE PROCUREMENT OF ANW-CONTROLLED AIRCRAFT ON A PROGRESSIVE UPGRADING BASIS BY SPAIN, ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY.

(SLIDE 58)

THIRD: ADVOCATE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TASS, THE TOWED ARRAY SONAR SYSTEM. THE PROVISION OF AN AREA ASW SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY IS VITAL TO THE ASW EFFORT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

ACTIONS:

A. ALTER PRESENT DISCLOSURE POLICIES ON LOFAR/TASS PROCEDURES TO ALLOW BILATERAL OPERATIONS OF TASS BY ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY.

B. RECOMMEND THE INITIATION OF BILATERAL U.S. DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR BILATERAL OPERATION OF TASS, WITH THOSE COUNTRIES MANNING AT LEAST PART OF THE REQUIRED STATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(SLIDE 59)

FOURTH: ALTHOUGH NOT A NEW CONCEPT, ADVOCATE THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF A STANDING NAVAL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN MODELED ALONG STANAVFORLANT.

ACTIONS:

A. FREQUENTLY CALL UP THE NAVAL ON-CALL FORCE MED TO WORK TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

B. ENCOURAGE ITALY TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF STANAVFORMED.

(SLIDE 60)

FIFTH: OUTSIDE OF NATO CHANNELS, ENCOURAGE FRANCE AND SPAIN TO PARTICIPATE IN ASW EFFORTS SUPPLEMENTAL TO THOSE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

ACTIONS:

- A. APPROACH EACH COUNTRY DIRECTLY TO SUPPORT A "SOUTHERN EUROPE" INTERLOCKING ASW EFFORT WHICH COULD ALSO INCLUDE PORTUGAL, MOROCCO AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA.
- B. MOVE POSITIVELY TO EXPAND THE FRENCH ASW CAPABILITY AND ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM TRAINING/COORDINATION WITH NATO AND "SOUTHERN EUROPE" ASW ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN SUBMARINE SURVEILLANCE.
- C. CAPITALIZE ON FRENCH EXPERTISE IN THE NATO ASW CENTER AT LA SPEZIA.
- D. ENSURE THAT ALL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE FRENCH NAVY HOLD FORTH THE INDUCEMENT FOR HER EVENTUAL RETURN TO NATO.

THE PACIFIC OCEAN

(SLIDE 61)

JAPAN IS THE KEY COUNTRY IN THE PACIFIC. JAPAN IS ABLE TO PAY HER OWN WAY, AND MAY WELL BE PERSUADED TO IMPROVE HER ASW CAPABILITY IN VIEW OF HER NEED TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF

HER SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS CLEARLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO RETAIN CLOSE TIES WITH JAPAN THROUGH A REAL PARTNERSHIP EFFORT AS SHE CONTINUES EXPANSION OF HER NAVAL FORCES.

OUR KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PACIFIC, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PACIFIC OCEAN RECOMMENDATIONS

(SLIDE 62)

FIRST: INCREASE THE MULTINATIONAL COOPERATIVE ASW ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FREE WORLD NAVIES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN REGION THROUGH AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS BY BUILDING ON THE RIMPACEX PROPOSAL BY COMASWFORPAC. THE ULTIMATE GOAL IS TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF INTERLOCKING ON-CALL MARITIME CONTINGENCY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC.

ACTIONS:

A. DEVELOP AND CONDUCT A COMBINED ANNUAL ASW EXERCISE BETWEEN THE MOST CAPABLE PACIFIC NAVIES, (AUSTRALIA, CANADA, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE U.K. AND U.S.) IN A CENTRAL LOCATION AS PROPOSED IN RIMPACEX.

B. DEVELOP SUBSIDIARY MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES IN EACH LOCALIZED AREA IN THE PACIFIC. THESE EXERCISES SHOULD BE ON AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION WITH THE MOST CAPABLE NATIONS PROVIDING THE LEADERSHIP IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA. AS



THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOP GREATER ASW CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL SOPHISTICATION, THEY SHOULD BE INVITED TO JOIN THE ANNUAL COMBINED RIMPACEX.

ULTIMATE ACTIONS:

A. PROPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT MULTINATIONAL NAVAL STAFF TO PLAN AND ORGANIZE THESE EXERCISES.

B. PROPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERLOCKING SERIES OF SUBREGIONAL ON-CALL MARITIME ASW CONTINGENCY FORCES FOR THE PACIFIC AREA, DEVELOPED ALONG THE LINES OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC (WEST AFRICA) PROGRAM.

C. INITIATE A MULTINATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC AS ONE ASPECT IN THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATRIX OF INTERLOCKING PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS PROGRAM, THE MOST CAPABLE ASW NAVIES WOULD ASSIST IN TRAINING THE LESS CAPABLE NAVIES IN ITS AREA OF CONCERN MUCH LIKE THE U.S. ASSISTS THE TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES IN THE UNITAS PROGRAM.

(SLIDE 63)

SECOND: FOSTER THE ACCELERATED GROWTH OF WIDER REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN MARITIME NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC, EMPHASIZING THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF JAPAN.

ACTIONS:

A. PROPOSE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ASW ORIENTED MARITIME COLLEGE OF THE PACIFIC, POSSIBLY AT OKINAWA. THIS COLLEGE SHOULD BE A MULTINATIONAL VENTURE HAVING A PRESIDENCY ROTATED AMONG PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, AND SHOULD SPONSOR ASW EXERCISES WITH UNITS FROM PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, SIMILAR TO FORMER LONDONDERRY OPERATIONS IN THE U.K.

B. PROPOSE AN ANNUAL PACIFIC ASW SYMPOSIUM, SPONSORED BY JAPAN IF POSSIBLE. THE AGENDA FOR THE FIRST MEETING SHOULD INCLUDE THE PROPOSALS OF THIS STUDY WHICH RELATE TO THE PACIFIC ASW PROBLEM.

C. PROPOSE THE ADAPTATION OF EXISTING NATO TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC.

NUMEROUS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUPPORT EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S ASW POSTURE IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND HER PACIFIC MARITIME ALLIES ARE FOUND IN THE STUDY. A SAMPLING OF THESE PROPOSALS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING.

1. AT THE APPROPRIATE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, EMPLOYING A BRIEFING TEAM APPROACH, PROVIDE JAPAN WITH THE INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR PRESENTATION TO NATO.

2. EMPHASIZE THE COMMON THREAT TO SEA LACS BY SOVIET NAVAL POWER, IN PARTICULAR SUBMARINES. THE VULNERABILITY OF JAPANESE OIL SUPPLY LINES FROM THE MID-EAST SHOULD ALSO BE STRESSED.

3. RECOGNIZING THE INABILITY OF ANY PACIFIC POWER TO MEET THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT UNILATERALLY WITH A HIGH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS, SEEK ACTIVE JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN A WIDER AND MORE DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE ASW PROGRAM.

4. EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A JAPANESE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT IF THE U.S. IS TO INCREASE ITS ASW ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN THROUGH WIDER TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES.

5. SOLICIT JAPANESE POSITIONS AND DESIRES WITH REGARD TO IMPROVING HER ASW CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE DISCUSSION ITEMS ARE:

A. A FRANCHISE TO BUILD P3 ASW AIRCRAFT.

B. PURCHASE OF A U.S. LSD OR LPD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ASW HELICOPTER ESCORT CONCEPTS.

C. JAPANESE OPCON OF MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES.

D. REQUIREMENTS FOR BETTER ASW WEAPONS, SUCH AS THE MK 46 TORPEDO.

6. RECOGNIZING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON RAPID UNILATERAL JAPANESE NAVAL EXPANSION, ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO EXPAND HER CURRENT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID TO HER LESS AFFLUENT FRIENDS ALONG THE MID-EAST OIL ROUTE. THIS AID SHOULD INCLUDE A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOCUSED ON IMPROVEMENT OF ASW/SEA CONTROL FORCES IN ORDER THAT THESE COUNTRIES ACTING IN A COMMON INTEREST CAN BETTER PROTECT THE SEA ROUTES OFF THEIR COASTS.

7. EMPHASIZE THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGES TO BE REALIZED BY OF A JAPANESE OFF SHORE BASE IN ASW IN CONDUCTING ASW/SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS WITH AND PROVIDING MUTUAL AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

(SLIDE 64)

TO INCREASE AWARENESS OF THE MAJOR MARITIME POWERS OF THE PACIFIC (AUSTRALIA, CANADA, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE U.K. AND U.S.)

ACTIONS:

A. COMMENCE WIDER BILATERAL, MULTINATIONAL AND COMBINED ASW PLANNING WITH THE MAJOR FREE WORLD MARITIME POWERS OF THE PACIFIC.

NR 46 100740.

B. CHANGE PRESENT U.S. POLICY WHICH PREVENTS COMBINED PLANNING UNDER THE ANZUS TREATY AND CONDUCT PLANNING FOR ASW/SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS AMONG THE ANZUS NATIONS.

## THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

(SLIDE 65)

IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA, AUSTRALIA IS REGARDED AS THE KEY COUNTRY. AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL, AUSTRALIA HAS BOTH THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY TO ASSUME A LEADING ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF ASW CAPABILITIES RESPONSIVE TO FREE WORLD NEEDS IN THE AREA. OUR SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

## INDIAN OCEAN RECOMMENDATIONS

(SLIDE 66)

FIRST: DEVELOPMENT OF DIEGO GARCIA TO SERVE AS A SUPPORT BASE FOR EXPANDED FREE WORLD ASW OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

ACTION: IN ADDITION TO THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY PROVIDED FOR IN THE FY 71 PROGRAM, PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AUSTERE VP AIR FACILITY, AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AIRBORNE ASW OPERATIONS AT DIEGO GARCIA. SECONDARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOP THE ISLAND'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ALLIED ASW SURFACE/SUBMARINE FORCES TO INCLUDE PIER, ANCHORAGE, AND FUEL FACILITIES.

(SLIDE 67)

SECOND: ESTABLISH AN ON-CALL AIR ASW SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY IN THE AREA TO OPERATE SIMILARLY TO "EAGLE EYE" IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

ACTION: ENCOURAGE AUSTRALIA TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ORGANIZING THIS SURVEILLANCE EFFORT, ENLISTING THE U.K. AND NEW ZEALAND ALONG WITH THE U.S. AS INITIAL PARTICIPANTS.

(SLIDE 68)

THIRD: ESTABLISH, BY AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP BY STEP PROCESS, A MULTINATIONAL ASW FORCE IN THE AREA BASED PRIMARILY ON INDIGENOUS NAVIES. THE U.S. SHOULD PROVIDE ASW AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCES ONLY WHEN REQUESTED AND FEASIBLE.

INITIAL ACTIONS:

A. INCREASE THE DIALOGUE, COOPERATION, COORDINATION, AND SUPPORT AMONG FREE WORLD INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES BY ACTIVELY SUPPORTING AN INDIAN OCEAN ASW SYMPOSIUM/CONFERENCE, HOSTED BY AUSTRALIA.

B. SUPPORT AUSTRALIA IN IMPLEMENTING AND COORDINATING BINATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL ASW EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS AMONG NATIONS ATTENDING THE ASW SYMPOSIUM/CONFERENCE, EMPHASIZING COMBINED PORT VISITS AND ASW TRAINING.

C. SUPPORT AUSTRALIA IN INITIALLY ESTABLISHING A MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE STAFF TO PLAN AND COORDINATE COMBINED VISITS AND EXERCISES. THE EVOLUTIONARY GOAL OF SUCH AN EXERCISE STAFF IS THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL STAFF TO PLAN, COORDINATE AND CONTROL MULTINATIONAL ASW OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

ULTIMATE ACTIONS:

A. SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ON-CALL MARITIME ASW CONTINGENCY FORCE WHEREIN PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD PROVIDE UNCOMMITTED FORCES TO MEET DEFENSIVE CONTINGENCY ASW/SEA CONTROL SITUATIONS. SUCH A FORCE CAN BE REALIZED WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR FORMAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS.

B. CONSIDER THE LONG TERM EVOLUTIONARY GOAL OF EXPANDING THE ON-CALL FORCE INTO A STANDING NAVAL FORCE.

C. CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENT FOR SAM AND SSN SUPPORT FOR A MULTINATIONAL ASW FORCE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST SOVIET MISSILE EQUIPPED LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE SHIPS. THE SSN COULD ALSO PROVIDE ASW TARGET SERVICES DURING MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES.

THIS COMPLETES THE REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(SLIDE 69)

COMMENTS ON NEWPORT STUDY BRIEFING

- Slide 3: We may have to eliminate.
- Slide 4: We may have to eliminate.
- Slide 9: Plan to use sub endurance for 90 days only, eliminating the 60 day figures and possibly add comments concerning Soviet use of the Suez Canal.
- Slide 10: Shorten the slide and clean it up. Reduce the emphasis on World War II and increase the emphasis on todays capabilities.
- Slide 11: Reduce to one sentence if possible.
- Slide 14: Eliminate if possible.
- Slide 15: Expand on the write-up on this slide.
- Slide 16: Eliminate the last sentence on the write-up.
- Slide 17: Use the present start, OPNAV will give us some new words based on the outcome of the board presently meeting on this subject.
- Slide 18: Change this slide to a status report. OPNAV will furnish the information on the status.
- Slide 19: OPNAV will again give us the status and may modify the write-up. The SACLANT viewpoint may be helpful to us.
- Slide 20: Use the present first sentence only and Op-98 will help on new words for the remainder of the write-up.
- Slide 21: Include a better summary. OPNAV will help with this and possible expand it to indicate where help from SECNAV is required.



- Slide 22: Update current status figures and proposals. Change the level of the pitch to that required for the SECNAV.
- Slide 23: Eliminate recommendation. Expand a bit on this subject for SECNAV. Indicate any additional plans that are known and attempt to feel out the attitude of the SECNAV.
- Slide 24: Eliminate the last sentence.
- Slide 25: Change the slide from a recommendation to a proposal for what we want the SECNAV to do.

#### GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE BRIEF

We would like to get any inputs from VADM Colbert on the remainder of the Study after slide 25. We would like to get two copies of VADM Colbert's trip report, if possible. We should indicate in the brief the areas in which we need SECNAV assistance or SECNAV's okay to take forward to SECDEF (ISA). There is some question in OPNAV about the study itself going forward. What is being proposed is that the brief to SECNAV be on the Navy's proposals for international ASW cooperation. This pitch would include the Newport Study but it probably would not be necessary to take the Newport Study itself forward or release it outside of the Navy.

#### FACTORS IN OPNAV AFFECTING BRIEF

1. SECNAV will be visiting Europe and will not return until about 7 October. We will probably have to get a briefing date of 8 October or as soon thereafter as possible.
2. A major effort is presently being made in the Foreign Disclosure Area. A review board meeting on 17 September and the results of this review should probably be mentioned in the brief to SECNAV.

3. ADM McNitt is presently reviewing the personnel exchange program, officer, enlisted and civilian. Probably this should be included in the SECNAV brief.

4. The international information exchange program is also under review as is the hardware exchange program.

5. It appears to me that the effort in OPNAV is tracking away from our brief. It appears that it might be desirable to have two briefers with me making the pitch on the Newport Study first, followed by an OPNAV briefier to give the present status on implementation and action desired from the Secretary to help in accomplishing the over all mission.

OPNAV recently received a message from SACLANT concerning U.S. studies on sensors on fishing boats and non-Navy vessels. OPNAV says this appears possible but could be a rather sensitive area and would like to know a little more specifically what SACLANT has in mind.

1105 / 16 September 1971

TELECON FROM CAPT RUIZ

1. Arriving Norfolk Monday, 20 September via AL955, sked to land at 1052.
2. Planning to return to Newport via Washington (Op-92) on the 21st.
3. Would like to bind the 35mm slides in metal vice cardboard since the cardboard bound slides get jammed in the Washington projectors. If we don't have this metal binding capability, he'd like to take the slides back to Washington where they do have such a capability.

← Please  
take FORAC  
pls meet  
C-02A and C-02B  
have mtg w/  
C-02Y. explain  
to Ruiz

SACLANT (MR. BROWNLEY [ERNIE]) HAS  
THE METAL FRAME CAPABILITY.

ALLOW A FEW DAYS TO HAVE  
NEW SLIDES MADE.



# Naval War College

## CLASSIFIED LIBRARY

CALL NO: \_\_\_\_\_

### Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 6/29/98

Title of Article: LTR SUBJ: ALLIED ASW Improvement Plan

Author: ADM Zumwalt

Date of Presentation: 12 JAN 71

Classification: ☐ Secret

☒ Confidential

Number of Pages: 2

Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 08 APR 1996

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

02-71  
CONFIDENTIAL

IN REPLY REFER TO  
Op-61/cy  
Ser 02159P61  
12 JAN 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief of Naval Operations  
To: President, Naval War College

Subj: Allied ASW Improvement Plan (U)

Ref: (a) NWC ltr Ser 0088 of 17 November 1970

*Capt Ruiz*  
*ENCL*

1. (U) Reference (a) forwarded copies of a first draft of the Naval War College study, "A Plan to Persuade Allies to Improve and Expand Their ASW Capabilities." In addition, copies were forwarded for comment to CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCSOUTH.
2. (C) A preliminary review within OPNAV indicates that the draft plan goes a long way toward defining the full range of the problem. It is clearly evident that an impressive amount of effective work has gone into producing such a comprehensive document, particularly in light of the short time frame involved. While the total plan is not directed at increasing the size or budget of the US Navy, it is believed that this aspect of the plan will have to be explored more fully. In order that a coordinated knowledgeable approach can be made to OSD, the JCS, and other interested agencies, the Navy must be able to state with certainty what impact such a plan may have on the Navy budget.
3. (C) When final comments have been received from the CINCs, it is requested that the Naval War College produce a final version of the plan, and that it be forwarded to CNO for consideration. Any decision to discuss the plan with offices outside of the Navy will be withheld until such time as Navy implementation plans are firm. When the final plan is received in OPNAV the budgetary impacts will be more fully explored. It is anticipated that a Naval War College briefing will be scheduled for appropriate officers subsequent to receipt in OPNAV of the final plan.
4. (U) It is recommended that SECRET-NOFORN continue to be used as an appropriate classification, recognizing that at some future time it may be necessary to reconsider this classification.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

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18 JAN 1971  
3840116

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Op-61/cy  
Ser 02159P61

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5. (U) You and your staff are to be commended for the thorough and expeditious manner in which this important piece of work has been accomplished.

6. It was a really nice piece of work and well so of your value!

*E. R. Zumwalt, Jr.*

E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.

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# Naval War College

## CLASSIFIED LIBRARY

CALL NO: \_\_\_\_\_ Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Title of Article: LTRA ALLIED ASW Improvement plan

Author: VADM COLBERT

Date of Presentation: 17 NOV 20

Classification: ☐ Secret

☒ Confidential

Number of Pages: 1

### Disposition:

☒ Declassify IAW OPNAVINST 5513.16 Dated 08 APR 1996

☐ Additional Review Required.

☐ Maintain Current Classification.

### Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

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*Cap R* *042601/101111*  
SER 0088

17 NOV 1970

SECRET-NOFORN

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Confidential upon removal of Enclosure (1)

From: President, Naval War College  
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Allied ASW Improvement Plan (U)

Ref: (a) CNO Msg 061554Z Sep 70

Encl: (1) First draft of "A Plan to Persuade Allies to Improve and Expand Their ASW Capabilities" (C)

1. As directed by reference (a), enclosure (1) has been prepared at the Naval War College under my supervision. In large measure the study reflects the timely and valuable assistance of the OPNAV Staff and Fleet Commanders.

2. A brief of the plan is available and can be presented at your convenience. The Abstract of the study embodies the essentials of the brief.

3. Since you indicated that this plan was to be evaluated by the Fleet Commanders, copies of enclosure (1) have been distributed to CINUSNAVEUR, CINCPACFLT, and CINCLANTFLT for review and comment. These comments, when received, will be coordinated and incorporated where appropriate in the final draft.

RICHARD G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College

Copy to:

CINUSNAVEUR (less encl (1))  
CINCPACFLT (less encl (1))  
CINCLANTFLT (less encl (1))

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Confidential upon removal of Enclosure (1)

Written by: CAPT Charles K. RUIZ, USN (2M/CKR:mpb) 17 Nov 1970

66  
Capt Ruiz  
SER 0000

17 NOV 1970

SECRET/NOFORN

Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosure (1)

From: President, Naval War College  
To: Commander in Chief Naval Forces Europe  
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet  
Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Allied ASW Improvement Plan (U)

Ref: (a) CNO msg 051554Z Sept 70  
(b) CINCPACFLT msg 220427Z Sept 70  
(c) CINCPACFLT msg 112031Z Oct 70  
(d) CINCSNAVEUR msg 011844Z Oct 70  
(e) CINCSNAVEUR msg 301011Z Oct 70  
(f) CINCLANTFLT ltr 000106 of 22 Oct 1970

Encl: (1) First Draft of "A Plan To Persuade Allies To  
Improve and Expand Their ASW Capabilities" (C)

1. Enclosure (1) has been prepared as directed by reference (a) and is forwarded herewith for review and comment. A first draft is also being submitted to CNO because of the short time available.

2. It is requested that comments be forwarded to the President, Naval War College by message if possible. Comments submitted will be coordinated at the Naval War College and will be included in the study prior to forwarding in the smooth. If the Chief of Naval Operations desires smooth submission before comments are received your comments will be forwarded to CNO as an addendum to the study.

3. A brief of the plan is included as an abstract. In a large measure the enclosed study reflects the timely and valuable material furnished by yourselves and your subordinate commands in references (b) through (f) and directly to study members. These inputs have been included in the study to the maximum extent possible and I thank you for your fine cooperation and support. Please extend my thanks to the responsible staff officers.

RICHARD G. COLLIER  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College

Written by: CAPT C.K. RUIZ, USN (CDR:jp) 17 Nov 1970

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Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosure (1)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

00/rbm  
Ser 0015  
2 April 1971

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From: President, Naval War College  
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Allied ASW Improvement Plan

Ref: (a) OPNAV ltr ser 02159P61 of 12 January 1971  
(b) NWC ltr ser 0088 of 17 November 1970  
(c) CINCUSNAVEUR msg DTG 161438Z DEC 70  
(d) CINCLANTFLT msg DTG 212029Z DEC 70  
(e) CINCPACFLT msg DTG 112208Z JAN 71


Encl: (1) The Newport Study, "A Plan to Persuade Allies  
to Improve and Expand their ASW Capabilities"  
(20 copies)  
(2) Abstract of The Newport Study (20 copies)

1. As directed by reference (a), the finalized Allied ASW Improvement Plan is forwarded as enclosure (1). This plan was submitted in draft form by reference (b). The finalized plan takes into consideration comments made to the draft plan by CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT in references (c), (d) and (e).

2. Enclosure (2) is an Abstract of The Newport Study, which should be useful as a synopsis of some of the major points in the study.

3. The brief of the plan requested by reference (a) is being prepared.

4. It is requested that copies of the draft plan, forwarded by reference (b), be destroyed.

  
R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Copy to: (5 copies of enclosures)  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
CINCLANTFLT  
CINCPACFLT

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# Naval War College

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### Declassification Review Form

Name of Reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 6/29/98

Title of Article: Newport Study Brief

Author: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Presentation: \_\_\_\_\_

Classification: ☒ Secret

☐ Confidential

Number of Pages: 37

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☐ Additional Review Required.

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Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

☐ Other:

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SLIDE 1:

MR. SECRETARY, THE NEWPORT STUDY WAS CONDUCTED AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF VICE ADMIRAL COLBERT. IT MET TWO GOALS. FIRST, IT WAS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY CNO. SECOND, IT WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR DIRECTIVE THAT THE WAR COLLEGES AND THEIR FACILITIES BE UTILIZED TO A GREATER EXTENT BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

THE STUDY ACCOMPLISHES TWO PURPOSES. FIRST, AS CNO DIRECTED, IT ADDRESSES THE MATTER OF HOW THE U.S. CAN PERSUADE SELECTED MARITIME ALLIES TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR ASW CAPABILITIES FOR SEA CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF FREE WORLD SEA LINES. SECOND, IT GOES BEYOND THE INITIAL TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MAKES CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS IN WHICH REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE FURTHER DEVELOPED TO EFFECT GREATER ALLIED NAVAL COOPERATION. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE ARRIVED AT AFTER CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE MAJOR FLEET COMMANDERS AND THE OPNAV STAFF.

AT THE OUTSET, IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT THIS IS, AT BEST, AN OUTLINE PLAN. FOR IT TO BECOME OPERATIONAL, IT MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AROUND WHICH OUR ALLIANCE SYSTEM OPERATES. IN SHORT, ANY FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT IS FOUND ACCEPTABLE TO AND ADAPTABLE BY BOTH ISA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

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SLIDE 2:

THIS BRIEF IS CENTERED ON THREE THEMES:

FIRST, THE SOVIET NAVY, PARTICULARLY ITS SUBMARINE FORCE, NOW HAS THE TRIPLE CAPABILITY OF SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING SLBM OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.; OF DEFENDING ITS HOMELAND AGAINST U.S. STRIKING FORCES; AND OF CONDUCTING AN EXTENSIVE ANTI-SHIPING CAMPAIGN.

SECOND, THE FREE WORLD HAS THE ASSETS TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE WORLDWIDE NAVAL CAPABILITY TO DETER OR DEFEAT THE SOVIETS AT SEA. IN LIGHT OF EXISTING BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, A UNILATERAL EFFORT BY THE UNITED STATES TO EFFECT THIS TASK IS NOT FEASIBLE. BUT A POOLING OF PRESENT AND POTENTIAL U.S. AND ALLIED ASW RESOURCES ~~WULD~~PRODUCE A SYNERGISTIC EFFECT, BY WHICH THE TOTAL CAPABILITY WILL FAR EXCEED THE SUM OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL NAVIES.

THIRD, THE MOST ECONOMICAL AND OPERATIONALLY EFFICIENT EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF ASW CAPABILITY BY THE FREE WORLD WOULD BE ON A REGIONAL BASIS, BY WHICH NATIONS CAN BENEFIT FROM THEIR MUTUAL PROXIMITY AS WELL AS THE SIMILARITY OF SEA KEEPING PROBLEMS, CAPABILITIES, AND NEEDS. THE ESSENCE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE NEWPORT STUDY REFLECTS THE SPIRIT AND INTENTION OF BOTH THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND ARTICLE 52 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THE ADVANTAGES ARE, CONSEQUENTLY, TWOFOLD. FIRST, IT IS DESIGNED TO BE A CONCOMITANT PART OF CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. SECOND, IT CONFORMS TO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES. AS SUCH, IT WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SOVIET LEGAL OBJECTION. FURTHER, IT WOULD REQUIRE NO NEW TREATY ARRANGEMENTS.

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ONE ADDITIONAL COMMENT DESERVES TO BE MADE AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE  
ULTIMATE STRENGTH OF THE PLAN IS THAT IT IS FOUNDED ON <sup>the principle of</sup> NAVY TO NAVY  
COOPERATION, WITH, OF COURSE, THE CONCURRENCE OF NATIONAL POLITICAL  
AUTHORITIES. THE MEDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS IS ONE WHICH IS SPARED  
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPLEXITIES NECESSARILY <sup>involved in</sup> ~~COMPLICATING~~ ANY ALLIED  
COOPERATION <sup>by ground</sup> ~~BASED ON LAND~~ FORCES AND <sup>air forces on foreign soil.</sup> ~~LAND BASES~~. AS SUCH, THE TICKLISH  
ISSUE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IS AVOIDED.

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#2

## NEWPORT STUDY THEMES

- Triple Capability of Soviet Submarines
- Synergistic Effect of Pooled ASW Assets
- Regional ASW Arrangements — as per Nixon Doctrine and Article 52



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SLIDE 3:

BUT FOR THE PLAN TO BE TRULY EFFECTIVE, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO REVISE THREE ELEMENTS OF POLICY.

FIRST, WE WILL HAVE TO REVISE OUR DISCLOSURE METHODS. OTHERWISE, THE TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION ENVISIONED HEREIN WILL BE PATENTLY IMPOSSIBLE.

SECOND, WE WILL NEED TO ABANDON EXPLICITLY THE McNAMARA/McNAUGHTON POLICY WITH REGARD TO ALLIED NAVIES. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT UNDER THIS POLICY WE DOWNGRADED THE NAVIES OF ~~THE~~ NATO NATIONS AND OF LATIN AMERICA PARTICULARLY, ON THE ARGUMENT THAT SUCH FORCES ARE UNNECESSARY LUXURIES WHOSE FUNCTIONS THE U.S. NAVY WAS PERFECTLY CAPABLE OF FULFILLING. BOTH NECESSARY REDUCTIONS IN OUR NAVY'S FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE DYNAMIC SOVIET NAVAL BUILDUP HAVE, QUITE CLEARLY, MADE OBSOLETE ANY SUCH POLICY, IF IT WAS EVER VALID IN THE FIRST PLACE. ✓

AND THIRD, WE WILL HAVE TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY WITHIN OUR DEFENSE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE FACT THAT THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF THE SOVIET THREAT HAS BEEN TO SEAWARD. AS A DIRECT RESULT, MAP ALLOCATIONS WILL HAVE TO BE REDIRECTED WITH THE AIM TOWARD STRENGTHENING ALLIED NAVAL FORCES. ✓

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#3

US Should

- Revise Disclosure Methods
- Abandon McNamara-McNaughton Policy
- Re-orient MAP in Direction of the Threat: Seaward

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SLIDE 4:

THE BRIEF NOW TURNS TO A CONSIDERATION OF EACH OF THE THREE MAJOR THEMES OUTLINED EARLIER. FIRST, THE SOVIET MARITIME THREAT.

IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THAT THREAT MOST REALISTIC TO OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS, THE AUTHORS OF THE NEWPORT ~~PLAN~~ <sup>STUDY</sup> SELECTED THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SEABORNE OIL ROUTES AS THE SINGLE BEST INDUCEMENT FOR INSPIRING COMBINED EFFORTS. NATIONAL SELF INTERESTS--IN PEACETIME, IN PERIODS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION, AND IN TIME OF WAR ARE MOST LIKELY TO PROMPT RECOGNITION THAT THOSE SEA LANES OVER WHICH VITAL OIL IMPORTS TRAVEL MUST BE PROTECTED AT ALL TIMES. THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE RUSSIANS AT SEA TO DISRUPT OR THREATEN TO DISRUPT THESE LANES, WITHOUT GREAT DANGER OF ESCALATION, ARE MANY.

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#4

## PART I

[World map - with water covered  
by Sv + ships/subs.]

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SLIDE 5:

THREE FACTORS MAKE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE OIL SUPPLIES PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE: THE LONG SEA ROUTES WHICH CARRY THE OIL; THE LIMITED OIL SUPPLIES ON HAND; AND THE LIMITATIONS OF U.S. REPLACEMENT CAPABILITY.

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SLIDE 6:

THE FIRST LIMITATION IS A RESULT OF THE ALMOST EXCLUSIVE DEPENDENCE ON PERSIAN AND AFRICAN OIL AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE LONG SEA ROUTES CARRYING THIS OIL.

FOR EXAMPLE, OF WESTERN EUROPE'S TOTAL DAILY OIL CONSUMPTION OF OVER 12 MILLION BARRELS, SOME 92% IS IMPORTED. ALMOST ALL OF THIS COMES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST/AFRICAN REGION, MEANING THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES DEPEND ON FREE SEA LANES...BOTH AROUND THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AND THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN...FOR ALMOST ALL THEIR OIL.

THE SAME IS TRUE OF JAPAN, WHO IMPORTS 99% OF HER OIL NEEDS, OF WHICH SOME 92% DERIVE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST/AFRICAN REGIONS. OBVIOUSLY, OPEN SEA LANES ARE VITAL TO HER SURVIVAL ALSO.

WERE EUROPE'S AND JAPAN'S SEA LOCs CLOSED BY A HOSTILE POWER, WOULD THE AVAILABLE OIL SUPPLIES ON HAND SUFFICE FOR ANY EXTENDED PERIOD? UNFORTUNATELY, NO. EUROPE MAINTAINS OIL STOCKS ON HAND SUFFICIENT FOR ONLY ABOUT 75 DAYS, JAPAN FOR A MAXIMUM OF 45 DAYS.

THE THIRD VULNERABILITY FACING OUR ALLIES IN TERMS OF OIL IS THE LIMITED ABILITY OF OUR OWN NATION TO EXPAND ITS OIL EXPORTS. OUR STOCKS ON HAND COULD COVER OUR EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES FOR ABOUT 40 DAYS. ~~AND~~ THIS IS ASSUMING THAT OUR SEA LANES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC AND THE PACIFIC REMAINED OPEN.

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SLIDE 7:

IN WORLD WAR II, THE LARGEST MERCHANTS BEING SUNK WERE TANKERS OF 17,000 TONS OR LESS. MOST OF THE TANKER TONNAGE NOW BUILT IS IN SHIPS OF 200,000 TO 250,000 TONS. THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE TANKERS TO SUBMARINE ATTACK IS OBVIOUS WHEN YOU CONSIDER THAT ONE 250,000 TON TANKER CARRIES ABOUT THREE TIMES AS MUCH OIL AS AN ENTIRE CONVOY OF WWII. THE LOSS OF JUST ONE OF THESE SHIPS COULD BE A MAJOR DISASTER.

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SLIDE 8:

THIS SLIDE SHOWS ONE OF MANY FEASIBLE SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINE CONTINUOUS OR STEADY DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES, SUPPORTED FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT THE USE OF TENDERS OR OVERSEAS BASES.

THE LOWER DEPLOYMENT FIGURES, SHOWN IN BLACK, HAVE BEEN GENERATED FROM THE VERY CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF 60 DAYS ENDURANCE. THE HIGHER FIGURES, SHOWN IN RED, ARE BASED ON 90 DAYS ENDURANCE; <sup>INTELLIGENCE</sup> NOW INDICATES NUMEROUS SOVIET SUBMARINE PATROLS OF MORE THAN 100 DAYS.

WITH THE DEPLOYMENT SHOWN, 51 SUBMARINES CAN BE MAINTAINED CONTINUOUSLY ON WAR PATROL USING 60 DAYS ENDURANCE, AND 87 SUBMARINES WITH 90 DAYS. UNDER A SURGE CAPABILITY, MANY MORE BOATS COULD BE KEPT ON PATROL.

OF COURSE, SUPPORTED DEPLOYMENTS, USING REPLENISHMENT SHIPS AND/OR FORWARD BASES SUCH AS CIENFUEGOS, VALPARISO, SOCOTRA, OR PERHAPS EVEN MAURITIUS COULD SUBSTANTIALLY AND DRAMATICALLY EXPAND SOVIET CAPABILITIES... PARTICULARLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AREA, AND THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN ATLANTIC.

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SLIDE 9:

IT IS A MATTER OF HISTORY THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE REAPED DURING WWII BY AXIS SUBMARINES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1941 THERE WERE 3.6 U-BOATS PER 1000 MERCHANT SHIPS IN THE ATLANTIC. TODAY, THE SOVIETS HAVE 10 SUBMARINES PER 1000 SHIPS THERE. BASED ON THE GERMAN RATE OF SINKING SHIPS AT 4.2 SHIPS PER MONTH, WE COULD LOSE FROM 110 TO 205 MUCH LARGER SHIPS MONTHLY IN THE ATLANTIC. AND THE DANGER IS THAT MUCH GREATER WHEN WE RECALL THAT HITLER'S SUBS WENT ABOUT 5 KNOTS, WHILE THOSE OF THE USSR SPEED ALONG AT FROM 20 TO 30 KNOTS; IN CONTRAST, THE SPEEDS OF SURFACE SHIPS HAVE NOT INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY OVER THESE THREE DECADES.

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# Slide 9:

## PAST AND PRESENT THREAT

- ~~WW II - 10 U-BOATS SANK 42 SHIPS PER MONTH~~
  - ~~25 ON STATION U.S. SUBS SANK 71 JAPANESE SHIPS PER MONTH~~
- WW II - 3.6 U-BOATS PER 1000 ALLIED ATLANTIC SHIPS
- 1970 - 10 SOVIET SUBS PER 1000 ALLIED ATLANTIC SHIPS
- SHIP LOSSES COULD BE 110 TO 205 PER MONTH
- ~~IMPROVED CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES~~
- improved submarine speeds.

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SLIDE 10:

THE SECOND PRINCIPAL PART OF THE PRESENTATION IS THE AVAILABILITY OF FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS TO COUNTER THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT. THE ASW FORCES OF MOST ALLIED OR POTENTIALLY ALLIED NAVIES INDIVIDUALLY ARE SMALL, AND RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. HOWEVER, TAKEN AS A WHOLE THESE ASSETS ARE IMPRESSIVE.

FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS, SHOWN ON THE FIRST LINE OF THIS SLIDE, PROVIDE A POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE WHEN COMPARED TO U.S. ASW ASSETS, SHOWN ON THE SECOND LINE. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THIS POTENTIAL IS NOT A PROJECTION, IT IS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN TERMS OF FORCES IN BEING TODAY. THE TOTALS SHOWN INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMBINING U.S. AND FREE WORLD ASSETS.

TO ILLUSTRATE THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS I WOULD LIKE TO SINGLE OUT THE 560 FREE WORLD ESCORTS SHOWN.

89 OF THE 560 FREE WORLD ESCORTS ARE ABOUT AS CAPABLE AS U.S. FIRST LINE DESTROYERS. THESE 89 ESCORTS EQUATE TO ABOUT ONE THIRD OF ALL U.S. DESTROYER TYPES AND WELL OVER ONE HALF OF THE U.S. FIRST LINE DESTROYER INVENTORY, AND THEIR NUMBERS ARE GROWING. THE REMAINING 470 SECOND LINE ESCORTS, IN NUMBERS ALONE, OFFER A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL.

OTHER NON-U.S. ASSETS ARE GENERALLY LESS CAPABLE THAN U.S. UNITS. HOWEVER, IF FREE WORLD CAPABILITIES COULD BE COMBINED MEANINGFULLY WITH U.S. FORCES, THEY COULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE OVERALL ALLIED ASW POSTURE.

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SLIDE 11:

IN SHORT, THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF THIS THEME OF THE NEWPORT PLAN. THE FIRST IS THE SHORT TERM DIMENSION. THAT IS, MAKING MAXIMUM USE OF WHAT WE AND OUR ALLIES ALREADY POSSESS IN TERMS OF HARDWARE FOR IMMEDIATE ASW PURPOSES.

THE SECOND IS THE LONG RANGE ASPECT. THAT IS, WHAT CAN BE DONE IF THIS NATION PROVIDES EDUCATION, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO ASSUME A LARGER SHARE OF THE ASW JOB. OF COURSE, THIS MEANS A REVITALIZED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

INHERENT HEREIN IS THE NEED TO SHED OUR PAROCHIAL PREFERENCE TO "BUY AMERICAN". MANY OF OUR ALLIES HAVE EVIDENCED THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE SOPHISTICATED ASW EQUIPMENT AT PRICES FAR BELOW OUR OWN. SELLING TO CONGRESS THE IDEA OF AN EXPANDED MAP MIGHT BE FACILITATED IF IT COULD BE SHOWN THAT SOME OF OUR ALLIES HAVE EVOLVED INTO CAPABLE PRODUCERS OF NECESSARY HARDWARE FOR USE IN THE COMMON DEFENSE. EXPANDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE COSTS COULD WELL BE OFFSET BY SAVINGS REALIZED THROUGH PURCHASES OF LESS EXPENSIVE NON-AMERICAN PRODUCTS. SIMILARLY, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RELAX THOSE SECURITY LIMITS WHICH PREVENT US FROM PUTTING ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS MANY OF OUR OWN WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE SOLD TO OUR ALLIES.

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#11

## TWO DIMENSIONS

SHORT-TERM: Use Assets Available

LONG-TERM: Revitalize MAP

∴ Revise Weapons Purchase/Sales Policies

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SLIDE 12:

THE THIRD PART OF THE PRESENTATION COVERS THE STUDY'S PRIMARY RECOMMENDATIONS. THEY CONSTITUTE THE PRAGMATIC PLAN WE PROPOSE, AND ARE BASED ON ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE MAJOR REGIONS SHOWN. IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, I WILL NOT COVER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EACH OF THE FIVE REGIONS. RATHER, I WILL PRESENT SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH APPLY GENERALLY TO ALL REGIONS AND WHICH SERVE AS A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY.

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SLIDE 13:

FIRST: THE U.S. MUST GIVE CLEAR AND VOCAL SUPPORT TO THE CONCEPT OF WORLDWIDE MULTINATIONAL ASW SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES. SUCH SUPPORT IS, IN FACT, A LOGICAL CORROLLARY OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AND OUR ALLIES OUGHT TO BE MADE EXPLICITLY AWARE THAT WE VIEW IT IN SUCH TERMS. ABOVE ALL, OUR APPROACH MUST BE COOPERATIVE AND FRATERNAL, NOT DOMINANT AND PATERNAL.

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SLIDE 14:

SECOND: THE LIMITED MULTINATIONAL SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS NOW CONDUCTED IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN MUST BE EXPANDED WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO FULL-TIME OPERATIONS ON A MULTINATIONAL BASIS; FURTHER, THEY OUGHT TO BE ORIENTED PRIMARILY TO ASW. SIMILAR COMBINED OPERATIONS ARRANGED ON A NAVY TO NAVY BASIS SHOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE PACIFIC, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN.

HISTORICALLY, MULTINATIONAL ASW EXERCISES HAVE IN THE PAST EVOLVED INTO FORMAL AND INFORMAL COOPERATIVE ASW ARRANGEMENTS. THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC, THE MARITIME CONTINGENCY FORCES ATLANTIC, AND THE NAVAL ON-CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN ARE EXAMPLES OF SUCH FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS DERIVING FROM MULTINATIONAL ASW EXERCISES. THE NORTH ATLANTIC RENOVATE AND MEDITERRANEAN EAGLE EYE OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF LESS FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH EXERCISES AND CONTINGENCY FORCES MAY EVOLVE INTO STANDING NAVAL FORCES DEPENDS ON HOW MUCH THEY ARE NEEDED, FEASIBLE, AND DESIRED BY THE COUNTRIES OF A PARTICULAR REGION. IN THE VARIOUS REGIONAL PLANS OUTLINED IN THE STUDY, SUCH FORCES ARE GENERALLY THE ULTIMATE GOAL.

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#14

## IMPROVE/EXPAND MULTINATIONAL

### ASW EXERCISES

- Formal and Informal Arrangements
- Standing Naval Forces

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SLIDE 15:

THIRD: AS PART OF THIS PLAN OF FOSTERING EXPANSION OF MULTINATIONAL ASW EXERCISES AND FORCES, MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE STAFFS SHOULD BE FORMED TO PLAN, COORDINATE, AND CONTROL SUCH EXERCISES. THESE STAFFS WOULD PROVIDE VISIBILITY AND PROVIDE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FUTURE OPERATIONS AND FUTURE ON-CALL AND STANDING FORCES EVOLVING FROM THE EXERCISES.

EXPERIENCE WITH THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC HAS SHOWN THAT COMMAND OF NAVAL FORCES CAN BE ROTATED AMONG PARTICIPATING NATIONS. AND HERE WE MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES IN WHICH WE PARTICIPATE.

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#15

ESTABLISH MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE  
STAFFS TO:

- Plan
- Coordinate
- Control

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SLIDE 16:

FOURTH: A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO WIDER MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION IS U.S. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE POLICIES.

THESE POLICIES MUST BE LIBERALIZED TO PERMIT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN THE TECHNICAL, OPERATIONAL, TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE AREAS.

IF THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP IS TO BE MORE THAN MERE RHETORIC, WE MUST FIRST DEMONSTRATE OUR GOOD FAITH BY LIBERALIZING OUR DISCLOSURE POLICIES AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO MORE EFFECTIVE MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION. HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM IS SO COMPLEX THAT RESOLUTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT MAY WELL BE NECESSARY -- AND IMPLEMENTATION AT ALL LEVELS ESSENTIAL.

IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE STUDY DOES NOT RECOMMEND THE DISCLOSURE OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACOUSTIC SIGNATURES OR U.S. NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT TECHNOLOGY.

IT IS TRUE THAT ALLIED SECURITY PROCEDURES ARE AT TIMES INADEQUATE. THEREFORE, WE MUST INSIST THAT OUR ALLIES IMPROVE THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BEFORE WE SUBSTANTIALLY LIBERALIZE OUR DISCLOSURE POLICIES.

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SLIDE 17:

FIFTH: MORE EXTENSIVE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION CLEARLY  
REQUIRES GREATER COMMONALTY OF ASW, DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND  
COMMUNICATIONS.

COMMONALTY CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COMBINED ASW TRAINING SCHOOLS  
AND EXERCISES IN EACH REGION. THESE MUST BE ORIENTED TO THE SPECIFIC  
NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES OF THAT REGION.

WIDER DISSEMINATION OF TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS IS ALSO NECESSARY.  
NATO, AND U.S. NAVY, PUBLICATIONS WHICH GENERALLY HAVE LOW SECURITY  
CLASSIFICATIONS, ARE LOGICAL CANDIDATES FOR WORLDWIDE USE.

ASW COORDINATING ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS NATO NAVAL CONTROL AND  
PROTECTION OF SHIPPING PROCEDURES AND DOCTRINES, ALREADY ADOPTED IN SOME  
NON-NATO AREAS, SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED AND EXTENDED TO ALL THE WORLD  
OCEAN REGIONS.

SECRET NOFORN

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SLIDE 18:

SIXTH: THE U.S. SHOULD INITIATE AN EXPANDED TRANSFER AND SALES PROGRAM FOR ASW SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT NOW BEING INACTIVATED.

MANY OF OUR SHIPS AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER ARE OVERAGE BUT STILL POSSESS THE CAPABILITY FOR LESS DEMANDING ASW SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS.

THE TRANSFER OF SHIPS NOW IS A ONE TIME OPPORTUNITY. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. SHIPS MAY NEVER AGAIN BE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER. SHIP TRANSFERS ARE LEAD-TIME CRITICAL. POSITIVE ACTION NOW WILL PERMIT A "HOT SHIP" TRANSFER PROGRAM THUS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING TRANSFER COSTS. ADDITIONALLY, A NEW SHIP SALES PROGRAM, BROADER AND WITH INCREASED MAP FUNDING, SHOULD BE INITIATED. SIMILARLY, ASW AIRCRAFT BEING INACTIVATED COULD ALSO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALLIES AND BE VALUABLE FREE WORLD ASSETS. THE NIXON DOCTRINE CANNOT SAIL MEANINGFULLY WITHOUT SUCH PROGRAMS.

A STEP UP PROGRAM OF ASW AIRCRAFT TRANSFERS IS OPERATIONALLY AND FINANCIALLY PRACTICAL. NATIONS WITH AN AIR ASW CAPABILITY SHOULD IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITY BY PURCHASE OF MORE ADVANCED AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S. AT FAVORABLE PRICES. THESE NATIONS COULD THEN SELL OR TRANSFER THEIR PRESENT ASW AIRCRAFT TO LESS CAPABLE COUNTRIES.

SOME U.S. AIRCRAFT SOLD SHOULD BE EQUIPPED SO THEY ARE NOT CLASSIFIED AS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THIS WILL MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR SALE OR TRANSFER TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

A DYNAMIC WEAPONS SALES PROGRAM COULD BE SIGNIFICANT NOT ONLY IN SUPPORT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE TO PERSUADE OUR ALLIES TO DO MORE -- BUT ALSO IN HELPING TO REDRESS OUR CURRENT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM.

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 19:

SEVENTH: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO IMPROVING FREE WORLD ASW CAPABILITY IS AN INCREASED POOLING OF TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORTS, WHICH THE U.S. SHOULD ACTIVELY ADVOCATE AND PURSUE.

THIS WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, AND COST EFFECTIVE IN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF SENSORS AND WEAPONS, AND IN SENSOR ANALYSIS. OUR ALLIES CAN OFFER SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE IN THESE AREAS.

TECHNOLOGICAL POOLING COULD ALSO BE EXTENDED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE WORLD FIXED WING ASW AIRCRAFT, ASW HELICOPTERS, AND VTOL AIRCRAFT.

AS WE KNOW, ONE OF THE MOST EXPENSIVE AND THE MOST DURABLE ASW WEAPONS SYSTEM IS THE ASW SHIP ITSELF.

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 20:

THE SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICERS AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, REPRESENTING SOME 30 NATIONS, HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETED AN EXCITING STUDY FOR THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF A FREE WORLD FRIGATE. IF BUILT, THIS SHIP COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN NAVAL TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

SECRET NOFORN



SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 21:

MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED USING EXISTING FORCES, AND INVOLVE ONLY MODEST EXPENDITURES OF RESOURCES. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS LARGELY CONCERN INCREASED MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION, ORGANIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES (ON-CALL AND STANDING), AND TRANSFER OF EXCESS U.S. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT. INTERNATIONALIZING THE ITASS (<sup>INTERIM</sup>~~INTERIOR~~ TOWED ARRAY <sup>SONAR</sup>~~SURVEILLANCE~~ SYSTEM) COULD EXPAND THIS CAPABILITY WITHOUT ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCE COMMITMENTS.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS, HOWEVER, WILL REQUIRE TIME AND SUBSTANTIAL EXPENDITURES. THESE CONCERN DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EQUIPMENT, SENSORS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS. EXPANSION OF SMALLER ALLIED NAVIES IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND EXPANSION OF OVERALL ALLIED SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES ARE THE GOAL. THIS WILL REQUIRE A MUCH GREATER U.S. MAP EFFORT. THE STUDY ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT JAPAN AND GERMANY BE CALLED ON TO SUPPORT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO EQUIP ALLIES WHICH IN TURN WOULD PROTECT THEIR IMPORTANT SEA LOCs.

THE GENERAL PLAN PRESENTED IS DESIGNED TO PERMIT PROGRESS AT ANY LEVEL OF FUNDING. THE FIRST CATEGORY OF RECOMMENDATIONS WILL NOT COST A LOT OF MONEY AND CAN BE IMPLEMENTED NOW.

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 22:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY OUTLINE PLAN WILL REQUIRE:

FIRST, GAINING SUPPORT WITHIN THE U.S. -- BOTH IN DEFENSE AND STATE.

SECOND, ACHIEVING ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE ON THE PART OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO EXPAND THEIR NAVAL (ASW) CAPABILITIES AND.

THIRD, DETERMINATION OF SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN ON A REGIONAL BASIS, ONCE A GENERALLY FAVORABLE FOREIGN RESPONSE IS ASSURED .

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 23:

TO CONVINCE THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF THE NEED FOR A GREATER ASW EFFORT WE MUST BE SURE OF SUPPORT FROM THEIR NAVAL LEADERS. AN INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWERS SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN 1969, AND ILLUSTRATED ON THIS SLIDE, HELPED ACHIEVE A WIDE CONSENSUS ON THIS AMONG NAVAL LEADERS OF THE 38 FREE WORLD COUNTRIES REPRESENTED. A SECOND SYMPOSIUM IS SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER, WITH OVER FORTY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INVITED. THIS SYMPOSIUM SHOULD BE USED TO TEST AND EXPAND ON THE NEWPORT STUDY, PLAN AND ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF NAVAL LEADERS IN MOVING TOWARD ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 24:

THE REAL TARGETS OF OUR PROPOSALS, HOWEVER, MUST BE THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES SINCE THEY ALONE HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE NECESSARY RESOURCES.

AND IN THIS REGARD THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF THE THREAT TO SEAWARD OVER THE LAST SIX YEARS MUST BE EMPHASIZED. THE FORMER U.S. POLICY WHICH DENIGRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED NAVIES MUST BE REVERSED.

IN ADDITION TO GAINING POLITICAL ACCEPTION FOR EXPANDED NATIONAL NAVAL (ASW) CAPABILITIES THERE IS ALSO THE NEED TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FOR PEACETIME MULTINATIONAL ASW REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. HERE IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH AND IN SUPPORT OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER; AND THAT THEY COULD BE ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT NEW FORMAL TREATY ARRANGEMENTS, ON A NAVY TO NAVY BASIS WITH CONCURRENCE OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF COUNTRIES CONCERNED. FINALLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO CRITICISM OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT SUCH AS THIS WHICH IS CLEARLY PEACEFUL AND DEFENSIVE IN ITS OVERALL GOAL.

SECRET NOFORN

#24

### SELLING THE PLAN:

- Convince Political and financial leaders
- Emphasize Shift of Threat Seaward
- Stress Proposals Consistent with Art. 52

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 25:

THE SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON STEPS WILL VARY ACCORDING TO REGION,  
BECAUSE OF DIFFERING POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

POLITICO-MILITARY BRIEFINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL SHOULD BE  
PRESENTED TO REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS NATO WHERE THEY  
EXIST, AND, WHERE NOT, IN VARIOUS NATIONAL CAPITALS BY A BRIEFING TEAM  
OF NAVY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEADED BY AN AMBASSADOR OR EQUIVALENT.  
UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND U.S. AMBASSADORS WOULD PLAY APPROPRIATE ROLES IN  
THE PRESENTATIONS IN THEIR AREAS DEPENDING ON THE COUNTRY OR REGION.  
DETAILED BRIEFING PLANS, BASED ON OUTLINE PLANS IN THE STUDY, WOULD BE  
DEVELOPED BY THE NAVY IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH DOD (ISA) AND STATE.

PROPOSALS MADE SHOULD STRESS COMMON ELEMENTS OF THE BROAD SOVIET  
NAVAL THREAT TO THE VITAL SEA LOCs OF COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND SHOULD  
BE TAILORED TO SPECIFIC REGIONAL FACTORS, INCLUDING LOCAL CAPABILITIES,  
LOCAL PROBLEMS, AND LOCAL POLITICAL REALITIES.

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 26:

AND FINALLY THERE IS THE URGENT NEED, WITHIN THE U.S. ARENA, TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO A NEW LOOK AT MAP ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF OUR ALLIES ARE TO SHARE THE SECURITY BURDEN, AS CONGRESS SO CLEARLY WANTS. AND TOO -- WITHIN THE EXISTING MAP, THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO REVIEW THE APPORTIONMENT TO ALLIED NAVIES PROPERLY REFLECTING THE VASTLY INCREASED THREAT AT SEA.

SECRET NOFORN



#26

MAP

Sell Congress on a "New Look"



SECRET NOFORN

SLIDE 27:

MR. SECRETARY, THESE HAVE BEEN THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEWPORT STUDY. IN ESSENCE, THEY ARE PROPOSALS FOR APPLYING THE NIXON DOCTRINE AT SEA IN WORLDWIDE BUT REGIONALLY ORIENTED EFFORTS. MANY ALLIED NAVIES NOW HAVE THE ASSETS TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO OUR OVERALL ASW SEA CONTROL POSTURE. WITH MODEST HELP FROM US IN HARDWARE AND TRAINING, THEIR CONTRIBUTION COULD BE EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT. IN THE U.S. INTEREST, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD START IMMEDIATELY AND TAKE THIS COURSE TOWARD INSURING THE PROTECTION OF OUR WORLDWIDE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

SECRET NOFORN



# Naval War College

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SLIDE 1

ADMIRAL COUSINS, THE NEWPORT STUDY WAS CONDUCTED AT  
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF  
VADM COLBERT, ATCNO'S REQUEST. THE STUDY ADDRESSES THE ISSUE  
OF HOW THE U.S. CAN PERSUADE SELECTED MARITIME ALLIES TO  
IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR ASW CAPABILITIES FOR SEA CONTROL.

*CAIRIS  
program*

THE RECOMMENDATIONS REPRESENT THE VIEWPOINT OF THE STUDY  
GROUP AFTER CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE MAJOR FLEET COMMANDERS  
AND THE OPNAV STAFF. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AND SELECTED APPROPRIATE  
PROGRAMS AND IDEAS WHICH SHOWED THE MOST PROMISE AND COULD BE  
EXPANDED AND BUILT UPON TO IMPROVE ALLIED ASW CAPABILITIES.

*NATION is  
not initiated and  
regional  
programs*

*Tighter  
in*

IT IS <sup>will</sup> RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE ONGOING PROGRAMS IN THE  
AREAS OF SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS. SOME ARE RECENT INITIATIVES  
AND SOME ARE OLDER PROGRAMS WITH ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL. *Included*

*to present a complete program -*

*??*

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SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 2

THE STUDY BASES ITS RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FOLLOWING  
SIX THESES:

FIRST: THE SOVIET NAVY, AND IN PARTICULAR ITS SUBMARINE  
FORCE, NOW HAS THE TRIPLE CAPABILITY SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CONDUCT  
SLBM OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S., TO DEFEND ITS HOMELAND AGAINST  
U.S. STRIKING FORCES, AND TO CONDUCT AN EXTENSIVE ANTISHIPPING  
CAMPAIGN.

SECOND: A UNILATERAL EFFORT BY THE UNITED STATES TO MAIN-  
TAIN A WORLDWIDE NAVAL FORCE CAPABLE OF DETERRING OR DEFEATING  
THE SOVIETS AT SEA, UNDER ALL CONCEIVABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, IS NOT  
CONSIDERED FEASIBLE UNDER EXISTING BUGETARY CONSTRAINTS. ...

THIRD: A POOLING OF PRESENT AND POTENTIAL NON-U.S. FREE  
WORLD ASW RESOURCES WILL PRODUCE A SYNERGISTIC EFFECT, IN THAT  
THE TOTAL CAPABILITY WILL FAR EXCEED THE SUM OF THE CAPABILITIES  
OF THE INDIVIDUAL NAVIES.

FOURTH: THE FREE WORLD CAN EXPAND AND IMPROVE ITS ASW  
CAPABILITY ON A REGIONAL BASIS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL FURTHER  
THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES IN EACH REGION.

FIFTH: IMPROVEMENT OF FREE WORLD ASW CAPABILITIES WILL  
REQUIRE INITIAL MOTIVATION OF EACH COUNTRY CONCERNED. THE  
IMPETUS FOR MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION MUST ORIGINATE WITHIN EACH  
REGION.

SIXTH: FINALLY TO BE EFFECTIVE, U.S. COOPERATION WILL REQUIRE  
A REVISION OF OUR DISCLOSURE POLICIES, AND A REVISED OFFICIAL U.S.  
THREAT APPRECIATION. THE McNAMARA/McNAUGHTON STATEMENT OF THE  
THREAT IS STILL CONSIDERED THE U.S. POSITION BY OUR ALLIES.

*FOR example*  
*policy questioning the need for*  
*WATO naval forces*

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 3

*general supported by the study*

THE PLAN IS DESIGNED TO BE VIABLE THROUGH A SPECTRUM RANGING FROM INTERNATIONAL TENSION SITUATIONS, TO LIMITED HOSTILITIES, TO FULL WAR AT SEA. IT IS NOT AN OFFENSIVE WAR PLAN FOR ALLIED ASW. RATHER, THE STUDY PROPOSES A PLAN FOR A DEFENSIVE, DAY-TO-DAY EFFORT BY FREE WORLD NATIONS HAVING A COMMON INTEREST IN KEEPING THE PEACE AND MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF MUTUAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE ESSENCE OF THE PROPOSALS REFLECTS THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AND ARTICLE 52 OF THE U.N. CHARTER, WHICH PERMITS REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PURPOSE. *No new Treaty arrangements are involved - the whole concept is based on navy to navy cooperative*

THIS PRESENTATION IS AN OVERVIEW OF A HIGHLY COMPLEX PROBLEM. FOLLOWING IT WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILED ASPECTS OF THE PLAN AND TO ENLARGE ON ANY AREA OF INTEREST.

*Concerned in by appropriate political and military*

?7

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 4

THE PRESENTATION WILL COVER THE FOUR PRINCIPAL AREAS  
SHOWN.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 6

*any other* THREE FACTORS MAKE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE OIL SUPPLIES PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE, THE LONG SEA ROUTES WHICH CARRY THE OIL, THE LIMITED OIL SUPPLIES ON HAND, AND U.S. REPLACEMENT LIMITATIONS.

SECRET/NOFORN

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SLIDE 7

THE FIRST IS A RESULT OF THEIR GREAT DEPENDENCE ON PERSIAN GULF AND AFRICAN OIL SUPPLIES AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE LONG SEA ROUTES WHICH CARRY THIS OIL.

FOR EXAMPLE, OF EUROPE'S TOTAL DAILY OIL CONSUMPTION OF OVER 12 MILLION BARRELS, 92% IS IMPORTED. 88% COMES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA REGION. MUCH OF EUROPE'S OIL IS MOVED ON THE 11,000 MILE ROUTE AROUND THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE. 5.9 MILLION BARRELS ARE SHIPPED ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN DAILY. SIMILARLY, IN THE PACIFIC, JAPAN IMPORTS 99% OF HER OIL - OVER 4 MILLION BARRELS DAILY. 92% COMES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA BY SEA.

THE SECOND VULNERABILITY IS THE LIMITED OIL STOCKS ON HAND IN EUROPE AND JAPAN.

EUROPE MAINTAINS OIL STOCKS ON HAND SUFFICIENT FOR ABOUT 75 DAYS, JAPAN FOR A MAXIMUM OF 45 DAYS.

THE THIRD FACTOR OF VULNERABILITY IS THE LIMITED ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO EXPAND ITS OIL EXPORTS.

U.S. OIL STOCKS ON HAND COULD COVER THESE COUNTRIES' USAGE FOR ABOUT 40 DAYS, BUT ONLY IF TANKER DELIVERIES COULD BE MADE FROM THE U.S. OBVIOUSLY, IF A HOSTILE POWER INTERDICTED OUR NORTH ATLANTIC SEA LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS THIS CAPABILITY WOULD BE SEVERELY REDUCED, IF NOT NEGATED.

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SLIDE 8

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE SITUATION WHICH CONFRONTS US IS GIVEN BY TODAY'S MERCHANT SHIPS. IN WW II ABOUT THE LARGEST MERCHANT SHIPS BEING SUNK WERE TANKERS OF 17,000 TONS OR LESS. MOST OF THE TANKER TONNAGE NOW BEING BUILT IS IN SHIPS OF 200,00 TO 250,000 TONS.

SLIDE 8a

A NUMBER OF TANKERS IN USE TODAY ARE 330,000 TONS SUCH AS THE UNIVERSE IRELAND. EVEN LARGER ONES ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. TWO OF THESE LARGE TANKERS MORE THAN EQUAL JAPAN'S TOTAL DAILY OIL REQUIREMENTS OF 4 MILLION BARRELS.

SLIDE 8b

THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE TANKERS TO SUBMARINE ATTACK IS OBVIOUS WHEN YOU CONSIDER THAT ONE 250,000 TON TANKER CARRIES ABOUT THREE TIMES AS MUCH OIL AS AN ENTIRE CONVOY OF WW II. THE LOSS OF JUST ONE OF THESE SHIPS COULD BE A MAJOR DISASTER.

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SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 9

THIS SLIDE SHOWS ONE OF MANY FEASIBLE SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINE CONTINUOUS OR STEADY STATE DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES, SUPPORTED FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT <sup>not without</sup> THE USE OF TENDERS OR OVERSEAS BASES. THE DEPLOYMENT SHOWN DOES NOT INCLUDE SOVIET SSBNS SUCH AS THE YANKEE CLASS. ~~DEP~~

THE LOWER DEPLOYMENT FIGURES, SHOWN TO THE LEFT, HAVE BEEN GENERATED FROM THE VERY CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. DIA ASCRIBES A TOTAL UNDERWAY ENDURANCE OF 60 DAYS TO SOVIET NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES. ~~DEP~~

THE HIGHER DEPLOYMENT FIGURES, SHOWN TO THE RIGHT ARE BASED ON 90 DAYS ENDURANCE. THE U.S. HAS RECENT INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET SUBMARINE PATROLS OF MORE THAN 100 DAYS. THIS IS BELIEVED TO MAKE THE 90 DAY ENDURANCE ASSUMPTION MORE REALISTIC. UNSUPPORTED DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE QUESTIONABLE WITH 60 DAYS ENDURANCE, YET ARE QUITE POSSIBLE WITH 90 DAYS <sup>3</sup>

WITH THE DEPLOYMENT SHOWN, 51 SUBMARINES CAN BE MAINTAINED CONTINUOUSLY ON WAR PATROL WORLDWIDE USING 60 DAYS ENDURANCE, AND 87 SUBMARINES WITH 90 DAYS. USING A SURGE CAPABILITY MANY MORE SUBMARINES COULD BE MAINTAINED ON WAR PATROL FOR A GIVEN PERIOD.

OF COURSE SUPPORTED DEPLOYMENTS, USING REPLENISHMENT SHIPS AND/OR FORWARD BASES SUCH AS CIENFUEGOS, VALPARISO, SOCOTRA OR MAURITIUS <sup>which may well be available to the US</sup> WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY EXPAND SOVIET CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE <sup>also</sup> AND SOUTH AND WESTERN ATLANTIC. <sup>1</sup>

*diminutively*

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 10

THE U.S. GROSSLY UNDERESTIMATED BOTH THE JAPANESE AND GERMAN NAVAL CAPABILITIES BEFORE WW II. SOME HISTORICAL FACTS THEREFORE SHOULD HELP IN ASSESSING THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT.

- IN 1940 AND 1941 GERMANY KEPT AN AVERAGE OF 10 U-BOATS AT SEA IN THE ATLANTIC AND SANK AN AVERAGE OF 42 MERCHANT SHIPS PER MONTH. OUR SUBMARINE PERFORMANCE IN THE PACIFIC WAS COMPARABLE.

- IN 1941, THERE WERE 3.6 U-BOATS PER 1000 MERCHANT SHIPS IN THE ATLANTIC. TODAY THE SOVIETS HAVE 10 SUBMARINES PER 1000 SHIPS THERE.

IF THE SOVIETS COULD EQUAL THE GERMAN WW II SINKING RATE OF 4.2 SHIPS PER MONTH, PER SUBMARINE, WE WOULD LOSE 110 TO 205 MUCH LARGER MERCHANT SHIPS PER MONTH IN THE ATLANTIC. THIS IS BASED ON 60 AND 90 DAY DEPLOYMENTS WHICH GIVE 26 OR 49 SUBMARINES ON STATION IN THE ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN.

*shorten  
make  
punchy*

IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE SUBMARINE OF 1940 WAS PRIMITIVE IN CAPABILITY WHEN COMPARED TO THE 1971 MODEL. SUBMERGED SPEEDS OF ABOUT 5 KNOTS HAVE NOW CHANGED TO SPEEDS FROM 20 TO OVER 30 KNOTS, WHEREAS THE SPEEDS OF SURFACE SHIPS HAVE NOT INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. FINALLY, THE BALANCE BETWEEN ASW CAPABILITIES AND SUBMARINE ATTACK CAPABILITIES HAS SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER.

PART II

FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS\*

<u>CVS</u>	ASW HELICOPTER <u>CRUISERS</u>	<u>ESCORTS</u>	<u>SS/SSN</u>	ASW <u>AIRCRAFT</u>
7	6	560	169	347

\* FREE WORLD (LESS U.S.) TOTALS BASED ON 1 JAN 1971  
OPERATIONAL FORCE LEVELS

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 11

THE SECOND PRINCIPAL PART OF THE PRESENTATION IS THE AVAIL-  
ABILITY OF FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS TO COUNTER THE SOVIET SUBMARINE  
THREAT. THE ASW FORCES OF MOST ALLIED OR POTENTIALLY ALLIED  
NAVIES <sup>individually</sup> ARE SMALL, AND RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. HOWEVER,  
TAKEN AS A WHOLE THESE ASSETS ARE IMPRESSIVE.

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SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 12

FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS, SHOWN AGAIN ON THE FIRST LINE OF THIS SLIDE, PROVIDE A POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE WHEN COMPARED TO U.S. ASW ASSETS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THIS POTENTIAL IS NOT A PROJECTION, IT IS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN TERMS OF FORCES IN BEING <sup>today</sup> THE TOTALS SHOWN, INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMBINING U.S. AND FREE WORLD ASSETS.

TO ILLUSTRATE THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF FREE WORLD ASW ASSETS I WOULD LIKE TO SINGLE OUT THE 560 FREE WORLD ESCORTS SHOWN.

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FREE WORLD ESCORTS

OF THE 560 FREE WORLD ESCORTS ONLY 89 ARE FIRST LINE

THESE EQUAL  $\frac{1}{3}$  OF ALL U.S. DDs AND  $\frac{1}{2}$  U.S. FIRST  
LINE ESCORTS

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 13

89 OF THE 560 FREE WORLD ESCORTS ARE ABOUT AS CAPABLE AS  
U.S. FIRST LINE DESTROYERS. THESE 89 ESCORTS EQUATE TO ABOUT  
ONE THIRD OF ALL U.S. DESTROYER TYPES AND OVER ONE HALF OF THE  
U.S. FIRST LINE DESTROYER INVENTORY *and their numbers are growing.*  
*Remaining ~~assets~~ assets, number - times the 2nd line US destroyers*  
OTHER NON-U.S. ASSETS ARE GENERALLY LESS CAPABLE THAN

U.S. UNITS, BUT IF FREE WORLD CAPABILITIES COULD BE COMBINED  
MEANINGFULLY WITH U.S. FORCES THEY WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE  
OUR ASW POSTURE.

SECRET/NOFORN



SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 14

THE THIRD PART OF THE PRESENTATION COVERS THE STUDY'S  
PRIMARY RECOMMENDATIONS. THEY CONSTITUTE THE PRAGMATIC PLAN  
WE PROPOSE, AND ARE BASED ON ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE MAJOR REGIONS  
SHOWN. IN THE INTEREST OF TIME I WILL NOT COVER RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR EACH OF THE FIVE REGIONS. RATHER, I WILL PRESENT NINE  
*apply generally to all regions and*  
RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH SERVE AS A SUMMARY.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 15

FIRST: THE U.S. MUST SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF WORLDWIDE MULTINATIONAL ASW SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD ENUNCIATE THIS AS NATIONAL POLICY AND A LOGICAL COROLLARY TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

THE U.S. APPROACH SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FRATERNAL, NOT DOMINANT AND PATERNAL. (WE MUST CHANGE OUR ATTITUDE AND TREAT OUR ALLIES AS EQUALS. THE U.S. CANNOT RUN THE WORLD, AND SHOULD AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF TRYING TO DO SO.)

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 16

SECOND: A POLICY OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR MULTINATIONAL ASW OPERATIONS WILL REQUIRE THE U.S. OFFICIALLY TO INFORM INTERESTED COUNTRIES AND APPROPRIATE TREATY ORGANIZATIONS, OF OUR CHANGING POLICIES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- ① <sup>A</sup> RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET SUBMARINE TRIPLE CAPABILITY.
- ② ~~U.S. NAVAL FORCE LEVELS~~ <sup>Explain</sup>, THE PRESSING REASONS THAT CAUSE THE REDUCTIONS AND THEIR EXTENT AND IMPLICATIONS.
- ③ ~~OUR NAVY'S~~ <sup>in</sup> SHIFT IN EMPHASIS TO SEA CONTROL FORCES.
- ④ OUR POLICY OF WORLDWIDE MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION, AND HOW WE PROPOSE TO SUPPORT SUCH COOPERATION.

MORE DETAILS ON THESE POINTS WILL BE PRESENTED WHEN I DISCUSS OUR PROPOSALS FOR PRESENTING THE OVERALL PLAN TO OUR ALLIES. } ?

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE

16

Fourth:

THIRD: A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO WIDER MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION IS U.S. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE POLICIES.

THESE POLICIES MUST BE LIBERALIZED TO PERMIT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN THE TECHNICAL, OPERATIONAL, TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE AREAS.

IF THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP IS TO BE MORE THAN MERE RHETORIC, WE MUST FIRST DEMONSTRATE OUR GOOD FAITH BY LIBERALIZING OUR DISCLOSURE POLICIES AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO MORE EFFECTIVE MULTINATIONAL ASW COOPERATION. HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM IS SO COMPLEX THAT RESOLUTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT MAY WELL BE NECESSARY *- and implementation at all levels essential.*

IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE STUDY DOES NOT RECOMMEND THE DISCLOSURE OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACCOUSTIC SIGNATURES OR U.S. NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT TECHNOLOGY.

*It is true that*  
ALLIED SECURITY PROCEDURES ARE AT TIMES INADEQUATE. THEREFORE, WE MUST INSIST THAT OUR ALLIES IMPROVE THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BEFORE WE SUBSTANTIALLY LIBERALIZE OUR DISCLOSURE POLICIES.

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 18

*Sixth:*  
FOURTH:

THE U.S. SHOULD INITIATE AN EXPANDED TRANSFER AND SALES PROGRAM FOR ASW SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT NOW BEING INACTIVATED.

MANY OF OUR SHIPS AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER ARE OVERAGE BUT STILL POSSESS THE CAPABILITY FOR LESS DEMANDING ASW SEA CONTROL OPERATIONS.

THE TRANSFER OF SHIPS <sup>*now*</sup> IS A ONE TIME OPPORTUNITY. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. SHIPS MAY NEVER AGAIN BE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER.

SHIP TRANSFERS ARE LEAD TIME CRITICAL. POSITIVE ACTION NOW WILL PERMIT A "HOT SHIP" TRANSFER PROGRAM THUS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING

TRANSFER COSTS. ADDITIONALLY, A NEW SHIPS ~~LEAD TIME~~, BROADER AND WITH INCREASED MAP FUNDING, SHOULD BE INITIATED. THE NIXON DOCTRINE CANNOT SAIL MEANINGFULLY WITHOUT SUCH PROGRAMS.

*(Similarity)* ~~THE~~ ASW AIRCRAFT BEING INACTIVATED COULD ALSO BE VALUABLE FREE WORLD ASSETS, IF SO TRANSFERRED.

A STEP UP PROGRAM OF ASW AIRCRAFT TRANSFERS IS OPERATIONALLY AND FINANCIALLY PRACTICAL. NATIONS WITH AN AIR ASW CAPABILITY SHOULD IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITY BY PURCHASE OF MORE ADVANCED AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S. AT FAVORABLE PRICES. THESE NATIONS COULD THEN ~~SELL~~ OR TRANSFER THEIR PRESENT ASW AIRCRAFT TO LESS CAPABLE COUNTRIES.

SOME U.S. AIRCRAFT SOLD SHOULD BE EQUIPPED SO THEY ARE NOT CLASSIFIED AS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THIS WILL MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR SALE OR TRANSFER TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

*A dynamic weapons sales program could be significant wing in support of the Nixon Doctrine to persuade our allies to do more - but also in helping to reduce our current balance of payments problem.*

SECRET/NOFORN

*SALES Program*

*made available to allies and be*  
*T. F. H. H.*  
*Up*

SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE

19

<sup>ASW</sup>  
FIFTH: MORE EXTENSIVE MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION CLEARLY  
REQUIRES GREATER COMMONALTY OF ASW, DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND  
COMMUNICATIONS.

COMMONALTY CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COMBINED ASW TRAINING  
SCHOOLS AND EXERCISES IN EACH REGION. THESE MUST BE ORIENTED  
TO THE SPECIFIC NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES OF THAT REGION.

WIDER DISSEMINATION OF TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS IS ALSO  
NECESSARY. NATO, AND U.S. NAVY, PUBLICATIONS ARE LOGICAL  
CANDIDATES FOR WORLDWIDE USE.

ASW COORDINATING ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS NATO NAVAL CONTROL  
AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING PROCEDURES, <sup>and doctrine, already adopted in some</sup> SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED  
<sup>world</sup> AND EXTENDED TO ALL THE OCEAN REGIONS.

some  
NATO  
matters

which generally low  
level security elements

SECRET/NOFORN

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SLIDE 19

*SEVENTH.*

SIXTH: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO IMPROVING FREE WORLD ASW CAPABILITY IS AN INCREASED POOLING OF TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORTS, WHICH THE U.S. SHOULD ACTIVELY ADVOCATE AND PURSUE.

THIS WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, AND COST EFFECTIVE IN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF SENSORS AND WEAPONS, AND IN

SENSOR ANALYSIS. *Our allies can offer substantial knowledge and expertise in these areas.*

TECHNOLOGICAL POOLING COULD ALSO BE EXTENDED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE WORLD FIXED WING ASW AIRCRAFT, ASW HELICOPTERS, AND VTOL AIRCRAFT.

AS WE KNOW, ONE OF THE MOST EXPENSIVE AND THE MOST DURABLE ASW WEAPONS SYSTEM IS THE ASW SHIP ITSELF.

SLIDE 20

THE SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICERS AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, REPRESENTING SOME 30 NATIONS, HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETED AN EXCITING STUDY FOR THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF A FREE WORLD FRIGATE. IF BUILT THIS SHIP COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN NAVAL TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

SECRET/NOFORN

MULTINATIONAL SUBMARINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS MUST BE IMPROVED

EXPAND SURVEILLANCE ORIENTED TO ASW

SHARE SEA BASED DETECTION SYSTEMS

EXPAND SOSUS COVERAGE



SECRET/NOFORN

SLIDE 21

SEVENTH: (THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL ASW OPERATIONS IS TO KNOW WHERE THE SUBMARINE IS). LIMITED MULTINATIONAL SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS ARE NOW CONDUCTED IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN ~~IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC~~

THEY SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO FULL TIME OPERATIONS, ON A MULTINATIONAL BASIS AND BE ORIENTED TO ASW. SIMILAR COMBINED SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE <sup>should</sup> EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, <sup>primarily</sup> <sup>propagating</sup> <sup>the</sup> PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS.

OTHER SEA BASED OPERATIONS MIGHT WELL INCLUDE THE BILATERAL OPERATION OF THE TOWED ARRAY SONAR SYSTEM, TASS, <sup>in appropriate areas.</sup>

AS TO SHOREBASED UNDERWATER SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS, THE U.S., JAPAN, U.K., CANADA AND NORWAY, ALREADY CONDUCT JOINT SOSUS OPERATIONS. SOUND SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO OTHER VITAL SEA AREAS.

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REGIONALLY ORIENTED MULTINATIONAL ON-CALL ASW FORCES

- DERIVED FROM EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
- STANDING NAVAL FORCES

EIGHTH: THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT INCREASED MULTINATIONAL ASW EXERCISES, AS A BASIS FOR MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION. SUCH EXERCISES IN THE PAST HAVE EVOLVED INTO FORMAL AND INFORMAL COOPERATIVE ASW ARRANGEMENTS. THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC, THE MARITIME CONTINGENCY FORCES/ATLANTIC, AND THE NAVAL ON CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN ARE EXAMPLES OF FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS: THE NORTH ATLANTIC RENOVATE AND MEDITERRANEAN EAGLE EYE OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF LESS FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS.

WE SHOULD BUILD ON EXISTING EXERCISE ARRANGEMENTS. WHERE NONE EXIST, NEW ONES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED, *always on a Navy to Navy basis.*

MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE STAFFS SHOULD BE FORMED TO PLAN, COORDINATE AND CONTROL SUCH EXERCISES. THESE STAFFS PROVIDE VISIBILITY, AND PROVIDE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FUTURE OPERATIONS.

EXPERIENCE WITH <sup>the</sup> STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC HAS SHOWN THAT COMMAND OF NAVAL FORCES CAN BE ROTATED AMONG ~~THE~~ PARTICIPATING NATIONS. <sup>And the</sup> WE MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES.

IF WE ARE TO ENCOURAGE ALLIED ASW OPERATIONS, IN AREAS WHERE OUR ALLIES HAVE NEITHER BASES NOR UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SHIPS, *?*

*Reminds* WE MUST EXTEND U.S. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

*Correct* *1/5/16* — FINALLY, THE U.S. SHOULD PROVIDE SSN SERVICES FOR ALLIED ASW EXERCISES, WHEN SUBMARINES ARE AVAILABLE. THIS WOULD BE A STRONG INDUCEMENT TO ALLIED ASW PARTICIPATION. TO SPREAD THE SERVICES BURDEN, 594 AND LATER CLASS SUBMARINES SHOULD BE USED. APPROPRIATE NOISE DEVICES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR THESE SUBMARINES, BOTH TO MASK THEIR SIGNATURES AND TO SIMULATE SOVIET SSNS. ROYAL NAVY SSNS SHOULD ALSO BE CALLED ON TO SHARE THE BURDEN OF SUBMARINE EXERCISE SERVICES.

MULTINATIONAL ASW ARRANGEMENTS

EXPAND PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS

ESTABLISH COMBINED STAFFS

COMMAND AND REPLENISHMENT

PROVIDE SSN SERVICES

SLIDE 23

NINTH RECOMMENDATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MULTINATIONAL ON-CALL ASW CONTINGENCY FORCES IS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS WHICH BEGINS WITH MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE FORCES. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, SUCH EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN. THEY SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS.

THESE ON-CALL CONTINGENCY FORCES CAN LOGICALLY EVOLVE INTO "STANDING NAVAL FORCES", WHERE NEEDED, WHERE FEASIBLE, AND WHERE DESIRED BY THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

Cabinet  
with  
memo  
page



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SLIDE 24

THE NATO, STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC COULD BE THE  
PROTOTYPE FOR SUCH FORCES. - SLIDE - IT HAS BEEN OPERATING  
SUCCESSFULLY FOR ~~THREE AND ONE HALF~~ <sup>about four</sup> YEARS - SLIDE - WITH

<sup>5</sup> TO 7 NATIONS PARTICIPATING <sup>on a continuity basis, you would.</sup>

<sup>Mr. Kistner</sup> ADMIRAL THIS COMPLETES THE STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS, YOU  
PROBABLY NOTED THEY FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES.

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SLIDE 2d

MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED USING EXISTING FORCES, AND INVOLVE ONLY MODEST EXPENDITURES OF RESOURCES. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS LARGELY CONCERN INCREASED MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION, ORGANIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES, AND TRANSFER OF

EXCESS U.S. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

*(on-call and standby)*  
*Intensifying the 17th Flotilla (Atlantic Ocean) could expand this capability without additional*

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS, HOWEVER, WILL REQUIRE TIME AND SUBSTANTIAL EXPENDITURES. THESE CONCERN DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EQUIPMENT, SENSORS

AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS EXPANSION OF SMALLER ALLIED NAVIES IN THE

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND EXPANSION OF OVERALL ALLIED SURVEILLANCE

CAPABILITIES. *are the goal.* THIS WILL REQUIRE A MUCH GREATER U.S. MAP EFFORT. THE

STUDY ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT JAPAN AND GERMANY BE CALLED ON TO SUPPORT ~~SIGNIFICANT~~ *new major*

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS *to equip allies with in turn received*

*noted they originate from LOCs.*

THE PLAN PRESENTED IS DESIGNED TO PERMIT PROGRESS AT ANY LEVEL OF FUNDING. THE FIRST CATEGORY OF RECOMMENDATIONS WILL NOT COST A LOT OF MONEY AND CAN BE IMPLEMENTED NOW.



## (PART IV)

SLIDE 22STUDY  
outline

~~FINALLY THE STUDY ADDRESSES PRESENTATION (OF THE PLAN)~~ ~~IMPLEMENTATION~~ WILL REQUIRE:

FIRST, GAINING SUPPORT WITHIN THE U.S. - *both in Defense and State,*

SECOND, ACHIEVING ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE ON THE PART OF  
*Top leadership?* THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND *To expand their view (AS W) capabilities*

THIRD, DETERMINATION OF SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON STEPS TO BE  
*generally* TAKEN ON A REGIONAL BASIS, ONCE A FAVORABLE FOREIGN RESPONSE  
 IS ASSURED.

*then the Japanese Supreme Allied*  
*as the top command and*  
*the*

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SLIDE 23

TO CONVINCE THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF THE NEED FOR A GREATER  
ASW EFFORT WE MUST BE SURE OF SUPPORT FROM THEIR NAVAL LEADERS.  
AN INTERNATIONAL SEA POWER SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED AT THE NAVAL  
WAR COLLEGE IN 1969, AND ILLUSTRATED ON THIS SLIDE, HELPED  
ACHIEVE A WIDE CONSENSUS ON THIS AMONG NAVAL LEADERS OF THE  
38 FREE WORLD COUNTRIES REPRESENTED. A SECOND SYMPOSIUM IS  
SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER, WITH OVER FORTY FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
INVITED. THIS SYMPOSIUM SHOULD BE USED TO TEST THE PLAN AND ENLIST  
THE SUPPORT OF NAVAL LEADERS IN MOVING TOWARD ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

ABOVE ALL, THE SEAPOWERS SYMPOSIUM WILL PROVIDE THE TYPE OF NAVY TO  
NAVY FOUNDATION WITHOUT WHICH THE PLAN CANNOT SUCCEED AND WITH  
WHICH IT COULD PROVE TO BE A MOST VIABLE RESPONSE TO THE MUTUAL  
MARITIME PROBLEMS FACING THE MANY NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD.

*Naval study*

*Exdun  
way to  
GAP  
test the  
study*

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THE REAL TARGETS OF OUR PROPOSALS, HOWEVER, MUST BE THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES SINCE THEY ALONE HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE NECESSARY RESOURCES.

① IF FOREIGN NAVAL LEADERS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR PROPOSALS, THEY WILL BE MORE WILLING AND ABLE TO PERSUADE THEIR GOVERNMENT LEADERS, AS WELL AS TO ADVISE US ON THE BEST METHOD OF APPROACHING THESE LEADERS. *Supporting position*

TO GAIN POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE FOR MULTINATIONAL ASW REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH AND IN SUPPORT OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR NEW FORMAL TREATY ARRANGEMENTS. *re-emphasize*

*McCarmona*  
NATIONAL

*action*

*the CNR with pos. of increased*

*MAP - Allocation in rec. shift in balance threat. ~~Major~~ ~~Artificial~~ doing STATE/Dep pitch to Congress.*

THE SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON STEPS WILL VARY ACCORDING TO REGION, BECAUSE OF DIFFERING POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

POLITICO-MILITARY BRIEFINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS <sup>And as NATO</sup> WHERE THEY EXIST, <sup>where not,</sup> AND IN VARIOUS NATIONAL CAPITALS BY A BRIEFING TEAM OF NAVY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEADED BY AN AMBASSADOR OR EQUIVALENT. ~~in the future~~ UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND U.S. AMBASSADORS <sup>A</sup> WOULD PLAY APPROPRIATE ROLES IN THE PRESENTATIONS <sup>S</sup> IN THEIR AREAS DEPENDING ON THE COUNTRY OR REGION. ~~THE BRIEFING TEAM NEED NOT BE ALL U.S. PERSONNEL.~~

<sup>broader</sup> PROPOSALS MADE SHOULD STRESS COMMON ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET ~~SEAMARINE~~ <sup>Naval</sup> THREAT, AND SHOULD BE TAILORED TO SPECIFIC REGIONAL FACTORS, INCLUDING ~~LOCAL~~ <sup>local</sup> CAPABILITIES, LOCAL PROBLEMS, AND LOCAL POLITICAL REALITIES. ~~THE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY INCLUDE SUCH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.~~

<sup>to the intel</sup>  
<sup>sea LOC</sup>  
<sup>countries</sup>  
<sup>covered</sup>

<sup>high in</sup>  
Detailed plans, based on outline plans in the study, would be developed by <sup>the</sup> NAVY in collaboration with DOD (ISA) and JSTATS.



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SLIDE

27  
MR. SECRETARY,

THESE HAVE BEEN THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEWPORT STUDY. IN  
ESSENCE, THEY ARE PROPOSALS FOR APPLYING THE NIXON DOCTRINE AT  
SEA IN ~~A~~ WORLD WIDE BUT REGIONALLY ORIENTED EFFORTS. MANY  
ALLIED NAVIES NOW HAVE THE ASSETS TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER  
CONTRIBUTION TO OUR OVERALL ASW SEA CONTROL POSTURE. <sup>where we</sup> WE SHOULD  
START IMMEDIATELY <sup>and take this course toward insuring</sup> TO ~~ACHIEVE THIS IMPROVED CAPABILITY.~~

*The protection of our under water sea line of communication.*

*With modest help from us in  
hardware and training their contribution  
could be even more significant.*

*In summary  
slide*

*if time permits  
example of one  
regional area -  
Latin America*

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ADM THOMAS ROSSER CNO

Author: VADM COLBERT

Date of Presentation: 24 Dec 1969

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☒ Maintain Current Classification.

Comments:

☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

☐ Continued classification not required per OPNAVINST 5513.16.

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*Pess*  
SER00104

24 DEC 1969

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Dear Admiral,

Our report on the Seapower Symposium, in the form of a "Summary of Proceedings" brochure, will be forthcoming in January. In advance, I would like to offer this brief report.

By separate correspondence, I have informed Champ Blouin of the strong feelings held by Admiral Charoon, CinC, Royal Thai Navy, on the subject of Soviet and U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific area. I also mentioned Admiral Charoon's desire for an 1800-ton vessel to project the Thai naval presence. Also, I reported on the opinions held by Commodore Jimenez, Dominican Republic Navy, regarding the future of Haiti.

But there are additional subjects which I feel are worthy of report. First, Rear Admiral Skjong, Deputy CinC, Royal Norwegian Navy, and the other Norwegian participant, Commodore Hans Gundersen, showed deep concern for the balance of naval presence in the Norwegian Sea. They stated that there was a real need for a more visible U.S. naval presence in that area to ensure the credibility of support against the Soviet Union. With the progressive buildup of Russian naval operations on a continuing, daily basis in their adjacent waters, there is a "political" need within Norway for a frequent demonstrated counter U.S. presence. In discussing this with Commodore Gundersen, he made the point that we should maximize our port visits to his country when we have units deployed in the area. I have mentioned this to Eph Holmes.

Next, in conversation at the Symposium, Rear Admiral Faria Lima, Vice Chief of the Brazilian Navy, made some comments worthy of note. He expressed concern at the need for his government to procure frigates built in Europe. The Brazilian Navy would much prefer the ships to be built in the United States. They foresee logistics

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and training problems with European-built ships. Their faith rests with U.S. logistics support and training through our missions. Admiral Faria Lima is fearful of the disestablishment of our Naval Mission in Rio de Janeiro. The crux of the matter, as he described it, is the construction loan interest rate. By procurement in Europe, they face a 7½% interest versus a 14% interest on financing in the United States. Thus, the Brazilian Navy cannot justify U.S. construction to their government leadership.

The Brazilian Admiral went on to express high interest in "internationalizing" the planning of UNITAS operations. This would be done on a navy-to-navy basis, possibly with "liaison" officers temporarily (or permanently) assigned to the ComSolant staff in Puerto Rico. These officers could privately be organized as the staff which would plan the annual UNITAS operations. Under this concept, ComSolant would have an extra "international" hat for his conduct of inter-American naval training operations.

A general topic of informal discussion and agreement among the participants was that the U.S. Navy's procurement of bigger, more sophisticated ships at costs which might mitigate against acquisition of sufficient numbers, could run counter to the need to provide a U.S. naval presence in distant places where Russian naval activities are on the increase. Some felt that the role of seapower, as control of the seas in war, is valid, but preoccupation with this objective has led U.S. naval and political leaders to underemphasize the importance of forces to meet the political objectives of seapower in peacetime, in cold war. Commodore Loxton, Royal Australian Navy, stated that "the concentration on seapower per se is already a limiting factor in the provision of a naval presence in distant waters, particularly in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, 'within sight or call' of those whom she (the U.S.) seeks to influence." Another consequence of contemporary developments in the U.S. Navy as they see it, is an ever widening gap between our Navy and other friendly navies, particularly in the development of weapon systems they can use to make their navies viable and credible as a counter to Russian developments.

Commodore Besta, Imperial Ethiopian Navy, and Rear Admirals Rafie and Attaie, Imperial Iranian Navy are concerned over Soviet naval operations in the Red Sea

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and Persian Gulf, respectively. They are interested in combined operations and discussed the idea of UNITAS type operations, possibly with ComMidEastFor. I have written to Ed King about this. They also discussed the possibility of the eventual establishment of a regional, naval Peacekeeping Force with U.S., U.K., and Australian participation. This force could be organized along the lines of Standing Naval Force Atlantic as a counter to the Soviet naval activity in the area. Their ideas reinforced a general consensus of the participants who had high interest in the concept of regional, multinational naval operations.

Finally, there was also strong consensus among the participants that there should be another Symposium in about two or three years. They felt that, for any future symposia, their governments would be willing to pay for the participants' transportation. While the possibilities of holding such future symposia in other countries was discussed, the general thrust was that the U.S. Naval War College was the most politically feasible locale, in view of country representation which is tied to the Naval Command Course. There was also the feeling that regional symposia should be held in the interim between major symposia. In this regard, Admiral Uchida has written me, and I believe you, about Japan hosting an Asian regional symposium. The letters which are flowing in from Symposium participants continue to reflect this high interest in future symposia. I would hope that I may be given authority to offer the U. S. Naval War College facilities for the periodic "world" meetings as we might move ahead in any such future planning.

In closing, I would note that I am forwarding to Champ Blouin copies of the rough committee records for his private review. They are quite revealing in some areas. We do not plan to duplicate these records, since they attribute remarks and thoughts to specific participants. They are therefore sensitive and must be held closely.

Sincerely,



R. G. COLBERT  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350

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Title of Article: ASW Briefing Intro Remarks

Author: VAN COLBERT

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
VADM COLBERT

IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST, ADMIRAL, MY STAFF AND I WITH THE COOPERATION AND FULL SUPPORT OF THE FLEET COMMANDERS, HAVE DEVELOPED A PLAN DESIGNED TO PERSUADE SELECTED ALLIES TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR ASW CAPABILITIES.

THE PLAN WE WILL PRESENT GOES BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE GOAL OF IDENTIFYING SUCH COUNTRIES AND PROPOSING ACTIONS NECESSARY TO PERSUADE THEM TO GREATER EFFORTS IN THE ASW FIELD. IT ALSO VERY IMPORTANTLY EXAMINES, ON A REGIONAL BASIS, CURRENT MULTINATIONAL ASW ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE EXPANDED OR NEW ONES THAT COULD BE INITIATED IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE OVERALL DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF THE FREE WORLD IN THE FACE OF A GROWING SOVIET THREAT.

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BEFORE INTRODUCING MY BRIEFING TEAM, I  
WOULD LIKE TO SET THE STAGE WITH THREE  
PRINCIPAL POINTS:

FIRST - OUR PRESENTATION TODAY IS AN  
OVERVIEW OF A HIGHLY COMPLEX PROBLEM. WE ARE  
PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILED ASPECTS OF THE  
PLAN IF REQUESTED, AND TO ENLARGE ON ANY AREA  
OF INTEREST.

SECOND - THE SUPPORTING STUDY PROVIDES  
WORLDWIDE TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM,  
<sup>UTIL</sup>  
~~EMPHASIZING~~ A REGIONAL ANALYSIS METHOD.  
HOWEVER, IN KEEPING WITH THE EXPRESSED  
EMPHASIS ON EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC IN  
PRESIDENT NIXON'S MORE RECENT FOREIGN POLICY  
<sup>Focus</sup>  
APPROACHES, THIS BRIEFING WILL RELY HEAVILY  
ON DATA AND PROSPECTS RELATED TO THAT AREA.  
WE BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH IS VALID, SINCE  
THE NATO EXPERIENCE HAS PROVIDED INSIGHTS INTO

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION WHICH MUST  
INEVITABLY BE CONSIDERED IN FOSTERING REGIONAL  
GROUPINGS ELSEWHERE.

THIRD - MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE ARE NOT  
DESCRIBING A WAR PLAN FOR ALLIED ANTI-  
SUBMARINE WARFARE. RATHER, WE ARE PROPOSING A  
PLAN FOR A DEFENSIVE, DAY-TO-DAY EFFORT BY FRE  
WORLD NATIONS HAVING A COMMON INTEREST IN  
KEEPING THE PEACE AND MAINTAINING OUR MUTUAL  
SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE ESSENCE OF  
OUR PROPOSALS TODAY WILL REFLECT THE SPIRIT AN  
INTENT OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE U.N. CHARTER  
WHICH AS YOU KNOW PERMITS REGIONAL DEFENSE  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE PLAN IS  
DESIGNED TO BE VIABLE THROUGH A SPECTRUM FROM  
INTERNATIONAL TENSION SITUATIONS, TO LIMITED  
HOSTILITIES, TO FULL WAR AT SEA.



THE STUDY AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS  
PRESENTED IN THE BRIEF ALSO REFLECT, I BELIEVE  
THE THOUGHTS AND IDEAS OF SENIOR OFFICERS  
INCLUDING MANY OF THE CHIEFS OF SOME 38 FREE  
WORLD NAVIES WHO ATTENDED THE INTERNATIONAL  
SEAPOWERS SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE WAR COLLEGE  
IN 1969.

THE BRIEF WILL BE PRESENTED IN THREE PARTS  
FIRST - WE WILL PRESENT SIGNIFICANT  
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE  
IMPORTANT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN. THESE  
WILL BE PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR FREDERICK  
HARTMANN WHO OCCUPIES THE ALFRED THAYER MAHAN  
CHAIR OF MARITIME STRATEGY AT THE WAR COLLEGE.

SECOND - WE WILL PRESENT TWO DOMINANT  
INTERNAL ISSUES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.  
WE WILL THEN BRIEFLY DEFINE OUR ANALYSIS OF  
THE THREAT COMMON TO US AND OUR ALLIES. WE

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CONSIDER THAT ONLY A FULL RECOGNITION OF THIS  
COMMON THREAT WILL MOTIVATE OUR ALLIES TO DO  
MORE.

THIRD - WE WILL PRESENT SPECIFIC MAJOR  
RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM OUR ANALYSIS.  
TAKEN IN TOTAL, THESE AND OTHER RECOMMENDATION  
DEVELOPED IN THE STUDY, CONSTITUTE THE  
PROPOSED PLAN.

BRIEFING OFFICERS FOR PARTS TWO AND THREE  
WILL BE LCDR STECKLER AND LCDR TOLLE,  
STUDENTS OF OUR NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE  
AND MEMBERS WITH PROFESSOR HARTMANN OF OUR  
STUDY GROUP.

I NOW PRESENT PROFESSOR HARTMANN.



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☐ Maintain Current Classification.

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☐ Article is greater than 30 years old.

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☐ Other:

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

VADM COLBERT

THE BRIEF YOU HAVE JUST HEARD OUTLINES A PLAN WHICH, WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, IS-- WE BELIEVE--A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE WORLDWIDE ASW PROBLEM. IF IMPLEMENTED, IT CLEARLY WOULD ENHANCE THE FREE WORLD DEFENSE POSTURE AGAINST THE BURGEONING SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS THREAT A CONVINCING CASE CAN BE MADE TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES THAT IT WOULD BE IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST, NOT ONLY TO INCREASE THEIR ASW CAPABILITIES, BUT ALS TO ASSIGN THEIR FORCES TO MULTINATIONAL REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS ON A DAY- TO-DAY OR "CALL-UP" BASIS.

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TO SUPPLEMENT THE BROAD APPROACH THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED IN THE BRIEFING-- FOR THE FIVE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS ADDRESSED--THERE IS A HANDOUT WHICH PROPOSES OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR SELLING THE ASW IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM TO VARIOUS NATIONS WORLDWIDE. BEFORE FINALIZING ANY SUCH PLANS, HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST, OF COURSE, BE GIVEN TO THE VIEWS OF THE FLEET COMMANDERS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT OUR ALLIED NAVIES IN MANY, IF NOT ALL, CASES HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO OUR OVERALL ASW POSTURE. HOWEVER, AS WAS BROUGHT OUT



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AT OUR SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM, CERTAIN  
NAVIES HAVE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY,  
THE MANPOWER, THE ENTHUSIASM, AND THE  
WILLINGNESS. BUT THEY LACK THE HARDWARE-  
THE SHIPS/AIRCRAFT/SENSORS/AND OTHER  
NEEDED WEAPONS. THIS IS WHERE A  
CONCERTED STATE/DEFENSE REORIENTATION  
OF CONGRESS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS  
URGENTLY NEEDED. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT  
OF THE NEWLY PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS ESSENTIAL.  
THE NIXON DOCTRINE CANNOT "SAIL"  
WITHOUT THE MATERIAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
CALLED FOR BY THIS NEW PROGRAM.

~~FINALLY~~, WHILE INDIVIDUALLY THE  
ASW RESOURCES OF MANY NATIONS MAY APPEAR  
MODEST, THE SYNERGISTIC EFFECT OF

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COMBINING THOSE ASSETS IN DAY-TO-DAY/  
REGIONALLY COORDINATED DEFENSE ARRANGE-  
MENTS IS MOST SIGNIFICANT. FOR EXAMPLE,  
AS THE STUDY BRINGS OUT, TODAY OUR  
ALLIES POSSESS 89 FIRST LINE ESCORTS  
WITH SQS-23 OR BETTER SONARS. THEY  
HAVE 119 ESCORTS WITH SQS-29 EQUIVALENT  
SONARS AND 352 OLDER ESCORTS WITH  
LIMITED ASW CAPABILITIES. ADDED TO  
THIS ARE SOME 350 MARITIME PATROL  
AIRCRAFT, WITH VARIED SURVEILLANCE/  
ATTACK CAPABILITIES.

FINALLY, AGAIN I WOULD EMPHASIZE  
THAT I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE THINKING  
OF MANY SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS OF FREE  
WORLD NATIONS HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN  
THIS STUDY. I PROPOSE THAT THE NEXT

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WAR COLLEGE SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM, PLANNED FOR NOVEMBER 1971, FOCUS ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN IMPROVING MULTINATIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION AND IN IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS STUDY. THIS COULD THEN GIVE US A MEASURE OF THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS, AND PROVIDE A FORUM FOR AIRING ANY ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS WHICH COULD HELP US IN REACHING OUR GOAL.

OUR PRESENTATION TODAY HAS BEEN AN OVERVIEW OF A HIGHLY COMPLEX PROBLEM. WE ARE <sup>NOW</sup>~~ARE~~ PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILED ASPECTS OF THE PLAN AND TO ENLARGE ON ANY AREA OF PARTICULAR INTEREST.

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